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City Limits: A Psychoanalysis of Urbanism and Everyday Life

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree in Doctor of Philosophy

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Abstract

This dissertation begins with Lefebvre's theoretical framework that space is a social product and provides a brief account of the plans and road networks established with John Graves Simcoe's founding of York (now Toronto). Foucault's arguments about gridded street systems and early forms of policing are then introduced to explain the intentions and desires associated with the gridded street pattern of Toronto. Foucault's theory of governmentality is argued to be the marking of a limit rather than a strict prohibition, and is a specifically urban practice. Lacan's graph of desire and Lacanian concepts such as jouissance, enjoyment, transference, and love are then introduced to continue this discussion of the problem of limits in contemporary urban everyday life. The overriding questions addressed here are, "What do we desire from the city?" and, "What do we think the city wants from us?" The historical formation of cities and the central writers and movements in urban planning are then interpreted through Lacan's 'four discourses.' Generally, early 'organic' urban spaces are understood through the master's discourse, Frederick Law Olmsted, Ebenezer Howard, and Le Corbusier represent the shift to the university's discourse, while Jane Jacobs is presented as within the analyst's discourse. The reading of Jacobs also shows her to be primarily concerned with the economic aspects of cities. A deeper analysis of Lefebvre's theories, along with Manuel Castells' theory of the 'space of flows' and 'timeless time,' are then used to tie together the problem of desire and spatial arrangement through a discussion of the implications of mobile communication, 'Big Data,' and the 'internet of things' on urban life with theoretical support from Simmel.

Keywords

Urbanism; cities; psychoanalysis; Lacan, Jacques; Foucault, Michel; Jacobs, Jane; Castells, Manuel; grids; everyday life; mobile communication; Toronto; political theory.

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INTRODUCTION

The last ten or fifteen years have seen an increasing rise of interest in cities. Throughout this period, nearly every publication on cities begins with the statistic that the majority of the world's populations now live in urban areas, and that this trend is expected to continue. In 2000, Manuel Castells suggested there have only been two stages of urban sociology, three if you count the latest: "a deep silence."[1] The first wave of the Chicago School (Robert Park, Louis Wirth, and others) employed an early version of what is now known as 'quantitative' analysis to understand and support social 'integration' within cities.[2] In the 1960s and 70s, a new framework of 'conflict' was introduced to understand the competing interests of various groups within cities.[3] This new 'school' of thought was not particularly unified, but from their shared Marxist perspective, two main themes arose: the right to the city[4] and the production of space.[5] Since then, Castells insists that urban sociology has only been a rehashing of these old debates and largely silent on new forms of urban life.[6] However, cities themselves have grown and become more complex, and it has been other disciplines and interests that have taken the city as an object of study. Beyond the Marxist 'everyday life' tradition, one is more likely to find accounts of urban life by those who study

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[1] Manuel Castells, "Conclusion" in *The Castells Reader on Cities and Social Theory*, ed. Ida Susser (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2002), 393.

[2] Notable publications include: Robert E. Park, "The City: Suggestions for the Investigation of Behavior in the City Environment," *American Journal of Sociology* 20 (1915): 579–83; Robert E. Park, Ernest Burgess, Roderick McKenzie, *The City* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1925); Louis Wirth, "Urbanism as a Way of Life: The City and Contemporary Civilization," *American Journal of Sociology* 44 (1938): 1–24.

[3] These thinkers are well-documented in Andy Merrifield, *Metromarxism: A Marxist Tale of the City* (New York: Routledge, 2002).

[4] Henri Lefebvre, *Le droit à la ville* (Paris: Anthropos, 1968). English translation: Henri Lefebvre, "The Right to the City" in *Writings on Cities*, ed. and trans. Eleonore Kofman and Elizabeth Lebas (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), 147–159. This work has been taken up by David Harvey. See David Harvey, "The Right to the City," *New Left Review* 53 (Sept–Oct 2008): 23–40.

[5] Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, trans. Donald Nicholson Smith (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991).

[6] Castells, "Conclusion," 393.

contemporary culture (much of which is within the Marxist, 'conflict' tradition),[7] contemporary economy (such as Castells, Edward Glaeser,[8] and Richard Florida,[9]), or in the eviscerations of American suburbia.[10] Though more than half the population lives in urban areas, for the most part, cities are not currently considered an important object of analysis in academia.[11] While urban sociology is no longer suffering the "deep silence" that Castells diagnoses, but is still largely quiet, much of the contemporary discourse around cities is largely defined by those seeking to 'boost the local economy' or 'attract talent.' This dissertation seeks to be another voice out of this "deep silence" with a critique the economic discourse, an interrogation of the traditional history of urbanism, and provide an alternative methodology to theorize everyday urban life.

Coincidentally, also during this period in which Castells argues there was a "deep silence" in urban sociology, multiple disciplines have endured a rising interest in (and perhaps an annoyance with) Lacanian psychoanalysis. Since 1990, much of this is due to Slavoj Žižek's work, which presents arguments and

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[7] For example: Henri Lefebvre, *The Critique of Everyday Life* (3 vols.), trans. John Moore and Gregory Elliot (London: Verso, 2008); Henri Lefebvre *Everyday Life in the Modern World*, trans. Sacha Rabinovitch (London: Transaction, 1984); Michel de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, trans. Steven Rendell (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).

[8] Edward Glaeser, *Triumph of the City: How Our Greatest Invention Makes Us Richer, Smarter, Greener, Healthier, and Happier* (New York: Penguin Press, 2011).

[9] Richard Florida, *The Rise of the Creative Class: And How It's Transforming Work, Leisure, Community, and Everyday Life* (New York: Basic Books, 2002).

[10] By far, the most influential of these is James Howard Kunstler, *The Geography of Nowhere: The Rise and Decline of America's Man-Made Landscape* (New York: Touchstone, 1993). For similarly themed books on Toronto, see: John Sewell, *The Shape of the City: Toronto Struggles with Modern Planning* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993); John Sewell, *The Shape of the Suburbs: Understanding Toronto's Sprawl* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009); and Lawrence Solomon, *Toronto Sprawls: A History* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007).

[11] I realize this is a contentious claim and it may have been more true at the end of the twentieth century than now, which speaks to my opening argument about the increasing interest in cities. However, consider that few, if any Political Science or Sociology undergraduate student is required to take a course on cities. Canadian Political Science students are required to take at least one course on Federal politics, and usually one on international relations – but not local governance. Similarly, Sociology departments require students to take a variety of courses, but not on cities even though they are the primary location of social relations. My point, and what should be a concern, is that the discourse around cities has become largely dominated by economists often 'selling' their prescriptions to, for example, local governments and Business Improvement Areas.

assertions that are, at first, counter-intuitive but linger with the reader, confronting him or her with the possibility that he or she has had it all wrong. Lacanian analysis is not without its detractors, and nor is it exempt from critique. To accept insights from Lacanian psychoanalysis is to accept the existence of the unconscious, which is an 'object' that cannot be measured, counted, or quantified. And, even if one does accept the existence of the unconscious, Lacanian analysis structures and defines its functions differently from other, more traditional psychoanalytic and psychology frameworks. While Lacanian psychoanalysis is, of course, concerned with individual subjects, it does not seek to 'develop the ego,' but rather to demonstrate how the subject is a 'barred subject' – always-already alienated from itself. Further, and this will become clear why this important by the end of this dissertation, Lacanian psychoanalysis does not seek to 'cure' the subject, but rather find ways to allow the subject to 'traverse the fantasy' and even 'enjoy' their symptoms.

Adding to the confusion and frustration with Lacanian psychoanalysis is the way in which Lacan presented his work. Lacan never wrote a 'book' in which he sought to clearly explain his ideas and theories. There is a collection of essays, published as *Écrits*, but these do little to satisfy the seemingly reasonable question, "What is Lacan arguing?" Lacan's work comes to us primarily through a series of 'seminars,' which are in fact transcriptions of courses he taught from 1953–1980, and not all of these have been published. Throughout these seminars, we do find some of his main concepts and arguments clearly articulated, but we also find an unrelenting series of puns, jokes, asides, and provocations. After reading some of his work – how much depends on the particular reader – one should inevitably encounter this frustration with his apparent lack of clarity as one's problem, not Lacan's. From where does this demand for 'clarity' come? Much like the analyst-analysand relationship, it is not up to the analyst (Lacan) to provide all the answers. It is the analysand (the reader) who, through transference, insists the analyst is the 'subject supposed to know.'

In Žižek's various applications of Lacanian theory we, again, find concepts deployed to understand a wide range of issues and objects and, depending on the issue or the object, come to have different meanings. Thus, in this dissertation, I take care to explain my interpretations of Lacanian concepts and themes. It is my hope that a reader unfamiliar with Lacanian theory will perhaps learn something about Lacan and, more importantly, understand my Lacanian-infused arguments. As well, I hope that readers familiar with Lacan's work will find something of value in my interpretations and applications of his concepts and theories.

Michael Gunder and Jean Hillier are two urban planners who have taken up Lacan's work to theorize the contemporary profession of urban planning. Gunder and Hillier have published a series of articles beginning in 2003[12] and more recently a book in 2009.[13] Gunder and Hillier focus on contemporary planning as a profession and the relationships between the planner, the space of the plan, and the 'stakeholders' (i.e. affected residents and businesses).[14] While their articles and the book are interesting and ought to be required reading for contemporary planning professionals, there is little overlap between their work and what is presented here. They focus on the current profession of urban planning and urban policy makers whereas this dissertation takes up Lacan's work to theorize central historical movements that sought to solve the problem of the urban, as well as the social and political relations between contemporary urban dwellers, and their interactions with the built environment – planned or not.

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[12] Michael Gunder, "Planning Policy Formation from a Lacanian Perspective," *International Planning Studies* 8, no. 4 (Nov 2003): 279–294.

[13] Michael Gunder and Jean Hillier, *Planning in Ten Words or Less: A Lacanian Entanglement with Spatial Planning* (Surrey, England: Ashgate, 2009). Much of this book is drawn from their previously published work, as noted in the book's "Acknowledgements," which lists twenty articles and book chapters the authors had previously published.

[14] For example: Michael Gunder, "Lacan, Planning and Urban Policy Formation," *Urban Policy Research* 23, no. 1 (March 2005): 87–107; Michael Gunder, "Shaping the Planner's Ego-Ideal: A Lacanian Interpretation of Planning Education," *Journal of Planning Education and Research* 23: 299–311; Jean Hillier and Michael Gunder, "Not Over Your Dead Bodies! A Lacanian Interpretation of Urban Planning Discourse and Practice," *Environment and Planning A* 37 (2005): 1049–1066.

Furthermore, Gunder and Hillier are writing for professional urban planners and policy makers, not theorists or academics, and thus present a rather scaled-down, digestible interpretation of Lacan's work. This is *not* to say their interpretation of Lacan is incorrect or too simplified, but rather that they have a different focus and a different imagined reader than I. For example, their book *Planning in Ten Words or Less* takes up Lacan's and Jacques Derrida's theory of language to argue that the central terms of contemporary urban planning (such as sustainability, Smart Growth, risk, rationality, and planning) are "empty signifiers,"[15] whereas this dissertation makes only a few references to theories of language.

This dissertation seeks to demonstrate how cities and urban space become invested with the the Lacanian notion of the Other's desire. That is, the thoughts, plans, and behaviours of urbanists, urban planners, and urban dwellers often take the city as an object that has its own desires and lacks. In other words, we ask "What does the city want?" and "What does the city want from us?"[16] In many of Lacan's writings and seminars, he uses the concept of the 'Other' (either A or $\mathbb{A}$) to indicate not simply another subject but a familial, juridical, mythical, or religious order. In Žižek's Lacanian theory, we are also presented with 'the Big Other,' a 'transcendental' and unknown force that appears to structure and control the coordinates of a subject's 'reality' (the Symbolic).[17] Thus, I argue 'the city' is frequently and continually taken as the Other – a particular physical and social structure with what appear to be its own demands and desires. Taking the city as the Other's desire is not in any way a normative prescription, nor a

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[15] Gunder and Hillier, *Planning in Ten Words or Less*. The argument and structure of the book is clearly outlined on pages 1 and 2.

[16] These questions are inspired by Lacan's "*Chè vuoi*?" (What do *you* want?) which will be discussed fully in Chapter 2. See: Jacques Lacan, "The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire in the Freudian Unconscious," in *Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English*, trans. Bruce Fink (New York: W.W. Norton, 2005).

[17] 'The Big Other' is the phase Žižek uses to distinguish Lacan's 'Other' from 'the little other' (*objet a*). The Big Other often surfaces in everyday discourse as 'they,' as in, "Well, you know what they say…" or, "They just do this so we have to pay more…" It should be clear that the Other gains this status only because the subject or subjects invest it with this status, and so Žižek repeatedly states there really is no Big Other.

'problem' that needs to be 'solved,' but rather a diagnosis that this dissertation will make clear. And I should be clear that I am not arguing that all discussions of cities or urban planning must take this, or any, Lacanian methodology.

This dissertation takes an interdisciplinary approach to discuss this theme of the city as the Other's desire. Thus, this work is more of a bricolage than the presentation of a central thesis with a series of supporting arguments.[18] However, that we take the city as the Other's desire is, in fact, an argument and the reader will find a whole series of sub-arguments and interpretations throughout this work, which I will now outline.

Chapter 1 introduces Toronto as the primary city of analysis in this dissertation by problematizing what we mean by 'Toronto.' The focus of this chapter is the grid – the common street pattern of many cities, including the one laid out by John Graves Simcoe when he 'founded' York (now Toronto). This basic grid structure remains as the 'backbone' of Toronto: not just as the main circulation routes but what gives Toronto its "texture" and largely underwrites the way in which people give Toronto its "soul" or "personality." [19] While many urban writers recognize the importance of gridded street networks, few provide a theory of the grid or discuss its implications. Michel Foucault, however, provides a thorough and compelling account of gridded street systems of the eighteenth century, the time of York's founding. Foucault makes a strong connection between the practice of urbanizing with the grid network and the role of police. Foucault's theory of grids, urbanization, and policing are presented to support a deeper discussion of how this gridded network relates to governmentality, which I

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[18] I am using the term 'bricolage' as I interpret it from Derrida's discussion of Claude Lévi-Stauss' work: to use, in this case, theories, which "had not been especially conceived with an eye to the operation for which they are to be used … even if their form and their origin are heterogenous." Jacques Derrida, "Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of Human Sciences," in *Writing and Difference*, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978): 285.

[19] Gerald Suttles, "The Cumulative Texture of Local Urban Culture," *American Journal of Sociology* 90 (1984): 283–304. Suttles (and others) use the term "texture" to refer to the "soul" or "personality" of a city or local urban area.

argue is a specifically urban phenomenon. This culminates in a critique of Jacques Rancière's distinction between politics and the 'police order.'

But what is the political? How is it different than social relations? Social and political theorists largely agree that, while governance is part of it, 'the political' extends to other relationships as well. Contemporary political and social thought is largely influenced by Foucault's theories of power which has led many to equate power relations with politics. We are familiar with the various strategies to 'politicize' a variety of established arrangements, which essentially means to point out that 'power relations' are at work. Rancière has published a new theory of the political in which he argues that "politics is not the exercise of power."[20] Rather, he distinguishes much of what we normally understand as 'politics' is part of what he calls the 'police order' (a system of the arrangement and distribution of the sensible where we find power relations).[21] 'Politics' is whatever ruptures the police order. While Rancière's arguments are compelling, he confines politics to unique and rare instances which implies that everyday life (the opposite of unique and rare) is 'non-political.'[22] Further, I argue that whatever ruptures the police order (i.e. politics proper) is 'resolved' by being incorporated into the police order and thus loses its political significance. It appears that Rancière conceives of these ruptures as coming from outside the police order, but I will suggest that these ruptures can and do come from within the police order. Something which we tolerate or accept within the police order (such as poverty or an inequality) can become too much to tolerate and thus erupts from within the police order and exposes its contingency.

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[20] Jacques Rancière, "Ten Theses of Politics" *Theory and Event* 5, no. 3 (2001), Thesis 1.

[21] See: Jacques Rancière, *Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), 28.

[22] I say "unique and rare" here because I interpret this as the central and most compelling aspect of Rancière's theory of the political. His arguments in *Disagreement* clearly seek to wrest the term 'political' from what he finds to be its overuse. My arguments about this and the veiled critique of Foucault will be further developed in chapter 1.

My definition (perhaps a theory) of the political is the judgment and declaration of a limit. In chapter 1, I respond to Foucault's theory of power, previous definitions of the political, including Rancière's, to untangle the politics of everyday urban life. This is only a secondary concern of this dissertation, but throughout a common theme of 'limits' arises. In chapter 1, I argue the production of urban space (be it from plans, actions, or behaviours) are the result of declaring 'too much' or 'too little.' We will see how British colonizers declared a limit to the territory that was, perhaps, named 'tkaronto' by dropping a box on it and naming it York. John Graves Simcoe, who 'founded' York, similarly marked limits on this territory by parcelling the land in a grid. Foucault's theory of urbanization and governmentality accounts for the limit of 'too much' or 'too little' insofar as early practices of urbanization comprised the circulation of people and goods *and* criminals and disease and gave rise to a new form of governance as "the right disposition of things."[23]

As already hinted, chapter 2 takes up Lacanian concepts to demonstrate how we take the city as Other, instilling it with its own desires and lacks. To this end, Lacan's graph of desire, along with his theories of enjoyment, *jouissance*, transference, and love are used to understand a number of different arrangements and behaviours associated with everyday urban life. Much of this chapter is devoted to close reading of Lacan's graph of desire (which is, in fact, four graphs) and the numerous concepts and relations it contains. Of particular importance is the question posed in "graph 3" (Figure 7): "*Chè vuoi*?" ("what do you want?"), which I argue is asked by *both* the city dweller to the city, and by the city itself to the city dweller. Thus, this chapter most clearly examines the central questions of this dissertation: "What does the city want?" and "What does the city want from us?" The answers to these questions, I argue, are bound up with enjoyment, *jouissance*, and, especially, transference. The purpose of this chapter

[23] Michel Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977–1978*, ed. Michel Senellart, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Picador, 2009), 96.

is to contribute to the sociology of everyday urban life from a non-Marxist perspective.

The various 'applications' of Lacan's theories (such as by Gunder, Hillier, and especially Žižek) demonstrate that Lacanian psychoanalysis is essentially a *social* theory. Gunder and Hillier use Lacanian insights to theorize the relationships between planners and between planners and the various "stakeholders." Much of Žižek's use of Lacanian theory is used to explain a wide variety of social and political relationships (from parenting, to popular culture, to war and violence). This is because Lacanian analysis is nothing without the essential relationships between self and others, be it the 'little other' or the 'Big Other.' In other words, the subject in Lacanian analysis is only understood in relation to other people, other people's desires (often literally *as* the other's desire), and within the cultural setting. And these relationships are caught up in various struggles and contestations, which can be understood in the realm of the political.

It is my Freudian[24] and Lacanian[25] inspired argument that we accept the annoyances and like the pleasures of urban life, but we lose our acceptance and favour when it reaches a limit of 'too much.' For example, we like the city for its density and intensity of life but it reaches a limit of 'too much' density and intensity. The Law is often unable to find a balance or compromise and responds to 'too much' of anything with 'none at all.' We also find this response of 'none at all' in short-sighted fantasies of total efficiency, which deny the contingencies and externalities of social and political life.[26]

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[24] Sigmund Freud, "Beyond the Pleasure Principle," in *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XVIII (1920–1922)*, trans. James Strachey (London: Vintage Books, 2001).

[25] Jacques Lacan, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan. Book XX, On Feminine Sexuality: The Limits of Love and Knowledge*, trans. Bruce Fink (New York: W.W. Norton, 1999).

[26] In the conclusion to this dissertation, I will argue that, by taking some liberties with Lacan's notion of the 'symptom,' we can theorize the way in which an urban object or phenomenon shifts from something we enjoy to something we find to be a problem.

Lacan's four discourses are introduced in chapter 3, where I argue that the history of cities and early urban planning can be understood through these discourses. This chapter shows the slow rotation from the master's discourse to the university discourse in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Toronto, along with the parks movement and the Garden City movement. Le Corbusier is then presented as the completion of this rotation to the university discourse, and his overidentification with this discourse unwittingly exposes its failures. I argue that the parks movement, the Garden City movement, and Le Corbusier all begin as a response to the master's discourse from the hysteric's position but then seek to situate themselves in the university discourse. My presentation of these movements and Le Corbusier all seek to remain 'close to the text' and highlight aspects of their ideas and theories that are often overlooked and misrepresented. The theme of 'limit' introduced in chapter 1 reappears in this chapter. We will see how, in response to 'too much' urbanism of the industrial era, early urban planners responded with the parks movement,[27] then the Garden City movement.[28] Le Corbusier responds to his perception of crumbling cities and pushes the limits of urbanism,[29] so that planners and builders of the twentieth century would only take some of his ideas.

The history of urbanism presented here through Lacan's four discourses is a new interpretation of this history.[30] More than simply novel, it also reveals different implications of the various writers and movements, and allows us to see

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[27] Frederick Law Olmsted, "Public Parks and the Enlargement of Towns" (NP: American Social Science Association, 1870). Reprinted in *Early Town Planning: Volume One, Selected Essays*, ed. Richard LeGates and Frederic Stout (New York: Routledge, 1998).

[28] Ebenezer Howard, *To-morrow: A Peaceful Path to Real Reform, Original Edition with Commentary by Peter Hall, Dennis Hardy and Colin Ward* (New York: Routledge, 2003 [1898]).

[29] Le Corbusier, *The Radiant City: Elements of a Doctrine of Urbanism to be Used as the Basis of Our Machine-age Civilization*, trans. Pamela Knight, Eleanor Levieux, and Derek Coltman, (New York: The Orion Press, 1967 [1933]).

[30] Lacan thoroughly discusses the four discourses in Jacques Lacan, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan. Book XVII, The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, trans Russell Grigg (New York: W.W. Norton, 2007).

similarities when none were thought to exist. It also provides a different understanding of why certain movements failed or succeeded.

Lacan's four discourses are the master's, the university, the analyst's, and the hysterics. They are expressed as formulas:

Master's	University	Analyst's	Hysteric's
$\frac{S_1}{\$} \in \frac{S_2}{a}$	$\frac{S_2}{S_1} \in \frac{a}{\$}$	$\frac{a}{S_2} \in \frac{\$}{S_1}$	$\frac{\$}{a} \in \frac{S_1}{S_2}$

In each of the four discourses, the four positions (Agent, Other, Product/loss, and Truth) remain in these locations:

$$\frac{A}{T} \in \frac{O}{P}$$

While these four positions remain in their locations, Lacan identifies these slightly differently in his seminars. These differences, and the discourses themselves, will be explained more fully in chapter 3. The meaning of each of the four concepts that occupy the four positions ($\$$, S_1, S_2, a) change slightly depending on their position and their relation. Generally, though, $\$$ is the barred subject, S_1 is the master signifier, S_2 is another signifier or knowledge, and a is *objet petit a*, the 'little other,' the object-cause of desire. The master's discourse represents the 'nonsensical,' 'because I said so!' power. It interrogates claims to knowledge, though enjoying the products of this knowledge. Since the truth is that master is also a barred subject, the master's power is revealed as a sham. The university discourse is what Lacan argued ruled his time (1950s–70s, roughly). It is a discourse of science, automation, mechanization, and logic. It seeks to rationalize the ambiguities of life and desire. It is a system of knowledge that does not know everything, but claims to have a way or system to 'know' all things. The hysteric's discourse is the one that talks back to the master, demanding the master 'prove' himself. 'Hysteric' in this discourse is not to be interpreted as derogatory or misogynistic in any way. Instead, the agent here is the barred subject (male or female – we are all barred subjects) who is enacting

a type of resistance. The analyst's discourse is the discourse of the clinical analyst-analysand relationship in which the analyst seeks to position him or her self as an object of desire so that transference may take place. The product of this discourse is the symptom (a master signifier) that the analysand 'coughs up' and the truth is knowledge gained through clinical analysis.

This is a very brief account of the four discourses, but they will be explained fully in chapter 3 as I show how these discourses can be applied to the history of cities and urban planning. Generally, the master's discourse is how we may understand ancient cities that grew 'organically,' while modernist urban planning initiates itself from the hysteric's discourse, but ultimately seeks to establish itself within the university discourse.

Chapter 4 sustains the discussion of the four discourses, but with a focus on Jane Jacobs' unique approach to cities. While she also begins from the hysteric's position, and though her critics seek to dismiss her as such, she immediately situates herself in the analyst's discourse and remains there, resisting the urge to fall into the university discourse and the lure of its authority. As in the previous chapter, I present a close reading, this time of Jacobs, which counters many contemporary interpretations of her ideas and arguments. Jacobs will be shown to be correct in her insistence that declaring a limit of 'too little' or 'too much' urbanism is not reconciled by a number, calculation, or ratio but instead is the kernel of urban life.[31] While many take her seminal work, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, as a valourization of human-scaled, livable, walkable urbanism, I argue that the primary concern of this book is the economic aspects of cities.

The final chapter continues to explore the problem of economics to reveal how the contemporary resurgence of cities is largely a result of changing economic tendencies. Henri Lefebvre's Marxist-inflected account of cities and

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[31] Jane Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities* (New York: Vintage Books, 1992 [1961]), 209.

urban space is presented in greater detail than in chapter 1. This provides the context for Castells' economic theory of networks, technology, time, and space. The final section of this chapter takes up what I argue is an important but overlooked influence of the arrangement of cities and urban everyday life: mobile communication technology. We will also see how Castells, despite taking an interest in contemporary economy, networks, and new forms of space and time, ultimately reveals his conservatism in declaring there needs to be a limit to the 'space of flows' that has overwhelmed traditional 'space of places,' and that too much of traditional time has been lost to the compression and desequencing of 'timeless time.' Georg Simmel's theories of urban life and technology are introduced to show how we may negotiate the demands of mobile technology and our own enjoyment of urban space. Like Jacobs, Simmel seeks to find a nebulous balance between opposite extremes of complete indifference and indiscriminate suggestibility in urban space,[32] and of objective technology and subjectivity,[33] which I use to discuss contemporary mobile communication technologies.

The conclusion to this dissertation extends my discussion of limits to present a theoretical framework which takes the city as symptom. I argue the symptoms of the city are the things we enjoy about urban life: the complexities, messiness, flaws, and contingencies. But these objects and relations can become a problem when we have judged and declared a limit. High density is the obvious example: the large number of people living in a city is what allows for the myriad of enjoyments of urban life, but at various times we declare a limit and judge there to be 'too many' people. I also argue that we must follow the spirit of Jacobs and be suspicious of any plans or codes that promise make these symptoms disappear or promise to make this judgment for us by determining

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[32] Georg Simmel, "The Metropolis and Mental Life," in *Simmel on Culture: Selected Writings*, ed. David Frisby and Mike Featherstone (London: Sage, 1997), 174–185.

[33] Georg Simmel, *The Philosophy of Money*, 3rd Edition, ed. David Frisby, trans. Tom Bottomore and David Frisby (London: Routledge, 2005). The final chapter of this book is where Simmel discusses technology.

before the fact a clear distinction between objects of enjoyment and objects of frustration. While many have sought it, from Le Corbusier's modernist principles to New Urbanism's 'Smart Code,' there is no code, formula, ratio, or calculation to determine in advance the limit between enjoyment and problem. Instead, I argue that we need to make this judgement ourselves, either individually or collectively. While this will, as Jacobs says, "depend on our wits,"[34] taking the city as symptom would ensure we do not take objects of enjoyment as problems from the start. This would allow us to enjoy the city while maintaining a fidelity to our desires rather than the superego's cruel imperative, "Enjoy!"

There are many theories, movements, and writers are reader might expect to be discussed in this dissertation but are not addressed. Perhaps most conspicuous in his absence is Lewis Mumford.[35] His historical account of cities is much more detailed than what I present here, but mine is informed by with a different theoretical framework with a different purpose. His preferred form of cities, however, is well represented in my detailed discussion of Ebenezer Howard's Garden Cities. Though the reader will find a few references to David Harvey's work, there are no other references to the work grouped under the umbrella of 'postmodern cities.' While connections could be made between my arguments about 'messy urbanism' and 'bottom-up' instead of 'top-down' urban planning or the arguments found in central 'postmodern cities' writers,[36] I have not articulated these connections for a few reasons. Mainly, the 'postmodern cities' field deeply saturated and so a fair discussion of the various works and themes would take considerable space and distract from the arguments and theories I present. There is also a deep divide between the central theorist of this dissertation, Lacan, and the defining features of postmodern thought – the

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[34] *City Limits*, DVD, directed by Laurence Hyde (Toronto: National Film Board, 1971).

[35] Lewis Mumford, *The City in History: Its Origins, Its Transformations, and Its Prospects* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1961); Lewis Mumford, *The Culture of Cities* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1938).

[36] For example, Michael Dear, Steven Flusty, Allan Irving, Edward Soja, and Mike Davis.

"incredulity toward metanarratives" and a suspicion of structure.[37] Further, while there is a clear connection between Jane Jacobs' arguments and some of what falls within 'postmodern cities,' I am seeking to 'redeem,' if not provide an original interpretation of her work through Lacanian psychoanalysis and I do not wish there to be any confusion or easily drawn parallels between her work and postmodernism. With my focus on space and movement, one might expect to find the theories of Gilles Deleuze and/or Felix Guattari.[38] While their theories are useful, especially to understand Jane Jacobs' epistemological position,[39] I leave it up to others to theorize the urban with their approaches and concepts – a project I believe would be worthwhile and interesting.[40] As well, there are a host of everyday life thinkers not accounted for, but this is because I am seeking to provide an original contribution to everyday life theory that is not within earlier, usually Marxist, traditions.

Throughout this dissertation are the themes of space and movement. Arrangements of space for movement (circulation) are presented early, while later chapters discuss new arrangements of space and time implicated by mobility. Mobile connectivity participates in a new form of 'de-locating,' which appears to defeat both time and space. However, time and space are not

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[37] Jean-François Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*, trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), xxiv. While it is up for debate as to whether Lacan is presenting a 'metanarrative' (many attribute Lacan with 'deuniversalizing' Freud's theories), there is no doubt that Lacan provides a structural analysis of the unconscious and social relations – this will be abundantly clear in chapters 2 and 3.

[38] Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987).

[39] See the final chapter of Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, particularly where she argues that to understand cities we must think like a city.

[40] There are a few central reasons why Deleuze's and/or Guattari's theories are incommensurable with this project. One is that I am deploying Lacanian psychoanalysis as a methodology to theorize the urban, whereas they take a decidedly anti-psychoanalytic approach. See: Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983). Further, their concept of 'mechanistic desire' is a desire without a subject that does not allow for a number of theoretical moves I make here, including taking a city's 'texture' as the unconscious. Lacan's theory of desire, with its related concepts, allows me to take up the city as the Other and the Other's desire. Finally, my position is that this 'mechanistic desire' is an attempt to avoid the problems of human desire, not a resolution – but this is up for debate.

'defeated' but have become rearticulated and experienced in different ways with simultaneous 'nows' and a blurring of 'heres' and 'theres.' While many of the theorists and urbanists presented here take space as a direct object of analysis, it should also be noted that Lacan is himself a spatial thinker. Many of his concepts and relations are presented as spatial arrangements, such as in the graph of desire and the rotations of the four discourses.

Finally, I would like to address the meanings of the two central terms of this dissertation: 'city' and 'urban.' 'City' is derived from the Latin *cīvitās* and concretely means "the body of citizens, the community."[41] While more will be said about this term in chapters 1 and 2, it should be noted here that the connection between 'citizen' and 'city' has largely been lost in contemporary usage. Citizenship is now under the purview of the state, not the city, and 'city' refers a governing body and concerns all residents, not just citizens.[42]

The Latin form *urbs* came into use after *cīvitās* and refers instead to the specific site occupied by a community, distinct from *rus* (rural).[43] While it referred to the site of a city, it signified the behaviour or style of those in the city: civilized, refined, and even "being free of embarrassment."[44] The root *urbs* has largely survived through the term 'urbane' (from the French *urbain*) with the similar meaning of refined behaviour that derived from life in towns. Not until, or just prior to, industrialization was the term 'urban' used more widely to signify a

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[41] Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. 'city.' Ancient Greece used the term πόλις (polis), which is the same root as 'politics.'

[42] While there were *cīvitātes* in Britain during Roman times, the Angles and the Saxons applied the term *burh* (borough) to all towns and cities. *Burh* is derived from the German *burg* and originally meant a fortress or castle, the owners of which were burghers, from where we now have the term 'bourgeois.' 'Borough' is still used in North America, with the obvious of example of the 'five boroughs' in New York City which are each somewhat separate administrative units. And *burgh* is still found in the names of many US cities such as Pittsburgh and Gettysburg. In Canada we find 'borough' in the names of cities like Peterborough and the former city of Scarborough, now part of Toronto.

[43] Witold Rybczynski, *City Life: Urban Expectations in a New World* (Toronto: HarperPerennial, 1996), 37.

[44] Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. 'urban.'

section within the larger city.[45] And this is generally how these terms are used and understood here: 'city' refers to the entire administrative area, whereas 'urban' indicates the denser parts of the city (usually the 'downtown')[46] and the behaviours, attitudes, and 'style' associated with it.

However, much of this dissertation is concerned with interrogating these terms. In chapter 1, we will see how Foucault finds a symmetry between the eighteenth century practices of 'policing' and 'urbanizing,' so that 'urban' comes to be understood as tactic, not a descriptor. Further, Foucault's theory of governmentality is predicated on the shift of governance from that of a territory to that of the people ('population'). This does not dispense with the notion of 'territory' but rather recasts it so that instead of taking 'city' as the people and 'urban' as the location, each has specific meanings of both its subjects and the territory. In chapter 2, I will argue that attempts at precise definitions of either 'city' or 'urban' necessarily fail to capture their full meanings because they are bound up with our fantasies and the Other's desire. Chapters 3 and 4 will take up the history of 'the city' with Lacan's four discourses so that 'city,' its inhabitants, planners, and urbanists come to occupy various roles and relations within these discourses. Chapter 5 positions the city within Castells' theory of the 'space of flows' and 'timeless time' as well as demonstrate the influence of mobile communication technology on changing notions of the city and urban space. Ultimately, rather than clarify or narrow down definitions of 'city' and 'urban,' this

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[45] Both the US and Canadian census define an "urban area" as having at least 1000 people and 400 people per square kilometre (or 1000 per square mile).

[46] 'Downtown' is used nearly exclusively in North America and, surprisingly, came into use *after* the term 'uptown.' See: Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. 'downtown' and 'uptown.' 'Town' is derived from the Old English word *tūn* which originally meant a fenced in enclosure and then came to signify large or small walled-in settlements. Contemporary North American usage takes 'town' to refer a settlement where the people have close emotional and identifying ties to the countryside, whereas 'city' refers to larger settlements that are mostly self-sufficient with few affective ties to its surrounding countryside. Thus, it is not uncommon for a place to be called a 'large town' and another a 'small city' even though both have similarly sized populations: the former indicates connections to the surrounding country side, whereas the latter is largely self-sufficient and most necessities are imported from afar.

dissertation will show how these terms are much more amorphous than they appear.[47]

[47] Though there does not appear to be a clear etymological link between 'amorphous' and the Latin *amor* (love), the connection between attempts to define 'city' and love is worth considering, especially in latter parts of chapter two. The Oxford English Dictionary suggests the ancient Romans named their city Roma as an anagram of *amor*. See: Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. 'city.'

CHAPTER 1: FOUNDATIONS, GRIDS, AND GOVERNANCE

What is Toronto? Where is Toronto? Answering these questions seem easy since we are comfortable with the discourse imposed by these questions. But the rather mundane question, 'Where is Toronto?' relies on a vast network of philosophies of space, time, and the metaphysics of existence. Common answers to this question assume that Toronto is a tangible object in a stable place. If one leaves Toronto, one knows they can get back to Toronto. Even if someone has never been to Toronto, it is not difficult to get to. Like the "road to Larissa" in Plato's *Meno*, one need not ever have been in Toronto or know anything about it and still figure out how to get here. But where is it when one 'arrives'? What is necessarily foreclosed to insist that a particular location in space is understandable and stable under a single sign 'Toronto'? And what remains? What determines where Toronto is? It cannot be its geography, as that has changed (rivers filled, hills flattened, the shoreline extended outward, etc.). Similarly, it cannot be based on its buildings, for they come and go just as the people do; and it cannot be in relation to other places, for these places change and move as well. Though the question 'Where is here?' is found in so many books and articles that it is nearly a cliché, I pose the question for the purpose of making the 'space' or 'place' of Toronto strange. Perhaps we should ask Kevin Lynch's question: "What time is this place?"[1]

Consider the location of "Historic Fort York." The site has been preserved, but visiting it today one cannot help but wonder why it is where it is. History tells us that the location for the fort was chosen for being on the shore of Lake Ontario at the mouth of Toronto bay. 'Historic Fort York' is in the 'same spot' (some of the original buildings remain), but between it and the Lake now stands the towering Gardiner Expressway and about a half a kilometre of land. What was once the mouth of Toronto bay is now what is known as the "Western Channel" of Toronto Harbour, and this Channel is only one hundred metres or so of water, with an

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[1] Kevin Lynch, *What Time Is This Place?* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1972).

impossibly straight shore lines. What was once a peninsula forming the bay is now a series of islands, between which most of the harbour's boat traffic now travels. Regardless of these changes, it was 'Toronto' then, and it is now. Despite these uncertainties, we still find our way 'here,' we usually know when we have 'arrived' and there are times when we know, without a doubt, that we are 'in Toronto.'

We know Toronto because of the particular way 'Toronto' has been produced as a space. From Henri Lefebvre's theory of space as a social production and the history of urbanization, this chapter will also employ Michel Foucault's theories of grids and policing to argue that governmentality is a specifically urban phenomenon to show why the space of Toronto is produced and arranged the way that it was and remains. Because of the close connection between urbanizing and policing, Jacques Rancière's critique of Foucault's theories of power and governance is discussed here to counter possible criticisms of Foucault's applicability.

I will be assuming Lefebvre's theory of the production of space to provide a critical history of the space produced as 'Toronto.' Rather than take the area of Toronto as blank space (Kantian, necessarily *a priori*, etc.),[2] Lefebvre's theory of space as a *social production* will give insight as to how the space of contemporary Toronto has been produced on culturally, socially, and historically specific notions of space and time. This chapter will only briefly present Lefebvre's crucial arguments; the final chapter, along with a discussion of Manuel Castells, will deploy Lefebvre's theories more fully.

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[2] I will show in the final chapter that, though Lefebvre claims to present an 'anti-Kantian' theory of space, I am not convinced he has extracted himself from a 'Kantian universe.'

Following the tradition of Foucauldian scholars of 'governmentality,'[3] I argue that governance has shifted from governing territory to governing people, and in doing so has recast the meaning of territory. *Urban* is a relatively new term that refers to a particular space or territory, whereas the millennia-old term *city* refers to a collection of 'citizens.' However, it is not simply that 'urban' signifies space and 'city' signifies subjects but that 'urban' and 'city' each understand the subject and the territory differently. Just as the subject of the city is different than that of the urban, the territory of the urban is different than that of the city. When considering contemporary 'issues facing Toronto,'[4] it is clear that nearly all issues are those that concern or affect the *people* of/from/in Toronto, yet most of Toronto's structure of governance assumes a responsibility to the space of Toronto, not its citizens. In political discourse, the phrase 'issues facing Toronto' implies that the space of Toronto is the subject of governance, not the citizens. Perhaps this should not be surprising since the structure of governance defines Toronto as a locatable space (its borders are drawn by governance/jurisdiction) so that governance defines the 'legal' parameters, limits, and borders of the space of Toronto. Thus, to understand the space of Toronto, there needs to be a concern with the governance of Toronto since governance is one way in which the borders of Toronto are defined. This chapter will cover some of the early history that led to the current formation and arrangement of space of Toronto and demonstrate how its physicality is intimately connected to Foucault's theory of governmentality. John Graves Simcoe's act of producing a box on the shore was

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[3] Those who theorize territory through governmentality are largely international relations theorists, such as Michael Dillion, David Campbell, and R.B.J. Walker. Much of this work was presented to the North American audience when Walker became editor of the journal *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political* in 1983 though governmentality did not become a topic in the journal until 1990, particularly volume 15. These 'critical international relations theorists' then published a collection of essays: Michael J. Shapiro and Hayward R. Alker, ed. *Challenging Boundaries: Global Flows, Territorial Identities* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996). Most of the governmentality scholarship on urbanism does not concern territory but rather critiques of 'neo-liberal' economics.

[4] Such as transit, motorways, walking and cycling, city services, parks, libraries, its economy and funding, garbage pickup, etc.

'political' (or 'policing') and still informs desires in contemporary everyday life (easily oriented, efficient movement).

Lefebvre: The Social Production of Urban Space

Before turning to the 'founding' moments that influenced the production of the space of Toronto, I will here present some of the crucial concepts and theories in Lefebvre's *The Production of Space*, in which his main argument appears quite simple: "(social) space is a (social) product."[5] Each society or community creates its own space, a space as distinct as the society or community. For example, ancient Greece produced a space particular to it (i.e. the *polis*), different from, say, York (i.e. a fort town).[6] While the specificity of 'social space' is emphasized, Lefebvre often broadens this to space in general. However, Lefebvre accepts something called 'natural space' – a form of space which is then *altered* by social production.

Lefebvre presents two corresponding triads for thinking the social production of space. One is composed of "spatial practice," "representations of space," and "representational space." The second triad is, respectively, "perceived space," "conceived space," and "lived space."[7]

Spatial Practice → Perceived Space
Representations of Space → Conceived Space
Representational Space → Lived Space

This triad will be explained more fully in the final chapter, but is briefly explained here to provide an initial theoretical lens through which the early history and founding of York will be understood. *Spatial practice* concerns

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[5] Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, trans. Donald Nicholson Smith (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), 30.

[6] When Simcoe established a fort town at what is now 'Toronto,' he named it 'York.'

[7] Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 40.

production and reproduction and makes certain a social group has coherency and cohesion, which reveals how that society *perceives* space. *Representations of space* concern knowledge, signs, and codes, which go beyond perception of space to *conceived* space. Scientists and urban planners, for example, function within this space. Finally, *representational spaces* are more complex and refer to the space that is directly lived and concerns affect and emotion.

Lefebvre makes an important distinction between "absolute space" and "abstract space." Absolute space concerns the sites of habitation chosen for their natural features, such as caves, mountains, rivers, and lakes. But as soon as these places were consecrated as 'spaces' they lose this quality to become abstract space.[8] Abstract space is formal and quantitative, creating generalizations at the expense of specifics. The outcome of abstract space is "the reduction of the 'real' … to a 'plan' existing in a void and endowed with no other qualities" while at the same time reducing it to "the flatness of a mirror, of an image, of pure spectacle under an absolutely cold gaze."[9]

Lefebvre locates the beginning of abstract space in the historical shift that moved labour outside the domestic realm and into factories.[10] Spatial practice, in opposition to abstract space, defines the places of the local through symbolization that makes them desirable, benevolent, sanctioned, or forbidden. Spatial practice concerns "the places of a *purely political* or social kind."[11] It would seem that spatial practice is political because it counters the "violence intrinsic to abstraction."[12] By "violence," Lefebvre is referring to a loss inherent to abstraction (as opposed to the concrete thing immediately present), which imposes a particular order onto nature.

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[8] Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 48–49.

[9] Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 287.

[10] Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 49.

[11] Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 288–289. Emphasis added.

[12] Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 289.

In *The Urban Revolution*, Lefebvre begins by declaring that society has been completely urbanized.[13] Lefebvre argues that, because of the social relationships of production, pre-industrial or industrial cities are not like the modern form of the urban, which comprise not just the built world of cities, but all manifestations of the dominance of the city over the country. This process of urbanization is represented in the "space-time axis" which shows (from left to right) the absence of urbanization to total urbanization:



Fig. 1. *Lefebvre's space-time axis*. (Diagram from Henri Lefebvre, *Urban Revolution*, trans. Robert Bononno (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003), 15.)

The shift from nomadism to agriculturalism is, for Lefebvre, merely "a gathering" of people. Urbanization only begins when authoritarian pressures begin the development of the modern state and its administrators, represented here as the "political city," which is an order of ruling and being ruled.[14] It was populated by priests, princes, nobles, and administrators, and its function was to administer, protect, and exploit a territory. Later, industrialization is responsible for "the urban" and replaces "the city." This shift from the "merchant city" to the

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[13] Henri Lefebvre, *Urban Revolution*, trans. Robert Bononno (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003).

[14] It may be worth noting here that, just as Lefebvre does not accept the "mere gathering" of people as constituting a politics, Rancière does not accept that politics is a necessity that comes from the gathering of people. Both locate the political in an order of ruling and being ruled.

industrial urban space marks what Lefebvre calls a "process of implosion-explosion."[15] The "implosion" refers to excessive concentration of people, activity, wealth, goods, and thought, while "explosion" refers to an outward projection towards the peripheries of suburbs, vacation destinations, and satellite towns.[16]

Lefebvre's theories from *The Production of Space* and *Urban Revolution* will be more fully explained in chapter 5. And, though this 'space-time axis' is the means by which Lefebvre discusses the industrial and post-industrial city, we can also place the founding of Toronto (York) on this axis, in the middle at "transition from agrarian to urban." Positioning York here will be made clear in the following sections of this chapter.

Toronto's Early History and the Founding of York

With Lefebvre's work in mind, this section will discuss some of the early history of the area now known as Toronto. I will offer a selective history to show the continuity and its impact on contemporary Toronto. In some ways, I will rehearse the traditional narrative of Toronto's history, but my goal is to demonstrate that this narrative persists is shaping contemporary understandings of Toronto. That said, I will devote scant attention to the pre-colonial history of the area, and to what might be called 'French Toronto' (usually understood as 1615–1759). The reason for this omission is that very little of the pre-colonial or 'French Toronto' period has much influence on contemporary Toronto, or at least the contemporary Toronto that interests me.

Histories of Toronto often begin with the story of the arrival of John Graves Simcoe, some going so far as saying, "Toronto began in the summer of 1793 – the morning of Tuesday, July thirtieth to be exact."[17] Simcoe, the first Lieutenant-

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[15] Lefebvre, *Urban Revolution*, 14.

[16] Lefebvre, *Urban Revolution*, 14.

[17] William Dendy and William Kilbourn, *Toronto Observed: Its Architecture, Patrons, and History* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1986), 1.

Governor of the newly created Upper Canada in 1791, established the area as a colonial fort and produced the space so as to encourage a society (a village). We will see that he 'drew the map' that still informs the *social space* of contemporary Toronto. Of course, prior to Simcoe's arrival the space of Toronto had already been undergoing a social production, demonstrated in the fact that it had a name. It may or may not have been "tkaronto," but it had a name nonetheless. And the relationship between the aboriginals and European (mostly French) explorers, fur traders, missionaries, and visitors developed a particular 'knowledge of' the area and this (social) space came to be (socially) produced. This production of space was essential for Simcoe's decision to establish Toronto as a fort and town.

The Toronto Carrying Place was a significant space produced by early aboriginals, French explorers, and fur traders in the seventeenth century. Though subject of historical debate, it is usually agreed that in 1614 the French explorer Samuel de Champlain sent his translator, Étienne Brûlé, down the Toronto Carrying Place and that he was the first European to do so.[18] The Toronto Carrying Place is a portage route between Lake Ontario and the Holland River which flows into Lake Simcoe. The route mostly follows along the Humber River but sometimes up the Rouge River (near today's Markham). While it is contested as to whether or not Brûlé actually took the Toronto Carrying Place route, this space was then produced/known as a portage route and many French people took the route in the decades that followed. For much of the seventeenth century there were competing French and British fur traders meeting at the Toronto Carrying Place.

In 1720 the French established a small fort near the mouth of the Humber but it only lasted a decade. A larger log fort (*Roullie*) was constructed in 1751 on what is now the Canadian National Exhibition grounds.[19] The defences of New France began to crumble and in 1759 those posted at *Roullie* was told to burn

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[18] Derek Hayes, *Historical Atlas of Toronto*, (Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre, 2008), 10.

[19] Dendy and Kilbourn, *Toronto Observed*, 3–4.

everything and come back to Montreal. The following year, the American adventurer Major Rogers and his Rangers took possession of the site in the name of George III. The Toronto area came under British rule by way of the Treaty of Paris in 1763.

The British did not seek to colonize the area until after the American Revolution, which split the empire of the St. Lawrence and the Great Lakes in two. Dendy and Kilbourn suggest the British "wished to protect their Indian allies" and "believed that the land they inhabited should be acquired only by treaty."[20] The British negotiated for the "river lands on either side of Kingston and Newark" which they would then offer to prospective settlers.[21] The then governor-in-chief, Lord Dorchester, negotiated the purchase of the Toronto region from the Mississaugas who occupied the land on the north shore of the lake. As part of this negotiated treaty, in August 1788 HMS *Seneca* arrived in Toronto bay with one hundred forty-nine barrels of goods and a small amount of cash, valued at £1,700 in all.[22] Though this 'purchase' took place in the summer of 1788, the British did nothing with the land for five years until Simcoe arrived in the summer of 1793.

Simcoe's situation prior to founding York helps explain why he chose York as the new capital. Before coming to Toronto bay, Simcoe had been living in Newark (now Niagara-on-the-Lake) and had been developing it as Upper Canada's new capital. Simcoe disagreed with (and held in contempt) his superior, Lord Dorchester, who insisted that Kingston, where Dorchester was posted, ought to be the capital. Still, with fears of an American attack, Simcoe sought to establish a capital further away from the American border than Newark. Early in 1793, he brought a few soldiers and pushed through the land to what is

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[20] Dendy and Kilbourn, *Toronto Observed*, 4.

[21] Dendy and Kilbourn, *Toronto Observed*, 4.

[22] Dendy and Kilbourn, *Toronto Observed*, 4. In essence, Toronto was 'bought' for two thousand gun flints, twenty-four brass kettles, ten dozen looking glasses, two dozen laced hats, a bale of flowered flannel, and ninety-six gallons of rum.

now London, Ontario. He performed a single-day's survey of the area, named the river 'Thames' and the town 'Georgina' (in honour of King George III), and campaigned for it to be the new capital of Upper Canada. The first Loyalist settlers were "horrified" at Simcoe's plans because the site was in the middle of dense forest and very difficult to access. Richard Cartwright, the leading merchant of Kingston, mused that Georgina could only be visited by the Montgolfier brothers' new invention, the hot-air balloon.[23]

With pressure from Lord Dorchester for Kingston to serve as the capital of Upper Canada, Simcoe abandoned his somewhat radical proposal to establish Georgina as the capital and began to consider the Toronto bay. The land in the area was swampy[24] and the slow running creeks would limit the number of mills, but there were many tall pines for ship masts, and there were patches of farmable land. Simcoe also knew from the aboriginals about the Toronto Carrying Place, which provided fresh water and a trade route to the northwest along the Humber River to what was then Lake Toronto (which he named Lake Simcoe in honour of his father), and on to Georgian Bay.[25] Toronto served as a terminus for a trade route from Georgian Bay to Lake Ontario, all without going through American territory.

So, in many ways, Simcoe's choice of the Toronto bay was because it was 'good enough' and was not Dorchester's Kingston. However, historians traditionally argue that Simcoe's choice of Toronto bay was primarily a militarily strategic one; Simcoe chose the site because he expected war with America. The Treaty of Paris, which formally confirmed the United States independence from

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[23] Dendy and Kilbourn, *Toronto Observed*, 5.

[24] At the time it had the largest "wetland" in North America.

[25] Tom Cruickshank and John de Certeau Visser, *Old Toronto Houses*, rev. ed. (Richmond Hill, Ontario: Firefly Books, 2008), 17.

Britain, had been signed in 1776, and many believed the victorious army would continue to advance north into British Upper Canada.[26]

Even though the land was swampy and full of slow-running creeks, the Toronto bay was protected by a peninsula that ran from its east side extending westward, leaving a fairly small channel on the west side.

[26] The American army did attack in 1812. Had Simcoe followed through with his preference for Georgina (London, Ontario), one can speculate on just how different the outcome would have been.

Foundational Grids



Fig. 2. *Toronto Purchase map*. (Untitled map called “Toronto Purchase” map, with signatures on reverse. William Chewett, 1805. Library and Archives Canada: RG 10, Vol. 1841, IT 039.)

This “Toronto Purchase” map (Figure 2) was created for and signed at a meeting on August 1, 1805. The Toronto Carrying Place is marked through the centre of the mapped area, and the Etobicoke Creek near the western border is marked by

a “maple tree blazed on 4 sides,” as written on the map. It should also be noted that an area to the west (the “Mississauga Tract”) was also surrendered at this meeting. As with the maps to follow (Figures 3 and 4), there is little regard for the terrain of the land and a rectangle is imposed on top to define the area that now ‘belongs’ to the British crown. It also marks a limit to the territory that will define the borders of York County, making colonization and settlement manageable.



Fig. 3. *Plan of the Harbour of Toronto with the Proposed Town and Settlement*. (John Collins, 1788. Toronto Public Library: T1788/4MIrg)

This *Plan for the Harbour of Toronto* (Figure 3) dated 1788, was prepared for Lord Dorchester and Major General Simcoe. This map is a plan which was

never fully implemented, but is important since it represents a common aspiration for both British and French colonists in the eighteenth century. What is remarkable about this plan (and other plans and maps of the time) is how the grid is imposed on the terrain. The Toronto Carrying Place is well marked (labelled here as “Part of a road towards Lake La Clie,” now Lake Simcoe), as are the nuances of the shoreline. However, the surveyed lots do not account for these rivers at all. In fact, the River Don and its valley are completely absent from this map. In the central town square we can see both Garrison Creek and Taddle Creek, but again the grid is imposed over it. I will address this idea of imposing a grid later in this chapter, but here we should at least note how clean and ‘sanitized’ the grid appears over the terrain.

The common area and town square in this plan are of interest because they were never implemented. The shore on either side of the proposed town is marked “ground reserved,” and the area across the top is marked “common,” to be left for each town inhabitant to use in common as an early form of public space. The legend also tells us that the four corner parcels enclosed with ‘A-A-A-A’ are “reserved lots for public purposes.” The legend on the bottom left tells us that the red ‘A’ marks the place where defences are to be set up to protect the harbour but this did not turn out to be the location of Fort York.

In the spring of 1793, Simcoe sent a few soldiers to clear some land in Toronto bay, and in the early summer Simcoe set sail from Newark to Toronto bay with his wife Elizabeth and three youngest children. They arrived July 13, 1793, and set up a camp at the mouth of the Garrison River (what is now Bathurst Street and Lake Shore Boulevard West). Simcoe established Fort York here (where “Historic Fort York” remains today) and fortified the tip of the peninsula, Gibraltar Point, to protect the bay from a water attack.[27] That afternoon they sailed east to the mouth of the Don River and walked around, deciding the area just west of the Don River near the lake would be the centre of the new town. He

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[27] Dendy and Kilbourn, *Toronto Observed*, 2.

and his team surveyed a grid, decided the first row of buildings would be near the river along the embankment that rose above the waters of the bay.

Simcoe and his soldiers established a ten-block town site: Front, George (just east of Jarvis), Duke (now Adelaide), and Parliament streets. “[L]ike all good Georgians” he made it a grid, a response to the problems of the chaotic British street systems.[28] Other examples of Georgian grid plans are Bath, England, and Savannah, Georgia – but York’s grid did not have a clear focal point or centre, nor a civic square nor a park. This lack was not a result of a shortage of ideas. There are a handful of ‘plans’ that remain which map the area with a town square as a focal point. Figure 3 is just one example. It is likely that Simcoe was wary of providing a common area that might encourage any form of American-influenced democratic sentiments.



Fig. 4 *Plan of York Harbour Surveyed by order of Lt Govr Simcoe*. (Alexander Aitken, 1793. U.K. National Archives CO 700 Canada 60.)

[28] Cruickshank and de Certeau Visser, *Old Toronto Houses*, 17. The only Georgian house from this period that survives is Campbell House, which was moved from its original site on the north side of Adelaide at Frederick to Queen and University.

Figure 4 is the first map that Simcoe sent to Britain after founding York. Here we have nearly all the rivers and creeks accounted for, as well as indicating the River Don and its valley. The grid at 'D' is the ten-block town site that Simcoe established, 'C' (left side of map) indicates the barracks of Fort York, 'E' (right of ten-block town site) refers to a viewpoint mentioned in the accompanying letter and the numbers in the bay refer to depth of the water (fathoms). The horizontal line close to the centre of the map is Lot Street (now Queen Street), so called for the numbered lots that run north of it. Lot Street is the result of a line drawn at 90 degrees to the eastern border of York County (now Victoria Park Avenue). Again, we see the imposition of a grid without regard for the terrain. The River Don weaves back and forth across the border between lots 15 and 16. The southern edge of the ten-block town site ignores the contours of the shoreline, as though Simcoe knew that eventually much land would be literally 'produced' in the lake and the shoreline would be made into a straight line. The lots that run north of Lot Street were to be given to officials and other wealthy, loyalist families to settle and, perhaps taking from the earlier plan of the town, the area south of Lot Street is marked "reserved" for industry and government buildings.

Beyond the ten-block town site, the outlying area was divided up into 200-acre lots by 'orderly' surveying, similar to rural Ontario roads. The borders of these lots still survive as Toronto's main arterial roads. The entire area was not divided up into these 200-acre lots, however, since Simcoe had the idea to reserve a string of one hundred acre "park lots" running north from present-day Queen Street to Bloor, and just west of the Don River to Dufferin Street. These lots were granted to "political allies" and government officials as compensation for their service to the new colony.[29] This was a bit of 'cronyism' on Simcoe's part, but he thought it would help populate the town with 'the gentry' and develop it like the manors of England. Only the Grange remains as one of these original estates.[30]

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[29] Cruickshank and de Certeau Visser, *Old Toronto Houses*, 17.

[30] Cruickshank and de Certeau Visser, *Old Toronto Houses*, 17.

This grid that Simcoe laid out was neither original nor surprising, though it should be. This map clearly shows that the geography does not lend itself particularly well to a grid. The shoreline is clearly at odd and changing angles, while the Don River runs in a crooked line. The map also does not show the elevation of the terrain nor the conditions of the ground (swamp, soil, rock, clay). We might understand that Simcoe saw the Don River with its swampy mouth as the eastern border – it would be difficult to cross in order to build and settle on the other side. And it seems reasonable to tuck a settlement within a harbour to protect it from invading armies. But less clear is why Simcoe established the original ten-block town site on the eastern reaches of the surveyed land. If he were establishing a new governable city, he would likely have placed the centre of the town in the centre. Seeing that Simcoe did not include a focal point of the ten-block town site (such as in Savannah, Georgia, or other contemporaneous 'new world' towns), it might suggest that Simcoe was not concerned with establishing a new urban city. Instead, Simcoe was settling a camp, or at least a "mixed-use" camp and a colonial outpost to be inhabited by the gentry. Simcoe's chosen site for the ten-block town and the plan for lots above Lot Street left little room for expansion of the civic parts of town. All courthouses, parliament or council buildings, markets, banks, etc. were built westward from the ten-block site on the strip of land between the lake and Lot Street. Today, this ten-block site remains, but it does not have any distinguishing boundaries and if one is not specifically looking for the original town, it is easily missed. And, because of the poor quality of the original buildings and two 'great fires,' all of the 'old' buildings around the ten-block site are in fact from the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century.

The location of the town at the eastern edge of the surveyed area reflects this "mixed-use" camp and colonial outpost. That is, rather than seeking to establish a new metropolis with a set of 'zoning' usages, Simcoe was more concerned with providing some rough form of a town for basic needs and then simply parcelling up the rest of the land, with clear borders, to give to upper-class

families currently residing in Newark (Niagara-on-the-Lake). These families were likely more interested in being self-sustaining with little need for a truly varied society like one would find in their contemporary cities in Britain and elsewhere in Europe. Indeed, so many of the upper-classes in Canada were here precisely to avoid the messy urbanism from which they fled.

Organizing a town or city on a grid goes at least as far back as ancient Greece[31] and continues to inform contemporary plans for cities and towns. However, the justifications and reasons for the grid of ancient Greece are not the same as they were at the end of the eighteenth century, when Simcoe had this map (Figure 4) created and delivered to England. So why do Simcoe and the other planners and dreamers of the time impose a grid on this terrain? Why not organize the new town around the natural features? Establishing the ten-block town at the base of the Toronto Carrying Place (i.e. where the Humber flows into Lake Ontario) would place the town on the wrong side of the defences of the Toronto Bay. But the question remains: why the imposition of straight lines and square boxes, and not the concession of diagonal or winding roads?

Some might be tempted to suggest that all these plans, including the plan Simcoe implemented, were a result of the times – it was the Georgian period. This might be true, but it does not help much. This descriptor, based on the names of reigning monarchs, simply refers to the time period and nothing to do with the particular monarch. The ‘Georgian period’ is so called because of the four successive kings of England named George that spanned the years 1714–1830. Among many things that happened in this period were the beginnings of the abolition of slavery and the implementation of ‘social reforms’ such as orphanages and hospitals. Perhaps the most notable events that occurred in this period were the French Revolution and the American Revolution, which took place concurrent with Britain expanding its massive empire through colonialism.

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[31] Aristotle, “Book II” in *The Politics*, ed. Stephen Everson, trans. by Jonathan Barnes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). See especially section 1267b where Aristotle praises Hippodamus of Miletus “who invented the art of planning cities.”

The founding of York in 1793 occurred during this amassing of colonial territory. What was essential to this colonial project was the ability to take the world as an object that could be dissected and parcelled out.

Prior to the colonization of North America, including the founding of York, western states were practicing cadastral mapping on their own 'home' territories. Cadastral mapping is the technique of surveying land to have a clear record of what property existed and who owned it, for the purpose of taxation. While this practice does not provide a comprehensive explanation for York's grid plans, it does begin to show how the space of York was produced: a particular production of space informed by the practice of cadastral mapping.

If we compare these British plans with the earlier, aboriginal 'maps' drawn on birch bark, it is clear the latter has nothing to do with parcels of land equally divided but more to do with movement. Birch bark maps were to assist in following a known route. They were never meant as an objective representation of an area; they did not distinguish 'parcels' of land nor suggest private property. Though cadastral maps were a matter of course in the nineteenth century, during the eighteenth century "the cadastral map was a highly contentious instrument for the extension and consolidation of power, not just of the propertied individual, but the nation-state and the capitalist system which underlies it."[32] Beginning in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries "cadastral mapping became increasingly professionalized," concerning itself with the cataloguing of private estates for the purpose of tax reforms and levies.[33] While cadastral maps were used by the governments of many European states in the sixteenth and seventeenth century, Britain was a little late to the game. Not until the Enclosure Acts of the late eighteenth century were maps required by the government,[34] which coincides

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[32] Roger J.P. Kain and Elizabeth Baigent, *The Cadastral Map in the Service of the State: a History of Property Mapping* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1992), 8.

[33] John Pickles, *A History of Spaces: Cartographic Reason, Mapping, and the Geo-coded World* (London: Routledge, 2004), 101.

[34] Kain and Baigent, *The Cadastral Map in the Service of the State*, 263.

with the founding of York. However, cadastral maps were not necessarily grids. Grids are usually found on plans, imposed on what is deemed 'virgin territory.' Cadastral maps seek to represent what already exists: the already agreed-upon borders. In some cases, where land is being 're-claimed' (such as in the Netherlands where swamps were infilled), the cadastral maps indicate a grid. Yet it is clear that when producing knowledge a territory for the purposes of identifying the 'properties' and their borders, it is much easier for the borders to be straight lines and for the property to be a squared box.

Important, though, is that these grids insisted on a form of equality – that each parcel was of equal size and each contributed to the overall "fabric" of the city/society. Of course, some land is more valuable or useful, and some people get more than one square, but on paper it is an equal distribution and the sum of the parts make up the whole. It is not a coincidence that this abstract notion of space appears concurrently with liberal-democratic political philosophy (inalienable rights, social contracts, the critique of divine right of kings, etc.) in which 'men' are thought to be equals and each 'man' or 'citizen' makes up the whole or fabric of society.

There is little research or theory on gridded street networks. While many urbanists note that the grid is important and worthy of note, little is said about them beyond a tenuous link to rationality. Lefebvre's 'triad' helps to ensure we note the production of this space and the gridding of a territory clearly falls within 'representations of space' ('conceived space') as it reflects historically and culturally specific signs, codes, and knowledge. As Hannah B. Higgins tells us, the grid begins with a plan, not with what exists, and the space is then filled in – it traces the space between – between lives, homes, buildings. And what is traced relates to how we see ourselves in space in terms of organized social systems, not in organic or 'natural' terms.[35] However, Higgins and other urbanists who take

[35] Hannah B. Higgins, *The Grid Book* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2009), 50.

time to note the importance of grids do not sustain a discussion of these connections or make any specific arguments concerning the implications of grids.

Foucault on Grids and Urbanization

Foucault does provide a sustained discussion about the role of the grid as a means to allow circulation in the collection of lectures published as *Security, Territory, Population*.[36] He also connects gridded street networks to new practices of security and governmentality. Above, we saw how a grid makes an area knowable as a representation on a map within Lefebvre's 'representations of space,' which, to a large extent, agrees with Foucault's arguments. However, Foucault provides a much more detailed and complex theory, linking these 'representations' to broader historical shifts and implications.

Since Simcoe established York as a fort town, a place thought to be more 'secure' from an anticipated American attack, it is worth looking at the meaning of 'security.' In *Security, Territory, Population* Foucault breaks down security into three modalities. First the basic penal law, such as "you must not kill, you must not steal," with a series of punishments in place if one contravenes one or more of them.[37] The second modulation is the same law and punishment, but accompanied by "a series of supervisions, checks, inspections, and varied controls" that make it possible to determine if a person is going to steal or kill or not.[38] There is a concomitant shift from mere punishment for an offence to "penitentiary techniques" such as obligatory work, correction, and moral discipline.[39] The third modulation follows the previous two modulations, but the corrective punishment (introduced in the second modulation), accompanies a series of questions such as the "average rate of criminality" and how to predict,

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[36] Michel Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977–1978*, ed. Michel Senellart, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Picador, 2009).

[37] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 4.

[38] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 4.

[39] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 4.

through statistics, the probability of criminality in a particular place and time.[40] In what areas of a town and at what times can we predict criminality? What other variables are at play to increase or decrease criminality? Foucault provides a large number of questions that can be – and are – asked of this type of security including the costs, the possibility of reforming the criminal, and the predictability of re-occurrence of the crime. It is this third modulation that the grids assists and enables.

Foucault does not speak about criminality as though it were divorced from the rest of society. He wants to make it "absolutely clear" that the dominant "juridico-legal system" up until at least the eighteenth century had a strong emphasis on "the disciplinary side."[41] Many of the punishments imposed on those determined to have broken the law rarely had any consequence. What was important was the "corrective effect," not so much on the guilty party (for being hanged is hardly corrective), but on *the population as a whole*.[42] Thus, when a particularly harsh sentence was delivered for a relatively minor offence (such as petty theft being met with the sentence of death), it is clear that the punishment was aimed at altering (namely, decreasing) the *probability* of such thefts occurring. With this preoccupation with probability, Foucault is able to point to the beginnings of a type of "mechanism of security."[43] Foucault insists that there is not a successive series of disciplinary practices (that the three modulations of security outlined above are not a historical 'progression'). Instead, these modulations intertwine with one another; they do not replace one another.

It is with this type of disciplinary-security that we find, not the invention of, but a new deployment of the partitioning grid. During outbreaks of the plague and exclusion of lepers toward the end of the Middle Ages, the grid was imposed to indicate which areas were infected and which were not, where people could go,

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[40] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 4.

[41] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 6.

[42] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 6.

[43] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 7.

where they could not, which foods could be consumed, which homes had to be presented to inspectors, etc.[44] This is a production of urban space based on a particular notion of security – the security of the population.

For Foucault, discipline is exercised on bodies, but not primarily on individuals: "discipline exists only insofar as there is a multiplicity or an end," such as in the school, military or workplace.[45] Moreover, the space of a town radically shifted from the seventeenth to the eighteenth century as a result of this disciplinary structure. During this period, the town still had a "particular legal and administrative definition" that was based on that period's notion of sovereignty: control over a territory.[46] The town was a specific type of territory, confined within a tight, walled-in space that had more than a military function, since it was much more highly mixed in terms of social and economic practices than the countryside.

During this period, this mixed nature of the town led to increasing complexity and a number of defined 'problems' for its development, administration, and control. Trade and the rise of urban demography brought to bear the problem of the compact, walled-in nature of the town. In broad terms, during the eighteenth century, "what was at issue … was the question of the spatial, juridical, administrative, and economic opening up of the town: resituating the town in a *space of circulation*."[47] Following Foucault's argument, we ought to see the founding of York as military camp *and* as a capital; a defence camp *and* a town to be populated by people who are not directly involved in the military.

Foucault directs us to a study done in the mid-seventeenth century by Alexandre Le Maître. Again, this is the mid-seventeenth century, about 150 years before Simcoe's settlement of York, and though it provides a different framework

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[44] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 12.

[45] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 12.

[46] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 12.

[47] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 13. Emphasis added.

than York's actual settlement, it does help us understand the earlier *Plan for the Harbour of Toronto* (Figure 3). His study, *La Métropolitée*, posed the question, "Must a country have a capital city, and in what should it consist?"[48] Le Maître argues that the state is comprised of three elements: the peasants, the artisans, and the sovereign and his officers. The state itself ought to be an "edifice" of these three components. The peasants are the foundation, in the ground and underground, of this edifice, who are unseen but ensure the solidity of the whole. The artisans occupy the "common parts," the "service quarters," in this architectural metaphor. The upper tier, the sovereign and his officers, occupy the living and reception areas.[49] For Le Maître, the "foundations" of the state are the peasants – and only the peasants – who live in the countryside, the artisans live in small towns, and the nobles occupy the capital city. Beyond these two spatial relationships and metaphors, Le Maître depicts the state as a circle with the peasants at the furthest reaches, the artisans closer to the centre, and the sovereign at its very centre. Were a state's territory to be another shape (square, rectangle), the sovereign would not be able to fully exercise control over the entire territory were he located at one end or corner.

For Le Maître there are a number of functions and roles the capital must take: it must govern the entire territory of the state; it must be an example and set the morality of the people within the state; it must be the location of the best religious orators and academics; and it must be the centre of the state's economy. The latter means the capital must be a site of luxury, the place which attracts products and investments for trade and manufacture. Foucault points out a final argument of Le Maître that will be central to Foucault's analysis: "the capital must be the ornament of the territory."[50] This notion of 'ornament' will reoccur with Foucault's discussion of the police and its role of providing "splendour" to the city. Foucault interprets Le Maître's utopian depiction of the

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[48] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 13.

[49] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 13.

[50] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 14.

town as a town based on the principles of sovereignty; that the "primary relationship is that of the sovereign to the territory, and this [relationship] serves as the schema, *the grid"* for understanding what a town should be and how it ought to function.[51]

The *Plan for the Harbour of Toronto* (Figure 3) follows Le Maître's theory of how a town ought to be set up: surrounding farmland for the peasants (large grid), a tighter grid for the 'artisans' and trades people, with the seat of sovereignty at the central square. What actually happened, though, was quite the opposite (Figure 4): the upper-class were located out in the 'fields,' away from the centre of town, and the town itself was a muddy necessity for market-trade. In fact, the first council meetings of York were held to the west of Simcoe's ten-block town (at what is now St. Lawrence Market), and the 'seat of sovereignty,' in the form of town and city halls, continually shifted further to the west and away from ten-block town.

The shape of the plan and the actual town (York) are significantly different from Le Maître's theory. Le Maître states that the territory must be circular, not a rectangle or square, so that the sovereign may exercise control over the entire territory. In York, the sovereign was not present; the sovereign resided in Britain. Thus we can think of the exercise of sovereignty in York as an 'abstract' sovereignty. Though Simcoe, acting on the sovereign's behalf, was physically present, he was not acting as a 'ruler' over the territory. His concerns were more to do with the functioning of the military and ensuring the fort succeeded in its purpose. Sovereignty here was more a combination of 'governance at a distance' and 'self-governance.' One can think of the sovereign actually existing in the middle of a circle insofar as England positioned itself at the centre of the globe which it sought to colonize (we still live with the remnants of this – standard time, cardinal direction, etc.). What is more important for the subsequent history of Toronto and its contemporary state is this notion of self-governance. York was

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[51] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 14. Emphasis added.

not like other British colonies (compared to India or anywhere in the so-called 'Orient') as it was created to be fairly self-ruling, not ruled. The population of York was to be upper-classes, high-ranking military officials, British citizens, etc. – 'good liberal individuals.' This is 'in line' with the gridding of the territory – an equal plane of space.

Nonetheless, York falls within what Foucault calls the "grid of sovereignty," in which there appear a number of specifically urban functions: economic, moral, and administrative. For Foucault, the "interesting thing" is the desire to link the role of the sovereign to a "spatial distribution" so that an effective sovereign is one that is "well placed within a territory" and the territory is "well policed" so obedience to the sovereign is based on the territory's spatial layout.[52] In York, we can think of the sovereign being "well placed" insofar as he is both placed in 'abstraction' and placed within each self-governing individual. The actual layout of the territory is, itself, a form of sovereignty.

Essential to this form of spatial sovereignty is *circulation*; the circulation of ideas, desires, orders, and commerce. The circulation of capital around, and in relation to, the capital city is central to the economic system of mercantilism, the system in which Le Maître is writing. A good capital city is a city which is well-capitalized, and so Le Maître's idealized state is one in which the sovereign is able to best exercise control over a spatial territory.

To give another form of town from roughly the same period, Foucault then turns to one of the many towns built where previously there was nothing. To build a town from scratch, the form of the Roman camp is used along with military knowledge for the purpose of discipline. While Le Maître's form of the town was built on a broad, general understanding of a large territory, the town based on the military camp is based on a "smaller, geometric figure … namely the square or rectangle."[53] Camp towns, such as Richelieu, were built with a main street

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[52] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 14.

[53] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 16.

running through its centre and other streets running parallel or perpendicular and subdivided in greater or smaller distances. This leaves some city blocks larger and others smaller, with people living only within the larger blocks, and artisans and shops in the area with the smaller blocks. This commercial area with smaller blocks encourages circulation and this circulation is hemmed in as it is bordered by large churches. Finally, the residential area is further subdivided so that some houses are built with multiple floors and face the main street, while others are single-storied and face the quieter streets, to reflect the differences in social status and wealth.[54] Whereas Le Maître "capitalized" a territory, this camp town reflects a different disciplinary treatment of space. The camp town constructs an empty, closed space and produces artificial multiplicities within, according to principles of hierarchy, communications of relations of power, and specific functional effects. So, rather than "capitalizing" (or 'sovereigntizing') a territory which already contains people and relations of power, the camp town structures a space based on a disciplined order of construction.

For a third example, also concerned with the problem of circulation, Foucault points to the "real development of towns that actually existed in the eighteenth century," using Nantes as the specific example.[55] While Nantes is a very old city, in the eighteenth century it was undergoing commercial development, and "the problem" became one of overcrowding, of new administrative and economic functions, and of new relationships with the surrounding countryside, all the while allowing for growth.[56] In relation to the founding of York, though, we imagine London, England, rather than Nantes, which shares the similar problem in the eighteenth century of overcrowding and new functions and relationships as Nantes. Again, Foucault points to the concept of circulation, in this case having the "form of a heart that ensures the circulation

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[54] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 17.

[55] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 17.

[56] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 17.

of blood."[57] Of course, Nantes is not designed on the circulation system of the body, but this was the prominent idea governing many proposals. What did, in fact, occur was the cutting of routes through the town to make streets wide enough for four main functions: (1) opening up areas of the town for hygiene and ventilation where "morbid miasmas accumulated in crowded quarters" with 'too much' density; (2) ensuring trade could occur within the town; (3) connecting this network of streets to external roads so that goods from outside the core can reach the core; and (4) allowing for surveillance. Since trade and circulation of goods required the walls of the walled-in city to be removed, there was the concern for the circulation of the undesirable: the beggars, thieves, criminals, etc. that would come from outside the town. In other words, there needs to be a means by which to distinguish 'good' circulation from 'bad' circulation.

While these are the four functions Foucault describes for what actually happened in 'fixing' existing urban centres in Europe, we can see how each of these functions play out in the development of York.

Regarding the first function, ventilation and an opening up of areas too densely crowded, Simcoe avoided this problem by laying out a very small ten-block town, off to the side of the rest of the land to be populated. This would severely limit the possibility of 'too much' density occurring in the main or central part of town – and it was small and isolated to a specific area.

The second function of ensuring trade within the town is fairly clear – this is what this ten-block site was intended for. It was also located close to the lake for trade with places like Kingston, and even beyond to England.

The third function, to connect the core of the town to the outlying areas, is clearly displayed in that simple line through the centre – Lot Street. Each of these lots were connected along Lot Street, which ran straight to the ten-block town site. Further, shortly after founding York, he had men clear two roads: Yonge and

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[57] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 17.

Dundas streets. Yonge would run north-south pretty much in the centre of the township, while Dundas would run just north and parallel to Lot Street.[58]

Finally, as regards the fourth function of surveillance, we only need to look at the actual fort and the fortified point of the peninsula. While Foucault discusses the 'threat' of undesirables entering the town from the countryside, York was concerned with invasion from the water – and the surveillance of the water was precisely the point of Fort York.

I want to stress Foucault's point about circulation and the space of circulation. To answer his own question, "What is a good street?"[59] Foucault insists that "poly-functionality" is most important.[60] He makes an interesting statement here: "A good street is one in which there is, of course, a circulation of what are called miasmas, and so diseases."[61] In other words, a 'good street' is one that has disease circulating! This is, of course, something that has to be managed and not particularly desirable. A good street is also one in which merchandise can be transported and there are shops – and it will also be possible for thieves and rioters to move down the street.

In terms of planning a town, Foucault tells us, "the town must *not* be conceived or planned according to a static perception that would ensure the perfection of the function there and then, but will open onto a future that is not exactly controllable, not precisely measured or measurable, and a good town plan takes into account precisely what might happen."[62] We can see Simcoe following this notion of 'town planning.' While he designated one small area as the ten-block town, it was off to the side and he left the large area to west along

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[58] Dendy and Kilbourn, *Toronto Observed*, 1. These were named after two British Cabinet members: Sir George Yonge and Sir Henry Dundas, and the trails remain as two major streets in Toronto.

[59] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 19.

[60] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 19. This "poly-functionality" of a street is found in nearly all urbanists with the exception of Le Corbusier and CIAM.

[61] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 19.

[62] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 20.

the shore line 'blank.' Some may criticize Simcoe for not developing a full plan of the area, but he was likely right to leave this up to current and future citizens to determine its use. It is in this area that we now find the 'core' of Toronto: the financial district, the CN Tower, the Skydome – all the things that seem to define Toronto as Toronto and the destination of Toronto's tourists.[63]

To organize a town with a concern for its future is, in fact, a concern about security. The technique for this is a problem of the series, "an indefinite series of mobile elements" that circulate: "x number of carts, x number of passers-by, x number of thieves, x number of miasmas, and so on."[64] Alongside this series of circulations is the "series of accumulating units": how many inhabitants, houses, buildings, etc.[65] The space in which this occurs, Foucault terms the 'milieu': "The specific space of security refers then to a series of possible events; it refers to the temporal and the uncertain, which have to be inserted within a given space."[66] This space is the milieu – the space in which this series of uncertain events unfolds. Foucault tells us the milieu is what is needed to "account for action at a distance" and is "therefore the medium of an action and the element in which it circulates." Regarding the role of sovereignty, we can see York being produced as the space of milieu as it becomes a space for *governance at a distance*. Further, it is thus "the problem of circulation and causality that is at stake in this notion of milieu."[67] While the term or concept of milieu was not present in the work of Simcoe, the "pragmatic structure which marks out in advance is present in the way in which the town planners try to reflect and modify

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[63] This notion of not 'over planning' has been taken up in contemporary urban planning discourse. Rather than 'zoning laws' many are suggesting 'planning codes' so that a site is not bound to one time period's use. This links to Kant's notion in "What is Enlightenment?" – that one generation must not debilitate a further generation's enlightenment; one generation must not limit future generations.

[64] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 20.

[65] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 20.

[66] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 20.

[67] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 21.

urban space."[68] In other words, the milieu is that thing in which circulation is carried out; it is in the milieu where the apparatuses of security work. And Simcoe was trying to set the scene for this security.

Importantly, the milieu is the field of intervention. Instead of taking individuals as legal subjects capable of voluntary actions, or as a multiplicity of organisms, or bodies capable of performances – the milieu allows one to intervene and affect a population. However, York was not a "total milieu" as it *depended* on people's own self-governance. It was this 'quasi milieu' that enabled this self-governance to occur.

At first glance, it would appear that Foucault's 'milieu' is much the same as Lefebvre's 'representational space,' as it is the space in which "urban planners" intervene. However, it might be more appropriate to think of the milieu as the embodiment of Lefebvre's triad. It is a spatial practice as it reveals how that society perceived space, and is caught up in representational space as it informs how the space is directly lived by its inhabitants.

Grids, Urbanism, Politics, Police

The grid that Foucault discusses, the grid of *The Plan for Toronto Harbour* (Figure 3), and the grid that Simcoe imposed on/as York are all, among other things, a response to the messy, crowed 'naturally' developed urban spaces of Europe. Those winding, narrow streets that developed without an overarching plan, but were the result of slow and steady 'growth,' had become a problem: a problem of governance and a problem of security. The grid was meant to 'solve' this problem and was a means to organize the population along clean lines and square boxes. I argue that the early form of the city (narrow, winding streets) was a "natural" development – they were not planned, they were not worked out on paper beforehand but developed as individuals or small groups extended the city.

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[68] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 21.

The disciplining or securitizing grids imposed in the eighteenth century (like York) and right up until the middle of the twentieth century are, I argue, a symptom *not* of the imposition of rationality on what appears to be the chaos that develops if "nature" were left to run its ('her') course, but rather the symptom of the dream, fantasy, or belief that an imposed grid would solve this problem of chaotic nature.

Another important aspect of these grids is perspective. When one looks at either the *Plan for the Toronto Harbour* (Figure 3) or the map that Simcoe sent back to Britain (Figure 4) (or even any contemporary map), there is literally *no* perspective. It might appear that it is a perspective from above, but is not from a specific place above the territory. There are some very interesting "bird's-eye view" maps of Toronto made as souvenirs, but these were made later in the mid-nineteenth century. It is worth recalling the infamous line about Simcoe's idea to place the capital in Georgina (London, Ontario): that it was only reachable by "hot-air balloon," which was then a new invention. The hot-air balloon lifts a person up to give them this "bird's-eye view," which may have contributed to thinking and representing a space from above in the mid-nineteenth century. However, again the hot-air balloon provides an actual perspective, not the non-perspective of the *Plan for the Toronto Harbour* (Figure 3) or the map of what Simcoe had imposed (Figure 4). Some might even claim that these abstract grids are a 'God's perspective,' but they are not. They go 'beyond' this perspective to a complete abstraction based on European rationality.

The contemporary complaint about gridded street networks is that they are 'boring.' But, as Jan Gehl argues, grids are only boring from above.[69] From a person's eyeline (five or six feet off the ground), grids are not boring at all, but quite useful and enjoyable. Similarly, suburban curvilinear streets might look a bit interesting on paper, they're frustrating and can be quite boring on the ground. In any case, we ought to think of the grid of the *Plan for the Harbour of Toronto* (Figure 3) and Simcoe's map (Figure 4) are 'slow grids,' whereas the later, mid-

[69] Jan Gehl, "Cities for People," lecture delivered at University of Toronto, October 7, 2010. See also, Gehl, *Cities for People* (Washington, D.C: Island Press, 2010).

twentieth century, grid of Le Corbusier are ‘fast grids’ that correspond to the airplane and helicopter.

Policing and Urbanization

Let us now turn to how Foucault understands the role of the police in relation to urbanization. Foucault argues that policing and governance go hand-in-hand, and that to police is the same thing as to urbanize. Foucault also argues that the meaning of ‘politics’ in the seventeenth or eighteenth century shifts to become the ‘art of governance’ rather than control over a territory. Following a discussion of how Foucault understands the police in relation to the urban and his historical definition of politics, I will then turn to Jacques Rancière’s rather unconventional notion of politics and the police order. I should say here that, Rancière’s work is in some ways a criticism of Foucault and his attendant theory of omnipresent power. However, this criticism is founded on Rancière’s assumption that Foucault equates power with politics. Though power is an essential aspect of the political, nowhere does Foucault equate power with politics. Further, while Foucault provides an historical account of the shift of meaning of the political and the role of governance, Rancière provides a much more ‘absolutist’ or ahistorical definition of the political in which governance is not politics.

When Foucault discusses the rise of the problem of scarcity or epidemic or contagion in the middle of the eighteenth century, it is linked to the “phenomena of the town itself.”[70] Contagion and epidemic are the problem of the town as disease and sickness are the problem of the home. The town is also the place of revolt. The town is “at the heart of these different examples of mechanisms of security” and it is the town that created “new and specific economic and political problems of government technique.”[71] It is the creation and development of towns, of urban spaces, that shifts the technique of

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[70] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 63.

[71] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 64.

governance from one of controlling a territory to what Foucault calls 'governmentality.' However, prior to the full implementation of governmentality techniques, it was the town that was an exception from territorial governance – to some extent, it was a space of self-governance. Foucault argues that it is the "fact of the [existence of the] town and legitimate sovereignty [which] had to be reconciled. How can sovereignty be exercised over a town?"[72] In other words, sovereignty up until the middle of the eighteenth century was exercised over a territory – a well-defined space which is understood to be rather static. The town introduces the problem of circulation, to which sovereignty responds with the techniques of security and governmentality.

Governing circulation, movement, exchange, and contact – specifically urban phenomena – are in many ways beyond the early, Machiavellian, conception of sovereignty (how to maintain a principality as it is, how to demarcate or fix its borders). This early conception of sovereignty is concerned with 'safety' as security: how to keep things stable and ensure the sovereign's power is not endangered. The shift in the conception of sovereignty occurs when circulation becomes the object to secure, though allowing (and even encouraging) circulation to occur. Thus, the shift is from the 'safety' of the sovereign and the territory to the security of circulation and the population.

This shift gives rise to "urban research, ways of preventing or at least controlling food shortages" and epidemics.[73] This urban research is no longer about "a relationship of obedience between a higher will, of the sovereign, and the wills of those subjected to his will."[74] Rather than passive obedience to the sovereign, "urban research" concerns "physical processes," "natural processes," or "elements of reality."[75] Rather than a strict prohibition (you will not do this or that), law finds itself becoming a "progressive self-cancellation of phenomena by

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[72] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 64.

[73] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 65.

[74] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 65.

[75] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 65.

phenomena itself."[76] So, instead of a simple prohibition it becomes a matter of marking a *limit*, an encouragement of behaviours, delimiting a point of 'too much.' *This marking of a limit, of declaring 'too much' relates directly to Foucault's concept of 'governmentality.'* This shift from territorial sovereignty to governmentality occurs just prior to the foundation of York. While this governmentality was somewhat 'new,' I argue that it is the principles of governmentality that inform Simcoe and his means to plan, establish and, secure York as a 'fort-town.'

I also contend that governmentality is a specifically urban phenomenon. The tactics of governmentality occur at the level of the urban, and it is the existence of the town that gives rise to governmentality. This is a distinct contribution to the governmentality literature since it largely concerns the state or the international (the space between states). There are some articles and book chapters that discuss governmentality in relation to urban policy (which is hardly surprising) but many of these are written from a health policy perspective. In any case, there are certainly no discussions of the founding of York or more recent Toronto in relation to governmentality.

Foucault's concept of governmentality has had quite a bit of currency in English political theory since it was one of the few lectures 'leaked,' translated, and published. A first transcription of this lecture appeared in the Italian journal *Aut-Aut* in 1978 and was then republished in a few other journals.[77] The first English translation of that Italian version appeared in the journal *I&C* in 1979 and then reached a large, English-speaking audience when this translation was re-published in *The Foucault Effect* in 1991. Not surprisingly, much of this lecture had been lost or altered. This lecture, as it appears in *Security, Territory, Population*, is based on the many cassette recordings of his lectures in

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[76] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 66.

[77] For a full account of this lecture's publication history see: Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 87. This publication's history is important because it helps to explain the variety of interpretations and uses of the theory of 'governmentality.'

consultation with Foucault's own lecture notes. This lecture on governmentality revolves around Machiavelli's *The Prince* and a few texts, published in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, which critique the book. For Machiavelli, whom Foucault takes as the model of sovereignty during this period, the sovereign is concerned only with his territory. Foucault is tracing a 'genealogy,' documenting a shift in which political writings turn from 'advice to the prince' to a new 'art of government.' *The Prince* is about a prince's ability to hold his principality, while the anti-Machiavellian literature Foucault is presenting seeks a new 'art of government.' What is perhaps most important in this shift is the role that the family plays – from a model of government to an instrument of government.

From the fifteenth to the nineteenth century, most political thinkers sought to distance themselves from 'Machiavellianism' because in *The Prince* the prince appeared as a singularity, as an externality transcendent from his principality. There was, in fact, no link between the sovereign and the territory, so an 'art of government' (if there is one to be found in *The Prince*) is two-fold: identify dangers, and manipulate relations to keep the principality in the prince's control and dominion. Quite simply, the only 'art of government' to be found in *The Prince* are ways and means for a prince to keep his principality. But this, Foucault tells us, is not the 'art of government' that the anti-Machiavellian literature seeks.

Foucault presents us with a text from the seventeenth century by La Mothe Le Vayer that distinguishes between three types of government: the art of self-government that belongs to the realm of morality, the art of managing a family, which is essentially economy, and the science of ruling the state, which is understood as politics proper. Whatever we may think about these distinctions, it is clear that politics is clearly demarcated, as well as separated from these other 'fields' of reality – morality and family.[78] The art of government here becomes a problem of re-introducing morality and the control of individual behaviour (family)

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[78] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 91.

through the techniques of the government, which concerns the problem of properly re-introducing the matter of 'economy' into the realm of politics. In other words, it first spatializes and removes these 'realms,' then seeks to re-order government with economy and morality.

Foucault seeks to link this re-ordering to an earlier statement found in Guillaume de La Perriere's text *Miroir politique*: "Government is the right disposition of things, arranged so as to lead to a suitable end."[79] We are reminded that in *The Prince* the only 'things' on which sovereignty is exercised are the territory and the inhabitants. For La Perriere, though, government is not particularly concerned with territory, but with a multitude of 'things': men and their relations, including wealth, resources, climate, irrigation, customs, habits, etc. This type of governance is expressed in the metaphor of governing a ship – the captain must account for the sailors, the cargo, and the ship itself. What is important here is that property and territory (the objects of sovereignty found in *The Prince*), while essential, are only mere variables.

The latter half of La Perriere's statement ("arranged so as to lead to a convenient end") suggests that government has its own end, its own finality. This final end, La Perriere tells us is the "common welfare and salvation of all."[80] This common good is often reduced to obedience – which means that the people should conform to the laws imposed by God, nature, and the sovereign. Thus, the end of sovereignty is sovereignty; sovereignty ensures there is submission to sovereignty (much like what we find in *The Prince*). However, Foucault sees something new in La Perriere. Since government is concerned with 'things,' it seeks a whole range of ends to these various things – a series of finalities that become the objective of government.[81] It is not so much a matter of imposing laws which subjects must obey, but an arrangement of various things so as to

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[79] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 96.

[80] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 98.

[81] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 99.

lead to a particular end. Here, then, we see that government no longer takes territory as its primary object, but in all of the 'things' it manages.

Government begins to develop its own rationality – its own means, tactics, relations – that are seen as 'intrinsic' to government itself. In this time, the existing framework of sovereignty was too large, abstract, and rigid, while these new theories on the 'art of government' were too weak. They were too weak because they took the family as the *model* for the 'art of government.' New theories on the 'art of government' began to emerge, which sought to give government its own realm separate from the sovereign. They did this by reconfiguring the family as an *instrument* of government, not its model. 'Family' was reordered around the problem of population. Populations – which *include* families, the realm of economy – are seen to have their own laws, patterns, and regularities that are not reducible to the longstanding model of the family as a political organization. This is where, Foucault argues, our modern conception of 'the economy' emerges as separate from its root of 'running a household' and as separate from government. I would argue that this form of 'population' is largely an urban population. The tactics for producing and 'accounting' for this population are deployed by the police, who, as we will see below, are specifically urban, since "to police and to urbanize is the same thing."[82]

The 'art of government' begins to find its own rationality. It is not so much that this new 'art of government' "invented" its own rationality, but that the relations between government and people were themselves revealing relations with a seemingly inherent rationality irreducible to the family. Rather than a model for government, family becomes an instrument for government to manage populations: vaccinations, marriages, and the means through which to gain information (statistics) about the population.

Population, not sovereignty, becomes the ultimate end for government. Government sees its purpose as, well, government. That is, government is no

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[82] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 337.

longer primarily concerned with merely its own survival (as is the case in *The Prince*). Rather, the purpose of government is the welfare of the populations, the improvement of its condition, the increase of its wealth, longevity, health, etc. Importantly, the means for government to manage these things is somehow viewed to be immanent to the population. Foucault terms the emergence of this new art of government "governmentality."[83] Governmentality targets the 'intersection' of the interests of the particular people (what individuals want)[84] and the interests of the government. That is, governmentality seeks to transform individual's interests into the interests of the government. Populations are the instrument for this 'art of government,' they become a particular 'field of intervention.' It removes 'family' or economy as a model of government and re-introduces and re-orders 'economy' as its own 'field' of reality. Put another way, governmentality seeks to align individual desires with collective desires.

Foucault concludes this lecture with an argument that the state is overvalued. He argues that the state, despite having the affective quality of the "cold monster,"[85] does not have "this unity, individuality, and rigorous functionality, nor … this importance. After all, maybe the state is only a composite reality and a mythicized abstraction whose importance is much less than we think. Maybe."[86] It seems Foucault is suggesting the state is not as important as we think because this new form of governance (governmentality) is an urban practice. Foucault is much less concerned with the state's takeover of society than he is with the "governmentalization" of the state: "we live in the era of governmentality discovered in the eighteenth century."[87] This governmentalization of the state has become both the life-blood of the state as well as the "*only space of political*

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[83] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 108.

[84] Here a connection can be made between governmentality and desire. Perhaps governmentality is 'perverted' in the Lacanian sense since it seeks to tell us what our desires are.

[85] A reference to Nietzsche's *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, "The New Idol."

[86] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 109.

[87] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 109.

struggle and contestation."[88] Again, governmentality is the "space" of the political. Governmentality is *also* (i.e. not the same) the measure to define what does and does not belong in the state's domain. I add that governmentality, by virtue of determining a "convenient end," is one of the measures of determining 'too much' or 'too little': too much or too little circulation, too much or too little density, too much or too little state intervention, too much or too little freedom-security. The following chapters will show how this 'too much' figures prominently in the psychic state of the urban dweller. For now, I will turn to how this 'too much/too little' plays out in the realm of the police.

While governmentality finds its birth in the archaic notion of the Christian pastorate, it "acquires its present dimensions … in the old, seventeenth and eighteenth century sense of the word 'police.'"[89] As we will see, to police and to urbanize are essentially identical.

There are about three or four lectures in *Security, Territory, Population* that discuss the shift from earlier notions of politics and governance to the "art of government" that defines the "threshold of modernity."[90] In general, what occurred was a shift away from Plato's notion that the 'State' should exist in a permanent 'state' (an idealized 'perfect' government) to an art of governance that consists of "manipulating, maintaining, distributing, and re-establishing relations of force within a space of competition"; in other words, "government is deployed in a field of relations of forces."[91] This 'deployment' occurs through "two major assemblages of political technology."[92] The first concerns the 'balance of powers' in establishing the thing called 'Europe,' in which each state is to be 'powerful' but not significantly more powerful than another state. The second, the one that concerns me for this chapter, is the "police."

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[88] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 109. Emphasis added.

[89] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 110.

[90] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 312.

[91] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 312.

[92] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 312.

Foucault argues that there was a major shift in the understanding of police at the end of the eighteenth century (again, the time of York's founding). In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, 'police' referred to a "form of community or association governed by a public authority."[93] There would be lists like, "states, principalities, towns, police" so that "a police" was a human organization that was smaller than a town, but had a public characteristic unlike a family. Thus, what we now call a "community" was then called "a police." The notion of "police" as a "poorly defined society" would last until the beginning of the seventeenth century. During this period, "police" would also refer to the set of actions that direct these communities. And, "police" referred to the result of "good government."[94]

From the seventeenth century onward, Foucault argues that "'police' begins to take on a profoundly different meaning: … the set of means by which the state's forces can be increased while preserving the state in good order."[95] It begins to refer to the "mobile, yet stable and controllable relationship between the state's internal order and the development of its forces."[96] In a word, Foucault calls this "splendor." In his 1611 text, *La Monarchie aristodémocratique*, Turquey de Mayerne writes that the police are to be concerned with "everything that gives ornament, form, and splendor to the city."[97] Foucault unearths this quotation from 1776: "I accept the definition of those who call police the set of means that serve the splendor of the entire state and the happiness of all its citizens."[98] Foucault defines "splendor" as the "visible beauty of the order and the brilliant, radiating manifestation of a force. Police therefore is in actual fact the art of the state's splendor as visible order and manifest force."[99]

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[93] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 312.

[94] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 313.

[95] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 313.

[96] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 313.

[97] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 313.

[98] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 313–314.

[99] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 314.

Earlier, we saw that the "capital [city] must be the *ornament* of the territory,"[100] and here we see the police function as the means by which to provide "splendor" to the state. Related to this 'splendor' is the need for the police to concern itself with the 'interior' of a state: to ensure the "good use of the state's forces" so that each state will be well-policed and maintain the 'balance' or 'equilibrium' of Europe. Thus, it is essential that all states have good police to ensure this equilibrium and from this there begins a type of intra-state 'science' of the police. This science is statistics: "police makes statistics necessary, but police also makes statistics possible."[101] Statistics are the set of procedures for the forces of the state so that "statistics is the state's knowledge of the state" – knowledge of both itself and other states.[102]

But what is it that the police are concerned with specifically? Foucault returns to Turquey de Mayerne's text: "'everything that gives ornament, form, and splendor to the city.' It is 'the order of everything that one can see' in the city."[103] Foucault interprets this as being the entire art of government. Turquey de Mayerne breaks down the offices and officers of the police. Without going into the details of all these, allow me just to say that the essential concern of these officers is with the role and behaviour of the people who make up the population. Adding to the traditional institutions of justice, the army, and finance, the police become an additional institution, "which is administrative modernity par excellence."[104] The police then concern themselves with a moral regulation of the population, wealth and household management, education, and the professionalization of the individual.

The fundamental aspect of police is forming and taking "man as the true subject on whom virtue and vice are impressed" so that he may perfect himself

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[100] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 14.

[101] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 315.

[102] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 315.

[103] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 319.

[104] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 321.

and take up some occupation to which he devotes himself.[105] This is a concern for the police since it makes possible the perfection of the state. It is important to princes, sovereigns, or the state that men be virtuous, obedient, and working – rather than a concern for men's wealth, the disputes the state as police are concerned with are what men 'do,' with their 'occupation.' These are tactics deployed at the level of the urban. Further, the police are concerned with the number of men in a state, the necessities for life, their health, and circulation. Setting aside the first two, the problem of health connects to the theory of miasmas and affects the shape of a "new urban space."[106] The air, ventilation, and "politics of amenities" in towns will be organized with reference to this problem of health, such as the width of roads, the dispersion of poisons, and the location of butchers, abattoirs, and cemeteries.

Circulation is the final objective of police. While this is meant to be circulation throughout the state, much of this relates to urban space: roads, public squares, etc. The circulation of goods, the products of these "proper subjects," will be through roads, canals, rivers, etc. so that the space of circulation becomes a "privileged object" for police.[107] God has provided circulation and communication through nature; man by the police.[108] And not only the circulation of the material goods themselves, but the set of regulations, constraints, limits, or the facilities and encouragements that allow for this circulation within and beyond the borders of the state.

Generally speaking, the fundamental object of police is "men's coexistence with each other."[109] Police must concern themselves with people living together, depending on one another for their needs and desires, reproducing – all of this occurring within a space of circulation. So, while the

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[105] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 322.

[106] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 325.

[107] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 325.

[108] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 332.

[109] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 326.

police must ensure that people have the basic necessities for survival, it goes beyond this to ensure they are "produced, divided up, and put in circulation" so that the state can draw its strength from them.[110] At the end of the sixteenth and the beginning of the seventeenth centuries, "police is a set of interventions and means that ensure that living, better than just living, coexisting will be effectively useful to the constitution and development of the state's forces."[111] Police ensure the "splendor of the state and the felicity of each" individual.[112]

Foucault unearths some texts from the early eighteenth century that list the concrete functions that must be of concern to the police. Without listing them all, they can be grouped as "goodness of life" (religion and morals), "preservation of life" (health and subsistence), "convenience of life" (buildings, arts, science, manufacture, commerce), the "pleasures of life" (games, theatre), and what is considered "a considerable part of the public good": the elimination and control of poverty.[113]

Foucault argues that first and foremost, these "are all essentially what could be called urban objects."[114] These are 'urban' because these things only exist in a town or because there is a town. We might object to "goodness of life" or the "preservation of life" being specifically urban issues, but Foucault points out that these were considered by the police in terms of urbanism – for the police, they are problems of coexistence and dense coexistence.

Secondly, these problems that concern the police relate to market exchange – the buying and selling of goods, ensuring a space of circulation in which this trade can occur, that products meet some standards, etc. For the police, it is about the "circulation of men and goods in relation to each other. It is

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[110] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 326.

[111] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 327.

[112] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 327.

[113] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 334.

[114] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 334–335.

the whole problem, precisely, of these vagrants, of people moving around."[115] The term "vagrant" shows up here rather unexpectedly, but it relates the problem of those who are nomadic, those who do not 'circulate' *per se*, but move about as they seemingly wish. In other words, vagrants move around 'too much' whereas "men and goods" ought to circulate at the appropriate rate of speed. In any case, for Foucault, these rules, concerns and regulations of the police are "urban regulations."[116]

Of course, all these things that the police consider problems or things they sought to implement were already in existence prior to their 'policies.' Roads, markets, violence, crime, vagrancy – all these were already in existence. But in the seventeenth and eighteenth century, with the police taking these things up as their concern, Foucault argues we begin to see the "urbanization of the territory."[117] By 'urbanizing the territory,' Foucault is referring to the ways in which an entire state or principality becomes organized like a town, arranging things to function as a town, as a perfect town. It allows for a population to communicate with each other, to live together and circulate, exchange, buy and sell because there are police regulating the rules of this circulation. Police, then, are the condition of possibility for an urban existence. This fits within Foucault's larger argument that governance had shifted from territory to population, and this 'urbanizing the territory' is part of the governance of populations, re-defining territory with concepts of the population. Thus for governmentality to function 'on' a territory, the territory must be urbanized: "to police and to urbanize is the same thing."[118] Since governmentality is interested in the "fine materiality of human existence and coexistence, of exchange and circulation," it functions through an intervention at the level of the urban or the town ("health, roads, markets, grains, and highways").[119]

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[115] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 335.

[116] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 335.

[117] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 336.

[118] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 337.

[119] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 339.

Rancière's 'Police Order'

Since Foucault argues this equivalence between policing and urbanizing, I feel it is worthwhile to bring Jacques Rancière's distinction of the political from the 'police order' into this discussion. The history of political theory is largely concerned with governance and very few theorists have provided any 'radical' (in the literal sense) theory of politics. That is, very few have theorized the meaning of 'the political.' Even the few theorists who have, such as Schmitt and Weber, understand politics primarily as governance. While Schmitt provides a clear definition of 'sovereignty' in *Political Theology* ("sovereign is he who decided on the state of exception"),[120] he also makes a compelling case for his definition of 'the political': marking the distinction between friend and enemy.[121] Schmitt is referring to states: that states distinguish between friends and enemies in the international.

Rancière provides a very compelling definition of the political in relation to what he terms the police order and, moreover, his theory is a thinly veiled critique of Foucault. But, even if we agree with Rancière's theory of the political, there is still 'room' for Foucault. Generally, I think Foucault's theory of the police gives a very good analysis of Rancière's 'police order.' While Rancière's project is to mark a limit to the political, there is nothing to suggest that the police order is unimportant. His point is just that re-arranging the police order does not count as politics. In many ways, his theory of the police order is a theory of the social, something distinct from politics. Rancière argues that politics is not the same as power. Though Foucault is 'the' theorist of power, nowhere does he write that power is the same as politics – and nowhere does he argue that politics is simply governance. Foucault's theories of power and governance only clarify what Rancière means by the police order. Moreover, in *History of Sexuality*, Foucault

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[120] Carl Schmitt, *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty*, trans. George Schwab (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985 [1922, 1934]), 5.

[121] Carl Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, trans. George Schwab and J. Harvey Lomax (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996 [1927, 1932]). The 'friend-enemy distinction' is discussed throughout, but is clearly stated on page 26.

is clear that 'emancipation' or resistance does not come from "saying yes to sex"[122] – resistance does not come from saying 'yes' to the police order, or by creating a 'better' police order.

In *Disagreement*,[123] Rancière presents his argument that much of what we normally understand as politics is not politics but what he assigns to the 'police order.' He begins with a foundational conflict in which there is a dispute among a "community of the just and unjust from the capacity of any speaking being."[124] From this, "two logics of human being-together must" be discerned: politics and the police order.[125] By "police," Rancière is referring to something beyond the normal understanding of "the truncheon blows of forces of law" but rather what encompasses all possible arrangements of "tangible reality in which bodies are distributed in a community."[126] The term "police" refers to the "system of distribution and legitimation" that involves the "organization of powers, [and] the distribution of places and roles."[127] It concerns all the things, borrowing from Foucault, regarding "'man' and his 'happiness.'"[128] In reference to Althusser's Marxism, policing is not meant to be "pejorative" or to refer to "state apparatuses" by which the state imposes order, for this would already involve a prior understanding of politics confused with police.[129] Police refers to "an order of bodies that defines the allocation of ways of doing, ways of being, and ways of saying, and sees those bodies are assigned by name to a particular place and task."[130] In another reference to Foucault, it is what allows particular speeches to

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[122] Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality: Volume 1: An Introduction*, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage Books, 1990), 157.

[123] Jacques Rancière, *Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998).

[124] Rancière, *Disagreement*, 28.

[125] Rancière, *Disagreement*, 28.

[126] Rancière, *Disagreement*, 28.

[127] Rancière, *Disagreement*, 28.

[128] Rancière, *Disagreement*, 28.

[129] Rancière, *Disagreement*, 29.

[130] Rancière, *Disagreement*, 29. This is very similar to governmentality: "the right disposition of things so as to lead to a convenient end."

be a proper discourse and another as “noise,” and it is not so much “disciplining” as it is that which allows certain things and operations to “appear” and be deemed “actually occurring.”[131]

Politics is completely different and antagonistic to policing. Politics refers to “whatever breaks with the tangible configuration whereby parties and parts or lack of them are defined by a presupposition that, by definition, has no place in that configuration.”[132] In simpler terms, ‘politics’ is whatever breaks the police order. This break is manifested on the part of those who have no part in the configuration of the police order. That the presupposition of the configuration is “outside” of the configuration can be thought of as a “constitutive outside,” similar to how Derrida theorizes the “centre” of a structure.[133] From this definition of politics as that which breaks the police configuration, it follows that “political activity is whatever shifts a body from the place assigned to it or changes a place’s designation.”[134] Political activity makes visible what once was obscured, makes heard what once was mere “noise,” or makes the unconsidered considered. Political activity is a “mode of expression that undoes the perceptible divisions of the police order” and “demonstrates the sheer contingency of the order.”[135] Furthermore, “politics occurs when there is a place and a way for two heterogeneous processes to meet.”[136] One of these processes is the ‘police’ and the other is “the process of equality,” by which he means the “open set of practices” that insists on the “equality between any and every speaking being.”[137]

Rancière’s understanding of “equality” does not refer to equality as a “given that politics then presses into service,” nor is it “embodied in a law” which

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[131] Rancière, *Disagreement*, 29.

[132] Rancière, *Disagreement*, 29.

[133] Jacques Derrida, “Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of Human Sciences,” in Derrida, *Writing and Difference*, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 278–293.

[134] Rancière, *Disagreement*, 30.

[135] Rancière, *Disagreement*, 30.

[136] Rancière, *Disagreement*, 30.

[137] Rancière, *Disagreement*, 30.

is then put into practice.[138] Rather, it is the "mere assumption that needs to be discerned with the practices implementing it."[139] It is not the equality we are familiar with in the liberal democratic state; that ought to be understood as policing. It is the equality of humans as speaking beings. Thus, if one person or group were told they were not equals, they would be equals in Rancière's eyes as they were assumed to understand what they were being told. In some ways, this notion of equality relates to the previous discussion regarding the grid and the type of equality it represents/produces. Above I had suggested that the grid relates the type of 'liberal equality' that was gaining acceptance. Now we might understand this type of equality expressed in the grid as a material manifestation of the police order.

In what many have taken as a critique of Foucault, Rancière takes issue with the claim that "everything is political," which stems from the somewhat recent "discovery" that "power relationships" are at work in nearly everything.[140] It would be more accurate to say that "everything is policing," but this would imply that nothing is. Rancière is clear on this point: "Nothing is political in itself merely because power relationships are at work in it."[141] To those who would take this as a critique of Foucault, I would counter that this is a critique of those who have taken up Foucault for their own projects. From the late 1960s onward, many have sought to 'politicize' that which had been taken as 'normal.' However, 'politicize' in this sense really means to show that power-relations are at work, and Foucault's theory of power supported these movements. But nowhere in Foucault's work does he argue that 'power' is synonymous with 'politics.' In fact, the clearest articulation of his theory of power is found in *The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1* under the chapter heading "Method." This means his theory of power is how he

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[138] Rancière, *Disagreement*, 33.

[139] Rancière, *Disagreement*, 33.

[140] Rancière, *Disagreement*, 32.

[141] Rancière, *Disagreement*, 32.

seeks to understand sexuality and the productive nature of its discourse.[142] Further developments of his theory of power can be found in both his theory of disciplinary society and his theory of discourse (notably in *The Archeology of Knowledge*).[143] Both of these branches of his theory concern how certain things come to be objects of knowledge, and how the realm of what can be known or said about these objects of knowledge is delimited and defined. Again, I would argue that power-as-method, disciplinary society, and discourse's power-knowledge all share similarities to Rancière's police order: a distribution of what can be sensed and known, the 'field' in which this occurs and situating objects (as objects) of knowledge.

For Rancière, the only "things" that are political are those that give "rise to a meeting of police logic and egalitarian logic that is never set up in advance."[144] What is important here is that nothing is political in itself, but anything can become political if it opens the space for these two logics to meet. Rancière gives the example of the politicization of the space of the domestic household. It is not political simply because there are power relations at work, *pace* Foucauldians, but because "the subject of [the] argument [is] a dispute over the capacity of women in the community."[145] Following this, we should not assume that urban space is political in itself merely because there are power relations at work. As well, we must not confuse politics in the urban with the imposed orders or distributions of bodies to assigned places, which is the function of the police. However, the urban can become a space for politics if it gives rise to itself, or the subjects in it, being heard as legitimate speaking beings, no longer as mere noise. The urban can be a space for politics if its 'babble' (its rhythm) is heard as

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[142] It also provides the beginnings of how Judith Butler came to understand poststructuralism: that power pervades the very apparatus that seeks to negotiate its terms. In other words, the 'method' by which one seeks to understand is always-already imbued with power; there is no 'neutral' method or structure.

[143] Michel Foucault, *The Archeology of Knowledge*, trans, A.M. Sheridan Smith (London: Routledge, 2002).

[144] Rancière, *Disagreement*, 32.

[145] Rancière, *Disagreement*, 32–33.

a legitimate speaking being, either as an unheard collective or as unheard subjects in the space of and/or on behalf of the urban.[146]

However, none of this is to suggest that the police order is not important, just that it does not 'count' as politics for Rancière. Nearly all of our everyday urban lives are, dare I say, 'structured' by the police order – it constrains and enables our actions, behaviours, thoughts, and beliefs. Simply walking down a sidewalk we are implicated in the police order: where to walk, how quickly, for what purpose, what we focus on and ignore, expecting certain things to be in certain places (and other things not). The distribution and location of various objects (the street, sidewalk, buildings, etc.) as well as their functions (where to circulate, where to stop, where to cross the street, the use of the buildings) are all caught up in the police order. However, since this is a material manifestation of the police order, it lends itself to a Rancièrian politics: one can disrupt this order. We can assume, then, that refusing the specified 'use' of building ('zoning') could count as politics. Indeed, as we will see in chapter 4, Jane Jacobs' insistence on a diversity of uses in an area (commonly called 'mixed-use') goes against the then-common notion of 'single use' zoning 'counts' as a rupture of the police order. In other words, Jacobs' *Death and Life* is, in Rancière's terms, a political text.

Let us now turn to a few passages from Rancière's "Ten Theses of Politics."[147] Here we find a similar argument as in *Disagreement* but it takes a different tack, from structures of governance. "Thesis One" states that "politics is not the exercise of power." Instead, politics is to be understood as "part-taking" in ruling and being ruled. This is essentially Aristotle's understanding of what constitutes political philosophy: "he who partakes in the fact of ruling and the fact

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[146] A connection here may be drawn to Lefebvre's 'rhythmanalysis' in which he seeks to show the rhythms of a day in urban spaces. See: Henri Lefebvre, *Rhythmanalysis: Space, Time and Everyday Life*, trans. Stuart Elden and Gerald Moore (London: Continuum, 2004).

[147] Jacques Rancière, "Ten Theses of Politics" *Theory and Event* 5, no. 3 (2001). No page numbers but paragraphs are numbered, which I will indicate with §.

of being ruled."[148] Following this, Rancière finds that modern democracy has led to a "sad" state of affairs in which the common good is displaced in favour of "the masses" and "necessity," leaving any notion of what constitutes the good in the hands of "experts" which essentially reduces the political to functions of the state.[149] Rancière's concern is to demonstrate that "democracy is not a political regime."[150] Democracy is the institution of politics: democracy institutes the form of "part-taking" in "ruling and being ruled," denying the relationship between these two, which is the denial of politics.

Rancière challenges another common understanding of politics: "politics cannot be deduced from the necessity of gathering people into communities."[151] This understanding of politics as a necessity, which underwrites 'social contract' theories, is an "exception" from the "'normal' order of things" in which "human communities gather together under the rule of those qualified to rule – whose qualifications are legitimated by the very fact that they are ruling."[152] In other words, humans do not gather into groups and *then* engage politics; the very gathering of humans is done through the relationship between ruling and being ruled. From this, we ought to understand 'urban politics' not simply as some 'politics' that occurs within urban space, but the very process of urbanization itself, and in the processes of grouping inside and outside the urban (i.e. the back-and-forth movement between the urban and the suburban).

Politics cannot occur if "the people" is not already constituted as a group, such that the "poor" is a "particular disadvantaged sector," the "proletariat," or only "industrial workers."[153] This merely reflects the police configuration. There is politics, though, when "the people" concerns a "supplement to the count of the

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[148] Aristotle, "Book III" in *The Politics*, eds. Stephen Everson, trans. by Jonathan Barnes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

[149] Rancière, "Ten Theses of Politics," §2.

[150] Rancière, "Ten Theses of Politics," Thesis 4.

[151] Rancière, "Ten Theses of Politics," §18.

[152] Rancière, "Ten Theses of Politics," §18.

[153] Rancière, "Ten Theses of Politics," §19.

parts of society, a specific figure of 'the part of those who have no-part.'"[154] In other words, there is politics when there is a group who does not 'take part' in the 'part-taking' as ascribed by the police order. The "political issue" and "object" of politics concerns the existence of this "supplementary" part.[155] Thus, a conflict between "interest groups" is not politics, but merely power relations of the order of the police. Rather, "political struggle … is an opposition of logics that count the parties and parts of the community in different ways."[156] Within the urban and the processes of the urbanization, we can find many who are a 'part of those who have no-part,' such as the homeless, the disenfranchised, and many recent immigrants. Moreover, the built form of the urban can and does contribute to this exclusion.

Consider the space produced in various 'urban renewal' projects, such as Regent Park in the late 1940s, which sought to 'contain' its population. Streets which ran through Regent Park were removed, the multiplexes and apartment buildings were built facing inward and only those who were 'in need' were allowed to rent apartments there. This was thought to be helpful for the residents by giving them their own space, protecting them from the outside and allowing them to have their own 'community.' However, as Regent Park came to be synonymous with 'ghetto' and 'poverty,' this 'space of their own' became 'isolation.' The built form of Regent Park has come to be understood as the biggest factor in its failure: it literally created the residents as those who 'have no-part' in the rest of the city. The recent redevelopment has an identical enthusiasm as that in the 1940s. This new redevelopment ticks off each latest trend in housing: mixed-use, mixed income, integrated with surrounding area, geothermal, solar panels, sustainability, etc. However, the root cause of poverty or the need for a place like Regent Park is not addressed. It is as though

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[154] Rancière, "Ten Theses of Politics," §19.

[155] Rancière, "Ten Theses of Politics," §19.

[156] Rancière, "Ten Theses of Politics," §19.

everyone has convinced each other that if we just build good buildings and lay them out in a good manner, poverty will go away by itself.

In any case, let us return to the distinction between police and politics, as they are presented as "two ways of counting the parts of the community."[157] Police count "empirical parts" of the "social body" – the "actual groups defined by differences in birth, by different functions, locations, and interests."[158] Police is not "repression" or "control," but rather has its essence in a "certain manner of partitioning the sensible."[159] Police, then, characterize society as a totality with everything and everyone "dedicated to specific modes of action," leaving "no place for a void."[160] The "police-principle at the heart of statist practices" is the "exclusion of what 'there is not.'"[161] I think here we find a strong symmetry with Foucault's governmentality which seeks the 'right disposition of things' just as the police order 'partitions the sensible' to ensure there are specific modes of action in specific spaces.

Rancière takes this type of analysis further than Foucault by introducing 'politics,' which "counts 'in addition' a part of the no-part" – it counts the supplementary part that does not take part in part-taking.[162] In other words, I would suggest that Rancière's 'politics' as that which breaks with or goes beyond the police order, could also be understood or 'used' as a way to break with or move beyond the 'structure' of governmentality. By "supplementing" the police order with the "no-part," politics seeks to disturb the police order. Political struggle is "that which brings politics into being by separating it from the police" order that either denies the 'no-part's' existence or seeks to subsume it into its own logic; politics is, "first and foremost, an intervention upon the visible and the

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[157] Rancière, "Ten Theses of Politics," §19.

[158] Rancière, "Ten Theses of Politics," §19.

[159] Rancière, "Ten Theses of Politics," §20.

[160] Rancière, "Ten Theses of Politics," §21.

[161] Rancière, "Ten Theses of Politics," §21.

[162] Rancière, "Ten Theses of Politics," §19.

sayable."[163] In other words, politics makes visible and sayable that which was invisible and unspoken or unheard in the police order.

In relation to space, "the principal function of politics is the configuration of its proper space."[164] To explain this point, Rancière gives an example from the everyday. He rejects Althusser's example of interpellation, in which the subject is brought into being (subjugated) by the police's call "Hey, you there!" Instead, Rancière argues that "police intervention in public space" gives legitimacy to what there is and what there is not.[165] Rather than "Hey, you there!," Rancière invokes the police's phrase "Move along! There is nothing to see here!"[166] This urban scene tells us that "that there is nothing to see on a road, that there is nothing to do but move along."[167] Rancière argues that this asserts the space of the road as "the space of circulating," so it remains "nothing other than the space of circulation."[168] Politics would intervene in this scene to transform "this space of 'moving-along' into a space for the appearance of a subject."[169] Politics refigures what "there is to do … what is seen or named" in the particular space inscribed by the police.[170]

Again, we see reference to Foucault – this time in relation to circulation. Foucault tells us that policing and urbanizing are the same thing since both share a desire to specify uses to places and produce populations that ultimately benefit the state. Interestingly, one of the examples Rancière gives of a rupture with the police order is the "activity of demonstrators … that literally turned urban communications paths into 'public space.'"[171] While streets were initially 'urban

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[163] Rancière, "Ten Theses of Politics," §21.

[164] Rancière, "Ten Theses of Politics," Thesis 8.

[165] Rancière, "Ten Theses of Politics," §22.

[166] Rancière, "Ten Theses of Politics," §22.

[167] Rancière, "Ten Theses of Politics," §22.

[168] Rancière, "Ten Theses of Politics," §22.

[169] Rancière, "Ten Theses of Politics," §22.

[170] Rancière, "Ten Theses of Politics," §22.

[171] Rancière, *Disagreement*, 30.

communication paths' as we saw in Foucault's discussion of circulation, by the time of these demonstrations, streets were already broadly understood as 'public space' so Rancière's example is not particularly convincing. There are many contemporary examples of groups and individuals 're-purposing' streets, which, if we recall Foucault's arguments, are not of Rancière's "political." What would stopping circulation do in Foucauldian terms? I think it would count as 'resistance' for Foucault, but it should not count as 'politics' for Rancière, since it is merely a response within the police order's demand for circulation. Further, Foucault is not talking only about 'normal' circulation since these streets were meant to circulate beggars and thieves too. So, a different subject circulating is not the issue for Foucault, and neither for Rancière – it is doing something in a space designated for circulation that is completely different, not simply stopping circulation. Consider the annual event known as "Park(ing) Day" where people take over on-street parking spots with couches and fake grass and just hang out.[172] This interruption of circulation is surely *not* what Rancière reserves as politics proper. As for demonstrations, it is hard to accept that an organized 'march' (still circulation) along streets counts as Rancièrian politics. Even Critical Mass rides, in which a group of cyclists ride without permits or police escorts for the simple purpose of declaring cycling's existence, is about circulation.[173] Though it *is* about circulation specifically, it appears to simply be a re-ordering of the police order. Foucault tells us that urban space is produced to allow for circulation, but not just for circulating goods to the market, but also the vagrants, disease, riots, etc. Thus, we should not find a resistance or 'politics' (in Rancière's sense) by simply circulating other things (marches, protests, electric cars, bicycles, or people walking). Even the stoppage of circulation would just be a reaction to the police order.

A proper Rancièrian politics would occur only if the space of circulation is completely transformed into something else entirely. His example of transforming

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[172] See: http://parkingday.org/

[173] See: http://www.critical-mass.info/

the space of circulation (the street) into a public space with demonstrations is a reference to (perhaps nostalgia for) the late-60s notion of demonstration, not the contemporary organized and, literally, police-led demonstrations. And it is this shift which points to a serious problem in Rancière's theory of politics. Nearly everything that at one time was thought to have ruptured the police order was absorbed by the police order. Perhaps this is less a 'problem' than an argument that Rancièrian politics is something that is not as 'static' or universal as he presents it. The actions which mark an event as 'politics' are unlikely to always produce a political event. Though Rancière's notion of politics is inflected with time (a rupturing event), his definition of 'politics' is formal in the Kantian sense which makes it vulnerable to this criticism. Thus, an action or event that ruptures the police order is extremely likely to be incorporated within the police order. This means that that action or event was, for Rancière, proper politics, but once incorporated within the police order (such as contemporary street demonstrations), it no longer counts as politics. Rancière almost admits this himself in this passage from "Ten Theses on Politics":

> In order to refuse the title of political subjects to a category – workers, women, etc… – it has traditionally been sufficient to assert that they belong to a 'domestic' space, to a space separated from public life; one from which only groans or cries expressing suffering, hunger, or anger could emerge, but not actual speeches demonstrating a shared *aisthesis*. And the politics of these categories has always consisted in re-qualifying these places, in getting them to be seen as the spaces of a community, of getting themselves to be seen or heard as speaking subjects (if only in the form of litigation); in short, participants in a common *aisthesis*. It has consisted in making what was unseen visible; in getting what was only audible as noise to be heard as speech; in demonstrating to be a feeling of shared 'good' or 'evil' what had appeared merely as an expression of pleasure or pain.[174]

When Rancière argues "the politics" is "re-qualifying spaces," or making them "spaces of a community" it is as though he means making these spaces of the

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[174] Rancière, "Ten Theses of Politics," §23.

police order. Recall that what was once referred to as ‘police’ is what we now refer to as ‘community,’ so we can rephrase Rancière in a more literal way: “getting them to be seen as the spaces of *the police order*.” The purpose of my critique here is partly to show the limitations of Rancière’s definition of politics, but also to insist on the importance of what he calls the police order, which, I argue, is the focus of Foucault’s work. So, instead of a criticism of Foucault, I suggest that Rancière has actually given a series of reasons for the importance of Foucault’s work.

While Schmitt’s definition of the political is of the international (that is, that states mark a distinction between friends and enemies), I argue that everyday people do this as well. Further, I would like to take this notion of ‘marking a distinction’ or declaring a limit in the form of ‘too much’ is also a political act. That is, each subject marks his or her own limit and I am suggesting that the marking of this limit is political. We mark a limit to nearly everything within the urban: circulation and density being the two most important. The urban is largely defined by these things (circulation and density) and judged in terms of too much or too little. Too little density does not ‘count’ as urban, whereas it is declared a problem if there is too much. Too little circulation occurs with the problems of congestion or “gridlock,’ while a limit is placed on circulation through speed limits, restricted turns, one-ways streets, etc. For example, Bloor Street West loses its urban texture in the morning as there are relatively few cars so the circulation is too fast. During the day and at night, there are more cars, causing congestion and the street regains its ‘charm,’ its urban texture. This argument about marking a limit also relates to understandings of the political as judgment (making a judgment when we know not the outcome) since the marking of a limit is essentially a judgment. As shown above, governmentality is a matter of balance (not too much, not too little), since it is the ‘right disposition of things’. For example, in the above discussion of Regent Park, it was political to declare that there was ‘too much’ poverty and subsequently destroy the area. It is political

insofar as it makes a judgment about what constitutes the good life, and does so without knowing the outcomes of the action informed by the judgment.

Thus, I would add to Rancière's theory that a rupture of the police can occur from *within* that order. That is, the poverty and inequality that existed in Toronto in the 1940s were tolerated and considered part of the arrangement of the police order. But this arrangement within the order reached a limit as evidenced by the judgment that 'something' had to be done. The tactics of governmentality concerned the negotiation of circulation: both 'good' and 'bad' things to circulate, as well as how much. The limit of this was exemplified in Foucault's point about the 'vagrant' who circulated 'too much.' Schmitt's theory of the political also concerns this judgment of a limit insofar as he defines the political as distinguishing between friend and enemy. Similarly, Schmitt's definition of sovereignty rests on a limit to the normal course of things: the exception. The grids of *The Plan for the Toronto Harbour* (Figure 3) and of the map of what Simcoe established (Figure 4) are clear examples of establishing a police order.

This chapter has introduced Toronto as the city of analysis of this dissertation and has demonstrated connections between its foundational grid and Foucault's arguments about a new form of disciplinary-security, the opening up of towns to allow for spaces of circulation – circulation of people, goods for trade, and disease. Foucault links this to a shift in sovereignty and governance (from maintaining a territory to developing populations), which he terms 'governmentality.' This chapter argued that the shift in governance is specifically urban since governmentality concerns "the right disposition of things"[175] which requires an arrangement orchestrated by the police – and Foucault argues that "to police and to urbanize are the same thing."[176] Prior to the seventeenth century, 'police' referred to a level of human organization that we now call

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[175] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 96.

[176] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 337.

'community,' but then came to take on a new meaning: the means by which the state can increase its forces while preserving order. The concerns of the police "are all essentially urban objects."[177] Because of the importance of the police in this shift toward urbanization, Rancière's distinction between politics and the 'police order' are then introduced. While Rancière's work is partly a critique of Foucault, or more accurately, Foucauldians who equate power relations with politics, this chapter has argued that Foucault's work helps to understand Rancière's police order. This chapter then provides a critique of Rancière's concept of the political and presents a different theory of the political: the judgment and declaration of a limit.

In the following chapter, we will see how marking a limit relates to 'excess,' to trimming off the excess, and to the Lacanian concept of *jouissance*, in that 'too much' *jouissance* is unbearable (enjoy, but not too much).[178] We will also see how many urban planners and theorists are responding to a limit or 'too much' – too disorganized, too organized. This will also allow us to think about the relationship between the urban and the suburban: desire for the suburbs is a result of the 'too much' in urban, while disdain for the suburbs comes from the sense that it does not have enough of the urban.

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[177] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 334.

[178] Jacques Lacan, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan*, Book XX, *On Feminine Sexuality: The Limits of Love and Knowledge*, trans. Bruce Fink (New York: W.W. Norton, 1999), 9–11.

CHAPTER 2: A PSYCHOANALYSIS OF EVERYDAY URBAN LIFE

The industrial cities of late nineteenth century gave rise to a new production of cities and urban spaces. Those dirty, polluted, and disease-ridden industrial cities (the "Dickensian Hell") led to new ways of thinking about the kind of cities we want to live in. People were no longer content to let a city or urban space come into being by accidental factors or effects of other forces (like industry or war). Instead, people began to 'plan' cities, bringing about the invention of the town planner. Of course, there were designed cities and towns during ancient Greek and Roman times, but, as I discussed in the previous chapter, plans of the sixteenth and seventeenth century were the exception, a frill, a philosophical exercise. These were plans based on abstract, even unconscious principles to create spaces for circulation or isolate areas for particular uses. Industrial capitalism created similar – though much worse – conditions than the sixteenth and seventeenth century urban theorists sought to resolve: overcrowding, disease, impediments to circulation. Urban dwellers coped with these industrial cities, but their problems eventually reached a 'limit' and some began to propose other ways of organizing urban space. One of the most influential of these early proposals was Ebenezer Howard's "Garden City," which sought to develop new towns away from industry with the benefits of nature (mainly clean air). The early twentieth century saw the rise of the town planner and many cities across North America were planned according to their principles. The sudden rise in popularity of the automobile in the early twentieth century saw many of those early planners' ideas ignored in favour of means to efficiently move automobiles around and to cities. In the post-war era, 'freeways' or 'highways' with cloverleaf interchanges were built, along with elevated highways that cut through traditional downtowns, and the population shifted from traditional cities and towns to suburbs. Though artists like Constant Nieuwenhuys proposed a radically different version of city living in his *New Babylon*, this automobile-driven town planning was finally challenged by Jane Jacobs with her opposition to Robert Moses'

plans for an elevated highway through New York City[1] and the concurrent publication of her 1961 book *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*.[2] This debate between automobile-based town planning and developing cities for *people* is still prevalent.

The following chapter will explain these movements much more thoroughly, but for now let us note that though these plans are radically different, essentially spanning the 'spectrum' of imagination and vision, what much of this planning history shares are conceptions of *what people want from their cities and towns*. People wanted them to be free of garbage and pollution, while allowing for industry to continue. Then people wanted roads and highways on which to drive their cars. Then people wanted to reclaim their cities from the dominance of the automobile. Currently, there is a whole host of demands on cities: to be clean, efficient, sustainable, liveable, walkable, to have bike lanes, public spaces, and parks, more trees, better sidewalks, to accommodate accessibility issues, etc. While on the surface, these seem like a series of demands *on the city*, I would like to turn this demand around and explore what demands the city places *on us*.

In *The Pervert's Guide to Cinema*, Slavoj Žižek begins with this argument:

> The problem for us is not 'Are our desires satisfied or not?' The problem is 'How do we know what we desire?' There is nothing spontaneous, nothing natural about human desires. Our desires are artificial. We have to be taught to desire. Cinema is the ultimate pervert art; it doesn't give you what you desire, it tells you how to desire.[3]

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[1] See: Anthony Flint, *Wrestling with Moses: How Jane Jacobs Took On New York's Master Builder and Transformed the American City* (New York: Random House, 2009).

[2] Jane Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities* (New York: Vintage Books, 1992 [1961]). As we will see in chapter 4, Jacobs is not opposed to all automobiles, but arranging urban space *primarily* for automobiles.

[3] *The Pervert's Guide to Cinema*. DVD, directed by Sophie Fiennes (Vienna: Mischief FIlms, 2006).

And, by implication of telling us *how*, it tells us *what* to desire. It is this basic Lacanian formulation[4] that I wish to employ to understand the role of cities and our desires: while we ought to take interest in whether or not a city, an urban space, or a particular plan gives us what we desire, more important is how a city, urban space, or plan *teaches* us what to desire. That is, there is a difference between an urban space or city making a demand on us and an urban space or city teaching us what we desire – these are intertwined but ought to be kept somewhat conceptually distinct.

Consider some fairly innocuous objects and situations specific to urban space. Public space is something that has come to be seen as more and more important in cities. Though public space is something we all desire,[5] the question is: why do we? What does this public space demand of people? Who uses public space? How do we know it is public space and know what we 'should' be doing there? There has been a fairly recent shift in what we want the shape of urban streets and their designated uses to be – why is this? And what do these urban streets and sidewalks demand of us? We all like cafes and bars to have patios facing the street, but why, and what are they asking of us?

One theoretical structure that will help us formulate and think through these questions is Jacques Lacan's graph of desire.[6] This will be the central framework in which to theorize the relations of urban space and its inhabitants, between what we want for our cities and what we think the city wants from us.

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[4] See: Jacques Lacan, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan. Book XI, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: W.W. Norton, 1998), particularly Chapter 2.

[5] Mark Kingwell provides an worthy critique of 'public space' as a "master signifier": a "loose and elastic notion" and "nobody admits they have no idea what it means." See: Mark Kingwell, "Masters of Chancery: The Gift of Public Space," in *Rites of Way: The Politics and Poetics of Public Space*, eds. Mark Kingwell and Patrick Turmel (Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfred Laurier Press, 2009), 3.

[6] The graph of desire is discussed in Jacques Lacan, "The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire in the Freudian Unconscious," in *Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English*, trans. Bruce Fink (New York: W.W. Norton, 2005). My presentation of it here is influenced by Bruce Fink, "Reading 'The Subversion of the Subject'" in *Lacan to the Letter: Reading Écrits Closely* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2004), 106–128.

How do we 'mutilate' parts of the city we love? If it can, how does the city ask "*Chè voi*?" ("what do you (plural) want?") and how do we ask "*Chè vuoi*?" ("what do you want?") of the city?[7] How do the city and its subjects respond? The graph of desire is the main framework in which I ask, 'What do we want for our cities?' and 'What do we think our cities want from us?' Because of the ambiguity and 'excess' of the term 'The City,' I am tempted to suggest that 'The City' be placed at the top left of the complete graph. Does the subject approach the City as he or she approaches the Other? Can we understand the City, in its messiness, disorder, and excess (rhythms), as the space of *jouissance*? Perhaps the City ought to cover the entire top of the graph? Can we not understand the subject of the City as seeking to be what the City wants from him or her (e.g. the injunction to 'be urban')? Does the City not ask us, "*Chè vuoi*?" and do we not make our demands on the City (be clean, be safe, entertain me, etc.) – and perhaps these demands are not our demands at all, but what we believe the City wants? Is it really *our* demand for more 'green space'? Later in this chapter I will make a clearer distinction between 'what the city wants from us' and 'what we think the city wants from us' with a longer discussion of enjoyment ('*jouissance*') and the psychoanalytic concept of 'transference' to give a theory of the 'voice of the city.'

The Graph of Urban Desire

The graph of desire, as I present it here, can be understood in some ways as the 'story of the subject.' Though it begins in a particular place, it does not 'conclude' in finality but rather shoots out in multiple directions and loops back on itself. And though the graph depicts the "advent" of the subject through language, it should not be understood as a 'single' early moment of the subject coming into

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[7] "*Chè vuoi*?" is Italian and means "What do you (singular 'you') want?" *Vuoi* is the 'familiar' form of 'you,' whereas *Lei* is the 'formal' form of 'you' – a distinction similar to that found in French with *tu* and *vous*. If one were to ask "*Chè vuoi*?" to a group of people (like the citizens or inhabitants of a city), and one wanted to maintain the 'familiar' form, it would be "*Chè voi*?" If one wanted to invoke the 'formal' sense of you in the plural it would be "*Chè volete*?" "*Chè vuoi*?" is pronounced 'K-vwoy'; "*Chè voi*?" is pronounced 'K-voy.'

consciousness. Though the 'complete' graph of desire is actually the fourth graph, it is worth beginning with the first, 'elementary cell':



Fig. 5. *Graph 1*. (Image from Jacques Lacan, *Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English,* trans. Bruce Fink (New York: W.W. Norton, 2005), 681.)

The vector across the top ($S \rightarrow S'$) represents the unending sliding of signification, which is 'pinned down' by the loop of subjectivity ($\Delta \rightarrow \$$). The Δ represents the presubjective, prelinguistic human as the basic living organism. At the same time, Δ represents 'mythical intention.'[8] It is the beginning of the loop of subjectivity, of a retroactive movement of meaning making. This loop of subjectivity ($\Delta \rightarrow \$$) is also the 'button tie' or 'quilting point' (*point de capiton*) that pins down meaning. At the end of the loop we see the result of subjectivization, the barred subject ($\$$) barred because of language and the constant sliding of signification.

Before moving on to the second graph, more needs to be said about this 'quilting point.' While this dissertation is not particularly concerned with the philosophy of language, it is a problem that returns through nearly all the theorists employed here. One of Lacan's main concerns was to provide a critique

[8] Slavoj Žižek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology* (London: Verso Press, 2008), 112.

of Ferdinand de Saussure's theory of language,[9] and Lacan's critique is radically different than Jacques Derrida's.[10] Language and the relationship between signifier and signified are fundamental to Lacan's theory of the subject; it is through language that the subject comes into being and, because of the absolute Otherness of language (language is not the subject's), the subject is always-already a 'barred subject' ($). For Lacan, self-consciousness arises through the internalization of the Other, bringing within the self or ego the Other's approval and disapproval. The ego-ideal's ('I') approvals or disapprovals of the ego ('myself) are mediated through language. In Lacan's words, the means "in which the ego assures itself an indisputable existence … is in no way immanent to the ego, but rather transcendent, since consciousness is based on the ego-ideal ['I'] as a unary trait."[11] That is, there is a 'second order' of consciousness (self-consciousness) that is figured 'outside' of consciousness that acts as a guarantee that the self is a stable, knowable object.

This 'self-consciousness,' however, does not apply to the subject. The subject may want things and not know it, speak without knowing it, act without knowing it, etc. The subject does not take itself as an object; the unconscious is there but is not known by the subject. While the unconscious cannot be known, it is "passively registered, inscribed or counted."[12] The unconscious is *written* in the subject without the subject being aware of this writing. And this writing of the unconscious occurs precisely in the gap between signifiers and between signifiers and signifieds. Thus, in the first graph, $\Delta \rightarrow \$$ represents the movement ($\rightarrow$) from pre-subjective 'human' (Δ) to barred subject ($) *and* the intention of

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[9] See: Ferdinand de Saussure, *Course in General Linguistics*, ed. Charles Bally and Albert Sechehaye, trans. Roy Harris (LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court, 1986).

[10] See: Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976) and; Jacques Derrida, "Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of Human Sciences," in *Writing and Difference*, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978): 278–293.

[11] Lacan, *Écrits*, 685.

[12] Fink, *Lacan to the Letter*, 109.

meaning (Δ) to the resultant meaning, the signifier with a lack ($\$$). This loop is 'pinned' down by the sliding signification of signifiers ($S \rightarrow S'$).

It should also be emphasized that the 'quilting' of signification/meaning is a *retroactive loop*, not a linear series. For Saussure, and many language theorists, each signifier gains its meaning in a type of 'additive' series so that signifier *a* + signifier *b* + signifier *c* = meaning of sentence. For Lacan, the meaning of a signifier is determined retroactively and the subject tries to 'pin down' or 'quilt' meaning. The term 'pin' is perhaps misleading – creating meaning between or to signifiers is not 'pinned' or connected to anything transcendent or outside of language – the 'quilting point' (*point de capiton*) has a type of "independent suspension" that holds things in place on its own, not attached to something else – no 'external reality,' no referent.[13] So, the 'loop' $\Delta \rightarrow \$$ in graph 1 can be understood as the 'thread' of the quilting point and the movement of the signified ($S \rightarrow S'$) can be understood as the 'fabric' of signification being tied down. Importantly, this retroactive attempt to tie down meaning begins with a 'mythical' intention (Δ) and results in $\$$: the barred subject *and* the 'barred signifier' in that the full or 'true' meaning is never achieved/never was.

In *The Sublime Object of Ideology*, Žižek prefaces his discussion of this first graph by outlining the debate between descriptivism and antidescriptivism. This debate concerns how names refer to the objects they do. For descriptivism, the word or name is "the bearer of a certain meaning – that is, it means a cluster of descriptive features."[14] Descriptivism assumes that words, like 'table' or 'gold,' have a meaning in themselves and that, so long as an object meets the criteria of that meaning, then that object is then called 'table' or 'gold,' or what have you. Antidescriptivism, on the other hand, argues that an object and name are connected by a "primal baptism" and so the link between the word and object remain even if the cluster of descriptive features which initially determined the

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[13] Fink, *Lacan to the Letter*, 113.

[14] Žižek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology*, 98.

meaning changes radically. ‘Table,’ we can suppose, has always referred to what it refers now. ‘Gold,’ however, refers to something different now than it did when first ‘baptized’ ‘gold.’ In other words, what is referred to as ‘gold’ has changed over history; the meaning of the word ‘gold’ has changed (which, in a way, disproves descriptivism). Žižek presents us with this debate to show that the “fulfilment of desire” is central: “when we encounter in reality an object which has all the properties of the fantasized object of desire, we are nevertheless necessarily somewhat disappointed.”[15] In other words, when we encounter the object it never lives up to what we thought it would be. For Žižek, Lacanian theory helps us get at what both descriptivism and antidescriptivism miss – the “radical contingency of naming.”[16]

While my purpose here is not to get into an extended discussion of the theories of language, I bring this up to suggest that this relationship between fantasy, desire, the name, and the object can help us to understand the words ‘city’ and ‘urban.’ What we understand by the terms ‘city’ or ‘urban’ is caught up in fantasy, so whenever we encounter the city or the urban in reality, it necessarily fails to meet that fantasy. That ‘surplus’ that remains in the name (like ‘city’) but is never found in the object is *objet petit a* – the ‘little other [*autre*].’ So, while Žižek uses the example ‘gold,’ we can think of the name ‘city’ – “we search in vain in its positive, physical features for that X which makes of it the embodiment of, [for gold, its] richness.”[17] Likewise, to find the meaning of the terms ‘city’ or ‘urban,’ we will search in vain by looking at any empirical, physical features. Consider all the empirical ways people have tried to define ‘the city’: population, density ratios, economic activity, political boundaries, etc. All of these empirical criteria never really get to the ‘kernel’ of the word ‘city.’ Instead, the meaning of ‘city’ (or ‘urban’) exists as fantasy; it is a concept not so much laden with as it is produced

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[15] Žižek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology*, 100.

[16] Žižek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology*, 101.

[17] Žižek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology*, 104–105.

by desire. The term ‘city,’ then, is that surplus-X, the object-cause of desire that is retroactively named in the ‘quilting’ of the first graph (above).

However, fantasy in Lacanian theory is not something wholly from ‘within’ – fantasy is, as is everything in Lacanian psychoanalysis, caught up in the Other. So, as we will see in graph 2, the relation between an object and its name is largely determined by the Other. Rather than look to some ‘empirical reality’ to find a (lack of) correspondence between the object and the name, Lacanian theory would instead point to the Symbolic order itself, the realm of the Other (what Žižek calls the ‘big Other’). This is where we find the “dogmatic stupidity” of the signifier: a word refers to an object because that is what the object is called. This ‘what it is called’ invokes the big Other, the dimension of the Symbolic beyond a particular subject. So the city is called ‘the city’ because that is what it is called – because that’s what the Other calls it. This is why understand the city or urban by its ‘feel,’ its ‘urban-ness’ or its ‘city-ness.’ A city, as a collection of ‘citizens,’ is nothing without the space: the attendant roads, buildings, and infrastructure. And the ‘urban,’ as a particular built-form space, is nothing without other people and the particular ‘urban’ social relationships. Nonetheless, that a city is called a ‘city’ because that is what it is called should appear an unsatisfactory answer. In the final, complete graph we will see why we cannot depend on the Other to justify what a name refers to because the Other is lacking as well, which is why it is symbolized as $\mathbb{A}$ – *Autre* crossed out.



Fig. 6. *Graph 2*. (Image from Jacques Lacan, *Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English,* trans. Bruce Fink (New York: W.W. Norton, 2005), 684.)

While the 'starting point' of graph 1 was ∆, 'intention,' in graph 2 we see that ∆ is now at the beginning of the vector Signifier→Voice. From this we can understand the 'intention' of the signifier which is 'quilted' by the Other. The 'voice' represents the 'remainder' or 'surplus' of the 'intention' pinned down by the Other. The 'voice,' according to Žižek, is not that which precedes language (the 'presence' of voice or language) but rather the leftover of the signifying operation, what remains after the quilting operation. Žižek gives the example of the 'hypnotic voice' in which a repeated word loses all meaning and becomes its own object. Nonetheless, we should not confuse the 'voice' represented in this graph with what I will later refer to as the 'voice of the city.' The 'voice of the city' will be more of a 'projected agency' than the 'remainder' of the signifying operation, which I will demonstrate below through a discussion of transference. Here, however, allow me to suggest a link between the 'voice' represented in this graph and the 'rhythm' Lefebvre writes of in *Rhythmanalysis*,[18] such as the hum of fans, buzz of traffic, din of the crowd, etc. These are the leftovers, remainders or surpluses of the operations of the city. And yet these remainders and surpluses *are* precisely the 'sounds of the city': honking cars, rumbling streetcars and subways, people

[18] Henri Lefebvre, *Rhythmanalysis: Space, Time and Everyday Life*, trans. Stuart Elden and Gerald Moore (London: Continuum, 2004).

talking, sirens, etc. Without these sounds, there is no 'voice' of the city. It is like the sound of lapping waves of the ocean: though quite audible, it is peaceful and we bristle at a piercing sounds overtop, and we might find a silent ocean shore uncanny. Likewise, in the city, we bristle at excessively loud vehicles, someone talking *too* loud. And, while some seek out pure silence in an urban area, were the city to be completely silent we would find it uncanny. In fact, the silent, empty city is a common theme of anxiety in contemporary movies.[19]

The bottom half of this graph is essentially the mirror stage. The ego is represented here as *m* (*moi*). Opposite the ego, we see the imaginary other (*i(a)*), which is an alter ego or a 'little other like oneself,' a semblance of the ego. *i(a)* acts as a 'mirror' (or mold) for the ego (*m*) which provides 'imaginary identification.' The 'imaginary other' provides a fixed point (not unlike a quilting point) outside of the ego that gives the ego its unity, stability, and/or coherence.

I(A) is the Other's Ideal or the 'ego-ideal' that the subject internalizes, what the subject feels he must become to be the ideal of the Other. I(A) stands for symbolic identification, the subject identifying with some signifying feature or trait (I) in the "big Other"/ symbolic order.[20] The ego-ideal is a vantage point outside the ego (*m*) *from which* the ego observes itself. What is important here is that for the ego *(m)* to achieve self-identity, it must identify with an Other/other outside itself. This is how Lacan understands 'alienation' and why psychoanalysis is a social theory.

Again: imaginary identification *i(a)* is identification with the image in which we appear likeable or loveable to ourselves – what we would like to be. Symbolic identification I(A) is "identification with the very place *from which* we are being

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[19] One of the best examples of this occurs in the 1997 film, *Abre los ojos* translated as *Open Your Eyes*. (The film was remade in 2001 as *Vanilla Sky*.) The main character César (played by Eduardo Noriega) begins his routine commute to work, enjoying the lack of traffic in his sports car only to slowly realize that the lack of traffic is because the city is entirely empty – literally enjoying a lack. He stops and gets out of his car, calling out "Hello! Hello?" to anyone (the Other): *Abre los ojos*, DVD, directed by Alejandro Amenábar (Spain: Live Entertainment, 1997).

[20] Žižek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology*, 116.

observed, *from where* we look at ourselves so that we appear to ourselves likeable, worthy of love."[21] This interplay of imaginary and symbolic identification is the "mechanism by means of which the subject is integrated into a given socio-symbolic field," like the city.[22] For the ego *(m)* to achieve self-identity, it is necessary that it identify with something outside itself, which is how Lacan understands 'alienation.' Later, we will see how the subject 'turns' from 'alienation' to 'separation.'

Here, though, we need to pay attention to the difference between imaginary identification/alienation and symbolic identification/alienation. While the mirror stage necessarily involves an other, it is the other-like-ourselves. Much more important, and interesting, is the identification with the big Other, symbolic identification.

But let us first look at imaginary identification. Lacanian theory insists that the trait on the basis of which we identify with someone is hidden, and it is not a 'glamorous' feature.[23] Žižek gives some examples from European elections in the mid-1980s, but we can take as an example the 2010 election of Rob Ford as mayor of Toronto. It was obvious that his campaign promise was flawed: maintain city services while lowering taxes. This is a popular platform that has elected many politicians, none of whom have been able to deliver on it, but it resonates with the fantasy of contemporary, 'small government' conservatism. The structure of fantasy is "I know very well, however…" Thus, this conservative fantasy is "We know that governing and providing services requires money (hence the corporate donations, privatization, etc.) but we continue to act as though it can be done for free. But the point to be made here regarding voters' imaginary identification with Ford involves his character flaws. Though born into a wealthy family, inheriting a multi-million dollar international company and a network of political allies, Ford claims to speak up for the "little guy," on side with the working-class, and

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[21] Žižek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology*, 116. Emphasis original.

[22] Žižek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology*, 123.

[23] Žižek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology*, 117.

frustrated by the privilege of the power elites (of which he is one). Prior to the election, opponents, citizens, and the media pointed out many of Ford's character or personal flaws, but his popularity continued to rise. Some examples: drunken verbal abuse to strangers at a sports game; caught drinking and driving in possession of marijuana; saying in Council that if people were not gay or did not use needles they would not get AIDS; also in Council, saying that it is cyclists' "own fault" if they get hurt or killed by cars in the city. The lesson here is that the traits of Ford's which people identified were traits considered failures and weaknesses, so that, as Žižek writes, "by pointing out the failure we can unwittingly reinforce the identification."[24] People 'recognize themselves' in these flaws. So, the lesson for those opposed to Ford's city-destroying policies is to stop pointing out his character flaws. And, for a candidate who appears to the public as 'too smart,' 'to perfect,' or 'over qualified': invent some minor character flaws.

Similarly, we might also identify with the city, not with its successes, but with its flaws. Recently, some have started advocating for what is termed 'messy urbanism'[25] – a recognition that what has traditionally been considered 'problems' of the city (bit of litter, a lack of coherency, a certain 'grittiness') are actually the things that make a city a city. Consider, too, the horror we would ultimately feel were the city to function as smoothly as an efficient machine.

Now, this type of identification that occurs by identifying with a 'flaw' is imaginary identification. Symbolic identification is something we need to consider on another register – it is something that occurs "on behalf of a certain gaze in

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[24] Žižek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology*, 117.

[25] See: Josh Shelton, "Costumes, Grains, Lizards, Bones, and Vacuum Cleaners: The Urban Wilderness of Waldo," *Review* (Nov 2007): 26–31. Retrieved from: http://www.eldo.us/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/waldo.pdf. The phrase "messy urbanism" has gained popularity in Toronto after observations of the Los Angeles planner, James Rojas, which can be found here: Shawn Micallef, "Toronto's Messy Urbanism from the Perspective of an Angeleno," *Spacing Toronto*, Oct 17, 2007. Retrieved from: http://spacingtoronto.ca/2007/10/17/toronto%E2%80%99s-messy-urbanism-from-the-perspective-of-an-angeleno/. The value of cities' impracticalities and inefficiencies were noted previously by Jane Jacobs. See: Jane Jacobs, "The Valuable Inefficiencies and Impracticalities of Cities," in *The Economy of Cities* (New York: Random House, 1969): 85–121.

the Other."[26] So, beyond looking to see what model or person the subject is seeking (imaginary) identification, we need to ask, "*for whom* is the subject enacting" this identification?[27] Under what gaze does the subject consider him or herself when taking on this identification? Žižek tells us that the gap between the way the subject sees itself and the point from which the subject assumes to be observed helps to understand hysteria: the hysteric offers herself as the object of the Other's desire, but somehow 'knows' what the Other (the Other's gaze) wants. Žižek also gives a reading of Dickens – though Dickens provides an 'admiration' of the common, poor people in his novels, he nonetheless is providing this 'sympathy' from the "point of view of the corrupted world of power and money."[28] Similarly, Rob Ford enacts a concern for the "little guy" (the "taxpayer") even though he has inherited a large printing company, the money from which he uses to support his mayorship.

And do we not see this operation occurring within urban everyday life? Take the plethora of 'lifestyles' that one can seemingly 'choose' from in the city: hipster (young, claims irony, listens to indie music, etc.); eco-yuppies (young professionals with new children, a dog, expressing an exaggerated concern for the environment); the student, the professor, the athlete, the yogi, the business person, etc. All of these identifications are, of course, fed by the big Other, which is what gives subjects the cultural cues. But we might wonder under what gaze do these subjects assume they are being observed; *for whom* are they doing it? I would argue that it is for the gaze that only the urban provides: the gaze of the city itself. With its large and dense population, cities ensure that one is nearly always seen by an other, captured in Jane Jacobs' famous phrase, "eyes on the street."[29] We know, for example, that people enjoy sitting on patios, porches, balconies, or near windows that look out onto the street. Consider the insistence

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[26] Žižek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology*, 117.

[27] Žižek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology*, 117.

[28] Žižek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology*, 119.

[29] Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 35.

which impels suburban teenagers to ‘go to the mall’ or to ‘go downtown’: they’re playing with various imaginary identifications, but what is the point of having this identification with a little other if there is no gaze of the big Other? A friend of mine who is fanatical about yoga admits that you could just do yoga at home, “but it’s just not the same…” In other words, are so many people doing yoga for yoga itself, or are they doing it so they can walk along a busy street with a rolled-up yoga mat under their arm? Do hipsters go to concerts to enjoy obscure music or do they go to be seen there? Do we enjoy having a drink on a patio or do we enjoy being seen to enjoy a drink on a patio? Ultimately, do city dwellers enjoy the bustle of the city, or do they enjoy being seen to enjoy the bustle?

Allow me to explore this theory of the ‘gaze’ a bit further with three specific examples.[30] Recently on Bloor Street West, two food establishments opened up and both are very popular. One is a location of the frozen yogurt chain (Menchies) situated on the ground floor with very large windows so that the entire inside can be viewed from the outside. The other is a second location of the very popular restaurant “Guu” which is situated on the ground floor but ‘shuttered’ to the street by ‘shabby-chic’ boards, however, these boards have about a dozen view-holes which allow people on the street to literally peer into the restaurant. Though these two examples seem opposite, they are both playing on the notion of the gaze. Menchies provides a ‘transparent’ facade for the gaze of the Other the clearly look in;[31] Guu appears to limit this gaze, but in fact draws more attention. And, since 1976, Toronto has endured its own gaze via the CN Tower. We are able to gaze at it from nearly anywhere in the city, while the tower itself is constructed with an ‘observation deck’ for people to gaze out at the city. One of the more popular projects during 2010’s Nuit Blanche involved the CN Tower: the LED lights that run up the tower were altered by people sending text messages

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[30] Lacan’s theory of the gaze is discussed further in chapter 5 in relation to Lefebvre’s theory of the gaze and the ‘blind field.’

[31] Adding to the gaze of *Menchies* is its association with celebrity culture. Celebrities are often ‘caught’ with the product in paparazzi-style photos published in celebrity tabloids. Thus we have regular people wanting to be seen enjoying the thing that other people see celebrities enjoying.

to a special number. People would text “power” to the number and see the lights become brighter and race up and down more quickly. It could be thought of as giving people the ability to ‘control the Big Other.’ Unsurprisingly, many people said, “I don’t think it really works.”

In any case, *i(a)* is always already subordinated to I(A); imaginary identification (mirror stage, etc.) is always already subordinated to symbolic identification (the gaze from which we assume to be observed). The symbolic identification determines the imaginary form in which we appear likeable to ourselves.[32] In imaginary identification we “imitate the other at the level of resemblance.”[33] That is, we identify with the image of an other insofar as are like that other. In symbolic identification, we identify ourselves with the other at the point where the other is unable to be imitated, at the point which eludes resemblance. In terms of symbolic identification, consider the injunction to ‘be urban.’ We see this on condo ads as a means to market to young people who live or grew up in suburban areas. But what does it mean? To ‘be urban’ is to attempt to identify with something that eludes resemblance. It is only a vague notion of, perhaps, being more ‘sophisticated,’ ‘cultured,’ or ‘elite’ – none of this really helps us understand what ‘being urban’ means. Beyond these condo ads, this injunction to ‘be urban’ is felt by many city dwellers – a demand to enjoy the city, to take it all in, and not go crazy from the excessive stimulations the city provides. But, as we saw with the term ‘city,’ ‘urban’ in this injunction does not have any empirical meaning … it is a case in which we try to be this ‘*je ne sais quoi*.’ We do, however, increasingly see urban life portrayed in popular movies and television shows. And the form of the urban is drastically different than it was portrayed twenty or thirty years ago. Instead of the bleak backdrop of *Escape from New York*,[34] the opening scenes of *Jacob’s Ladder* (set in 1975 New York),[35]

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[32] Žižek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology*, 120.

[33] Žižek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology*, 120.

[34] *Escape from New York*, DVD, directed by John Carpenter (Los Angeles: AVCO Embassy Pictures, 1981).

[35] *Jacob’s Ladder*, DVD, directed by Adrian Lyne (Culver City, California: TriStar Pictures, 1990).

or the gritty streets that provide the backdrop of *Taxi Driver*,[36] we now see manicured storefronts, stylish café patios, and characters mingling safely on busy streets. This is not to say there were not positive portrayals of the urban environment in the 1980s or earlier, and it is difficult to pin-point a specific example here, but I argue that the urban is increasingly represented positively, especially in contemporary television shows from the vapid *Pretty Little Liars*[37] to HBO's new series *The Newsroom*.[38] I suggest that this trend began with *Seinfeld* (1989–1998)[39] and movies such as *You've Got Mail* (1998),[40] which presented the urban positively. Around the same time, movies such as Edward Scissorhands (1990),[41] The Truman Show (1998),[42] and American Beauty (1999)[43] began stressing the banalities of suburban life. These shows and movies present us with particular (and decidedly contemporary) notions of what 'being urban' means: such as what we should do in these spaces and what we should expect of others and ourselves.

Graph 2 (Figure 6) also shows the transformation of 'need' into 'need addressed to the other,' which is also phrased as 'the demand,' represented by the upwards movement *i(a)*→A. This demand is not self-evident to the Other and thus must be interpreted. The Other's interpretation of the demand is represented on the other side of the top vector as s(A), the signified's meaning supplied by the Other. And, as I have been arguing, the Other here can be understood as the

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[36] *Taxi Driver*, DVD, directed by Martin Scorsese (Los Angeles: Columbia Pictures, 1976).

[37] *Pretty Little Liars*, television series, multiple writers and directors (New York: ABC Family, 2010–present).

[38] *The Newsroom*, television series, multiple directors, written by Aaron Sorkin (New York: HBO, 2012–present).

[39] *Seinfeld*, television series, directed by Art Wolfe et. al. (New York: NBC, 1989–1998).

[40] *You've Got Mail*, DVD, directed Nora Ephron (Burbank, California: Warner Bros., 1998).

[41] *Edward Scissorhands*, DVD, directed by Tim Burton (Los Angeles: 20th Century Fox, 1990).

[42] *The Truman Show*, DVD, directed by Peter Weir (Hollywood: Paramount, 1992). Interestingly, *The Truman Show* was filmed in Seaside, Florida which was the first town built on New Urbanist principles, which I will discuss further in this dissertation's conclusion.

[43] *American Beauty*, DVD, directed by Sam Mendes (Universal City, California: DreamWorks Pictures, 1999).

city. Our needs and demands are often placed at the feet of the city. But the city, like the Other, can never satisfy the subject's demand. The original demand can never be fully formulated in language so the Other can never know what we really want, only what it seems we are asking for. The subject's need is never completely expressed in his or her demand: the demand is not all we want. The objects the Other provides in response never fully satisfy us; we always want something more. This 'more,' (remainder, surplus) is *desire*. It is the space represented as *d*, the puddle which spills over the Other in the third graph.



Fig. 7. *Graph 3.* (Image from Jacques Lacan, *Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English,* trans. Bruce Fink (New York: W.W. Norton, 2005), 690.)

The primary demand made to the Other is recognition: "I want to be wanted." The subject then seeks to know the Other's desire: "What does the Other want from me? What can I do to make the Other desire me?" The subject seeks to position him or herself as the object of the Other's desire. The subject is then continually seeking to figure out what the Other's desire is so that he or she can satisfy it. What gets lost is the ego's own desires. So, desire is not about

what the ego wants, but rather what it believes the Other wants from it and desire is, literally, the Other's desire. The subject of the city – citi-zen – asks, 'what does the city want or desire from me?'

To the subject's search for the Other's desire, the analyst asks, "*Chè vuoi*?" ("You are telling me all this, but what do you want with it, what are you aiming at: What do *you* want?"). At first, the subject's answer (were it honest) would be "I want to be the object of the Other's desire!" But the point of asking "*Chè vuoi*?" is for the subject to momentarily leave aside what he or she believes the Other wants and consider the ego's own desires. This split is essential and is represented in the graph: the top arc represents what the subject wants, while the arc below "*Chè vuoi*?" represents what the Other wants from the subject. So, "*Chè vuoi*?" is asked and answered by both the subject and the Other. Importantly, it is desire (*d*) that introduces this gap between the subject and the Other.

We make our demands on the City (be clean, be safe, be entertaining, be sustainable, have green space, etc.), but perhaps these demands are not our demands at all, but what we believe the City wants. Is it really *our* demand for more 'green space'? Green space, urban farming, urban tree projects, green roofs, etc. – are these not attempts to fill the hole/lack in the Other/city? Or consider the term the urban designer Jan Gehl uses to guide his designs – 'invite.' He sets up urban space to *invite* people to use the space: sit, walk, cycle, etc.[44] And he makes urban space 'un-inviting' for cars, literally inscribing a desire/demand in the infrastructure. Or think of circulation or the concept of induced traffic, which shows that adding another road or another lane to a highway does not relieve traffic congestion, but actually results in more traffic. The built environment demands (or expects) a certain behaviour of the subject.

The subject should begin to realize that the Other – the city – does not fully articulate what it wants or lacks. Thus, the subject's attempt to be what the

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[44] Jan Gehl, *Cities for People* (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 2010).

Other wants is doomed to failure. The subject can never be that 'final' (object of) desire that puts an end to it. So the city is a 'perpetual project' – it is never finished; there will never be the 'final' green space or 'final' highway.

The movement from *d* (desire) to $\$ \diamond a$ (fantasy) is motivated by the subject's own question: "What does the other want? What does it lack? Where can I fill/fit in?" – desire is still caught up in trying to be the Other's desire or the object of the Other's desire.

So, in the lower part of graph 3 (Figure 7), the subject identifies with the Other and tries to be what (the subject thinks) the Other wants. The status of the subject here in the lower half is 'alienation.' In the upper half of graph 3 (Figure 7), the subject's status is 'separation' – separation from the attempt to be the final object for the Other. 'Separation' is as close as Lacan gets to traditional leftist ideals of 'freedom' or 'emancipation.' In this upper half of Graph 3, the subject must face the fact that the Other has a lack or a gap between the Other's conscious and unconscious wants. In other words, the subject is confronted with the fact that the Other wants something different than it claims. The subject may begin to realize that the Other does not fully articulate what it wants or lacks, which is what the subject is trying to be, and realize the futility. The subject can never be the phallus (the signifier of the Other's desire) for the Other. In other words, the subject can never be the 'final signifier' of the Other's desire; it can never be that 'final' (object of) desire that puts an end to it. As we will see, the subject must take responsibility for his or her own desire.

Žižek argues that the split between demand and desire is what defines the hysterical position. For Lacanian theory, the hysterical demand is 'I'm demanding this of you, but what I'm really demanding of you is to refute my demand because this is not it!'[45] That the Other can answer "*Chè vuoi*?" comes only from a hysterical subject position in which he becomes exasperated: "Why am I what

[45] Žižek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology*, 124.

you are telling me that I am?"[46] That is to say, the hysteric's question is opening the gap between the what the subject is and what the Other sees or finds in the subject – that 'surplus object' in the subject that causes him to resist interpellation. The 'final moment' or 'breakthrough' (not 'cure') in the analyst-analysand relationship occurs when the subject/analysand begins to resist asking the Other the "*Chè vuoi*?" question and begins to accept his being as "non-justified by the big Other."[47] However, the subject needs to be the addressee of the "*Chè vuoi*?" question, and provide his own answer and take responsibility for his own desire.

So, one answer to "*Chè vuoi*?" is ($\$ \lozenge a$), fantasy. Fantasy functions as a means to fill the void of the desire of the Other by constructing an answer to "what does the Other want?" Fantasy is what allows us to "evade the unbearable deadlock in which the Other wants something from us," though it is impossible to figure out what it is the Other wants.[48] Very often what the Other really wants is both prohibited and impossible and so fantasy acts as a resolution to (or compensation for) this deadlock.

How might we see this play out in the city? A common complaint (sometimes a point of praise) of the city is that there is just 'too much' going on. There are too many 'things happening' and a person cannot 'keep up' with them all. So, we construct a fantasy about this: we make the appearance of keeping up, knowing very well that it is impossible to keep up but carry on like we can. We try to fill in this gap by just being aware of all the things going on, reading about them, telling people about them (not with any detail, just that they 'happened'). The city of Toronto is often described as the 'city of neighbourhoods' in an attempt to pretend the city is smaller, more small-town than big-city.[49] Many in

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[46] Žižek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology*, 126.

[47] Žižek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology*, 126.

[48] Žižek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology*, 128.

[49] This is likely explained by the desire for the "oceanic feeling" that Freud describes in *Civilization and Its Discontents* (discussed later in this chapter).

Toronto also seek to 'fill in' the desire of the city by assuming it requires more of the rural in the form of trees and urban farms. This fantasy of Toronto needing the rural also appears in the insistence of many that should be able to drive their cars anywhere and park them anywhere. People from residential areas come into the city for the services, entertainment, and life that only a dense population can provide, but then become annoyed at this dense population (too loud, too crowded, too busy).

As I have been suggesting, 'The City' can be understood as the Other (A) on the graph of desire. Below I will suggest that it can also be understood as $\mathbb{A}$ (the Other with a lack), but allow me to suggest that 'The City' could be placed on the graph of desire directly under "*Chè vuoi*?" were we to think of The City taking the place of the analyst. Pinning it here would allow The City to have a relation to desire, fantasy, the Other (A), and, in the final graph (Figure 8), the 'barred Other' ($\mathbb{A}$).



Fig. 8. *The Complete Graph*. (Image from Jacques Lacan, *Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English,* trans. Bruce Fink (New York: W.W. Norton, 2005), 692.)

Down the left side of the complete graph (Figure 8) we have $S(\mathbb{A})$, the lack in the Other, the inconsistency of the symbolic order. Then $\$ \diamond a$, the formula of fantasy, which functions to conceal this inconsistency. Finally, there is *s*(A) which is the effect of the signifier as dominated by fantasy. It is important to remember that for Lacanian theory, fantasy is not the realization of desire. Rather, fantasy is what *constitutes* desire; fantasy teaches us "how to desire."[50] Thus, fantasy exists as a sort of paradox – it provides the co-ordinates of our desire while at the same time acting as a defence against "*Chè vuoi*?" since it acts as a screen over the void in the desire of the Other. Further, there are really two forms of desire here: the desire constructed by fantasy is actually a defence against desire on a higher register – the 'pure' desire of the Other. Thus, when Lacan formulates an ethical maxim (not to give "ground relative to one's desire"),[51] he is referring to the "desire of the Other beyond fantasy."[52] Similar to not giving way on one's desire is the notion of 'traversing the fantasy' or 'going through the fantasy.' This involves exposing how the object of desire comes to be seen as containing that unknown X that makes it desirable: by entering the framework of fantasy ($\$ \diamond a$). So, what then are the true desires in the fantasies listed above (Toronto as a 'city of neighbourhoods,' the city needs more rural, should provide clear highways and free parking, and provide the things a dense population provides without the dense population)? Perhaps it is that these people actually do not like cities. Or perhaps they really do like urban life, but have 'sacrificed' this desire under the (false) assumption that it would be better to raise a family in the suburbs. Or perhaps they do not actually like the things they come into the city to see and experience, but just like the *idea* of it; they want to appear to enjoy these things like we saw above in the discussion of symbolic identification.

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[50] Žižek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology*, 132.

[51] Jacques Lacan, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan. Book VII, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis*, trans. Dennis Porter (New York: W.W. Norton, 1992), 319.

[52] Žižek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology*, 132.

The complete graph (Figure 8) is essentially divided into two elements: the lower half is the level of meaning while the upper half is the level of enjoyment. The previous graphs and my discussion of them have already covered the lower half, so I will focus here on the upper half. The main 'problem' of the upper half appears in the field of the signifier's order (the big Other/*Autre*), when it is "perforated [or] penetrated by a pre-symbolic (real) stream of enjoyment" – in other words, when pre-symbolic enjoyment (*jouissance*) becomes caught up in the signifier's network.[53] Thus, we see *jouissance* come out the other side of the signifier's network as 'castration' – the removal or evacuation of enjoyment. The first point of 'contact' of the vector *jouissance*→castration is S(𝔸), which represents that the lack of consistency in the Other, that there is no Other for the Other, that there is no God or guarantor of what the Other says. No statement has a guarantee. *Jouissance* is placed 'prior' to, or 'outside' of S(𝔸) because *jouissance* cannot be symbolized: as soon as it is, it is a loss of enjoyment. What is crucial to recall is that, while it is fairly well known that the Lacanian subject is 'barred' (𝕊), the Other is also 'barred' (𝔸). The Other, the symbolic order itself, is structured around a central lack. Without this lack in the Other, the symbolic order would be a totalized and closed structure leaving the subject with only radical alienation with the Other/symbolic order. But, since the Other contains this lack, the subject is able to experience a "de-alienation" or "separation."[54] This means that the subject is able to understand and experience that the object (within the symbolic order) is separated from the Other itself – that the Other "hasn't got it."[55] In other words, the Other is blocked as well, the Other has desire (a lack) as well. Thus, as Žižek likes to remind us, "there is no big Other" – the Other is not the totalized order it appears to be. Similarly, the symbolic order of the city 'does not exist.'

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[53] Žižek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology*, 136.

[54] Žižek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology*, 137.

[55] Žižek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology*, 137.

Lacan explains S(𝔸) through a discussion of *Hamlet* by arguing that Hamlet assumes his mother's (Gertrude) desire for his uncle is lacking (S(𝔸)) when, in fact, she does not: she 'has an answer' for her desire (s(A)). Since Lacan allows the Other (either A or 𝔸) in these formulas to be a familial, juridical, or religious Other, I argue we can think of the city as this Other – a particular physical and social structure with mores, demands, desires, rules, etc. I would like to suggest that can we can replace the Hamlet character with an everyday city dweller and Gertrude with the city itself. That is, the city dweller asks the city what it is lacking, what it desires from him or her, assuming that the Other (the city) is lacking in some way. That is, expecting an S(𝔸) type of answer. But the city responds with an answer much like Gertrude's – it does not require anything from one particular subject; it ticks along with or without the subject. That is, it provides an s(A) type of answer. The city does not need him to put in a new highway or park. Hamlet knows very well what he wants (he has a clear answer to "*Chè vuoi*?"): he wants to avenge his father's death. But the problem for Hamlet is how he reconciles his mother's desire. He cannot accept that she enjoys getting it on with his gross uncle. Similarly, a city dweller may know very well what he wants, but has a problem with the city's own indifference. The city doesn't really need anything from him or her. So we just make it up: the city needs 'beautification,' it needs to add or remove a rather banal rule, we express nit-picking complaints, etc. For example, many cyclists in Toronto argue that if all cyclists 'followed the rules of the road,' they would gain respect from the city and drivers (A). But, of course, this will never work because there is no Big Other (𝔸).

A different example: recently, plans were released concerning Queens Quay and changing the location of the uses of that street.[56] From the water north it was to be: pedestrian space, bicycle space, street car tracks, then two lanes of motor vehicle traffic. It was good plan. But, instead of just accepting this ("Looks good! Go ahead!"), many people interested or concerned with urban planning got

[56] The plans were created by West 8 and DTAH for Waterfront Toronto. See: http://www.waterfrontoronto.ca/explore_projects2/central_waterfront/queens_quay

caught up in a discussion about the grass beside and between the streetcar tracks. What kind of grass would it be? How would it be cut without interfering with the streetcars? How would it be watered without soaking people waiting for a streetcar? The discussion ended up with some very technical specifics about growing grass and examples from around the world were brought in to support various arguments. Of all the things regarding this street-scaping plan, the grass was hardly a major issue – the plan did not really need anything, so people made up a lack to fill in.

Urban *Jouissance*

So, in the lower level of the complete graph (Figure 8), the Other provides something (namely, 'meaning') represented by s(A). In the upper-level, the Other provides nothing and no meaning represented by S(𝔸). Bruce Fink argues that the Other often has to "work very hard" to not provide an answer or meaning – to say nothing.[57] When the Other is 'successful' in not providing an answer (being S(𝔸) instead of s(A)), the Other points beyond itself and the subject must desire something beyond the Other. In desiring something beyond (something without) the Other, there is an absence (what it is without). This absence is *jouissance* (Φ), and without the Other, the subject must take responsibility for his or her own *jouissance*. Because the subject and the Other are structurally caught in language, there is a remainder or surplus. As Fink expresses it, "the subject as *jouissance* encounters the signifier of a lack in the signifying order as such."[58] Crucial here is that the subject *is* an enjoying subject; the subject *is* the subject of *jouissance*. The subject is 'caught' between language and *jouissance*: the subject is a pure linguistic machine, inscribed with language, but there is a remainder. The remainder is the living being that escapes signification, the surplus that has no (mechanistic) purpose. Because *jouissance* is a surplus to language, and this

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[57] Fink, *Lacan to the Letter*, 123.

[58] Fink, *Lacan to the Letter*, 125.

jouissance (of the) subject does not serve a *purpose*, it thwarts the aims of science. It is a Truth beyond Knowledge. It is beyond knowing and concerns enjoying.

The subject encounters S(Ⱥ) and thus encounters *jouissance*: Φ, the signifier of the very process by which the signifier dominates and creates the signified. *Jouissance* is what the Other lacks, the lack which grounds the Other as the set of all signifiers or the very functioning of signifiers. The Other is the 'treasure trove' of all signifiers, but its lack is apparent in that it does not contain a signifier for the signification process. With Lacan's symbols: the Other contains S, S′, S″, S‴, etc. but does not contain $\frac{S}{s}$. That is, the Other contains all signifiers but does not contain the process by which the signifier creates the signified. So, what does contain the process by which the signifier creates the signified, the signification process as such? *jouissance* (Φ).

In the graph, *jouissance* does not only 'move' from S(Ⱥ) away from the graph (to the left). *Jouissance* also crosses the top of the graph (to the right), represented by the vector *jouissance*→S(Ⱥ)→(Ꞩ◇D)→castration as it results in -φ (minus phi), a loss of *jouissance*. Here we can think about S(Ⱥ) as similar to S_1 (the master) in the master's discourse (further discussion on the four discourses below); as the power without reason, such as the father in the structure of Oedipus or the Name-of-the-Father/No-of-the-Father (*nom-du-père, non-du-père*).[59] This is the way the Father *names* the Mother's desire. This naming of the desire, since it uses signification, takes away from pure *jouissance* and prohibits the subject/child's desire. *Jouissance* is lost in its very symbolization; the lack comes in only insofar as it is named. Fink compares it to an animal hunger – *jouissance* is like an animal's hunger, which can be satiated and forgotten. But if

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[59] As noted above, S(Ⱥ) is similar to S_1 (the master) in the master's discourse, and I wonder if these can be thought of as Rancière's police order? Is there a connection to be made between the political as that which breaks the police order and *jouissance* as that which breaks with the order of signification? Doesn't the political come from the 'excess' of the police order – that which breaks with it is what defines it – like *jouissance* from the excess of language?

this 'hunger' is given a name, it is represented, and can be re-represented at any time and persist.[60]

Now, this loss of *jouissance* represented by -φ does not mean the total end of *jouissance* – there is still the satisfaction of the drives, represented as $\$\diamond D$. $\$$ is, again, the barred subject, while D is the Other's demand or symbolic demand. Once a subject can 'traverse' his or her basic fantasy ($\$\diamond a$), he or she can then "live out the drive" and can experience enjoyment, represented as $\$\diamond D$. Castration, the other side of $\$\diamond D$ is not an end to enjoyment, but is rather the persistence of enjoyment in spite of prohibition and loss. Interestingly, Žižek uses the term "gentrified" to described this watered-down *jouissance* (-φ). There is clearly a link between this watered-down enjoyment and the disdain most hold for urban gentrification.[61] What is missing from 'gentrified' urban developments? *Jouissance*! A 'real' urban space has 'grit,' a dark pleasure to it – gentrification 'evacuates' this. This point inflects what I have argued before: that we identify with the 'flaw' in the city, it is that surplus that we enjoy, the messiness, when it is not efficient or purely functional. Here, though, I am arguing that the most successful urban spaces, at least in Toronto, are those that are not 'perfected' or 'gentrified' and, further, these are the urban spaces that most people like.

Consider the changing nature of Queen Street West. In the late 1970s Queen West from around McCaul to Spadina had a number of bars, art spaces, and unique retail stores. Above these ground level spaces were cheap apartments where many artists and other creative people lived. It was the model of what Richard Florida refers to as a 'creative class district.' The bars were not clean and bright but dirty and messy. The art spaces were not upper-class galleries and the retail shops were not chain outlets but independently owned.

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[60] Fink, *Lacan to the Letter*, 126.

[61] 'Gentrification' is a term that is thrown around quite a bit. Its precise meaning is simply the influx of middle-class people into an area largely populated by people of a lower socio-economic class. For an excellent discussion of the nuances of gentrification, see: David Ley, *The New Middle Class and the Remaking of the Central City* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).

The area was pretty 'rough' in the evenings, with many 'punks' walking the streets, selling and buying dope, getting worked up at a punk show. The area became well known and well liked, evidenced by the increasing rents. Those who had made the area what it was were unable to afford these higher rents, but large retail chains could. The large chains moved into the area, 'capitalizing' on the existing 'cultural capital.' Sure, the area is still popular, but as many say, "It's just not what it used to be." The only thing keeping the area alive are a few stores from the old days (John Fluevog, The Rex, The Horseshoe Pub and, until recently, the focal point – Pages Bookstore) and, more importantly, the modern-day 'punks' who still hang around.[62] It is perhaps not surprising that this stretch of Queen West attracts 'local tourists' (people from the surrounding suburbs), and people who live nearby mostly avoid the area in favour of other areas, including a stretch of Queen further west (Queen West West) and even further west in Parkdale, "scummy Parkdale."[63] My point is that successful and desirable urban areas are those with a certain 'grit,' disorder, and messiness. Most urban 'improvement' plans define these types of things as problems and seek to clean up streets, impose an order, separate uses, and make things function smoothly and efficiently. While these seem like reasonable goals, and while a totally 'run-down' area is neither successful nor desirable, it is precisely this messiness that makes an urban area successful.

The lesson here is that desirable urban space is between full, painful *jouissance* and watered-down, gentrified *jouissance*. In other words, we desire some *jouissance*, but not too much. Thus, the early days of Queen West had 'too much' *jouissance* for most people, but with the influx of retail chains, many feel it does not have enough *jouissance*. This limit is determined by the subject, and

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[62] For a detailed analysis of Queen Street West's transformation, see: Katharine N. Rankin, *Commercial Change in Toronto's West-Central Neighbourhoods* (Toronto: Cities Centre University of Toronto, 2008). Retrieved from: http://www.urbancentre.utoronto.ca/pdfs/publications/RP214RankinCommercialChangeWestToronto9-2008.pdf

[63] This phrase has recently been used by Amy Lavender Harris in reference to the refrain of a popular 1990s-era spoken word piece performed by Cad Lowlife and Rob Siciliano. See Amy Lavender Harris, *Imagining Toronto* (Toronto: Mansfield Press, 2010). Also see http://imaginingtoronto.com/2011/05/08/parkdale-scummy-parkdale/

the judgment of this limit is what I argue is the moment of 'the political' as I discussed in chapter 1. On a social level, there is a shared judgment on the limit of *jouissance*, which helps to explain a community's values and perceptions of an area's safety. A quiet, suburban community will have collectively marked the limit of *jouissance* much more so than people who choose to live in dense, diverse urban centres. On a more fine-grained subjective level, some choose to live in a dense urban area and choose an apartment on a busy street above a store. Others want to live downtown but on a quiet, residential street: they like the city, but not too much! "We don't mind a *bit* of noise, but…"

Enjoy the City!

Lacan provides a provocative understanding of the superego: the "superego is the imperative of jouissance – Enjoy!."[64] Žižek has brought this up many times in his books, referring to the "superego injunction 'Enjoy!'"[65] Above, I spoke about the injunction to 'be urban,' though, in various guises, we are also often told to 'enjoy the city.'[66] If we understand the imperative 'enjoy the city!' as the superego's injunction, one might be tempted to think that the imperative 'be urban' is the ego's injunction. However, as we will see, any injunction or imperative can only come from the superego. A reasonable question here would be, 'What's wrong with enjoying things? Why not enjoy the city?' I will now address these questions.

In order to contextualize Lacan's and Žižek's arguments about the superego's imperative or injunction 'Enjoy!,' let us briefly recall Freud's theory of the pleasure principle and the reality principle. In Freud's early writings, he

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[64] Jacques Lacan, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan*, Book XX, *On Feminine Sexuality: The Limits of Love and Knowledge*, trans. Bruce Fink (New York: W.W. Norton, 1999), 3.

[65] For example: Slavoj Žižek, *The Puppet and the Dwarf: The Perverse Core of Christianity* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003), 56; Žižek, *For They Know Not What They Do: Enjoyment As a Political Factor* (London: Verso, 2008), 9–10 and 239.

[66] It could be that 'enjoy the urban!' underlies the injunction 'be urban.' That is, perhaps the injunction to simply 'be' something assumes enjoyment of that something – at least in this case.

suggests that this mental energy works a bit like an economy or a system of exchange.[67] Since it takes a great deal of psychic energy to maintain repression, when the psyche is able to relinquish repression and partake in enjoyment, psychic energy is reduced. Though it seems counter-intuitive, the psychic energy expended during a moment of pleasure is less than it was when this pleasure was denied and repressed. Or, the other way around: when we are able to (partially) lift repression, pleasure occurs. It was in Freud's later writings where he introduced the pleasure and reality principles, which provide a theory of the drives – what actually motivates the psyche, not just economy of exchange.[68] The pleasure principle desires more and more pleasure, but the reality principle represents the obstacle to this pleasure and marks the place of a law that pleasure seeks to transgress. Freud found that the pleasure principle still works on the 'principle' of economy – that its tendency is to reduce psychic energy. Again, the psyche seeks to return to its initial state, to calm down its energy to the point of death.

The pleasure principle and the reality principle work together: the pleasure principle seeks to explain the drive towards pleasure, while the reality principle stands as the limit of what one can take pleasure in. That is, the pleasure principle represents our fantasies, while the reality principle represents that barrier or safeguard to our (impossible) fantasies. By conceiving the psyche as constantly working to calm down its impulses, Freud found that the aim of life is, in fact, death. That is, the limit or outcome of calming down the impulses is death.[69]

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[67] See: Sigmund Freud, "Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious," in *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume VIII (1905)*, trans. James Strachey (London: Vintage Books, 2001).

[68] Sigmund Freud, "Beyond the Pleasure Principle," in *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XVIII (1920–1922)*, trans. James Strachey (London: Vintage Books, 2001).

[69] Freud, "Beyond the Pleasure Principle."

With the pleasure principle and reality principle working in tandem (that it seeks pleasure, but defines and limits this pleasure through the transgression of the law of the reality principle), we are given the frustrating injunction to enjoy, but not too much. To go 'beyond the pleasure principle' is thus to seek to enjoy it all – to enjoy what is not allowed to be enjoyed. However, this limit to enjoyment and pleasure is what in fact structures desire. To go 'beyond' is to deny that there is a transgression involved in enjoyment.

We see this more clearly in the instance of going beyond the pleasure principle in *Civilization and Its Discontents*.[70] The 'oceanic feeling' that Freud describes is the psyche's sense of a connection to the rest of the world. The ego wants to distinguish itself from the world and be unique while at the same time dreaming of a connection to the whole, which plays out in cities as the desire for "community." This unconscious desire to return to an oceanic oneness with the world is another attempt to go beyond the pleasure principle – to be a unique ego while also attaining the whole. To make this task manageable, the ego reduces the world to a smaller scale and finds the world represented in the space (that is, the psyche) which makes it appear possible to connect the world to the conscious ego. But the unconscious remembers that the world is much larger and unattainable so that there is an internal conflict and latent recognition that the ego is not, in fact, connected to the entire world. Thus, it is not surprising that David Harvey insists that "community" is not a 'thing' but a process: we are not, in fact 'connected,' so we can only work at it.[71] Thinking that we are part of a larger whole is thus to attempt to go beyond the pleasure principle, to deny the limits of what the reality principle allows.

Lacan discusses the superego in *Freud's Papers on Technique*, locating it in the symbolic order (not the imaginary) with speech and language: "The

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[70] Sigmund Freud, "Civilization and Its Discontents," in *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud Volume XXI (1927–31)*, trans. James Strachey (London: Vintage Books, 2001), 64–68.

[71] David Harvey, "Contested Cities: Social Process and Spatial Form," in *The City Reader*, 4th edition, ed. Richard T. LeGates and Frederic Stout (New York: Routledge, 2007): 225–232.

superego is located within the symbolic plane of speech [I(A)], in contrast to the ego-ideal [*i(a)*]," which is located within the imaginary.[72] Though the superego has a relationship with the Law, it has a different character. The Law is a symbolic structure and ensures the integration of the subject. The superego, however, has a "senseless, blind character, of pure imperativeness and simple tyranny."[73] The superego is 'like' the Law, but functions as a "senseless Law" and even 'misrecognizes' the Law.[74] Lacan teaches us that the superego is found to be overworking in the "neurotic … because the morality of the neurotic is a senseless, destructive, purely oppressive, almost always anti-legal morality."[75] The superego is the "*you must*," it is "speech deprived of all its meaning" – it is the *command* or *imperative* and thus 'of' language.[76] It is not the 'voice of the Law' but rather a command without a reason, much like the master in the master's discourse.[77]

"The superego is an imperative."[78] Lacan argues that this imperative is Kant's categorical imperative but whose specific command is 'Enjoy!' – "the superego is the Other insofar as the Other commands the subject to enjoy."[79] This imperative of the superego, "Enjoy!", is "the expression of the will-to-enjoy, which is not the subject's own will but the will of the Other."[80]

Dylan Evans tells us that *jouissance* was not used much by Lacan until 1960, at which point he develops the opposition between pleasure and

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[72] Jacques Lacan, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan*, Book I, *Freud's Papers on Technique*, trans. John Forrester (New York: W.W. Norton, 1991), 102.

[73] Lacan, *Freud's Papers on Technique*, 102.

[74] Lacan, *Freud's Papers on Technique*, 102.

[75] Lacan, *Freud's Papers on Technique*, 102.

[76] Lacan, *Freud's Papers on Technique*, 102.

[77] The four discourses, including the master's, will be explaining in the following chapter.

[78] Lacan, *Freud's Papers on Technique*, 102.

[79] Dylan Evans, *An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis* (London: Routledge, 2005), 201.

[80] Evans, *An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis*, 201.

enjoyment.[81] The pleasure principle functions as a limit to enjoyment; the pleasure principle demands the subject enjoy as little as possible – 'enjoy, but not too much!' The subject, however, seeks to transgress the pleasure principle's prohibitions and go 'beyond the pleasure principle.' This does not lead to more pleasure, but pain, since there is only so much pleasure the subject can bear. It is this "painful pleasure" that Lacan calls *jouissance*.[82] In Lacan's words, "*Jouissance* is suffering."[83] *Jouissance* is the "paradoxical satisfaction that the subject derives from his symptom … the suffering that he derives from his own satisfaction."[84]

So, Freud's theories tell us that the reality principle and superego function to limit our pleasure and enjoyment. For Freud, the superego functions like a law which marks a limit on what can be enjoyed or how much enjoyment can take place. For Lacan, however, the "superego is the imperative of *jouissance* – Enjoy!"[85] The superego's "Enjoy!" is a "correlate of castration," the specifically Lacanian notion of 'castration,' the loss of *jouissance*.[86] This latter sense of the superego (castration, the loss of *jouissance*) is more in line with Freud's notion of the superego as the prohibiting father, the law, etc. Lacan's argument is that the *imperative* 'Enjoy!' is not the opposite of prohibition, but rather a correlate. And an imperative can only come from the superego.

The superego is normally understood in basic Freudian terms (prohibition, law, etc.), which becomes increasingly cruel the more we try to satisfy it. Though Lacan understands the superego as telling us to 'Enjoy!' it is still excessively cruel. It is worth remembering the social and historical context in which Lacan was writing and giving his seminars. Lacan first began this line of thought in the

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[81] Evans, *An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis,* 91.

[82] Evans, *An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis,* 92.

[83] Jacques Lacan, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan*, Book VII, *The Ethics of Psychoanalysis*, trans. Dennis Porter (New York: W.W. Norton, 1992), 184.

[84] Evans, *An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis,* 92.

[85] Lacan, *On Feminine Sexuality*, 3.

[86] Lacan, *On Feminine Sexuality,* 7.

1950s but fully stated "the superego is the imperative of *jouissance* – Enjoy!" in 1972-1973 seminar *On Feminine Sexuality*.[87] While we are familiar with the various cultural shifts in western society in the so-called 'post-war era,' allow me to present one example that shows Lacan was *diagnosing* this shift in the superego's demand, not inventing it. When Alfred Hitchcock's *Psycho* was released in theatres in 1960, it was accompanied by a clever marketing strategy.[88] One poster outside theatres read, "The theatre requests: see *Psycho* from the beginning to insure your own total *enjoyment* of it." Also in front of theatres were cardboard cut-outs of Hitchcock holding a sign that read, "We won't allow you to cheat yourself! You must see *Psycho* from the beginning to *enjoy* it fully!" Other promotional material demanded people "see the *uncut* version TV didn't dare show!" Here we have Hitchcock himself, as it were, taking the role of the superego (the symbolic, the Big Other), insisting that we enjoy the film and, further, that what we are going to enjoy is some 'excess' or more that was 'cut' (castration) from the televised, gentrified version. This level of enjoyment helps to explain the early gentrifiers of 1960s, often called "whitepainters,"[89] which refers to young professionals buying run-down houses in downtown Toronto, most notably in Cabbagetown and the Annex[90], though Bruce's article refers to Farnham and Woodlawn avenues (off Yonge, just south of St. Clair). Though termed 'whitepainters,' these pioneering gentrifiers painted the exterior brick of old houses a pastel colour. They would buy an old house, "clean out the cockroaches, replace the plumbing and generally exploit the building's sweet possibilities."[91] Bruce notes the common stylings of these

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[87] Lacan, *On Feminine Sexuality,* 3.

[88] These posters are shown in the documentary *American Grindhouse*, DVD, directed by Elijah Drenner (Los Angeles: Lux Digital Pictures and End Films, 2010.) All emphasis are added.

[89] 'Whitepainter' is a term was coined by Harry Bruce. See: Harry Bruce, "Glory Be, the Whitepainters Are Coming!" *Maclean's*, April 18, 1964. The 'whitepainter' movement is nearly always determined to occur in the 1970s, but Bruce identifies the movement in 1964.

[90] For an account of 'whitepainter' in the Annex, see: Jack Batten, *The Annex: The Story of a Toronto Neighbourhood* (Erin, Ontario: The Boston Mills Press, 2004).

[91] Bruce, "Glory Be, the Whitepainters Are Coming!," 26. Bruce notes that "in fifteen years" (i.e. 1949–1964) houses on Woodlawn Avenue increased from $8000 to $40,000. Now, these same houses sell for roughly $1,000,000.

gentrifiers: wrought iron railings, coach lamps, bootscrapers, and other adornments associated with farms and the countryside. Thus, while these early gentrifiers wished to live in the city, they clearly did not want *all* the city had to offer. They were like those who only saw the "uncut version TV didn't dare show." Again, we encounter a problem of limits: wanting some of the city, but not too much.

Essential to enjoyment and *jouissance* is its relationship to transgression. We find this in a seminar prior to *On Feminine Sexuality*: the seminar entitled *The Ethics of Psychoanalysis*. He argues that the myth of the murder of the father, which was supposed to open the path to *jouissance*, does not in fact open this path. Rather, it strengthens the prohibition.[92] Lacan's point is that whoever attempts to submit to the demands of the superego, and submits to moral law, will see these demands as increasingly cruel.[93] Whoever seeks to access *jouissance* by rejecting some form of moral law only ever encounters more and more obstacles. So, Lacan agrees with the formula "that without a transgression there is no access to *jouissance*."[94] Pushing this point further, there is no *jouissance* without the Law – transgression of the Law is required for *jouissance*. So, if the Law (such as the internalized Law of the superego) demands that we 'Enjoy!' (that we experience *jouissance*) then we cannot actually experience *jouissance*.

Žižek has an analogy he likes to tell about so-called "postmodern parenting."[95] He gives the example of the earlier, "totalitarian father" who tells his child, "You're going to your grandmother's house today!" which allows the child to be annoyed but still follow this 'duty'; she can be rebellious about it and thus maintain her own 'freedom.' The contemporary "postmodern or permissive father"

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[92] Lacan, *The Ethics of Psychoanalysis*, 176.

[93] Lacan, *The Ethics of Psychoanalysis*, 176.

[94] Lacan, *The Ethics of Psychoanalysis*, 177.

[95] Quotes from documentary film *Zizek!* DVD, directed by Astra Taylor (New York: Zeitgeist Films, 2005). Also see Slavoj Žižek, *How to Read Lacan* (London: Granta Books, 2006), 92.

will say, “We’re going to your Grandmother’s house today. You *should* come with us, but you don’t have to. You know your grandmother loves you very much and would really like to see you, but it’s up to you.” This puts the child in the position of a ‘false choice’ and takes away the child’s ability to rebel. However, we can alter the analogy slightly to explain the imperative to enjoy. We can imagine the “totalitarian father” saying, “You’ll go to your grandmother’s house today whether you like it or not!” The “postmodern or permissive father” will now say, “You’ll go to your grandmother’s house today – and *you’ll like it!*” It is this type of imperative to ‘Enjoy!’ that Lacan was pointing toward.[96] Much contemporary urbanism utter this imperative regarding the city: Richard Florida, Edward Glaeser, admonishing environmentalists, and various formations of the Big Other defining the urban as ‘cool’ all insist that you will live in the city, and *you will like it*.

In *On Feminine Sexuality*, Lacan tells us about ‘usufruct’ – the legal notion that you can enjoy things but must not waste them. He argues that this is the “essence of law – to divide up, distribute, or reattribute everything that counts as *jouissance*.”[97] This is one way to interpret the graph of desire – *jouissance*, as it moves from left to right, becomes caught up in language, in the law. He tells us that *jouissance* is “no more than a negative instance. *Jouissance* is what serves no purpose.”[98] The point is that, while we have a ‘right’ to enjoy things, there is nothing that forces anyone to enjoy things – nothing except the superego. “The superego is the imperative of *jouissance* – Enjoy!”[99] So, when we hear the injunction to enjoy, we must remember that this injunction comes from the superego. We can enjoy ‘on our own’ in a sense, but when we are told to, it is from the superego.

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[96] There is one common usage of “Enjoy!” that I do not think applies here. When a waiter in a bar or restaurant says something like, “Enjoy your meal!” or someone gives someone something and says “Enjoy!” I believe this is short for “*I hope* you enjoy…”

[97] Lacan, *On Feminine Sexuality*, 3.

[98] Lacan, *On Feminine Sexuality*, 3.

[99] Lacan, *On Feminine Sexuality*, 3.

Consider usufruct in relation to public space – you can enjoy its 'excesses' but not the thing itself. That is, you can enter the space, enjoy the space, but you cannot make any permanent private claims to it – you cannot call it your home or alter it in any way that would take away someone else's enjoyment of the space.[100] Further, you must follow certain rules while in that public space.[101] In Sunnybrook Park in Toronto, a sign is posted that says, "Welcome to Sunnybrook Park, enjoy your visit. Please be respectful of other and Future [sic] users." The sign then lists a series of rules and regulations. There are nine rules: keep your dog on a leash, no cycling, no fires, no groups of more than twenty-five without a permit, no kite flying, and several others. These rules clearly fall into the 'enjoy – but not too much' category. Were one to transgress these rules, would they not be on the 'path' to *jouissance*? However, we get a hint at what will be discussed shortly: that one of the 'laws' is that you enjoy your visit. A contrary example: on the Toronto Islands some of the public spaces there have signs that say "please walk on the grass!" Of course, this is a take on the common 'keep off the grass' signs we are familiar with, but the subtext is 'enjoy the grass!' Or consider the enjoyment of Toronto's nightlife. There is an astounding amount of rules for bars, night clubs, and alcohol, and even more rules to serve alcohol on a patio. Perhaps all these rules are what make some rather banal activities so enjoyable, and perhaps why, late at night, bar patrons are so rowdy: they are continuing to enjoy the transgression. In other words, being loud and screaming 'woo!,' messing up people's yards, and walking in the road is not what is enjoyed; it is the transgression that is enjoyed.

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[100] People in public spaces do, however, make temporary claims to (usually a portion of) the space, which is part of the notion of usufruct: the object (public space) may be enjoyed but not to the detriment of others. One can see this clearly at work by observing where people sit in public spaces (or even semi-public spaces such as cafés): a person entering such a space and wishing to sit will, normally, take a spot with some distance from other users. This person would not sit on an occupied bench if other, unoccupied benches are available. Nor would this person sit at an occupied table at a café but rather at an unoccupied one. This is a social recognition of a *temporary* claim to part of a public space, but no one is allowed (legally or socially) to, say, alter a bench that would take away future users' enjoyment of the bench.

[101] See: William H. Whyte, *The Social Life of Small Urban Spaces* (Washington D.C.: Conservation Foundation, 1980).

The superego's imperative 'Enjoy!' is related to the command 'love thy neighbour.' Lacan agrees and takes further Nietzsche's and Freud's contention that 'god is dead.' For Lacan, though, what remains is the commandment which orders man to "love thy neighbour." This edict is a horrifying proposition because of the role of *jouissance*. Following Freud's *Civilization and Its Discontents*, Lacan tells us that "*jouissance* is evil … it is suffering because it is suffering for my neighbour."[102] And it is here that Lacan tells us that *jouissance* is what is "beyond the pleasure principle."[103] Here we find out that *jouissance* is what is involved in aggression, exploitation, humiliation, suffering, and torture – all in relation to one's 'neighbour.'[104] Lacan's point here is that traditional moralists and ethicists always assume that pleasure is a good thing and the path to the good is paved with pleasure, whereas Lacan is arguing that pleasure involves suffering and evil. Interpreting Freud, Lacan argues that Freud found loving one's neighbour "horrifying"[105] because the fundamental nature of the neighbour is "bad."[106] There are more reasons why one should not obey the command to 'love thy neighbour.' One's love is a "precious" thing that should not be just given to someone just because he or she happens to be there.[107] The ethic of 'love thy neighbour' is a solipsistic, egoistic altruism that does not contain an articulation of the Good and avoids the problem of evil in the neighbour and oneself. What is desired is "the good of others in the image of my own."[108] Then it becomes "the good of others provided that it remain in the image of my own," which quickly degenerates into a good that "depends on my efforts."[109] The moral good, then, becomes the fantasy of sacrificing one's own happiness so that the other may

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[102] Lacan, *The Ethics of Psychoanalysis*, 184.

[103] Lacan, *The Ethics of Psychoanalysis*, 184.

[104] Lacan, *The Ethics of Psychoanalysis*, 185. Also in Freud, "Civilization and Its Discontents," Section III.

[105] Lacan, *The Ethics of Psychoanalysis*, 185.

[106] Lacan, *The Ethics of Psychoanalysis*, 186.

[107] Lacan, *The Ethics of Psychoanalysis*, 186.

[108] Lacan, *The Ethics of Psychoanalysis*, 187.

[109] Lacan, *The Ethics of Psychoanalysis*, 187.

have happiness, which as it turns out is a "harmful, malignant *jouissance*."[110] Because of the "unconscious aggression that *jouissance* contains," the resistance to the demand 'Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself' is the same resistance present when man stops himself from attaining his own *jouissance*.[111] One's neighbour's *jouissance* is "harmful" and "malignant" – and so is one's own.[112] Lacan is drawing our attention to "the unconscious aggression that *jouissance* contains, to the frightening core of the *destrudo*," which he claims constantly appears in "analytic experience."[113] And, it appears in the urban experience. This aggressive loving of the neighbour is the "togetherness" that Jane Jacobs finds "nauseating" in suburban communities, which I discuss further in chapter 4.[114] Jacobs is referring to the gossip and meddling in other's affairs prevalent in secluded suburbs. A different form of 'community' develops in dense, urban areas in which people trust one another yet maintain a social distance: they do not "love" their neighbours, but trust them and stay out of their affairs.

Further, "the energy of the so-called superego derives from the aggression that the subject turns back on himself."[115] In other words, and this is a crucial point, the aggression at the core of jouissance is that aggression that 'reappears' in the subject's own superego. This 'aggression' of the superego is why Freud and Lacan repeatedly state that the superego is 'cruel.' It becomes increasingly cruel since, once the subject concedes to the superego (by trying to obey its rules), there is no limit; it just generates "ever more powerful aggression in the self."[116] We "retreat from loving my neighbour as myself because there is something on the horizon there that is engaged in some form of intolerable

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[110] Lacan, *The Ethics of Psychoanalysis*, 187.

[111] Lacan, *The Ethics of Psychoanalysis*, 194.

[112] Lacan, *The Ethics of Psychoanalysis*, 187.

[113] Lacan, *The Ethics of Psychoanalysis*, 194.

[114] Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 62.

[115] Lacan, *The Ethics of Psychoanalysis*, 194.

[116] Lacan, *The Ethics of Psychoanalysis*, 194.

cruelty. In that sense, to love one's neighbour may be the cruelest of choices."[117] The laws the subject's conscience know are sacred are the laws that are "trampled underfoot" by the unconscious and are what "excites *jouissance*."[118]

My previous examples of transgressing laws in a public space pale in comparison to what Lacan is aiming at here. Urban examples of the eruption of *jouissance* through 'trampling underfoot' would involve some mass breakdown of social rules: perhaps a riot or, to a lesser extent, the behaviour of young drunks after last call. Or we might understand the eruption of violence on the part of the police during the June 2010 G20 meeting in Toronto as an eruption of *jouissance*. The police were 'finally' able to do what they signed up for and became extremely violent. They punched, kicked, and beat people with batons. They arrested over one thousand people and then detained them in horrible conditions. Many reported being abused physically and emotionally, and women complained of crude sexual harassment. It has since been revealed that there was little 'command structure' and so the violent abuse by the police was not the result of orders, but the individual officers. Many of the protestors, too, had their eruptions of *jouissance*: because of their large numbers, it gave them a chance to enjoy their expressions against the police. Very few of the emotional or violent outbursts were directed at the stated purpose of the demonstrations (opposing G20 policies) but instead at the police.

Of all these forms of enjoyment, Lacan argues that "the only thing of which one can be guilty is of having given ground relative to one's desire."[119] We often have to 'give ground' on our desires to do good, and this is where guilt comes in. So this 'maxim' of Lacan's is *not* an ethic and it should be noted this seminar took place in 1959–1960 and Lacan never spoke of this 'maxim' again.[120] Rather, it is the statement of the paradox surrounding ethics and desire. We are either

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[117] Lacan, *The Ethics of Psychoanalysis*, 194.

[118] Lacan, *The Ethics of Psychoanalysis*, 195.

[119] Lacan, *The Ethics of Psychoanalysis*, 319.

[120] Žižek, *The Puppet and the Dwarf*, 54.

betraying ourselves or someone else.[121] But, on another register, things are not so cut and dried: Lacan telling us to hold dear our desires is a way of asking us "*Chè vuoi*?" That is, asking us what our desires are and keep them separate from the Other's desire.

In Žižek's comments on the *Ethics of Psychoanalysis*, he suggests that this loss of the Big Other and its prohibitive Law really began with Kant. The prohibitions we now deal with are *self-posited*, which helps us understand why the prohibitions and the imperative 'Enjoy!' come from our own superego. Kant's philosophy clearly argues that we are all free and all limitations or constraints are self-posited.[122]

Žižek invokes Bataille's 'passion for the Real' and pursuing the excesses in life to show that Bataille depends on the Law – to achieve these excesses and the 'Real,' one must transgress the Law. The "'passion for the Real' *relies on prohibition*."[123] But Bataille's 'dialectal interdependence' of law and its transgression fails to fully account for the paradox that one needs to "install prohibitions in order to be able to enjoy their violation."[124] Žižek argues that Bataille is unable to perceive the consequences of Kant's "philosophical revolution": that "the absolute excess is that of the Law itself."[125] In other words, the 'excess' that Bataille proposes is not a transgression of the Law, but is found *in* the Law; "serving the Law is the highest adventure,"[126] obeying the Law only leads to crueler superego, etc. It is here that Žižek compares this problem of transgression to the "superego injunction 'Enjoy!'" Late-capitalist 'permissive' society is "in the thrall" of this injunction, which "elevates excess into the very

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[121] Lacan, *The Ethics of Psychoanalysis*, 321.

[122] Žižek, *The Puppet and the Dwarf*, 54.

[123] Žižek, *The Puppet and the Dwarf*, 55.

[124] Žižek, *The Puppet and the Dwarf*, 56.

[125] Žižek, *The Puppet and the Dwarf*, 56.

[126] Žižek, *The Puppet and the Dwarf*, 56.

principle of its 'normal' functioning.[127] Žižek tells us that the contemporary "journalistic description" of our age being the "age of anxiety" is only true insofar as transgression has been elevated into the norm under which we are expected to labour. There is a lack of prohibition that would sustain desire, and this lack puts us in the "suffocating proximity of the object-cause [*objet petit a*] of desire."[128] So, what used to be prohibited (such as sex) we are now told to not only go ahead and do it, but also enjoy it, we lose the ability to develop a sense of individually in opposition to a norm, and we also lose the guilt associated with it. However, the price we pay for this loss of guilt is anxiety.[129]

To clarify the distinction between the object of desire and its object-cause, Žižek provides an example: A woman who feels guilty for regular one-night stands ought to be told the one-stands are not morally wrong. This should reveal to the woman that what she is, in fact, enjoying is the 'masochistic' feeling of guilt and hopefully lose interest since she is not enjoying the object of desire, but the object-cause of desire (*objet petit a*). So, the question to be asked is, 'do we enjoy the object or the obstacle to the object?' We see this play out in the urban in many ways. Above, I gave the example of people leaving bars late at night, yelling, screaming 'woo!,' and disrupting the neighbours. Again, I would argue that these people are not enjoying these actions, but only the transgression. In fact, we can recall times when someone sarcastically exaggerates another's yelling and 'wooing' which has the effect of demonstrating that what they are doing is not, in fact, enjoyable.

Do we enjoy driving over the speed limit simply because we are transgressing the law? Bicycling is enjoyable in the city because one is able to transgress the laws with the knowledge that doing so is not particularly

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[127] Žižek, *The Puppet and the Dwarf*, 56.

[128] Žižek, *The Puppet and the Dwarf*, 56.

[129] Lacan's seminar on anxiety has unofficially been published: Jacques Lacan, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan X: Anxiety*, trans. Cormac Gallagher (London: Karnac Books, 2002). Also see: Roberto Harari, *Lacan's Seminar on Anxiety: An Introduction* (New York: Other Press, 2001).

dangerous and actually makes more sense, giving us the sense that we know better than the law, like the small thrill we feel when we 'jaywalk.'[130] Beyond rules of circulation, we see 'self-posited' prohibitions to entice us into spaces, such as the 'velvet ropes' of a club or entertainment venue. It is well known that bouncers and people who work 'the doors' at night clubs will restrict entry, keep a line-up, etc. only to make the appearance of 'exclusion' or 'exclusivity.' A recently opened park in Toronto, Sherbourne Commons, has a number of various water features, one being a concrete basin similar to a creek with shallow water. The design is set up so that people can sit on its edges and put his/her feet in the water or wade in the ankle-deep water. However, there are signs all along it that say 'no wading.' Just about everyone in the park on a hot day will wade or dangle their feet in the water anyway. The 'no wading' signs are likely in place for obscure legal reasons, but perhaps they unintentionally work to increase the user's enjoyment. And perhaps the astounding success of Kensington Market is partially a result of these minor transgressions of the law. Many of the shops are pushing the limits of what bylaws allow. Circulating through the streets and sidewalk by bike or on foot, one is almost forced to break conventions by walking on the road, cycling against one-way streets. On the other hand, boring and uninspiring areas of the urban are usually those that allow for no transgression of the law. Suburban areas and malls are designed so that users can do little but follow established rules.[131] Toronto has an arcane law that prohibits road hockey on any street, even though many people play this anyway with few problems. Recently, a

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[130] In Toronto there is no such thing (in legal terms) as 'jaywalking.' A pedestrian may cross a street mid-block so long as they do not interfere with traffic. For a detailed discussion of the relevant laws, see: Dylan Reid, "Pedestrians Crossing Mid-Block: The Definitive Guide," *Spacing Toronto*, Nov 20, 2007. Retrieved from: http://spacingtoronto.ca/2007/11/20/pedestrians-crossing-mid-block-in-toronto-the-definitive-guide/

[131] This is not to say that resistance is 'impossible' in suburban areas. Many shopping mall users engage these spaces in non-commercial uses (walking, conversing, gathering, etc.) and various projects have sought to subvert the homogenous aesthetic and use of suburban areas. See, for example the Leona Drive Project in Toronto: http://www.leonadrive.ca. Roger Keil, Director of the CITY Institute (City Institute at York University) is perhaps the most well-know Canadian researcher on suburbs and its resistive capacities. Keil is also the Project Coordinator of "Global Suburbanisms: Governance, Land and Infrastructure in the 21st Century," which can be found here: http://www.yorku.ca/suburbs/

city councillor sought to have this bylaw revoked so that it would be legal for people to play road hockey. But once the councillor and city staff began looking into this, they quickly realized that there was little they could do. To make road hockey legal meant there would be a host of other rules governing it (when, where, how long, etc.) and would open them to the possibility of lawsuits were anyone hurt. The councillor came to realize the best thing was to leave the law as is, and suggest the police not enforce it.

In *The Puppet and the Dwarf*, Žižek presents his oft-repeated argument about enjoying objects without their dangerous element. He gives the examples of "coffee without caffeine," "beer without alcohol" and more.[132] He is arguing that contemporary, tolerant, liberal, multicultural society implores us to enjoy the Other deprived of its Otherness: "a product deprived of its substance."[133] It is this particular twist that Žižek adds to the 'imperative of the superego – Enjoy!': "Everything is permitted, you can enjoy everything, *but* deprived of its substance," deprived of what makes it dangerous or 'transgressable.'[134] "God is dead, we live in a permissive universe, you should strive for pleasure, you should avoid dangerous excesses, so everything is prohibited if it is not deprived of its substance."[135] Or, "If God is dead, the superego enjoins you to enjoy, but every detrimental enjoyment is already a betrayal of the unconditioned one, so it should be prohibited."[136] In *The Sublime Object of Ideology*, it is the symptom that is the kernel of enjoyment. It persists as a surplus and "returns though all attempts to domesticate it, to gentrify it," by which Žižek means the "strategies to

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[132] Žižek, *The Puppet and the Dwarf*, 96.

[133] Žižek, *The Puppet and the Dwarf*, 96.

[134] Žižek, *The Puppet and the Dwarf*, 96.

[135] Žižek, *The Puppet and the Dwarf*, 96.

[136] Žižek, *The Puppet and the Dwarf*, 96.

domesticate the slums as 'symptoms' of our cities."[137] Tellingly, one of these 'strategies' is to name the symptom, to put it into words. As we saw above in the graph of desire, once *jouissance* is named, it loses its force: it becomes gentrified. Common to all gentrified areas in Toronto is the giving of a name. In what was once largely an industrial and warehouse area, many condos and a few shops were built and it became "Liberty Village." There is nothing particularly 'liberating' about these condos, and it is decidedly *not* a village. This naming happens in the suburbs, but is reversed. Many suburban areas are named after the thing or quality that is no longer there because of the development: creeks, meadows, woods, etc.

Another way in which we can understand Lacan's theory of enjoyment is when we are enjoying the Law itself, enjoying that which we feel is oppressing us. At the end of *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis* is an appendix that transcribes a session that took place at Vincennes, an experimental university on December 3, 1969.[138] The date is not insignificant as the protests of 1968 were still fresh in people's minds. During this session are a number of 'interventions' by audience members who are rather hostile to Lacan. Eventually someone dismisses him as a "liberal" after it becomes clear that most of the opposition is coming from a Marxist-Leninist position. Lacan implies that these so-called revolutionaries are, in fact, seeking a new master and that psychoanalysis is what will "enable you to locate what it is exactly that you are rebelling against."[139] He then tells these 'revolutionaries' that they "fulfill the role of helots of this regime. The regime is putting you on display. It says, "Look at them enjoying!"[140]

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[137] Žižek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology*, 74. The condition of the bathrooms in restaurants and bars in a way this gentrification of *jouissance* is materialized. In urban areas we find the bathrooms often covered in stickers, graffiti, and generally unkempt; in suburban areas, these bathrooms are clean, smell nice, and have soft music playing. Compare with Žižek's analogy of national ideologies and their respective toilets: Slavoj Žižek, *The Plague of Fantasies*, 2nd ed. (New York: Verso, 2008), 3–4.

[138] Jacques Lacan, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan*, Book XVII, *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, trans. Russell Grigg (New York: W.W. Norton, 2007).

[139] Lacan, *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, 208.

[140] Lacan, *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, 208.

This is a very compelling analysis of how the so-called 'progressives' functioned during Toronto's public consultations of the recent 'core services review' (July 2011). Just over 300 people registered to make a deputation to the Core Services Review Committee on the service cuts proposed in the Core Services Review Report. While the deputants made many impassioned pleas not to cut a variety of services, one could help but notice how much fun they were having. There were huge cheers for each deputant, laughter at each of the witty remarks, etc. A 'sleepover' was organized on Facebook and many came with pyjamas and pillows. People in the 'spill-over room' watched the proceedings on a big-screen TV, eating snacks and enjoying the proceedings as if they were at the movies.[141]

Urban Transference

Transference concerns the 'intersubjective relationship' on which the 'four discourses' elaborates, which will be the subject of the following chapter. Above, in my discussion of the graph of desire, I suggested that 'The City' could be understood as the Other (A) and *also* be thought of as the 'barred Other' (𝔸). Of course, A is always 𝔸 because "there's no such thing as the Big Other" – the Big Other (A) 'hasn't got it,' there is always a gap in the Symbolic order. 'The City' is not, of course, a conscious subject in any way, but gains this status through transference and projection. So, I would argue that, through transference, The City becomes A or 𝔸 depending on the context or question posed to it. Through transference we can think about the following questions: Does The City provide a meaning s(A) or does it provide no meaning S(𝔸) and point beyond itself? Further, when we ask "What does The City want from us?" doesn't transference allow us to reformulate this question as "What do we imagine The City wants from us?"

[141] In July 2012, on the one-year anniversary, some returned to City Hall to remember and celebrate the event.

Freud thought of transference as any transmission of affect from the patient to the analyst. For example, the patient might have a disagreement with his father and, through transference, have this disagreement with the analyst. In other words, the analyst takes the place of the person with whom the patient has an emotional relation.[142] Lacan, however, theorized transference rather differently. Perhaps most importantly, Lacan recognized that transference is not something specific or originating from the analytic setting but can happen anywhere.[143] Lacan also makes a distinction between positive and negative transference: "positive transference is when you have a soft spot for the individual concerned … and negative transference is when you have to keep your eye on him"[144] In an everyday setting, we might come to like or dislike (love or hate) someone simply because they remind us of someone else we like or dislike. This transference that concerns negative or positive feeling is of the imaginary. Below I will show how symbolic transference works to make the city the 'subject supposed to know.' In the imaginary register, transference in cities occurs, for example, when someone who grew up in the suburbs comes to dislike the suburbs simply because that is where he or she grew up and, further, feel the city's urban centre is a good thing. However, not everything is the result of transference: a person might grow up completely happy in a suburb and later come to prefer an urban area and find the suburbs boring.

Transference occurs because of some sign the analyst projects – a shape of the nose, jewellery, clothing, way of speaking, etc. For Lacan, transference "does not refer to any mysterious property of affect" but rather reveals itself in the relationship between subjects or between subjects and objects.[145] In *Freud's Papers on Technique*, Lacan tells us that any exchange of signs (i.e. speech) is a

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[142] Bruce Fink, *Fundamental Concepts in Psychoanalytic Technique: A Lacanian Approach for Practitioners* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2007), 127.

[143] Lacan, *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, 124–125.

[144] Lacan, *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, 124.

[145] Jacques Lacan, "Presentation on Transference," in *Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English*, trans. Bruce Fink (New York: W.W. Norton, 2005), 183.

transference – a symbolic transference.[146] Thus, transference is not simply emotion or affect, but involves signifiers. Signification thus shifts transference from the register of the Imaginary to the Symbolic. While Lacan devoted an entire year of seminars to transference (*Transference* 1960-61), I would like to focus on what he says in *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, specifically how transference relates to the 'subject supposed to know,' since I will argue that the city becomes The City as it takes on this status of the 'subject supposed to know.'[147]

The City Supposed To Know

Transference and the 'subject supposed to know' are intimately connected: "as soon as the subject who is supposed to know exists somewhere … there is transference."[148] Lacan's discussion of the 'subject supposed to know' is explicitly in the analyst situation – that it is the analyst who becomes the subject supposed to know for the analysand. I need to be clear here that the phenomenon of transference as it relates to the subject supposed to know is explained by Lacan in the analyst situation. The subject supposed to know is a phenomenon that occurs by the analysand – it identifies that function whereby the analysand 'supposes' the analyst as a subject of total knowledge about the subject himself.

Lacan argues the only way to begin to understand transference is to start with the 'subject supposed to know': "The transference is unthinkable unless one sets out from the subject who is supposed to know."[149] This involves "the transfer of powers from the subject to the Other … the locus of speech and, potentially,

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[146] Lacan, *Freud's Papers on Technique*, 109.

[147] See also: Bruce Fink, *Clinical Introduction to Psychoanalysis: Theory and Technique* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 28–33; Fink, *Fundamental Concepts in Psychoanalytic Technique*, 81–85.

[148] Lacan, *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, 232.

[149] Lacan, *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, 253.

the locus of truth."[150] What he is supposed to know is signification itself. By 'signification itself,' Lacan means the analyst is supposed to know the "secret meaning of the analysand's words."[151] This has the effect of the analysand changing his or her words or behaviour, or re-evaluating what he or she had said before – how his/her words, gestures, or behaviours might have been interpreted by the analyst.

We see this phenomenon when the analyst finds out something important about the analysand and asks "Why didn't you tell me earlier!?" To which the analysand replies, "because you might have taken it as something important, something responsible for all my problems, etc."[152] The "patient may think that the analyst may be misled if he gives him certain facts."[153] Lacan asks: shouldn't the person who might be misled always be suspicious of being misled? In other words, one should always expect transference.

The subject supposed to know becomes so "simply by virtue of being a subject of desire."[154] That is, the analysand 'creates' the analyst as the supposed subject of knowledge because the analysand desires that the analyst have this special knowledge of the analysand. The essential element of transference, the "axis, the pivot, the handle, the hammer," is desire.[155] However, Lacan reminds us that "Man's desire is the desire of the Other."[156] If a subject recognizes that her desire is the desire of the Other, then she will realize that his desire will never be recognized and "this obstacle will never be lifted."[157]

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[150] Lacan, *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, 129.

[151] Evans, *An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis,* 197.

[152] Lacan, *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, 233.

[153] Lacan, *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, 234.

[154] Lacan, *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, 253.

[155] Lacan, *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, 235.

[156] Lacan, *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, 235.

[157] Lacan, *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, 235.

"Transference is not, of its nature, the shadow of something that was once alive."[158] Transference is not "ectopia"[159]; it is not displacement. Rather, it is something 'new,' but nonetheless "transference is the enactment of the reality of the unconscious."[160]

Lacan suggests that transference is not so much about the "liquidation" of the unconscious as it is about "the subject who is supposed to know who must be liquidated as such."[161] This relates to the so-called 'maxim' to not give ground on your desires since 'liquidating' the subject supposed to know means the subject stops looking to the Other for the answers. Instead, the subject turns his own desire/knowledge for the answers.

Now, if transference and the 'subject supposed to know' is something specific to the analyst and analysand and involves two subjects, how would this help us understand the relationship between the city dweller and the city? I argue that in many instances, the city dweller enacts transference onto the city, turning the city into 'The City' as the '*object* supposed to know.' It is in this way that the line between object and subject become blurred, for how else could an object contain knowledge? While this might seem like I am playing fast and loose with these terms, I do not believe I am 'inventing' this so much as I am 'diagnosing' this. Consider how many people become exasperated and exclaim to 'no one' in particular, "What am I supposed to do?" This occurs frequently when someone is frustrated in their attempts to circulate in the city. Certain roads are congested, other roads limit direction of traffic, certain intersections limit turns, and people cry, "They've made it so I can't get to where I want to go!" Who is the 'they' in this sentence? On one level it is the Big Other (as we saw earlier in the "dogmatic stupidity" of the signifier: it is called that because that is what it is called). But I think we can also think of the 'they' as the city itself, as though the city were an

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[158] Lacan, *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, 253.

[159] Lacan, *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, 253.

[160] Lacan, *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, 146.

[161] Lacan, *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, 267.

entity unto itself, as though it made the rules and regulations. In fact, it makes more sense that to try and hold responsible the myriad of people who made the rules at different times with different goals – the 'accidental city.'[162] However, this example seems to show that the city is given the status of 'subject supposed *not* to know' … though it should! Indeed, Toronto's current 'slogan' is "We've been expecting you." In the 1970s it was "Toronto: Affectionately Yours…" Much different from the 1940s: "Toronto: A good place to work, A nice place to live!"[163]

There are a number of ways in which subjects reveal transference in their understandings of the city as the 'subject supposed to know.' All of these transferences share the commonality that the subject feels the city has a knowledge or truth to it; when they think the city knows what they really think. For example, when a person follows a rule or set of rules of the city without question, he or she assumes the city knows best. This assumption is very apparent in the current debate among Toronto's cyclists: quite a few believe that, if cyclists follow the 'rules of road,' the city will respect them. However, these rules are in place for motor vehicles and many of these rules are inapplicable to bicycles while others make cycling dangerous. Another example: when people go to a seemingly random street or area to find satisfaction of an unknown (unconscious) desire; they do not consciously know what they want, but figure the city will tell them once they get there. Pedestrians often rightfully complain about having to press a button at semi-actuated traffic lights as they often do not work, or take a long time to change the lights. They could easily cross before it changes with little danger, but they assume the traffic light knows best. When it takes really long time, people rarely 'blame' the fairly simple electronics involved but rather 'the city' itself is somehow to blame: "it happens all the time!"

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[162] Robert Fulford, *Accidental City: The Transformation of Toronto* (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1996).

[163] See Leah Sandals, "TOslogans Past, Present, Future." *Toronto Star*, May 20 2007. Retrieved from: http://www.thestar.com/sciencetech/article/215846

Finally, from the so-called 'marathon' committee meeting of July 2011 with many deputations about the core-service review mentioned above, Councillor Gord Perks said, "we heard the voice of Toronto" and believed what it said was true (mainly because he is opposed to the service cuts the mayor would like to make).[164] Here we have an example of the 'voice of the city' expressing what 'it' wants as though it speaks, and is, in this case, ignored. But, of course, the 'voice' of the city rarely speaks, if at all. Though we wish it could.

But the city does not speak. It is dumb. It does not want anything from you. This silence of the Big Other plays out in a number of films and movies. For example, Juan Antonio Bayona's 2007 film *The Orphanage* tells the story of a woman, Laura, who returns to run her childhood orphanage with her husband and son, Simon.[165] Simon befriends an 'invisible' masked child, Tomas, with whom Laura fears he will run away with. The horrific scenes involve the masked child, who appears with a burlap bag over his head simply staring at Laura. These scenes are frightening for both Laura and the viewer because Tomas is not asking or demanding or doing anything. He just stares. It would be a relief if he attacked Laura, or even stated his intentions no matter how awful. Or even if he removed the burlap bag so we might 'read' his face. At least we would know what he wants. A similar scene of terror reoccurs in David Lynch's television series, *Twin Peaks*. With some frequency, BOB, a menacing figure, appears as some otherworldly being. Only Laura's family members can see BOB (Laura is the girl who is murdered; finding her murderer is the plot of the entire series). When BOB appears in the family member's visions, he mostly just stares and leers. For the most part he does nothing and says nothing.[166] He does not want

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[164] Ben Spurr, "We Heard the Voice of Toronto," *NOW Magazine*, July 29th 2011. Retrieved from: http://www.nowtoronto.com/daily/news/story.cfm?content=182013

[165] *The Orphanage*, DVD, directed by Juan Antonio Bayona (Spain: Warner Brothers, 2007).

[166] In the episode "Demons" of the television series *Twin Peaks*, Agent Cooper asks Mike 'The One-armed Man', "What does BOB want?" Mike answers, "He is BOB. Eager for fun. He wears a smile. Everybody run." And, he continues, only a few can see him as he really is: "the gifted and the damned." *Twin Peaks*, "Demons" (season 2, episode 6), directed by David Lynch, first broadcast Nov 9, 1990 by ABC.

anything. Again, it would be 'better' were he to attack or say something – at least then we would know what he wants.

Similarly, the city does not want anything from you. It is dumb – it has no knowledge. We try to fill it in like it does have a desire or some knowledge or truth of us, but it does not. It just stares at us dumbly. It is indifferent. As I argued above in relation to the graph of desire, the city does not need its subjects to build another park or highway, it ticks along just fine without a particular subject. We find this lack of desire or intention or demand from the city terrifying, so we try to fill it in with demands and desires. It is as though the city is $\mathbb{A}$ and we try to make it A, or perhaps the city is *objet petit a* and we try to make it A.

Urban Love

Conspicuously absent from this discussion of transference is love. Love is the biggest transference of them all … "Transference is love. But why love someone like that?"[167]

For the last few years, the Kensington Market BIA has held 'Pedestrian Sundays.' On the last Sunday of each month during the warmer months, Kensington Market is closed to vehicles and various performers and vendors set up on the street. It is extremely popular – it is hard to just walk through the market because of all the people. However, unlike regular days in Kensington, Pedestrian Sundays seem too contrived. While there are a few permanent stores catering to the latest trends, the Market is mainly comprised of food shops that have been there for years. They are run largely by people who have immigrated to Canada in the post-war era, people who just want to carve out a living, and are not particularly interested in the latest trends. Their shops sell their goods cheaply without much 'merchandizing.' During Pedestrian Sundays, however,

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[167] *Jacques Lacan Parle* (extracts from a lecture at l'université Catholique de Louvain, Oct 13 1972). Directed by François Wolff (Brussels: Radio-Television Belge de la Communaute Française, 1982). Translated as "Lacan Speaks," subtitles by John Forrester.

there are vendors selling food that claim to be vegan, locally produced, ethically grown, gluten free, etc. And the people selling these types of things are caricatures of those who would be concerned about these things (unkempt, ragged clothes, bandanas covering their hair, etc.). When walking through the Market on a Pedestrian Sunday, one is constantly subjected to injunctions to "Have fun!"" "Enjoy!" and generally find everything "Awesome!" On a July 2011 edition of Pedestrian Sundays, a man with a megaphone implored us to "Check out the carpet of love! – It's awesome!" He was referring to chalk drawings all over the street, many of which referenced the theme of love. The person with the megaphone continued: "We got a carpet of love on the street! Who wants to help draw love! Who doesn't love love?!" Another person with a bucket of chalk was offering chalk to anyone interested. But *no one was*. Many people, looking a bit nervous though friendly, kindly shook their heads to the woman with chalk. I am sure most, if not all, the people there have nothing against love but when given the injunction to love something, people tend to recoil. One might also consider that if this act of drawing 'love' on the street is so enjoyable, so wonderful, why would there need to be this injunction?

Lacan spent much of his seminars, even devoting one entire seminar *On Feminine Sexuality*, to the topic of love. In *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, Lacan tells us "that there is a love of weakness is no doubt the essence of love" so that "love is giving what one doesn't have, namely what might make good this original weakness."[168] For Lacan, love is something that exists only in and through *objet petit a*. When people say they love someone, Lacan understands it as "I love you, but, because inexplicably I love in you something more than you – the *objet petit a* – I mutilate you."[169] That is, when someone loves someone or something, they are actually in love with some surplus, some "thing" that does not actually exist in the person or object. In *The Ego in Freud's Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis*, Lacan tells us that *objet petit a* is not an other

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[168] Lacan, *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, 52.

[169] Lacan, *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, 268.

(*autre*) at all since it "coupled with the ego."[170] Above, in my discussion of the graph of desire, we encountered *a* in the matheme of fantasy ($\$ \lozenge a$) and imaginary other (*i(a)*). In the 'four discourses,' which I will discuss next, *objet petit a* comes to be understood as the object of desire that we seek and find, though it is not really there, in the other whom we love and desire.[171] Lacan develops this notion of *objet petit a* through a reading of Plato's *Symposium*, wherein Alcibiades speaks of Socrates as a worthless wooden box that contains something precious. But, since this 'precious' thing contained does not in fact exist, and can thus never be obtained, *objet petit a* comes to be understood and not just the *object* of desire but also the *cause* of desire and is thus often called the 'object-cause of desire.' It is also worth noting that *objet petit a* is understood as a 'remainder' or 'left-over' of the Symbolic order, and that the drives do not seek to obtain *objet petit a* but instead circle around it. In the four discourses, one signifier attempts to represent all other signifiers but leaves a remainder and this remainder is *objet petit a*.

Now, these are all related though somewhat distinct 'definitions' of *objet petit a*. Much of this ambiguity is the result of Lacan's changing notions of *objet petit a* but it also allows for greater and more creative applications of the concept. So when people make the ridiculous claim that they "love" their city, this is why it sounds so ridiculous; a proper response to this claim is, "My God! What are you talking about!?" People can only say they love their city by covering over and falsely solidifying the city as 'The City' through transference or inventing an excess object/cause of desire.

This chapter has focused on the central argument that we take the city as the Lacanian Other, investing it with its own desires and lacks. This has been discussed mainly through an interpretation and application of the concepts found on the graph of desire, along with his theories of enjoyment, *jouissance*,

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[170] Jacques Lacan, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan*, Book II, *The Ego in Freud's Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis*, trans. Sylvana Tomaselli (New York: W.W. Norton, 1991), 321.

[171] Lacan, *The Ethics of Psychoanalysis*, 177.

transference, and love to present multiple arguments about the arrangements and behaviours associated with everyday urban life. This chapter addressed the central questions of “What do we want from our cities?” and “What does the city want from us?” – the answers to which are bound up with enjoyment, fantasy, jouissance, and, especially, transference. For Lacan, transference depends upon the ‘subject supposed to know,’ and I argued that, in the urban situation, transference depends on subjects taking the city as the *object* supposed to know, investing it with its own desires, lacks, and apparent ‘knowledge’ of the subject itself. Ultimately, though, the city is ‘dumb’: it does not want or need anything from its inhabitants. Using this Lacanian methodology to examine everyday urban life, I argued that the urban spaces most enjoyed are those with a degree of ‘messiness’ or ‘grit’ to them and that we identify with the ‘flaws’ of urban spaces. This ‘degree’ or limit to the amount of ‘grit’ or ‘messiness’ is understood here as a limit to *jouissance* – some, but not too much.

CHAPTER 3: EARLY URBANISM: FROM THE MASTER'S TO THE UNIVERSITY DISCOURSE

This chapter begins by outlining Jacques Lacan's four discourses. Once this theoretical framework is established, I will then briefly show how these four discourses can be used to interpret contemporary everyday urban life. The majority of this chapter is devoted to examining the writers and movements who have heavily influenced the shape of North American cities and the lasting built environment. Early, unplanned cities to which these movements and writers respond are understood through the master's discourse. I will present a brief history of nineteenth century Toronto as an example of the rotation from the cities of the master's to those of the university discourse. Following this, I will discuss the influential parks movement initiated by Fredrick Law Olmsted which wavers between the hysteric's and the university discourse. The Garden City movement of Ebenezer Howard will mark the beginning of the dominance of the university discourse. Le Corbusier and CIAM (*Congrès internationaux d'architecture moderne*) are shown to be clearly within the university discourse. However, all of these movements and writers begin their response from the hysteric's position, then seek to situate themselves in the university discourse. The following chapter will discuss Jane Jacobs, who also briefly begins from the hysteric's position, but immediately positions herself in the analyst's discourse. The purpose of theorizing this history through Lacan's four discourses is to provide an original interpretation of this oft-citied history. This will also show these movements and writers take the city as a problem of the Other's (the city's) desire. This analysis also demonstrates that, though Olmsted and Howard are usually seen in stark contrast to Le Corbusier and CIAM, they share many similarities. In the following chapter, Jane Jacobs will be positioned within the discourse of the analysts, which helps to explain why she is, rightly, held in such high regard.

Lacan's Four Discourses

The four discourses are those of the master, the university, the analyst, and the hysteric.[1] The word 'discourse' here has a specific meaning and, while similar, should not be conflated with Foucault's notion of discourse.[2] Each of these discourses can be thought of as "that kind of social bond which we will call a social agreement."[3] These discourses concern "life as such, the life we live [i.e. 'everyday life'] … we're aware of it all the time [but] it's a question of thought, of seeing life as a concept."[4] They are theories of the intersubjective relationships that occur in society. The master's discourse is primary and each subsequent discourse is formulated by a quarter turn counter-clockwise. They are represented as follows:

Master's	University	Analyst's	Hysteric's
$\frac{S_1}{\$} \in \frac{S_2}{a}$	$\frac{S_2}{S_1} \in \frac{a}{\$}$	$\frac{a}{S_2} \in \frac{\$}{S_1}$	$\frac{\$}{a} \in \frac{S_1}{S_2}$

In each of the four discourses, the four positions (Agent, Other, Product/loss, and Truth) remain in these locations:

$$\frac{A}{T} \in \frac{O}{P}$$

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[1] Lacan discusses the four discourses in Jacques Lacan, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan*, Book XVII, *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, trans. Russell Grigg (New York: W.W. Norton, 2007); and in Jacques Lacan, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan*, Book XX, *On Feminine Sexuality: The Limits of Love and Knowledge*, trans. Bruce Fink (New York: W.W. Norton, 1999). The presentation of the four discourses here also borrows from Bruce Fink, "The Four Discourses" in *The Lacanian Subject: Between Language and Jouissance* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995), 129–137.

[2] Foucault's concept of discursive regimes refers to particular social arrangements that determine what, and in which circumstances, certain things can be said or asked, while others literally cannot. See: Michel Foucault, *The Archeology of Knowledge*, trans, A.M. Sheridan Smith (London: Routledge, 2002).

[3] *Jacques Lacan Parle* (extracts from a lecture at l'université Catholique de Louvain, Oct 13 1972). Directed by François Wolff (Brussels: Radio-Television Belge de la Communaute Française, 1982). Translated as "Lacan Speaks," subtitles by John Forrester.

[4] *Jacques Lacan Parle*.

However, in *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, Lacan identifies the four positions as:[5]

$$\frac{\text{desire}}{\text{truth}} \qquad \frac{\text{Other}}{\text{loss}}$$

And later in the same seminar:[6]

$$\frac{\text{agent}}{\text{truth}} \rightarrow \frac{\text{work}}{\text{production}}$$

As we go through each of the four discourses, it will become clear why 'product' and 'loss' are somewhat interchangeable (or at least intimately connected) and why 'agent' takes the place of 'desire' and 'work' takes the place of 'other.' The meaning of each of the four concepts that occupy the four positions ($\$$, S_1, S_2, a) change slightly depending on their position and their relation. Generally, though, $\$$ is the barred subject, S_1 is the master signifier, S_2 is another signifier or knowledge, and a is *objet petit a*, the 'little other,' the object-cause of desire. While it seems the top left position is the 'dominant' position of each discourse, in all discourses "it is always the one up here on the right [top right] that does the work – and thus gets the truth to emerge."[7] So, while each discourse is named after the 'primary position' (top left), it is that which is Other that is most important, which is yet another example of how Lacan's theory is a social theory.

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[5] Lacan, *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, 93.

[6] Lacan, *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, 169.

[7] Lacan, *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, 105.

Master's Discourse

$$\frac{S_1}{\$} \in \frac{S_2}{a}$$

In the master's discourse, we see S_1 (the master) in the position of the agent with S_2 (slave/knowledge) as its Other. The product of this relation is a (*objet petit a*), the truth of which is $\$$ (the barred subject). S_1 (the master) is a nonsensical signifier; it holds great power without reason or justification. The master's discourse is best exemplified in the (lack of) justification in the 'reason,' "because I said so!" (which is addressed to S_2). Borrowing from Hegel's 'master-slave dialectic,' S_2 comes to mean 'knowledge' by virtue of its position as the slave. For Hegel, the slave's work for the master results in the slave learning 'something,' which Lacan calls knowledge.[8] In the work the slave does for the master, a 'surplus' is produced: a. Fink suggests that, taking the master as the capitalist and the slave as the worker, a represents 'surplus value' the capitalist 'steals' from the worker.[9] This 'surplus' can also be thought of as *jouissance*, which the master 'steals' from the slave. Lacan also refers to this 'product' as the master's "tithe."[10] The truth of the master's discourse is that the master, like all subjects, is a barred subject: $\$$. That is, all subjects are barred insofar as they are known to themselves only through language, language being radically Other. (This 'bar' also occurs through alienation with the 'specular image' as outlined in the previous chapter.) Thus, the truth of the master's discourse is that the master's power is a sham.

In *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, Lacan makes this reference to Marx and the connection between surplus value and *jouissance*. He also tells us that the master's discourse is "all philosophy ever talks about."[11] The knowledge in

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[8] Lacan, *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, 21.

[9] Fink, *The Lacanian Subject*, 131.

[10] Lacan, *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, 80.

[11] Lacan, *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, 20.

question here (represented as S_2) is 'know-how' (*savoir-faire*). Getting this know-how into the position of the master is what defines epistemes.[12] Lacan refers to Plato's *Meno* in which the slave boy is shown to have the knowledge, but in a derisory way, essentially 'robbing' the slave boy of his knowledge. However, Lacan insists that the master does not in fact really want to know, but just "desires that things work."[13]

University Discourse

$$\frac{S_2}{S_1} \in \frac{a}{\$}$$

In the university discourse, knowledge takes the position of the agent and addresses a and seeks to rationalize or account for the surplus, here understood as whatever is unknown to the 'knowledge' of S_2. Lacan argues that the university (philosophy, science) has always worked in the interests of the master, which is why it holds the position of truth in this discourse. Lacan states that while the master's discourse was the dominant discourse for ages, the contemporary discourse is the university.[14] This is not because S_2 is "knowledge of everything" but "all-knowing."[15] That is, the knowledge of university or science does not know everything, but that it has a system (a discourse) to discover all knowledge – or at least functions as though it does.

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[12] Lacan, *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, 22.

[13] Lacan, *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, 24.

[14] Lacan, *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, 31.

[15] Lacan, *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, 31.

Analyst's Discourse

$$\frac{a}{S_2} \in \frac{\$}{S_1}$$

The analyst's discourse puts the analyst in the position of the agent as the cause of desire, pure desirousness: a. The analyst interrogates $\$$ (the barred subject) who in turn "coughs up" an as yet undiscovered master signifier. The truth of this discourse is knowledge, meaning that the analyst is 'not really' the cause of desire, but has only positioned himself as such through his clinical knowledge. What the analyst produces is the "hystericization of discourse"; the analyst 'artificially creates' the hysteric's discourse.[16] The "institution of the analytic discourse … is the mainspring for transference."[17] While the analyst is positioned as the subject supposed to know, what is "striking" is that the analysand is given the freedom to speak as he pleases and "we recognize that he may speak as a master, that is, as a birdbrain."[18] The product of the analyst's discourse is that the master's discourse is masked (i.e. $\$$): the master is a barred subject too.

Hysteric's Discourse

$$\frac{\$}{a} \in \frac{S_1}{S_2}$$

While it may appear that the hysteric's discourse is the 'opposite' of the master's discourse, it is not. Lacan is clear that psychoanalysis and the analyst's discourse are what truly undermine the master's discourse in all its guises.[19] The hysteric's discourse, which 'talks back' to the master, is only seeking a new master, whereas the analyst's discourse disrupts the entire structure of the

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[16] Lacan, *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, 33.

[17] Lacan, *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, 38.

[18] Lacan, *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, 38.

[19] Lacan, *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, 87.

master's discourse. It is the analyst's discourse that teaches us the Big Other has a body, but does not actually exist.[20]

The hysteric's discourse as it is the one that, after the master's discourse, best describes urban life. It is the discourse that 'talks back' to the master. It is the discourse that interrogates the master and demands it prove its right to power. While it might appear that this would be the function of the university discourse, the hysteric's discourse is the literally the opposite of the university discourse. Rather than knowledge, the agent here is the barred subject with all its conscious and unconscious contradictions, alienations, and desires. In some ways, it is just as nonsensical as the master it goes after! This is why a, the object/cause of desire, is positioned as the truth of this discourse. It is in the hysteric's discourse that the bottom right-hand side changes from 'product' to 'loss.' We see that what results in this relation is that the cracks in the master appear – these interrogations of the master produce various schemas and understandings: knowledge. The "hysteric's discourse reveals the master's discourse's relation to *jouissance*, in the sense that in it knowledge occupies the place of *jouissance*."[21] The hysteric is "alienated from the master signifier" and "refuses to make himself its body."[22] The hysteric is not the master's slave – the hysteric "goes on strike … doesn't give up her knowledge."[23] While the hysteric "unmasks … the master's function" she does not refuse it. The hysteric is looking for a new master and requires the master for her very speaking position. What the hysteric "ultimately want[s] one to know is that language runs off the rails concerning the magnitude" of his *jouissance* and that the Other in the discourse

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[20] Lacan, *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, 66.

[21] Lacan, *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, 94.

[22] Lacan, *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, 94.

[23] Lacan, *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, 94.

knows just what a "precious object" he is.[24] "What the hysteric wants … is a master."[25]

These discourses reveal themselves in the film *Lacan Parle*.[26] During a lecture, Lacan is interrupted by a 'situationist' – the student walks up to Lacan's desk, pours his drinking water over the table, messes up his papers but does not demand anything or seem to have any reason. As he says, he is "just making a spectacle" to disrupt things. He tells the audience to ignore Lacan, saying he is just a stooge for the 'system,' a 'master' trying to make miserable bourgeois lives bearable. He says we all need to get together to overthrow this system, walk out of the lecture, join the free lectures taking place outside, etc. Once this spectacle is over, Lacan comments on what happened. He says that the situationist was asking us to "close ranks," to "form a new whole," create a "new order … the order of the discourse of the master, since 'master' is the very term which organization implies." Lacan admits there can be a lot of progress by doing such things "if we call that progress." Lacan points out the fundamental paradox of this type of activism: in trying to achieve a new whole, one ignores the "*volonté subjective*" (the will of the subject) which "can only manifest itself through its own division" and that is not "the achievement of total harmony." He goes on to say that the situationist's "appeal to him [Lacan] was love … it's love preaching to you." Lacan exhibits his horror: "if we were all like that, all together, loving each other … *mon dieu! Fuck!*"

Why is this so horrifying to Lacan? Because it implies the university discourse in which things will be resolved "in terms of mechanics, ballistics, equilibria, currents and the more we understand the better." It implies that we will be like "products, a certain type of individual who will fit in with everyone and everything." This notion is contrary to experience which clearly shows that there

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[24] Lacan, *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, 34. Lacan is purposefully playing with the gendered pronouns. Women do not have a monopoly on the position of the hysteric.

[25] Lacan, *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, 129.

[26] *Jacques Lacan Parle*. All quotations in this paragraph are from this film.

is only “one language,” the language we have all grown up with, the one we were taught at an early age that is “full of contradictions and confused reality.” Love turns on this, that “vibrant call to that union with … what? Something alienating.” The situationist was speaking as though he could “awaken” us from confusion, but forgetting that these confusions and contradictions are essential to life.

The Four Discourses and Contemporary Urban Life

These four discourses help us to examine various instances of everyday urban life as well as consider how subjects and groups seek to position themselves as particular agents, and how they position those they deem to be other to them. Currently, there seem to be many instances in which some agents position themselves as a type of ‘analyst’ by embodying pure desirousness (e.g. spaces of nightclubs, marketing). In the debates surrounding urban planning and land use, local government may not be so much in the position of the master than in the act of appropriating the university discourse by arguing what is ‘logically best,’ based on ‘data’ and the sudden interest in ‘open data.’[27] The opposition to ‘urban planning’ (as university discourse) could be the hysteric’s, analyst’s, or even a ‘return’ to the master’s discourse. Similarly, opposition to an urban form based on the master’s discourse could be situated within the university’s, hysteric’s, or analyst’s discourse. These resistances are dependent on how the subject positions that which he or she resists. However, these resistances will vary in their success since, for example, the hysteric is, in fact, demanding a new master and the university discourse works to prop up the old master.

Some of the most interesting spaces of the city are of the analyst’s discourse – whatever is riddled with the unconscious and structure of desire (unintended consequences/uses of spaces, the ‘backstage’ areas). The analyst’s

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[27] ‘Open data’ refers to the recent movement in which governments and organizations make available to the public the data they collect. This data is usually that which mathematical formulae produce, such as the frequency and location of emergency services calls or public transit schedules.

discourse also helps to explain the urban *flâneur* since his or her wanderings and explorations of the city is a method for provoking the city to 'cough up' something. Or would the *flâneur* be some ironic master, since the *flâneur* goes where he goes because that is where he goes? What is the discourse of the shopper? Or the window shopper? Would the city's discourse be the analyst's insofar as it embodies pure desirousness? Or is it of the master's or university discourse? Again, it depends on how the subject or others position it. For example, 'NIMBY,' the pejorative acronym (Not In My Back Yard) which is directed a person or group who appear to accept the need for a particular building or some infrastructure but do not want it near their residences. Examples which we would be sympathetic to residents would be a garbage dump or a sewage plant, but planners and the larger population have less sympathy for NIMBYs opposing, for example, shelters for those suffering domestic violence. There are other similar pejoratives, such as BANANA (Build Absolutely Nothing Anywhere Near Anything (or Anyone)), which refers to groups that oppose nearly every proposed development, and the even more sardonic NOPE (Not On Planet Earth). When planners and the larger population deploy terms like "NIMBY," planners are seeking to position themselves as the rational agent of knowledge within the university discourse and their opponents as hysterics. Another example: when a person or group insist on a politically correct 'community,' such as those who desire well designed parks, children's playgrounds, 'off leash' areas for dogs, and farmers' markets, but do nothing to address problems of, for example, housing or income inequality. We can understand them as partaking in the hysteric's discourse because they take the city as master in their assumption that these things (farmers' market, etc.) are a good in themselves, require no justification, but only a new master to organize and protect these features. Who could possibly be opposed to 'community'?

While these four discourses can help us interpret various things in contemporary urban life, they will also help us understand important movements in the history of urban planning, with particular regard for how these movements

played out in Toronto. I will not be providing an exhaustive account of the history of urban planning. Instead, I will focus on the movements and planners that have influenced contemporary Toronto, and I will be explaining this history mainly through Lacan's four discourses. That is, I will be arguing that the early history of urban planning represents the rotation from the discourse of the master to that of the university by way of the hysteric. I will be focusing on the role of desire insofar as certain desires are 'materialized' in various urban planning schemes whereas other plans are meant to teach the population what to desire.

Toronto: From the Master's to the University Discourse

Contemporary Toronto, known officially as the Greater Toronto Area (GTA), is comprised of an older 'downtown' core with residential and commercial areas well beyond this 'core.' Some of these are now known as 'inner suburbs' and further out as 'suburbs.' Like many cities, Toronto's area grew as an outward sprawl but Toronto (then York) incorporated smaller villages that once lay at its outskirts. This shape of the city is mostly defined by events from the late 1800s to the present. However, a brief history from the founding of York in 1793 to the late 1800s shows how its growth and development is of the master's discourse and university discourse.

Master's Discourse

$$\frac{S_1}{\$} \in \frac{S_2}{a}$$

Prior to modernist urban planning, there were only a few attempts to design a city on paper and then build following these plans. Most cities developed without any overarching plan: someone would build one thing here, and another something else over there. In the "master's discourse", the master (S_1) is a nonsensical signifier that gains its authority and power without any particular reason ("because I said so!"). And, as Žižek explains, the Master Signifier refers to the "dogmatic stupidity of the signifier": the word means what it

means because that is what it means! Similarly, cities prior to modernist planning were arranged in the way they were because they were arranged in the way they were. Sometimes these old cities are described as 'growing organically,' meaning they grew the way they did because that's how they grow… It is this 'knowledge' of the city that is received/addressed to S_2.

In the master's discourse, a (or *objet petit a)*, represents the loss/product of the master. In cities which developed without a 'master' plan, we encounter a strange phenomenon: either no desire is expressed or desire is all that is expressed; that is, the cities are developed based on a plethora of desires (I want to build over here) or with a loss of desire (there is no expressed desire accounted for the development of the city as a whole – there is no plan that would contain that particular desire).

The product or truth of the master's discourse is $\$$, the barred subject or the truth that the master is itself 'barred,' caught up in language, and does not have a direct relationship to authority. The truth of these old cities is that their arrangement without plan is *not* natural or 'organic,' but contains a multitude of problematic reasonings and, most importantly, contains many problems. On investigation, there is nothing natural or absolute about these city's arrangements. In fact, quite the opposite: their arrangement is arbitrary.

As noted in chapter one, John Graves Simcoe 'founded' the town of York just west of the Don River at the shore of Lake Ontario, established a ten-block town site, and created a few of the streets that still remain: Queen Street (then Lot Street), Yonge Street, and Dundas Street to name a few. Most important for the contemporary shape of Toronto was Lot Street. Shortly after Simcoe's arrival surveyors marked the township line of York and Victoria Counties which is now Victoria Park Avenue. A line was created straight to Lake Ontario, then another line was created at 90 degrees and this became Lot Street. On the north side of Lot Street were residential lots, on the south were industrial or commercial lots. Each lot was one acre. The only remaining original lot is the area that is now

Grange Park, the Ontario College of Art and Design University, and the Art Gallery of Ontario, bordered by Queen, McCaul, Dundas and Beverley Streets. All the other lots were subdivided by the respective landowners. Though only one original lot remains, this basic grid formation of Lot Street and its lots created the template for further gridded street and lot formations.

During the early 1800's, enterprises were mostly situated along what is now King Street and most of the residential areas were just to the north. Various villages were established just north of Bloor Street and further north as well. The City of Toronto incorporated in 1834 with a population of roughly 9000, mainly because a wave of British immigrants arrived in the 1820s and early 1830s and a better administrative system was needed. In 1841, Toronto lost its reason for existence: with the union of Upper and Lower Canada, it was no longer the capital of Upper Canada, and it was no longer needed as a military outpost. At this time, Toronto would have been recognizable to Simcoe since it was pretty much the same, only larger, and with some houses north of Queen Street. The City occupied the area from the Gooderham and Worts Distillery in the east to just beyond the Garrison in the west, between the lake and Queen Street. At this time, people still felt the effects of the recession that sparked the Rebellion. Government invested money to help the economy along, giving Toronto better roads, a jail, a new city hall, and gas-lit streets. The Ontario University was built and opened in 1843. In the 1850s, Gooderham and Worts started the first bank and others followed. Many businesses were established and were successful: Christie's bakery, Heintzman's piano factory, and many mills, publishers, steamship builders, and furniture builders. By 1860, Toronto had radically changed. The shore of Lake Ontario was dominated by warehouses and tracks and a terminal for three rail lines. In 1841, Toronto's population was 14,000; by 1867, the year of Confederation, it was 50,000.[28]

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[28] William Dendy and William Kilbourn, *Toronto Observed: Its Architecture, Patrons, and History* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1986), 41.

While this is a fairly substantial growth of population, by 1901 Toronto had 235,000 people. During the 1880s, the physical size of the city doubled as it annexed and incorporated the villages of Riverdale, Yorkville, the Annex, Seaton Village, Brockton, and Parkdale. Between 1871 and 1891, the number of factories increased five times from 500 to 2,500 and the industrial workforce grew from 9400 to 26,000. All of this development occurred while the economy was in recession roughly between 1873 to 1895.[29]

It was during these last two decades, especially the last decade, of the 1800s that many of the houses and buildings that still remain were built. Just about every "old house" from Dupont south was built during the 1880s and 1890s. This makes it rather easy for the amateur architectural enthusiast to answer "When was that house built?" Nine times out of ten, "around 1890" would be the correct answer. These houses range from the "Bay-n-Gables" prevalent throughout Toronto (and are unique to Toronto) to the larger homes of the Annex and Rosedale.[30] As we will see, town planning and home building was intimately connected to morality and this was obvious at the time. The pre-eminent property owner and builder of the late 1800s was Alexander Manning, who was also an alderman and mayor. Perhaps most famously, he built the Hospital for Incurables (later known as "the lunatic asylum," now officially The Centre for Addiction and Mental Health, or more commonly as "the place that used to be called the 'lunatic asylum'"). Manning was also the president of a brewing company and so his political career came to an end with the temperance movement in 1886. He lost to a reformer, William Holmes Howland, who promised, as mayor, to usher in a new era of the now-infamous "Toronto the Good."[31] Howland took up many causes, from providing clean drinking water to improving housing for the poor to stopping the incarceration of drunks. He and the city's first Medical Health Officer,

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[29] Dendy and Kilbourn, *Toronto Observed*, 94.

[30] 'Bay-n-Gable' is a style of row-house that are distinctive to Toronto. See Patricia McHugh, *Toronto Architecture: A City Guide* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1985), 16–17, 211.

[31] For humorous and self-depreciating account of "Toronto the Good," see: C.S. Clark, *Of Toronto the Good: The Queen City of Canada As It Is* (Montreal: The Toronto Publishing Company, 1898).

Dr. William Canniff, struggled unsuccessfully to bring sanitary garbage disposal, proper sewage treatment, and clean drinking water to the city. Howland was only mayor for two years before stress and exhaustion caused him to retire (and he died six years later at age 49). However, historians credit Howland with creating "an expectation among the citizenry – which grew and lasted – that Toronto's civic administration should actively intervene to promote the welfare of all its people."[32]

Also during the last fifteen or so years of the 1800s, the Toronto Public Library began, a proper City Hall was built (and still remains as "Old City Hall" at Bay and Queen),[33] two large high schools (one on Jarvis, the other in Parkdale) were built, and Upper Canada College was built in 1891 (and still remains at that site). And, innumerable churches sprang up in the 1880s and 1890s.

So, what is important to recognize is that much of contemporary Toronto was built in the last two decades of the 1800s. It is during this time that London, England, was developing a number of "solutions" to the problems of overcrowded industrial towns and cities. Fredrick Engels' *The Condition of the Working Class in England in 1844* was likely the first to address the terrible living conditions of the working class. It gives minute detail to the deplorable conditions of the proletariat – overcrowding, lack of sewers or clean water, hardship, disease, etc. The infamous 1848 *Communist Manifesto* of Marx and Engels even spoke of "gradual abolition of the distinction between town and country."

However, nearly everyone agreed at this time that the city was a site of evil, and for the most part, they were right. Factories that produced polluting air and other waste were built where people were living, and often homes for the factories' workers were built beside the factory. Little if any thought was given to the general well-being of the workers. Meanwhile, most streets were not paved.

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[32] Dendy and Kilbourn, *Toronto Observed*, 97.

[33] Old City Hall was never completed. One need only glance at the room that was once the Council Chambers to see this: there are large panels on the walls that were meant to be portraits and artwork but remain blank.

Horses were the main mode of transportation, and the amount of horse shit on the streets was overwhelming. Since nearly no one had a toilet, human shit was dumped in the streets' gutters. While many dreamed of fleeing the city, and doctors often 'prescribed' that women be sent to the country for a few days or weeks to regain their health, the city was also the location of both economic and social relations. This fact meant that simply leaving the city was not a viable solution, thus bringing some of the country into the city was thought to be a practical solution.[34]

During the latter half of the nineteenth century, a variety of social reform groups organized, some of which felt the working class deserved more, others felt the working classes' conditions were their own fault. Some advocated different living arrangements while others argued for stricter morals, including the beginnings of 'temperance' movements. While some improvements were made in terms of sanitation and clean water, the main response to these problems was to build more parks within the city.

This new parks movement was largely based on and inspired by Louis XIV and his Versailles compound. Versailles' gardens brought a 'balance' of nature and society since the gardens are full of plants and flowers but 'tamed' or 'domesticated,' controlled and purposefully designed. It served as 'the' example of a new form of nature, one which is not full of rot, decay, and destruction, but one marked by order, beauty, and pleasure. So, in 1844, Liverpool hired Joseph Paxton to make Birkenhead Park and the following year Victoria Park in London, England was created (expanded in 1872). It was during this time that Napoleon III appointed Haussmann to re-arrange Paris with wide boulevards. Paris had grown like many European cities – a maze of streets with little planning. Henry IV with his Bourbon dynasty in 1589 tried to impose some building codes, but these plans were lost to the 'natural' growth of the urban maze. With extremely high

[34] Henry Ford, the founder of Ford Motors, argued "We will solve the City Problem by leaving the City" (sic): Henry Ford, "The Modern City – A Pestiferous Growth," in *Ford Ideals: Being a Selection from Mr. Ford's Page in the* Dearborn Independent (Dearborn Michigan: Dearborn Publication Company, 1922). Retrieved from: http://archive.org/details/fordidealsbeings00fordiala

densities, and overcrowding, along with narrow streets, it was believed to allow crime to escalate and contribute, in part, to the success of the French Revolution. When Napoleon III took power, he wanted the city's streets to be cleared of people to make it less safe for revolutionaries and large boulevards for his military to cut down urban rebels. Along with this defensible space, he wanted to create a legacy for himself.[35] Napoleon appointed Haussmann in the late 1840s to enact these ideas over the 1850s. He evicted thousands from their homes, overtook parks, tore down landmarks, and spent four times the total budget of Paris to build the wide boulevards and new buildings to line these 'streets.' The results were 'monumental' streets with little life on them.[36]

Though not as 'organic' as the growth of early cities, Simcoe's founding act is largely of the master's discourse. While he did design and establish a basic grid pattern (of the university discourse, not simply because since grids rely on rational calculation, but because grids represent – if not materialize – a systematized knowledge), it was an arrangement of the master's discourse for two reasons. The grid and established town were set with little reason, coupled with the fact that the grid was large and mostly unplanned, suggest that he was relying on others to do with the land what they will. That is, he was allowing the town, within the large grid, to grow and develop however people wished. And that is largely what it did, giving rise to the problems that the university discourse seeks to solve: overcrowding, unsanitary conditions, spreading of disease, etc.

The important events and practices of the end of the nineteenth century in Toronto reflect a slow shift from the master's to the university discourse. It is a slow shift. The rotation from the master's to the university discourse is also a result of declaring 'too much' to the problems that arise in these cities of the

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[35] Marx famously describes the reign of Napoleon I as "tragedy" while the repetition of his nephew's reign (Napoleon III) as "farce." See: Karl Marx, "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte," in *Karl Marx: Selected Writings*, second edition, ed. David McLellan (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 300.

[36] Historical dates from the "Commentators' Introduction" in Ebenezer Howard, *To-morrow: A Peaceful Path to Real Reform, Original Edition with Commentary by Peter Hall, Dennis Hardy & Colin Ward* (New York: Routledge, 2003).

master's discourse. There had always been problems of crowding, sanitation, disease, etc., but they eventually reached an intensity or a limit that could no longer be accepted. This declaration of a limit is what guides the rotation toward, and response from, the university discourse.[37] One of the central figures in this gradual shift is Frederick Law Olmsted, the main advocate for the parks movement in the latter half of the nineteenth century.

The Parks Movement

Hysteric's Discourse

$$\frac{\not{S}}{a} \in \frac{S_1}{S_2}$$

University Discourse

$$\frac{S_2}{S_1} \in \frac{a}{\not{S}}$$

Beginning in the late nineteenth century, various ideas and plans were created (some of which I have outlined above) in response to these "nonsensical" cities. These responses include the parks movement, Howard's Garden Cities movement, Le Corbusier's plans, and the aims of CIAM. These responses and plans can be understood as functioning with the 'university discourse.' Olmsted, however, wavers between the discourse of the hysteric and that of the university. In the university discourse, the position of the agent is taken by knowledge (S_2), which address a: the surplus/loss of desire. Urban planning seeks to position itself as operating purely on knowledge and tries to account for the excesses of previous cities, why people built where they did, and to make up for the lack of an articulated desire of how the whole city would be built. The product/loss in the university discourse is $\not{S}$, the barred subject or the lack of pure signification (no direct connection between signified and signifier); the knowledge of the university discourse is not, in fact, objective and all-knowing, but is rather caught up with

[37] In chapter 1 we saw sixteenth and seventeenth century designs for a city, but these were largely a 'frill' or a 'philosophical exercise.' I would suggest that the industrial city of the eighteenth century gave rise to thinking of the city as a problem, and aside from the problems of sanitation and living conditions, the problem was that of enjoyment. Hence the proposals for parks – spaces of enjoyment.

the lack inherent in language[38] so that claims to truth expressed in language cannot be truth, and, moreover, the university discourse (as will the other discourses) are entangled in unconscious desires that cannot be calculated away. Put another way, all these responses to the old 'master' cities and the plans for new arrangements all share a common feature: failure. Degrees of failure, to be sure, but none live up to the promise of its 'all-knowing' knowledge. The authors of these responses and plans are barred subjects with their own lacks, deficiencies, failures, etc. While presented as objectively true responses and plans, they were caught in language and do not have direct access to the truth. How can we understand the 'truth' of the university discourse as S_1 (the master) in these responses and plans to the old 'master' cities? Lacan argues that the truth of the university discourse is the master because all the knowledge the university discourse produces actually props up the master. It does not appear that these responses and plans actually work to prop up the old master cities. Perhaps, though, the 'truth' is the city itself – that the responses and plans share the theme of wanting something very 'uncity like,' a clean arrangement without the messy, chaotic order that is inherent to cities. But the truth is that these plans, with clear lines and rationalism, are a sham and the actual result will be a 'return' of the chaotic messiness, a return of the city proper.

Perhaps the most well-known advocate for parks within existing cities was Frederick Law Olmsted, who designed and created Central Park in New York City. His son, Frederick Law Olmsted Jr., started the first school of urban planning, known then as Landscape Architecture, at Harvard in 1900.[39] Currently, Olmsted's largest influence is on the 'Landscape Urbanism' movement headed by Charles Waldheim. The first major event to define contemporary Landscape Urbanism was a conference in Chicago in April 1997, while this movement's work

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[38] This inherent lack in language is shown in Figure 5, Graph One, explained in the previous chapter.

[39] Anthony Alofsin, *The Struggle for Modernism: Architecture, Landscape Architecture, and City Planning at Harvard* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2002), 23.

is well documented in an issue of a journal[40] and a collection of essays.[41] The general thesis of Landscape Urbanism is that cities ought to be designed and defined by their landscapes, not the architecture of its built form.[42] Lewis Mumford credits Olmsted spearheading the movement to "re-ruralize the town" by planning and developing a new form of park: one that does not over-sculpt the land, nor consist of "vain architectural embellishment," and instead make heavy use of native flowers and shrubs.[43] P.D. Smith's expansive account of the history of cities also characterizes Olmsted as early proponent and builder of the "classic garden suburb."[44]

On February 25, 1870, Olmsted presented a paper to the American Social Science Association at the Lowell Institute in Boston, which he called "Public Parks and the Enlargement of Towns."[45] In this paper, Olmsted provides an interesting analysis of the relationship between town and country in America and who wants and does not want to live in the country.

Olmsted begins by arguing that very few people in America want to live in the country. Olmsted cannot fathom how anyone would want to live in these "half-equipped cities" while thousands of acres of farmable land and "the finest forests in the world" go undesired.[46] This is evidenced by the "women and girls arriving by the score" at train stations to visit the city during the day and returning to farms in the evening.[47] The attraction to the cities is not difficult to comprehend: more services, stores, social connections, better chances of employment.

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[40] Charles Waldheim, et. al. *Landscape Urbanism – Kerb 15* (Melbourne: RMIT Press, 2007).

[41] Charles Waldheim, *The Landscape Urbanism Reader* (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 2006).

[42] Waldheim, *The Landscape Urbanism Reader*, 108.

[43] Lewis Mumford, *The Culture of Cities* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1938), 219.

[44] P.D. Smith, *City: A Guidebook for the Urban Age* (New York: Bloomsbury, 2012), 154.

[45] Frederick Law Olmsted, "Public Parks and the Enlargement of Towns" (NP: American Social Science Association, 1870). Reprinted in *Early Town Planning: Volume One, Selected Essays*, ed. Richard LeGates and Frederic Stout (New York: Routledge, 1998).

[46] Olmsted, "Public Parks and the Enlargement of Towns," 1.

[47] Olmsted, "Public Parks and the Enlargement of Towns," 1.

Olmsted even tells us that rural housewives complain about their servants – only the poorest will work as servants in the country and, as soon as they can save some money, will move back to the city.

Olmsted is not convinced that the population's "strong drift townward" is a "moral epidemic."[48] Rather, he sees this movement of urbanization as "human progress" and it is "more rational to prepare for a continued rising of the townward flood" than to expect it to subside.[49] Olmsted's concern is that the land of towns is being divided up and sold or given away with little thought. He proposes that public parks be established so that these rapidly growing towns will have some green space.

Interestingly, Olmsted argues that it is women who are the cause of this movement toward towns: "we all recognize that the tastes and dispositions of women are more and more potent in shaping the course of civilized progress, and we may see that women are even more susceptible to this townward shift than men."[50] He argues that many men will give up his residence in the country for a smaller home in a town out of consideration for their wives and daughters. His reasoning is that women can find many more educational opportunities, services, and life in towns than in the country. And, because of the people, lighting, and infrastructure, it is cleaner and safer.

While Olmsted agrees that towns offer a wide variety of advantages, he nonetheless marks a limit with the possibility of "an unhealthy density of population."[51] He does not give a specific number, but instead states "the advantages of civilization can be found illustrated and demonstrated under not other circumstances so completely as in some suburban neighborhoods," where

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[48] Olmsted, "Public Parks and the Enlargement of Towns," 4.

[49] Olmsted, "Public Parks and the Enlargement of Towns," 5.

[50] Olmsted, "Public Parks and the Enlargement of Towns," 5.

[51] Olmsted, "Public Parks and the Enlargement of Towns," 9.

houses are spaced “fifty to a hundred feet or more” from each other.[52] Olmsted inserts the argument that “man’s enjoyment of rural beauty has clearly increased rather than diminished with his advance in civilization.”[53] There is no reason given or any explanation of this claim. What could he have meant? It appears that Olmsted assumes that the ‘rural’ is the ‘natural’ place for humanity. This assumption follows a long tradition of philosophy that sees man pulled from his ‘natural’ habitat within nature toward groupings with other people in villages, towns, and cities. In other words, man is meant to live alone within nature, but necessity pulls him toward living with other people.

Montesquieu discussed the problem of ‘nature vs. society’ in ‘Myth of the Troglodytes,’ in which people were bound by necessity to leave their solitary existence and forced to come together for mutual protection.[54] Hobbes articulated this with his account of the ‘state of nature’ (“solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short”) to show the necessity of creating a state to extend the life of each person – and their betterment.[55] This gives us the concept of ‘civilization.’ Rousseau’s arguments on nature and society, however, are closer to Olmsted (and, we will see, many others in the town planning canon). Rousseau insisted that man was at his best before any social groupings or state formations. He was, literally, a radical conservative.[56]

In any case, Olmsted finds that the only problems with these new suburbs are the loss of time, inconvenience, and expense of traveling between suburb and town, and so he proposes a “cheap and enjoyable method of conveyance”

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[52] Olmsted, “Public Parks and the Enlargement of Towns,” 9.

[53] Olmsted, “Public Parks and the Enlargement of Towns,” 9.

[54] Charles de Secondat, baron de Montesquieu, *Persian Letters*, trans. Margaret Mauldon (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). The myth of the Troglodytes is found in Letters 11 to 14.

[55] Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ed. Richard Tuck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). The account of the ‘state of nature’ being “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short” appears in Chapter 13.

[56] Jean-Jacques Rousseau, “Discourse on the Origins and Foundations of Inequality Among Men” in *Rousseau’s Political Writings*, ed. Alan Ritter and Julia Conaway Bondanella, trans. Julia Conway Bondanella (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1987), 3–57.

as the solution. Once this is in place, suburbs ought to be "indefinitely extended."[57] It needs to be emphasized that the only problem with suburbs for Olmsted is the difficulty of movement to the main city and back to the suburbs. Though he has spent considerable time explaining the draw of the city, he seems unable to even imagine that someone might choose to live in the city. However, he does envision each suburban train station becoming its own quasi-town with services and shops. This idea is nearly identical to the recent movement 'transit oriented development' (TOD).[58] Olmsted is suggesting a 'balance' of town and country – towns just large enough to provide urban amenities and small enough to retain the benefits of the country (fresh air, nature, etc.). This is clearly a foreshadowing of Howard's Garden Cities.

While Olmsted is certain that the enlargement of towns will continue unabated and contribute to the advancement of civilization, he also warns us that these large cities do have, and will increase, the death-rate, disease, crime, and all the other "special evils" a city brings.[59] He points to foul air in dense towns. He also highlights the loss of sociability in towns – the need to carefully walk so as to not bump into people and the indifference of people to each other. This "unfriendly" or "hardening" means of interaction has become so common that townspeople are not conscious of it.[60]

Since Olmsted is resigned to the fact that towns and cities will continue to expand, both in population and in the "distance from the interior to the circumference of towns," and that people ought to live in these suburban 'villages,' he argues that roads and sidewalks of the main town need to be made sufficiently wide to accommodate this back-and-forth traffic and for an abundance

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[57] Olmsted, "Public Parks and the Enlargement of Towns," 9.

[58] 'Transit oriented development' is a term was coined by New Urbanist Peter Calthorpe. See: Peter Calthorpe and William Fulton, *The Regional City: Planning for the End of Sprawl* (Washington, DC: Island Press, 2001).

[59] Olmsted, "Public Parks and the Enlargement of Towns," 10.

[60] Olmsted, "Public Parks and the Enlargement of Towns," 11.

of trees.[61] One can imagine his ideal street plan: wide road (perhaps 200 feet wide), space from road to sidewalk for trees, with houses set far back on the lot to accommodate even more trees.[62]

Olmsted finally gets to the main topic of his talk – public parks. He begins by stating that there is a particular "evil to which men are specially liable when living in towns" and this evil will become aggravated in the future since these towns are becoming larger and contain more and more people.[63] The 'evil' Olmsted is referring to are the conditions that corrupt and irritate both the body and the mind, which he simply names as "bad air."[64] Just as then-modern houses had 'parlours' for a family to spend evenings together, he argues that a town ought to have areas separate from dwelling and commerce. These separate areas would need to provide recreation that would either "stimulate exertion on any part or parts needing it" or "cause us to receive pleasure without conscious exertion."[65] The former Olmsted terms "exertive," the latter he terms "receptive."[66] He then further subdivides "receptive recreation" into "gregarious" and "neighborly." "Gregarious" recreation is that "looked upon by New England society as childish and savage" because it involves little intellectual activity.[67] Oddly, Olmsted's example of this "gregarious recreation" is a moment when people come together in public parks for no other reason than to be with other people. An individual, just by adding "his presence," adds "to the pleasure of all" gathered.[68] Olmsted finds this type of gathering to be a "good thing" for all

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[61] Olmsted, "Public Parks and the Enlargement of Towns," 13–14.

[62] This general plan, except with narrower roads, can found in the older parts of Toronto. For example: Brunswick Avenue from Ulster Street to College Street, and Lakeview Avenue.

[63] Olmsted, "Public Parks and the Enlargement of Towns," 14.

[64] Olmsted, "Public Parks and the Enlargement of Towns," 15.

[65] Olmsted, "Public Parks and the Enlargement of Towns," 17.

[66] Olmsted, "Public Parks and the Enlargement of Towns," 17.

[67] Olmsted, "Public Parks and the Enlargement of Towns," 18.

[68] Olmsted, "Public Parks and the Enlargement of Towns," 18.

involved as it gives each person a sense of "light-heartedness."[69] Thus, such public parks ought to be included when planning the extension of towns.

Olmsted's observation that people enjoy coming to places with other people has been 'rediscovered' by contemporary urban planners and theorists. Holly Whyte finds that people are attracted to other people.[70] Jan Gehl's entire urban planning philosophy is based on the simple, but unfortunately radical principle that urban spaces ought to be designed for *people* because it is people that make an area vibrant and successful.

How Olmsted describes "neighborly receptive recreation" is very similar to how Jane Jacobs describes a bustling sidewalk: children playing among adults conversing, with nothing being too extravagant or outlandish, but also not tired or unkempt. However, Olmsted is much more hysterical and paints the picture much darker than Jane Jacobs (as we will see in the following chapter): people sitting on doorsteps, rows of men sitting on the curb with their feet in the gutter, 'anxious' mothers concerned about their children playing among the strangers, and the "noisy wheels on the pavement."[71] He also describes young men lounging on and obstructing sidewalks, men who have no respect for anyone who passes by, men who will go into nearby basements "where they find others of their sort, see, hear, smell, drink, and eat all manner of vile things."[72]

It might seem obvious that Olmsted's solution to these problems is the creation public parks. These public parks must be part of what is fairly new at the time – plans for a town on a large scale. Were a town allowed to grow slowly and incrementally based on the wishes of independent developers (that is, the cities of the master's discourse), Olmsted argues they would not set aside land for public parks. Instead, assuming the university discourse, he insists the local

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[69] Olmsted, "Public Parks and the Enlargement of Towns," 19.

[70] William H. Whyte, *The Social Life of Small Urban Spaces* (Washington D.C.: Conservation Foundation, 1980).

[71] Olmsted, "Public Parks and the Enlargement of Towns," 20.

[72] Olmsted, "Public Parks and the Enlargement of Towns," 21.

government or administration needs to establish a larger ‘master plan’ that would include public parks. Indeed, the hysteric demands a new ‘master.’

Olmsted describes these public parks as being a place where a husband can meet his family when he is done work to have a picnic in the evening near a brook. People would bring musical instruments, tables, seats, and objects to provide shade. These would be a “pleasing rural prospect … unbroken by a carriage road or *the slightest evidence of the vicinity of the town*.”[73] Where Olmsted has witnessed such parks and gatherings, he claims to “have never seen such joyous collections of people,” including “tears of gratitude in the eyes of poor women as they watched their children enjoying themselves.”[74]

These public spaces are *parks*, places where people hear or feel “nothing of the bustle and jar of the streets, where they shall … find the city put far away from them. We want the greatest possible contrast with the streets and the shops and the rooms of the town.”[75] Olmsted tells us that he ‘wants’ a simple, broad, and open space of “clean greensward.”[76] These parks are to have enough trees at their edges to “completely shut out the city from our landscapes.”[77] This is how Olmsted defines the “most valuable” public space – the ‘park.’[78]It is worth noting that the etymology of ‘park’ refers to an area set aside from another area. Contemporary usage of ‘park,’ as in ‘park the car,’ refers to placing an object in an area set aside for a particular purpose. So, even the term ‘park,’ ensures that it is something separate from the city itself.

Olmsted is quite clear in his bias toward nature: “there is no more beautiful picture, and none can be more pleasing … than that of beautiful meadows.”[79] To

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[73] Olmsted, “Public Parks and the Enlargement of Towns,” 22. Emphasis added.

[74] Olmsted, “Public Parks and the Enlargement of Towns,” 22.

[75] Olmsted, “Public Parks and the Enlargement of Towns,” 22.

[76] Olmsted, “Public Parks and the Enlargement of Towns,” 22.

[77] Olmsted, “Public Parks and the Enlargement of Towns,” 22.

[78] Olmsted, “Public Parks and the Enlargement of Towns,” 22.

[79] Olmsted, “Public Parks and the Enlargement of Towns,” 23.

be fair, though, Olmsted has already spoken of the good things from 'gregarious recreation' (the gathering of people), and when describing his plans for public parks, he suggests that there ought to be a "promenade" at the edge, though he ensures we understand that its purpose is significantly different than the "greensward" of the park proper. The promenade is for people to watch "*congregated human life* under glorious and necessarily artificial conditions."[80]

Olmsted, within the university discourse, props up the cities of the master's discourse when he states that the "park should, as far as possible, complement the town."[81] He is referring to his ideal park as being "rugged" with "abrupt eminences" rather than being "picturesque": "Openness is the one thing you cannot get in buildings. Picturesqueness you can get. Let your buildings be as picturesque as your artists can make them."[82] Nice buildings make the town beautiful, whereas the park should be flat: meadows, prairies, green pastures and still waters. "What we want to gain is tranquility and rest to the mind. Mountains suggest effort."[83]

Furthermore, the type of park Olmsted is advocating is not the "artificial and exotic form … [that] the French have lately introduced."[84] Interestingly, he singles out iron fences: "the influence of iron hurdles can never be good."[85] So it should be clear that the type of 'park' Olmsted is proposing is not a highly manicured 'landscaped' park, but one that allows the so-called 'natural' features. Here we see Olmsted resisting the university discourse and, instead, proposing a partial return to the cities of the master's discourse. We often term the manicured green spaces as 'gardens,' those in which flowers are cultivated and arranged symmetrically, where people are meant to stroll along particular paths without any

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[80] Olmsted, "Public Parks and the Enlargement of Towns," 23.

[81] Olmsted, "Public Parks and the Enlargement of Towns," 23.

[82] Olmsted, "Public Parks and the Enlargement of Towns," 23.

[83] Olmsted, "Public Parks and the Enlargement of Towns," 23.

[84] Olmsted, "Public Parks and the Enlargement of Towns," 23.

[85] Olmsted, "Public Parks and the Enlargement of Towns," 24.

expectation of games or recreation. Olmsted's idea of a 'park' is what we normally understand as a 'park' – open space, rugged ground, ponds full of algae, fish, turtles, etc.

Now, we might wonder why Olmsted is often cited as beginning the parks movement, or why he remains influential. Olmsted designed and oversaw the building of Central Park in New York City. In the final section of this lecture, "Public Parks," he gives his account of how Central Park came to be.

In 1851, what finally became Central Park was first proposed on the east side of Manhattan Island. Olmsted tells us that the actual location of the park was determined without much thought, but only by someone pointing to a map. It took many years of public and government discussion, with much opposition from the public. In the seventh year of discussion, the *Herald* newspaper ran a lead article arguing that only the lower classes will use the park, intimidating other park users, and that "Central Park will be nothing but a great bear-garden for the lowest denizens of the city."[86] Olmsted implies that oppositions lasted for twelve years, yet the mayor and local government went ahead and began building the park anyway. Labourers worked around the clock to get the park built as quickly as possible to avoid anyone successfully stopping it. Stating that the last four years (i.e. 1866–1870) saw at least thirty million visits, Olmsted counts Central Park as a success. Indeed, one could hardly imagine New York City without it. Olmsted tells us that in these four years, women and daughters visit the park with little incident, physicians find their patients healthier and are able to advise them to visit the park rather than give up their business and leave the city entirely. The success of Central Park led to further parks built in New York City and other North American cities.

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[86] Quoted in Olmsted, "Public Parks and the Enlargement of Towns," 28.

Garden Cities

With the early parks and social reform movements, along with the rising dominance of the university discourse, Ebenezer Howard presented his own solution to the problem of the industrial city with the publication of *To-morrow: A Peaceful Path to Real Reform*[87] in 1898. This book has been extremely influential since its publication, but not in the way Howard had hoped. While it proposes new towns built with ample gardens, open space, and fresh air, the majority of the book is devoted to a radical form of property ownership (hence the "Real Reform" in the original title, dropped in subsequent publications). Rather than garden *cities*, builders produced thousands of garden *suburbs*. In *The Culture of Cities*, Lewis Mumford praises Howard for providing "statesmanlike proposals" for a properly "balanced urban environment."[88] Mumford's largest praise is for Howard's "sound sociological conception of the dynamics of rational urban growth."[89] Unlike many other accounts of Howard's work, Mumford ensures his readers know of Howard's more radical proposals concerning economic and social arrangements. P.D. Smith gives the typical reading of Howard: the man who began the British movement for leafy suburbs.[90] Howard's ideas, though, still admired. Peter Hall and Colin Ward position the garden city movement as a precursor to the contemporary discourse of sustainability.[91] Hall and Ward seek to reclaim Howard's legacy from suburban developers and insist on the benefits of building clusters of new towns connected by rail lines.[92] I will now give a close, if selective, reading of Howard's original text to show how it is of the university

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[87] Howard self-published *To-morrow: A Peaceful Path to Real Reform* in 1898. It was revised and republished in 1902 and many more times as *Garden Cities of Tomorrow*. All references here are to Ebenezer Howard, *To-morrow: A Peaceful Path to Real Reform, Original Edition with Commentary by Peter Hall, Dennis Hardy and Colin Ward* (New York: Routledge, 2003).

[88] Mumford, *The Culture of Cities*, 394, 396.

[89] Mumford, *The Culture of Cities*, 398.

[90] Smith, *City: A Guidebook for the Urban Age*, 151.

[91] Peter Hall and Colin Ward, *Sociable Cities: The Legacy of Ebenezer Howard* (Chichester, England: John Wiley and Sons, 1998).

[92] For an account of the experiences of and lessons from the development of garden cities beyond Europe (including Japan and Australia), see: Stephen Ward, ed., *The Garden City: Past, Present, and Future* (London: E & FN Spon, 1992).

discourse, what we have inherited from the garden city movement, and what we have lost.

Howard begins *To-morrow: A Peaceful Path to Real Reform* from the hysteric's position with the assumption that, no matter what political party or "sociological opinion" anyone holds, we all agree that people should not "continue to stream into the already over-crowded cities."[93] Underlying the concern for overcrowding is hysterical moralizing about alcohol and the temperance movement. By quoting some prominent people of the day about the "evils" of London, he argues that people need to get out of the city and back into the countryside. Howard is very clear in his assumption that people once lived where they should (in the country) and have been misled into cities: "that beautiful land of ours, with its canopy of sky, the air that blows upon it, the sun that warms it, the rain and dew that moisten it – the very embodiment of Divine love for man – is indeed a *Master-Key* … to pour a flood of light on the problems of intemperance, of excessive toil, of restless anxiety, of grinding poverty."[94] The "Master-Key" is, of course, the omniscience of the university discourse; it is that system that claims to explain all.

Howard is not particularly concerned with the specifics of what drew people into the cities, but is content to term them "attractions," and so proposes that new Garden Cities have their own attractions to draw people to them. This discourse of 'attraction' is furthered in his famous 'Three Magnets' diagram (Figure 9) (magnets attract), but it is also caught up in a discourse of desire.

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[93] Howard, *To-morrow: A Peaceful Path to Real Reform*, 1.

[94] Howard, *To-morrow: A Peaceful Path to Real Reform*, 5. Emphasis original.



Fig. 9. *The Three Magnets. No. 1*. (Image from Ebenezer Howard, *To-morrow: A Peaceful Path to Real Reform, Original Edition with Commentary by Peter Hall, Dennis Hardy and Colin Ward* (New York: Routledge, 2003), 24.)

Howard is much different than contemporary planners insofar as he believes his proposal for new towns will respond to people's desires, rather than having to teach people what to desire. There are many similarities between Howard's Garden Cities and the contemporary "urban sustainability" movement, but the latter spends much of its time convincing people that they want environmental sustainability (creating the demand), whereas Howard believes the demand is there and he is only offering 'supply.' One need only consider the

amount of "consciousness raising" done by environmental protection groups such as Greenpeace or those involved in the recent re-development in Toronto's Don Valley of an abandoned brick plant into the Evergreen Brick Works. It features renovated buildings using newly established 'sustainable' materials, native plants, power for electric cars, and a weekly farmers' market. Evergreen Brick Work's press released and stated goals continually refer to educating the public about, and 'galvanizing interest' in, sustainable urban development. They clearly assume that there is not much interest in what they are doing, but need to teach people why it is important. David House, the Site Development Advisor, insists that "the world needs this kind of place – a place to understand what impact we're having on the rest of the environment."[95] Other Toronto-based organizations, such as LEAF[96] and Not Far from the Tree[97] spend the majority of their time "educating the public" as to why their organization's actions ought to be desired. The point is simply that Howard was responding to the public's already established desire for more park land, whereas many contemporary environmental groups are 'activist' in nature: they educate this desire.

As shown in the Three Magnets diagram (Figure 9), Howard makes gestures to the need and desire for both town and country, though he has a strong bias for the latter. He writes that neither town nor country "represent the full plan of and purpose of nature. Human society and the beauty of nature are meant to be enjoyed together."[98] However, Howard only states that the town is a symbol for human society and togetherness, whereas: "And the country! The country is the symbol of God's love and care for man. All that we are, and all that

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[95] Seana Irving and Erin Elliot, *Transformation: The Story of Creating Evergreen Brick Works* (Toronto: Evergreen Brick Works, nd),10. Retrieved from: http://ebw.evergreen.ca/files/Transformation-EBW.pdf

[96] LEAF (Local Enhancement and Appreciation of Forests) is an organization that seeks to protect and advance Toronto's tree canopy, but most efforts go toward explaining why this important. See: http://www.yourleaf.org/

[97] Not Far from the Tree is a volunteer group that picks fruit from trees throughout the city. See: http://www.notfarfromthetree.org/

[98] Howard, *To-morrow: A Peaceful Path to Real Reform*, 9.

we have come from it."[99] Howard's enthusiasm for the country is partly explained in the sexual metaphor he often provides: "The two magnets [of attractions of town and country] must be made one. As man and women by their varied gifts and faculties supplement each other, so should town and country."[100] Here we see Howard suggesting the 'attractions of the country' are like the things that attract men to women, and that woman is aligned with nature and beauty. It is worth recalling masculinity's fantasy about the illusory nature of Lacan's 'feminine *jouissance*' since this fantasy is aligned with Howard's romantic notions of the countryside.

Howard tells us the country is the source of everything. It provides bodies, clothes, warmth, and shelter. It is what inspires all the arts, "its forces propel all the wheels of industry," all health, wealth, and knowledge.[101] We might wonder, then, why bother with cities or towns at all. Nonetheless, nature's "fullness of joy and wisdom has not revealed itself to man. Nor can it ever, so long as this unholy, unnatural separation of society and nature endures. Town and country *must be married*, and out of this joyous union will spring new hope, new life, a new civilisation."[102] Again we have the sexual metaphor of town and country 'marrying' one another to produce a new offspring – the Garden City.

After these hysterical complaints of the cities of the master's discourse, he then seeks to situate himself within the university discourse. Howard's idea of the Garden City (the 'marriage' of town and country) was to be on 6000 acres of as-yet untouched land, with 1000 acres for central core, and 5000 acres for surrounding agricultural land. It would have a set population of 32,000. This means that density would be around ninety to ninety-five persons per acre, which is not quite 'dense' or 'urban.' However, Lewis Mumford, likely the most well-known advocate for Garden Cities, argues that 90–95 persons per acre is

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[99] Howard, *To-morrow: A Peaceful Path to Real Reform*, 9.

[100] Howard, *To-morrow: A Peaceful Path to Real Reform*, 9.

[101] Howard, *To-morrow: A Peaceful Path to Real Reform*, 9.

[102] Howard, *To-morrow: A Peaceful Path to Real Reform*, 10. Emphasis added.

'compact' and 'urban.' Jane Jacobs, in contrast, argues that 200 *dwellings* per acre is the top end of what most people can comfortably deal with.[103] The following chapter will deal with densities in more detail, but here I will say that the 90–95 persons per acre in Howard's plan is not what one would think of as compact or urban. 90–95 persons per acre *could* resemble what we would think of as urban, but this is dependent on a host of factors that Howard does not address: if roads and streets 'count' as part of the area measured, the proposed heights of the buildings, and whether or not this density ratio includes employment and not only residential. Again, density ratios will be discussed more fully in the following chapter, but we should note here why Howard proposes this 90–95 persons per acre density ratio. This ratio is what he assumes is between the low density of the countryside and the high densities of his contemporary industrial London. So, again, we find the marking of a limit: the countryside's density is too low, but the city's is too high. And for Howard, this limit is guided by that "Master-Key" of man's supposed 'natural' relationship within nature, which he attempts to quantify in this density ratio (again, situating himself in the university discourse). Jacobs, as we will see, is basing her density ratios on what she experiences on the street: suggesting that the density ratios of areas that are successful and have diversity are the desired density ratios.

One of the things later planners and urbanists have praised Howard for is that his Garden City plan was not really a 'plan' so much as a general idea that would require a specific site before any specifics. Howard writes, "this plan, or if the reader be pleased to term it, this absence of plan..." in reference to a lack of specifics until a site acquired.[104] However, Howard, implicitly seeking the authority of the university discourse, provides many specifics about each street,

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[103] Jane Jacobs advocated for one to two hundred *households* per acre, each of which would house between one to five persons. St. Jamestown in Toronto is often cited as the most dense area of Toronto, and one of the densest in North America. In the 2006 census, its total population was 17,000. With an area of about .5 km² it makes the density about 137 per acre. However, other research suggests the actual population is much higher, closer to 25,000 which would make the density 202 per acre.

[104] Howard, *To-morrow: A Peaceful Path to Real Reform*, 17.

each house, each manufacturing place, and the width of streets, stating that the "grand boulevard to be 420 feet wide."[105] So, while it appears he is just providing a general scheme for the inhabitants to create what they will, it is in fact highly planned.

Later in the book he repeats that the town is not fully planned without a specific site and this would be the work of many minds. In his clearest formulation of his opposition to the cities of the master's discourse and desire to position himself within the university, he argues that there needs to be "a unity of design and purpose" and that "the town should be planned as a whole, and not left to grow up in a chaotic manner as has been the case with all English towns."[106] Howard relies on his love of nature to make this point: "A town, like a flower, or a tree, or an animal, should, at each stage of its growth, possess unity, symmetry, completeness."[107] He argues that American cities are "planned" but only "in a most inadequate sense."[108] He is referring to the grid pattern of American cities as better than the "intricate maze of streets" found in Europe, since it helps a person find his way around the town.[109] Nonetheless there is "little real design, and that of the crudest character." Howard argues that these American cities have monotony by design and do not provide a sufficient link to nature: "this city [Washington, the streets of which he praises] is not designed with a view of securing to its people ready access to nature, while its parks are not central, nor are its schools and other buildings arranged in a scientific manner."[110] So, while he praises the natural amenities, he is seeking to position this 'good' type of city building within the university discourse's claim of systematic knowledge (the "scientific manner").

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[105] Howard, *To-morrow: A Peaceful Path to Real Reform*, 17.

[106] Howard, *To-morrow: A Peaceful Path to Real Reform*, 45.

[107] Howard, *To-morrow: A Peaceful Path to Real Reform*, 45.

[108] Howard, *To-morrow: A Peaceful Path to Real Reform*, 45.

[109] Howard, *To-morrow: A Peaceful Path to Real Reform*, 45.

[110] Howard, *To-morrow: A Peaceful Path to Real Reform*, 45.

As further evidence of Howard's complete dislike for cities, and the persistence of his hysteria, he writes that it is much better to just abandon the current city and start afresh. He does this by highlighting the problems of trying to fix up an area of London. There was a plan to put "a new street between Holborn and the Strand" and it was going to displace many working class people.[111] To rehouse them would be very expensive, and likely impossible to do fairly. Howard's point is that instead of trying to fix cities like London, it is better to start on new, blank land: "it is obviously always easier, and usually far more economical and completely satisfactory, to make out of fresh material a new instrument, than to patch up and alter an old one."[112] However, what Howard ignores are the actual conditions of the people in this area. While it may be easier to start fresh elsewhere, it does not address the issues of the established area in question. The actual events of what took place to put in this new street (Kingsway, which still remains) show just how difficult it is. Many of the people who lived here worked close by and could not, as Howard seemed to assume, just move out to a suburb or new Garden City. The city of London had to figure out where to move these people and keep them close to their jobs. Demolition for the new street began in 1889 but the street was not opened until 1906.

In "Chapter 13" of *To-morrow: A Peaceful Path to Real Reform*, we find the famous diagrams, which show the Garden Cities close to each other with road and rail connecting each of them to each other. These diagrams are as famous as they are misleading.

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[111] Howard, *To-morrow: A Peaceful Path to Real Reform*, 47.

[112] Howard, *To-morrow: A Peaceful Path to Real Reform*, 46.



Fig. 10. *Group of Slumless Smokeless Cities. Diagram 7*. (Image from Ebenezer Howard, *To-morrow: A Peaceful Path to Real Reform, Original Edition with Commentary by Peter Hall, Dennis Hardy and Colin Ward* (New York: Routledge, 2003), 158.)

When referring to the “Group of Slumless Smokeless Cities” diagram (Figure 10) he again reminds the reader that his plans are only general guidelines:

> the reader is asked not to suppose that the design is put forward as one likely to be strictly carried out in the form thus presented; for

> any well-planned town, and, still more, any well-planned cluster of towns, must be carefully designed in relation to the site it is to occupy. [This] diagram as I have here sketched may be useful, as showing some of the broad principles which should be followed.[113]

While Howard ought to be commended for not planning an entire town or district regardless of the site, it is worth noting that his "broad principles," like the Master-Key, are of the university's discourse. It is that same form of knowledge: the system that claims to account for everything. So, though this "Group of Slumless Smokeless Cities" (Figure 10) is not a site plan, it is telling how much and what type of details are present. Perfect circles represent each 'city,' and the ringed and straight roads and railroads speak to the assumption that geometrical forms, drawn with the mathematician's tools, are the proper way to organize life. And while there are some necessities planned (water reservoirs and farms), the aspects of life accounted for are rather disturbing: "home for waifs" (homeless, usually youths), "insane asylum," "home for inebriates" (alcoholics), "epileptic farms," and a "cemetery". One wonders if these cities are where people go to drink, lose their minds, then die.

Howard ends the book with a hysterical rhetorical flourish, claiming that Garden Cities will solve just about every problem known to humankind: poverty, work, justice, disease, suffering, saving the elderly, and even a reference to it ending wars.

What I have skipped over in this brief explanation of Howard's book are the long and detailed passages on how the land in these Garden Cities would be owned co-operatively and 'rents' would be paid by each person to the general coffers to maintain roads, water, sewage, etc. There is also considerable detail on how the Garden Cities would be 'administered' and it was much different than democratic governance. As well, two chapters (10 and 11) are devoted to a review of the large number of then current social reform movements. It needs to

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[113] Howard, *To-morrow: A Peaceful Path to Real Reform*, 130–131.

be stressed that Howard was not just proposing a type of suburb with trees and flowers – his main concern was to provide a remedy for the social ills of the time (hence *Real Reform* in the title) and he clearly shows that he is very familiar with the various quasi-socialist co-operatives and rural colonies ideas. One-fifth of the book is devoted to the financial aspects of Garden Cities. It is clear that his intended audience are potential financial backers who would buy the land and begin to build the homes, roads, and infrastructure.

From *Real Reform* to Leafy Suburbs

Howard's book was largely self-financed – he published it himself and charged a nominal fee to anyone who wanted a copy. It was very well-received.[114] In less than a year a "Garden City Association" was formed as an organization for those who wanted to support and implement Howard's ideas.[115] Four years later, building began on the first Garden City, Letchworth. The main architects were Richard Unwin and Barry Parker. Welwyn was the second Garden City and construction began just after WWI. However, neither of these cities were properly Garden Cities. In fact, a Garden City as planned and presented in Howard's *To-morrow* was never built.

While many of his contemporaries liked the basic ideas in *To-morrow*, those on the left critiqued it mercilessly. Leftwing British parliamentarians did not agree with Howard's belief that this 'middle way' between socialism and capitalism would work, nor did they believe capitalists would be persuaded by rational argument and found Howard's ideas hopelessly utopian.[116] Meanwhile, those with the money – the book's intended audience – slowly pushed Howard to the sidelines as the first town was being considered. The financial backers stripped away much of the more 'radical' notions of communal property, and

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[114] Howard, *To-morrow: A Peaceful Path to Real Reform*, 1.

[115] Howard, *To-morrow: A Peaceful Path to Real Reform*, 197.

[116] Howard, *To-morrow: A Peaceful Path to Real Reform*, 197–198.

when the book was re-published in 1902, the title was changed to *Garden Cities of To-morrow* to leave out the "real reform" of the original title. Thus, when Letchworth was built, it did not have any of the 'contentious elements' of the original plan: none of the radical rent schemes, administration system, the public services, the area reserved for agriculture, restrictions on growth and the design layout. It seemed that Howard was content to be relegated to the position of "ideas man" and happy to collect his portion of the profits. This, for better or worse, would be the legacy of the Garden Cities movement. There were many appropriations of "Garden City" as a descriptor for speculative housing developments.

By 1909, the Garden City Association accepted these new 'garden-ish' developments as somewhat reasonable attempts to change the way planning was done. They renamed themselves the Garden Cities and Town Planning Association. Howard and few other devotees to the cause kept the flame alive. After WWI they began a second experiment, Welwyn Garden City. It had a reputation as a 'socialist town,' but it was not and did not contain any of the 'radical' notions (just like Letchworth). In 1939, the Association again changed its name, this time to Town and Country Planning Association, dropping any reference to 'Garden City.' The Town and Country Planning Association still exists today.[117]

Prior to WWI, there was interest in Garden Cities from across Europe, America, and Japan. Between 1910 and 1916 there were many American developments that purported to be Garden Cities, one of which was Forest Hill Gardens near New York City, built in 1912. In 1923, the Regional Planning Association of America formed to promote a 'purer form' of Garden Cities. Clarence Stein was the group's leader. He and Henry Wright built Radburn, New Jersey, which was to be a Garden City incorporating motor vehicles. The original

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[117] See: http://www.tcpa.org.uk/

plan for Radburn never materialized and it just became a leafy suburb in the late 1920s.

In 1945, the “Labour Administration” in England (i.e. the government), tabled the New Towns Act (passed in 1946). As the name suggests, this Act was to develop new towns outside London that were self-contained communities for working and living. The main lobbyist and supporter as Frederic Osborn and the towns were highly influenced by Garden City principles. The first was Stevenage (built immediately after the Act passed in 1946). Eventually the Act led to twenty-eight new towns built across Britain.

What needs to be emphasized is that no town was ever built as Howard intended. While Letchworth and Welwyn were *close* to what Howard proposed, neither of these towns incorporated the complex system of co-operative land owning or the rent system to fund the town’s services. These two towns (along with the twenty-eight towns built under the New Towns Act) did, however, follow Howard’s ideas of providing each home with a front garden and a back yard, each of these occupied by a single family. The lots were larger than found in the nearby cities and land uses were separated. That is, there was a central area with shopping and public space, with industries away from both the residential and shopping areas. This basic notion of separating forms of land use is the primary legacy of Howard’s Garden Cities plan.

While nearly everyone today argues in favour of ‘mixed-use’ and *not* separating land use, we can easily see why Howard proposed this separation. Again, the cities at the end of the nineteenth century were extremely dirty, congested, overcrowded, and unpleasant. Further, unlike nearly all contemporary town or city planners, Howard was attempting to provide for a desire, and not seeking to ‘teach a desire.’ That is, Howard took the popularly held desire to not simply ‘escape’ the city, but find a balance between the social and economic relations the city provides and the seemingly ‘natural’ need for fresh air, water, and sunlight. In this way, Howard is rare in that he is a town planner and not a

'pervert' in the Lacanian sense. Recall the discussion of Lacanian fantasy in the graph of desire explained in the previous chapter. Fantasy ($\$ \diamond a$) is the relationship between the barred subject and the object-cause of desire. While fantasy does teach us what and how to desire, perversion ($a \diamond \$$), the reversal of fantasy, makes this instruction of desire paramount and imposes it on the subject. In other words, instead of attempting to be or give what the other wants, the subject imposes his or her own desire on the other. In Howard's case, he sought to provide an object that people desired instead of providing an object that people need to be taught to desire. For the most part, anyway. His ideas for co-operative land ownership and rent systems were, indeed, novel and fairly radical. Thus, Howard seemed willing to give these up since that was not what most people wanted. People wanted a nice town with air, water, and sunlight and he was willing to compromise his ideals to give it to them.

Again, the unplanned cities up to the late nineteenth century fall within the master's discourse. These cities grew in the way they did because that is how the city grew: the maze of streets, with buildings wherever they were built with no overarching plan. In these early non-planned towns, the master is the "dogmatic stupidity" of the order of the town – things are where they are because that is where they are. It is the symbolic order; it is that dogmatic stupidity of the signifier discussed in the previous chapter. Just as a word means what it means because that is what it means, things in these cities are where they are because that is where they are. In this discourse, the other is the slave or knowledge. The other is what 'does the work.' In these old towns, it was, clearly, the workers and their 'know-how' that did the work in making the town. The product in the master's discourse is *objet petit a*, the object-cause of desire. In these old towns the object-cause of desire is the town itself – the 'city' as an ephemeral object that comes to be loved (later, nationalism), desired, romanticized, and begins to shape the co-ordinates of the town's subject's desires (what can be had or done, should be desired, etc.). The truth of the master's discourse is that these towns

were not organized by any authority (that is, the master), but was done arbitrarily and without justification.

We can then understand Howard's proposal for Garden Cities as the beginning of the first rotation of the four discourses: from the master's to the university discourse. In the position of the agent is knowledge, where we find Howard's own knowledge of the city's failings, of the previous and then current attempts at social reform, of the system of rents and, most importantly, the "scientific" lay-out of the proposed towns. Howard's proposal takes the perspective of no-perspective: his diagrams are purely abstract and rely on and reinforce 'scientific' knowledge of how a town ought to be laid out, a place for everything and everything in its place. In the university discourse, the agent (knowledge) addresses a, the surplus that its knowledge cannot account for. Howard is addressing the surplus of the city – its apparently obvious awfulness but nonetheless attractive (hence the overcrowding). That is, what Howard is seeking to solve is the tension between people's desire to live in cities and the subsequent 'problems' of people living in close quarters. The barred subject ($\$$) in the university discourse is located in the lower right of the matheme ($\frac{S_2}{S_1} \in \frac{a}{\$}$), which, at least in *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*,[118] falls into the category of 'loss.' This means that, while Garden Cities were ostensibly planned for the town's inhabitants (that is, the barred subjects), the plans do not take them into account. There is no 'street-level' perspective or concern for how one might live in these Garden Cities on an everyday basis. Lacan tells us that the 'truth' of the university discourse is the master because the knowledge of the university discourse fails and works in the interests of the master.[119] Howard's Garden Cities, while claiming to provide "real reform," ultimately meant the continuation of industrial capitalism without 'too much' of its detrimental effects. Thus, the left at the time was highly critical of Howard's 'incremental' approach or middle way

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[118] Lacan, *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, 93.

[119] Lacan, *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, 104.

between capitalism and socialism.[120] Howard might have believed he was providing a path to "real reform," but his Garden Cities would not provide any such reform, only lessen the exploitation of the working class; he was not addressing the causes of the working class's suffering and the ills befalling the city.

Finally, I would like to stress that Howard's Garden Cities was proposed with the best of intentions. He barely had to 'identify' the problems with late nineteenth century London (or other 'coke towns' of the time) because they were so obvious; few, if any, defended these towns and cities. Howard was seeking to provide a novel way to solve definite problems and provide something that people desired. As explained above, many later urban planners seek to do the opposite, and fall within Lacan's relation of 'perversion' ($a \diamond \$$). These later planners (especially during the mid-twentieth and early twenty-first century), unlike Howard, seek to 'teach' people what to desire, offering plans for towns, cities, or neighbourhoods that no one wants.

The same, however, cannot be said of the actual outcome of Howard's proposals. The various suburbs marketed as "garden suburbs" claimed to provide one thing but actually gave another. And the subsequent "parks movement" was clear in its paternalistic tone: parks were not something that many wanted, but their proponents insisted they knew what was best and would like these parks once built.

Hystericizing the Garden City

Following some of the ideas in Ebenezer Howard's Garden City proposal, Raymond Unwin provides his own form of Garden City development that shows the clear break from Howard's more 'radical' ideas and what has survived: garden *suburbs*. Unwin's famous text *Nothing Gained By Overcrowding!* is clearly

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[120] Howard, *To-morrow: A Peaceful Path to Real Reform*, 197–198.

within the hysteric's discourse, though there are a few attempts to appear within the university discourse.[121] The title's exclamation point reveals the hysterical position, and one might rightly ask, "Whoever argued overcrowding was good?" He exaggerates the problem and presents his solution as self-evident.

Unwin repeats the common argument: with industrialization, cities grew too quickly over the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and little thought was given to the general health of the cities or their populations. Thus, the Garden City idea was to combine the benefits of both town and country by building a new town based on these principles. Unwin is here proposing that the Garden City principles can be adopted within established towns and cities with good effects. However, though Unwin's article is an argument about improving conditions in existing cities, Lewis Mumford interprets this text, *Nothing Gained By Overcrowding!*, as guiding "the most effective suburban planners."[122] Mumford praises Unwin for proposing designs that will limit the number of "needless streets" and providing enclosed garden-style courtyards for children to play.[123]

Unwin is concerned with what many today call "sprawl." Contrary to Mumford's reading, Unwin is, in fact arguing *against* "suburban development" of existing cities based on "the detailed principles advocated for in a Garden City."[124] Unwin is proposing that existing cities establish a "green belt" around their current size and establish "detached suburbs" with their own town centres. Unwin argues that people can only "enjoy the advantages of social intercourse" when the village in which they dwell is small enough for each to have "immediate personal knowledge of each other."[125] These smaller villages would then form a

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[121] Raymond Unwin, *Nothing Gained by Overcrowding! How the Garden City Type of Development May Benefit Both Owner and Occupier*, 3rd edition (Orchard House, Westminster, P.S. King & Son, 1912).

[122] Lewis Mumford, *The City in History: Its Origins, Its Transformations, and Its Prospects* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1961), 497.

[123] Mumford, *The City in History*, 498.

[124] Unwin, *Nothing Gained by Overcrowding!*, 2.

[125] Unwin, *Nothing Gained by Overcrowding!*, 2.

group, and each group within smaller villages would interact in a ‘federated’ manner. This is based on what Unwin calls the “natural principles of organisation.”[126]

Just as the Garden City principles advocate for a green belt surrounding each town, Unwin is arguing that this same principle needs to be applied to individual houses and buildings. That is, each house or building needs to have “garden space” surrounding it. His concern is with the “overcrowding of buildings upon the land.”[127] In an attempt to claim the authority of the university discourse, he argues that instead of a standard city block having five cross streets intersected by one central street, there be only one cross street with no intersecting street. In Unwin’s proposal, each house would have a larger lot and the area behind the two groups of houses would consist of “tennis courts, children’s playground and bowling green.”[128] The effect of his scheme would reduce the number of houses by half and increase triple the size of each plot of land – the difference is made up by reducing the amount of road space.

Unwin provides some detail on the cost of such plans. What becomes apparent from a close reading is that he is skewing the numbers to make it appear that his scheme is more profitable. In “Table I”[129] he compares three “schemes”: “Scheme I is what has normally been done with plots of land and housing in major cities, while the other two are his proposals (though he calls both ‘Scheme II’). While claiming his proposal (Scheme II) is cheaper, one ought to notice he is providing less than half the number of houses than Scheme I, and his claims for an even cheaper proposal depend on the purchase farm land, meaning that these savings are only available to new developments outside a city. What he is ultimately ‘banking on’ is to build these new blocks on farmland since it sells for cheaper than city land. The only real savings in his proposal

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[126] Unwin, *Nothing Gained by Overcrowding!*, 2.

[127] Unwin, *Nothing Gained by Overcrowding!*, 3.

[128] Unwin, *Nothing Gained by Overcrowding!*, diagram I, p 4

[129] Unwin, *Nothing Gained by Overcrowding!*, 5.

come from reducing the number of streets needed, though if these plans are, indeed, for existing towns and cities, it is likely that the streets already exist. So, not only is his scheme poor economically, but he is advocating building suburban developments on farmland even though he began by arguing these plans were for existing towns and cities. Unwin acknowledges that the distance between these suburban outposts and the city proper will increase significantly, but states that this is "a comparatively unimportant matter."[130]

Unwin sees his contemporary cities as overcrowded and explains this is the result of developers seeking maximum profit, even though he goes to lengths to convince us that it is *not* profitable. Further, Unwin does not explain what constitutes overcrowding (i.e. what density counts as overcrowding) nor does he explain in any detail what is wrong with what others would simply call 'high density.' So, while he is proposing that cities pass laws that limit the number of houses built on an acre, he does not give any particular reason for this.

Unwin's publication ends with a dozen photographs showing the difference between developments based on Garden City principles and those built by developers. What is striking is that, while the Garden City examples show leafy lawns, the examples of "bad" planning look exactly like the highly desirable urban streets of Toronto. In fact, his example of "bad planning" is nearly identical to contemporary plans for "Smart Growth" championed by New Urbanists. One of these photographs even shows a row of what are nearly "Bay-n-Gable" townhouses. "Bay-n-Gable" houses, as mentioned above in this chapter are indigenous to Toronto, with a few examples in Hamilton, Ontario: "New York has its Brownstones; Toronto has its Bay-n-Gables."[131] The earliest example is the "Struthers/Ross" house built in 1875 at 30–32 Lowther Avenue.[132] The style was then copied and became catalogue homes which could be built quickly and

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[130] Unwin, *Nothing Gained by Overcrowding!*, 16.

[131] Tom Cruickshank and John de Certeau Visser, *Old Toronto Houses*, rev. ed. (Richmond Hill, Ontario: Firefly Books, 2008), 92.

[132] Cruickshank and de Certeau Visser, *Old Toronto Houses*, 92.

cheaply. Hundreds, if not thousands, were built at the end of the nineteenth century and have remained incredibly popular and versatile. They were partly responsible for Toronto's "love affair with downtown living" of the 1970s and their interiors have been altered to house multiple families, a single family, and singles and couples in smaller apartments.[133] These houses feature large bay windows, which allow for sunlight and cooling breezes, peaking gables decorated with bargeboard to keep rain out, and front porches, which were essential to the social life of the street. The Bay-n-Gable style is now mimicked in many North American 'urban renewal projects' and New Urbanist developments. I suggest that the peaked roofs, which were borrowed from Gothic architecture, were to lift the eyes toward the heavens, while the front porches suggest a sociability, an invitation to passersby. The modern period, which we will turn to promptly, flattened the roofs to refuse the spiritual and revoked the invitations to 'fellow man' with brutalist concrete exteriors, even calling for the 'death of the street.'

Le Corbusier and CIAM

Le Corbusier is perhaps the strangest figure in the history of urban planning. Even more strange is his enduring legacy.[134] His drawings and plans for urban areas (if they can still be called that) are radically different than anything else proposed or considered at the time (beginning in the 1920s and 1930s). Le Corbusier was the classic 'eccentric' whose ideas might have been met with bemused interest, but should never have been implemented. That he was so influential on urban planning and development has less to do with his ideas than his involvement with *Congrès internationaux d'architecture moderne* (better

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[133] Cruickshank and de Certeau Visser, *Old Toronto Houses*, 92. Some, such as though along College Street west of University Avenue, currently have restaurants and shops on their ground floors.

[134] The Dean of Columbia University's School of Architecture, Planning, and Preservation provides a theoretically informed history of Le Corbusier's influence on practicing architects: Mark Wigley, "Modernist Persuasion: Le Corbusier's *Toward an Architecture*," *Artforum* 46, no. 3 (Nov. 2007): 318–325.

known as CIAM), which included many members that advanced so-called 'modernism' in architecture, which radically changed urban areas.[135]

Aside from a few 'concrete fetishists,' contemporary architecture and urban planning is very much opposed to Le Corbusier's and CIAM's visions. While Le Corbusier was only one member of CIAM, it is worth looking at his ideas and plans closely because he did have an enormous influence on architecture and urban planning, and that influence is evidenced in many urban spaces, including some in Toronto.

This section will present the central ideas from Le Corbusier to show how and why he is important in the development of urban planning and the shape of contemporary cities. Le Corbusier is clearly within the university discourse, but he also displays his hysterical moments. Just as Olmsted and Howard sought to position themselves in the university discourse, Le Corbusier does as well, though much more excessively. Because of this excessiveness, he unwittingly becomes hysterical and reveals the failures of the university discourse.

I will now explain some of Le Corbusier's key 'arguments' (really, claims to Truth) from *The Radiant City*,[136] taking care to show what Le Corbusier was actually proposing, since many of his critics misrepresent his ideas (usually to make him sound worse than he is). We will see in the following chapter, in the section "Reply To Howard and Le Corbusier," how Jane Jacobs mis-reads Le Corbusier, particularly with regard to his plans for automobiles and streets. Ken Greenberg similarly mis-reads Le Corbusier's plan to devote the *entire ground*[137] to pedestrians as a plan for "separate circulation paths and gathering spaces for pedestrians."[138] James Howard Kunstler, the humorously snarky spokesman for

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[135] Le Corbusier, "CIAM's 'The Athens Charter' (1933)" in *The Athens Charter*, trans. Anthony Eardley (New York: Grossman, 1973).

[136] Le Corbusier, *The Radiant City: Elements of a Doctrine of Urbanism to be Used as the Basis of Our Machine-age Civilization*, trans. Pamela Knight, Eleanor Levieux, and Derek Coltman, (New York: The Orion Press, 1967). Originally published in 1933 in the Netherlands by N.V. Drukkerij en Knuttel, Gouda.

[137] Le Corbusier, *The Radiant City*, 113.

[138] Ken Greenberg, *Walking Home: The Life and Lessons of a City Builder* (Toronto: Random House Canada, 2011), 25.

New Urbanism, reduces *Radiant City* to a "complex of twenty-four sixty-story high-rises set amid parklike grounds and served by limited-access automobile roads" and, oddly, lumps Mies van der Rohe in with Le Corbusier's visions.[139] While these are just a few examples, contemporary urbanists hold a host of incorrect assumptions about Le Corbusier's work. It is not my intention of 'defend' Le Corbusier's work, but rather to point out the actual problems with his work, not the assumed problems. That so many have this tendency to mis-represent Le Corbusier is rather strange, since there are many problems with his ideas for urban planning that there is no need to libel him to find fault. For example, contemporary opponents to Le Corbusier would also be surprised, as I just mentioned, that he wanted to give the entire ground to pedestrians. And, while many contemporary urbanists are clearly opposed to Le Corbusier's insistence on the "disappearance of the street,"[140] they might find themselves agreeing with his account of suburban life. Le Corbusier provides a somewhat humorous "dialogue with my secretary" who lives in a 'garden suburb.'[141] She complains about not being able to arrive to work on time because of the trains, which are overcrowded with men who "aren't too pleasant." She has to walk too long on muddy roads to the train station. She is unable to catch a train until 7:30 or 7:45 in the evening, so she does not get home until 8:30 or 9:00 at which time she only has the energy to eat dinner, then go to bed to rise at 5:00AM to start all over again. Le Corbusier sympathizes, but assumes that Sundays must be nice in the suburbs. The secretary sets him straight: it is boring and there is nothing to do. For any entertainment or social interaction, she must board a train and come back into the city, something she does every work day and understandably does not want to do on a Sunday. She tells Le Corbusier, "I've spent the best years of my life on the train."

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[139] James Howard Kunstler, *The Geography of Nowhere: The Rise and Decline of America's Man-Made Landscape* (New York: Touchstone, 1993), 73.

[140] Le Corbusier, *The Radiant City*, 7.

[141] Le Corbusier, *The Radiant City*, 11–12.

A few historical facts are worth noting to contextualize *The Radiant City*. The first meeting of CIAM was organized by Le Corbusier on June 26–28, 1928, in Canton of Vaud in Switzerland. Some of the essential proposals, formulations, and concepts that came from this meeting are printed in *The Radiant City*.[142] Of primary importance to CIAM is concrete and steel. These were then new materials for building, and these materials lead to a number of consequences. Architects were able to abandon traditional methods of building for new ones, along with further standardization and mass production. Concrete and steel allowed architects to leave interior space completely open since "load walls" are no longer necessary, and it removed the need for the inclined roof. These new flat roofs, CIAM insists, will "lead to the creation of roof gardens."[143] That these modernists are proposing flat roofs for roof gardens might surprise their contemporary critics, since roof gardens are now seen as a way to assist in the 'sustainability' of urban areas. However, CIAM does not limit these new flat roofs to gardens; they also propose they be used as promenades, cafes or stores. Aesthetically, CIAM champions the flat roof since it will "provide a pure city skyline."[144] A consequence of using flat roofs for living spaces is that it takes away from life on the street, and this would be a 'happy coincidence' for CIAM since they are advocating for the disappearance of the street.

Concrete and steel also allow for another feature now famously associated with modernist architecture: *pilotis*. Raising buildings two and a half to four meters on poles allows the architect to "recuperate almost all of the surface covered by the house" to allow for "play, car parking or continuation of the garden under the house."[145] While CIAM proposed that the *pilotis* provide "double superimposed streets" with heavy traffic on the ground and lighter traffic on an upper, bridge-like street, Le Corbusier's plans for Radiant City will be markedly different.

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[142] Le Corbusier, *The Radiant City*, 19–25.

[143] Le Corbusier, *The Radiant City*, 21.

[144] Le Corbusier, *The Radiant City*, 21.

[145] Le Corbusier, *The Radiant City*, 21.

CIAM also proposes the elimination of the corridor street in favour of the indented street (*à redents*). This will allow houses to be set back as far as possible from 'streets' (really, 'roads' since their sole purpose will be to carry vehicular traffic). Concrete and steel, for CIAM at least, mean the "prohibition of the courtyard," the elimination of the roof template, the façade template, the bow window (a round bay window).

Standardization is also a primary concern, with CIAM even advocating for elimination of all building trades save one: fitters. All of a building's elements will be manufactured in a factory then taken to the site to be assembled by the fitters. Windows, doors, stairs, and other aspects of buildings will also be standardized in size and materials.

To prove that CIAM is not thinking on a small scale, they also propose that the League of Nations be approached to establish the worldwide teaching of a "universal technical language" for the new fitters, concrete mixers, electricians, etc. Aside from making international contracts possible and easy, they also argue it would also mean a "tremendous contribution to the pacification of the world."[146] Since CIAM's reform recommendations are to be "extended simultaneously to all cities, to all rural areas, across the seas," they call for a centralized agency to curb any "general confusion" where "chaos prevails," in which "danger is everywhere."[147]

These recommendations are from CIAM's first meeting in 1928. Architects from the Soviet Union were to be involved in CIAM but were unable to obtain visas to attend. A meeting was scheduled to take place in Moscow in 1933 but just prior, the Soviet government rejected Le Corbusier's plan for the Palace of the Soviets which suggested that they were not interested in CIAM's doctrines. Le Corbusier's plan for the Palace of the Soviets was originally titled *Reply to the Soviets* and, partly due to their rejection, Le Corbusier developed his ideas further and renamed the project *The Radiant City*. While this is a bit of trivia related to this project's title, it is also worth noting that Le Corbusier's plan was

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[146] Le Corbusier, *The Radiant City*, 23.

[147] Le Corbusier, *The Radiant City*, 23.

not acceptable by the Soviet dictatorial government. In fact, Le Corbusier insists that his *Radiant City* plan is meant to answer man's cry for individual liberty. Le Corbusier recounts a story of a friend of his who is a technician and works to solve various Soviet city planning issues. He objected to the Radiant City plans because they go against Soviet theory, which sees large cities as "an expression of capitalist rule; they are monstrosities intended as prisons for millions of suffering beings."[148] They want cities of no more than 50,000 people and were pursuing a strategy of "deurbanization." Again, Le Corbusier's plan, originally titled "Reply to Moscow" promotes a type of freedom and liberty at odds with Soviet theory.

So, despite the appearance of Le Corbusier's plan, it is decidedly not meant to restrict or impose on human liberty. Le Corbusier is within that school of thought in which technology and machines are to be used to liberate humanity and aid in its historical progress.

The Radiant City and the Good Life

Published in 1933 and republished with revisions in 1964, *The Radiant City* contains the most detailed explanation of his approach and vision for buildings and urban space. The title page of *The Radiant City* tells us right away the ideas that are informing Le Corbusier's plans for our cities. What appears to be an unofficial subtitle to the book fits within the university discourse: "elements of a doctrine of urbanism to be used as the basis of our machine-age civilization." However, also printed on the title page is the hysterical, "This work is dedicated to AUTHORITY" (sic). The title page also has a short, fourteen-line 'poem' of sorts which begins, "Plans are not Politics. / Plans are the rational and poetic monument / set up in the midst of contingencies." The poem continues by stating that these contingencies (people, culture, climate, etc.) are "resources" to be "liberated by modern techniques," the latter of which "are universal." So, what can we take from this title page? His dedication to 'AUTHORITY' appears

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[148] Le Corbusier, *The Radiant City*, 135. Words of the 'Soviet friend' who is not named.

hysterical since it is the master the hysteric addresses in the discourse of the hysteric. Further, he reveals the truth of the hysteric's discourse insofar as he seeks a new master: as he explains later in the book, this dedication is not to mean that he has fascistic tendencies, but rather that he wants the ideas and plans presented in this book to find their way to political leaders so as to realize these ideas and plans. That is, he desires a new master to implement his hysterical vision. Thus, it becomes a bit clearer what he means by 'politics' when he writes "plans are not politics." From the university discourse, he argues that plans are neutral, that they are objective, that they contain a truth outside of power or emotion or affect, and that plans should not become 'partisan' or ideological.

One might certainly wonder if Le Corbusier seriously believed that urban plans (even his own) would not be contested or that they were not imbued with a particular ideology. Perhaps he really did believe that we were in a "machine-age civilization" and that anyone who objected to this characterization was simply wrong, which is precisely the position of knowledge in the university discourse.

Le Corbusier paints a clear picture of the problem of the city and how it destroys liberty. He describes the city as the place where anxiety and depression "spring up afresh" because it is "swelling" and "filling up" as the city builds itself "on top of itself."[149] For him, the street is "appalling, noisy, dusty, dangerous" where automobiles can only crawl along and pedestrians are "herded together on sidewalks" and bump into one another.[150] The city "is like a glimpse of purgatory."[151] With no light or space for relaxation, no one is able to "live" and "there is no freedom for men in this present age, only slavery."[152] In the city, one cannot live, laugh, be a master of one's own home, or experience the light of the

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[149] Le Corbusier, *The Radiant City*, 91.

[150] Le Corbusier, *The Radiant City*, 91.

[151] Le Corbusier, *The Radiant City*, 91.

[152] Le Corbusier, *The Radiant City*, 91.

sun, greenery of nature, or the blue of the sky: “the man in a city is a lump of coal in a brazier.”[153]

Reminiscent of his ‘dialogue with my secretary’ (see above), Le Corbusier heaps scorn on the suburbs. The train has made these spaces possible, but it means so many are stuck on these trains in the morning and evening. Though they are surrounded by greenery in these ‘garden suburbs,’ they sit “all alone in their little green nests.”[154] He describes the suburbs as “broken, dislocated limbs! The city has been torn apart and scattered in meaningless fragments across the countryside.”[155] Le Corbusier wonders what the point of life is in the suburbs, or how one is expected to even live. “Suburban life is a despicable delusion entertained by a society stricken with blindness!”[156]

Le Corbusier points to the problem of overproduction in the 1930s. Just prior to this, the ‘machine age’ allowed for the implementation of the eight-hour workday since the mechanization of factories sped up the process of production. However, this advance in production resulted in the crisis of overproduction in the 1930s. Le Corbusier’s solution to this is rather simple, even simplistic: “produce less” so that the worker is only required to work five hours a day. And “we must master the machine” so that it does not create these crises of overproduction.[157] Le Corbusier also cites the entry of women into the workforce as a cause of unemployment: that “if the wife goes back to her home, to her children, then there will be less labour on the market.”[158] However, he insists that if “the husband” is to only work five hours a day, so should “the wife” on the household chores. So this increase in machine-aided production, reduced working hours for men in factories and women in the domestic sphere appears to be the key

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[153] Le Corbusier, *The Radiant City*, 91.

[154] Le Corbusier, *The Radiant City*, 92.

[155] Le Corbusier, *The Radiant City*, 92.

[156] Le Corbusier, *The Radiant City*, 92.

[157] Le Corbusier, *The Radiant City*, 112.

[158] Le Corbusier, *The Radiant City*, 112.

foundation for Le Corbusier's new city. It is on this rearrangement of working life, "to organize a whole new way of life," that his new city will account.[159] What is required for the "drawings of this new city … to be superimposed on the city as it stands today" is "*a process involving the replanning of private property*."[160] And this is why Le Corbusier dedicates his book to "AUTHORITY!" for it will take some power like 'authority,' but "*the necessary authority must be created*" to radically change the structure of private property. Le Corbusier is vague about what this new 'authority' would consist of or how this administration or government would be run. Nonetheless, he repeatedly states throughout this text that the freedom of the individual is paramount: "I have laid it down that the cornerstone for any form of organization in a machine civilization must be a respect for the liberty of the individual."[161]

So far I have shown what I would call Le Corbusier's 'political philosophy.' I call it this because these are his ideas and assumptions about 'the good life': how we ought to live and organize ourselves. I want to stress that Le Corbusier is seeking a complete overhaul of how cities are to be planned and built. He is not observing or studying cities as they actually exist and proposing changes, either small or large, to actually existing cities. Instead, his plans for the Radiant City (as well as his other city plans) are to be built on either untouched land, or only after an existing city is entirely demolished. In other words, there is absolutely nothing redeeming about any existing city – they must be demolished to make way for his Radiant City.

Clarification of Le Corbusier's Overlooked Details

While I will not recount every detail of Le Corbusier's plan for Radiant City, for he does a good job of that himself in this book of that name, I will continue to point

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[159] Le Corbusier, *The Radiant City*, 112.

[160] Le Corbusier, *The Radiant City*, 112. Emphasis original.

[161] Le Corbusier, *The Radiant City*, 113.

out the aspects of his plan that many, including those mentioned above (Jacobs, Kunstler, and Greenberg) have overlooked. We have already seen that Le Corbusier is opposed to both the Garden City and its offshoot, the garden suburb. Le Corbusier is often used as a shorthand by planners and urbanists to indicate totally car-dominated city plans, elevated highways, streets destroyed to make way for expanded road beds, etc. However, only part of this is true. In fact, there are many similarities with Le Corbusier's plans for Radiant City and contemporary planners who actually like cities, which is strangely an exception. That is, contemporary planning that seeks to encourage environmental sustainability, ensure walkability, increase densities, etc. to make cities more 'liveable' will find many of their aims and ideals voiced by Le Corbusier. While Le Corbusier now signifies the opposite of these ideals, I believe this occurs because of a conflation of Le Corbusier's actual plans and what other planners and architects have done and built with a selective reading and/or citation of Le Corbusier.

For example, let's consider the elevated highway. It was seen in the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s as the epitome of a modernist city. Visions of cars whizzing by overhead, out of urban stop-and-start traffic – a pure freedom of mobility. Whole neighbourhoods in cities across North America were demolished to make way for them. Toronto began erecting the elevated Gardiner Expressway along its waterfront in the mid-1950s and continued to add to it until the mid-1960s. Named after the first mayor of Metro Toronto, Frederick Gardiner, (who ensured it was built) it was seen by most as the solution to the city's problems of congestion and ensured that suburban living would be easier for those who worked in the core of the city. Now, many see elevated expressways as ruinous to the vitality of cities, particularly those, like the Gardiner, that act as a 'wall' between the city and its waterfront. Many planners and urbanists blame the 'Le Corbusian' approach to city planning for these elevated expressways. However, while Le Corbusier did in fact advocate for elevated expressways, it

was within a larger plan that was never implemented by those cities that took only the plan for elevated expressways.

In fact, what could arguably be Le Corbusier's first statement once he finally turns to the plans and drawings of The Radiant City involves pedestrians: "The city dweller, as a pedestrian, must have the entire ground surface of the city at his disposal."[162] He explains that the entire ground surface is to be one continuous park so that "*no pedestrian ever meets an automobile*."[163] All automobiles are to be "in the air, passing by behind screens of foliage."[164] So here we see that while Le Corbusier did champion elevated roads, it was meant so that *all* automobile traffic would be on these elevated roads. Le Corbusier envisioned every apartment building (and all residential buildings would be apartment buildings) would have a garage at level with these elevated roads so that one could immediately get into one's car and drive on these elevated roads to another apartment building or office tower, each of which would have its own garage.

Of course, what is lost in this plan is the street, which effectively evacuates the most urban of things: building frontage (door, landing, steps, etc.), sidewalks, and roadbed. Le Corbusier clearly advocates for the removal of *streets* in favour of elevated *roads* (with automobiles only) while the ground surface would be park-like: grass, trees, and other plants with 'promenades.' The 'street' with people and shops, he proposes, would be inside the buildings. While he spends time explaining that the police will no longer have to endure the weather, but instead patrol the interior streets, he does not explain what these streets are for. Perhaps it is just assumed that this is where 'life' will happen – the random sociability that a street provides – but it does not seem to serve any purpose in his 'machine age' city.

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[162] Le Corbusier, *The Radiant City*, 113.

[163] Le Corbusier, *The Radiant City*, 113. Emphasis original.

[164] Le Corbusier, *The Radiant City*, 113.

He does, however, devote considerable space to explaining what we would understand as ‘an apartment,’ but he, tellingly, refers to them as “cells.”[165] Each ‘cell’ would be soundproofed so that “even a hermit in the depths of a forest could not be more cut off from other men.”[166] In fact, if we recall that Le Corbusier believes it best to be able to get from one’s ‘cell’ (i.e. apartment) to their car as quickly as possible and travel in this hermeneutically sealed ‘pod’ to their destination above the city and its people, it should not be too surprising to find him proposing each “man” ought to (or would want to) live as isolated as possible. Though, perhaps ‘isolated’ is not strong enough a word – each city dweller would be ‘protected’ from the city and all other people. Each ‘cell’ would have glass walls so that they can “look out on a magnificent vista of parks, of sky, of space, and light and sun.”[167] This list of things city dwellers view from their ‘cells’ is not an arbitrary one. One would not see other people encountering other people, but only grass and trees, the sky and sun, and open, empty space.

Here we will clearly see the university discourse at work: everything is calculated. But these calculations cannot account for the desires of this city’s inhabitants nor the externalities and felicities of life. What Le Corbusier fails to recognize is that the thing he claims to value most, freedom, cannot be calculated. Le Corbusier simply states that the size of the ‘cells’ will be determined by the number of occupants. Each person will have “14 square meters of floor space at his disposal” and he provides a number of tables to calculate the size of each cell depending on the number of parents (always two) and the number of children.[168] These tables take up nearly an entire page.

As to the outside of these apartment buildings, Le Corbusier is also extremely specific. There are to be nurseries immediately outside in the parks on the ground level, which will be “run by qualified nurses and supervised by doctors

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[165] Le Corbusier, *The Radiant City*, 113–114.

[166] Le Corbusier, *The Radiant City*, 113. I assure you that I am not taking this quote out of context.

[167] Le Corbusier, *The Radiant City*, 114.

[168] Le Corbusier, *The Radiant City*, 114.

– security – selection – scientific child-rearing."[169] Also in these parks will be schools, sports grounds, and, for every 160,000 square meters of apartment building, one swimming pool. On the roof of these apartment buildings will be roof gardens with "sandy beaches" that will be "18 to 20 meters wide and kilometres in length."[170]

Le Corbusier also proposes a new system of delivering food and other consumer goods to each apartment, calculating how many loading bays are required per number of residents. This system would do away with "*les Halles*," a central market in Paris.[171] Other centralized delivery systems would do away with other service shops and stores. While Le Corbusier notes that this would put "thousands of little private businesses" out of business, he argues this does away with "waste" and will bring down the cost of living.[172]

What is perhaps the most important thing that defines a city as a city are streets. Streets are to cities what fields are to farms. Le Corbusier, however, insisted on the "death of the street."[173] To contextualize contemporary streets, Le Corbusier points back to Louis XIV, the 'Sun King.' Like the sun that beams straight lines of light, Louis XIV had straight roads built throughout Paris. This, of course, was for horse and carriage, but it was these new straight roads that allowed the easy inclusion of the automobile. For Le Corbusier, the automobile age has simply "arrived" and is fatalistic about this innovation: "we have to build new cities" to accommodate the increasing numbers of automobiles.[174]

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[169] Le Corbusier, *The Radiant City*, 115. It is not, then, surprising that Jane Jacobs devotes much of *Death and Life* to cities and child-rearing.

[170] Le Corbusier, *The Radiant City*, 115.

[171] Le Corbusier, *The Radiant City*, 116. *Les Halles* began as a central market in 1183AD and was significantly expanded in the 1850s. *Les Halles* eventually lost out to grocery chains, became a wholesale market and relocated to the suburbs in 1971. Montreal opened a market area, calling it *les Halles d'Anjou* in the late 1980s, offering a space for over 40 merchants. It is not in the central area of the city, but on the outskirts where two main highways intersect. See: http://www.hallesdanjou.com/

[172] Le Corbusier, *The Radiant City*, 116.

[173] Le Corbusier, *The Radiant City*, 119.

[174] Le Corbusier, *The Radiant City*, 121.

What is interesting, however, is the connection made between speed and space. He argues that "human biology is now in the grip of a new speed," namely the speed of automobiles.[175] With this new speed, more space is required. Mark Wigley provides a compelling reading of Le Corbusier's understanding of space and speed: despite the tall towers of his plans, Le Corbusier is "immensely horizontal."[176] Wigley insists that many of Le Corbusier's drawings are composed of horizontal lines, and that much of modernist architecture is a "structure of parallel planes – stacked up horizontally from the ground plane within a regular form."[177] This horizontality implies that Radiant City was meant to be approached at a high rate of speed (traversing the horizontal) by either a vehicle on one of the speedways or, better, by helicopter because of the vast spaces between buildings, while the interiors of the towers is "just a slower speed of the city."[178]

Le Corbusier suggests that pedestrians are like fish in a water tank and are doing just fine. But adding fish that move at twenty times the speed of the others will result in "a massacre."[179] The solution is a larger water tank. Oddly, Le Corbusier never considers leaving the tank alone and removing the speedy fish.

But we need to be careful with Le Corbusier's line of thinking here. While he is fatalistic regarding the increasing numbers and speed of automobiles, his concern is for pedestrians. He wants to ensure that people will not be injured or killed by automobiles. To this end, he states that "streets are an obsolete notion" that "no longer work."[180] Thus, instead of tinkering with the existing conditions of cities, he argues we must demolish them wholesale and start with "clean sheet of

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[175] Le Corbusier, *The Radiant City*, 120.

[176] Mark Wigley, "Network + Void + Lining: The Radical Architecture of the Global City," lecture delivered at University College, University of Toronto, November 11, 2008.

[177] Mark Wigley, "Deconstructivist Architecture," in *Deconstructivist Architecture*, ed. Philip Johnson and Mark Wigley (New York: Museum of Modern Art, 1988), 19.

[178] Wigley, "Network + Void + Lining."

[179] Le Corbusier, *The Radiant City*, 121.

[180] Le Corbusier, *The Radiant City*, 121.

paper."[181] On this "clean sheet of paper" he "calculates" that "normal biological speeds must never be forced into contact with the high speeds of modern vehicles."[182] He also "calculates" that all traffic must be one-way so that no vehicle ever has the possibility of crashing head-on nor ever has to cross the path of other vehicles. Intersections are to be eliminated.

Nonetheless, Le Corbusier takes some time to mock proposals that would give the ground surface to vehicles and put pedestrians up on catwalks. He argues that this would make people depressed and depraved until finally the people will "blow up the catwalks, and the buildings, and the machines, and everything!"[183]

Le Corbusier then offers a rather poetic definition of cities:

> Cities are magnetic fields; the area over which they exert their pull can vary, and according of this pull, according to the qualitative differences of its components, so attitudes, attractive power, function within a national context, property value, etc., will all vary from city to city.[184]

While Le Corbusier does make the connection, clearly there is one to made to Howard's "Three Magnets" (figure 9). In that diagram, Howard implies that only the combination of town and country will attract people, as the qualities of the town and country separately are nearly all negative. Le Corbusier, however, is providing a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between cities and people's desires. He rightly notes that there are many factors ("qualitative difference") of cities that attract different types of people and in different types of ways. Put another way, it also points to region surrounding a particular city and how that region affects the character, texture, and desirableness of that city.

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[181] Le Corbusier, *The Radiant City*, 121.

[182] Le Corbusier, *The Radiant City*, 122.

[183] Le Corbusier, *The Radiant City*, 122.

[184] Le Corbusier, *The Radiant City*, 135.

He provides what could be used to understand Toronto's position within Canada, with its national identity bound up with pioneers and prairie farmland:

> The word city indisputably signifies the center of gravity for a geographical region, the natural center of gravity for a given producing area. But it also signifies, because of much more subtle attractive forces at work, the center of gravity for an even vaster, sometimes immense, spiritual hinterland.[185]

Interestingly, were one to replace "word" with "world" in the above quotation, we would get a glimpse of contemporary discourses of cities and global capitalism.

Le Corbusier At His Best: The Radiant Farm

Towards the end of *The Radiant City*, Le Corbusier publishes a plea from a farmer, who signs his letter Norbert Bézard. This farmer asks Le Corbusier to take a moment to consider the village and farm, to design a "Radiant Farm" or "Radiant Village." This farmer has been bitten by the 'efficiency bug' and would like his farm and nearby village to be re-organized, particularly in light of new technologies on these farms (tractors replacing horses). Interestingly, Le Corbusier's reply, which contains ideas for re-organization of the farmable land and the location of necessary buildings in the villages are much more compelling than his plans for cities.

The opening line of his reply is telling: "During these recent years of research, I had been forced to the conclusion that our cities are bulging with human detritus, with hordes of people who came to them to try their luck, did not succeed, and are now all huddled together in crowded slums."[186] Besides his famous "death to the street" mantra, it is clear here that Le Corbusier does not like cities. Odd, then, that he would want to plan them. Perhaps cities are Le Corbusier's 'symptom' in one Lacanian sense. In the seminars that took place in

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[185] Le Corbusier, *The Radiant City*, 135.

[186] Le Corbusier, *The Radiant City*, 321.

1974–75, Lacan suggested that the symptom is "the way in which each subject enjoys the unconscious."[187] From this, we might interpret Le Corbusier's planning the thing he dislikes as a way for him to enjoy his dislike.

This enjoyment of his dislike of cities becomes clearer in his delight in the countryside and farms. Le Corbusier's ideas for a "Radiant Farm" or "Radiant Village" respect the existing farms and villages, and spends considerable time praising their work and products. This is in direct contrast to his feelings toward any existing city (they are to be destroyed). For Le Corbusier, the farm is completely in tune with nature: "nothing could be artificial here: everything is the harmonious expression of a complex of real facts: nature and man."[188]

Another telling aspect of Le Corbusier's respect for farms, in contrast to his disdain for cities, is that, with Bézard's help, he spent "six months gradually penetrating the secrets of rural life."[189] In other words, Le Corbusier took the time to learn about his subject before offering up plans and ideas. The insistence that one learn about one's subject prior to offering up plans is at the forefront of contemporary, 'progressive' urban planning. No longer are urban planners to design urban spaces far away from said urban space, but must spend time in this urban space, learn how it works, what people want, what people do with it, etc. Le Corbusier writes, "it is easier (for people like me!) to approach the industrial problems of large cities than the complex annual development of work in the fields."[190] Perhaps Le Corbusier would have done better to think that dealing with the 'problems of large cities' was not so easy, and should have taken the same attitude he does towards farms and the rural. And why would Le Corbusier tell us that the rural is more complex than a large city? Why, indeed.

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[187] This seminar is unpublished. Quotation from Dylan Evans, *An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis* (London: Routledge, 2005), 189.

[188] Le Corbusier, *The Radiant City*, 323.

[189] Le Corbusier, *The Radiant City*, 324.

[190] Le Corbusier, *The Radiant City*, 324.

The proposals and plans for “The Radiant Farm” are completely reasonable, and one would imagine most welcomed by farmers of the time (mid-1930s). The farm house is to be large enough for living, but also for celebrations and guests. Here the *pilotis* make sense – it raises the house off the dirt and muck allowing for a dry and hygienic space. Raising the house also allows the people to look out over the fields of their farm. The space under the raised farm house, unlike the raised apartment buildings, is practical. It is not just a space for strolling, but for washing clothes and, during warmer months provides shade for eating dinner, socializing with family and friends. Under the raised house is “an active, living area, in contact with the outside.”[191] The house itself is to have large bedrooms, large windows, and bathrooms for “a good scrub” after working on the farm. All reasonable things.

The farm itself would have a gate leading to a ‘farmyard’ with a concrete floor with drainage so there would no longer be “mud and muck” to stand in.[192] Le Corbusier provides details for the housing of animals, systems for feeding and watering them – again, all reasonable proposals. Interestingly, though Le Corbusier despised any roof other than flat in cities, these farm buildings are all to have curved roofs since they are functional.

It is not necessary here to recount Le Corbusier’s details of the plan for the near-by village, though a few things ought to be pointed out, particularly the contrast to his plans for cities. A variety of necessary buildings (post office, gas station, school, community centre, etc.) are all accounted for – but here they are their own buildings. In the Radiant City, these things were to be part of the larger towers that also contained the ‘cells’ (i.e. apartments). Though Radiant City would see the destruction of the central market, the Radiant Village sees such a thing created in what he calls a “co-operative building.”[193] He also calls for a

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[191] Le Corbusier, *The Radiant City*, 325.

[192] Le Corbusier, *The Radiant City*, 326.

[193] Le Corbusier, *The Radiant City*, 328.

single building, “The Club,” as a space for entertainment and social functions.[194] Why does the village get a market and club? So that “village life will become more intense, more active; the whole community will be woken up.”[195] If one wonders why the Radiant Village would have these social buildings and not the Radiant City, the answer is lurking here: “The countryman will become one of the nation’s active forces again. His intellectual participation is indispensable to the spiritual awakening of the whole country.”[196] In other words, the countryman, the farmer, is essential to the nation’s ‘spiritual identity,’ which cannot be said for the “human detritus,” how Le Corbusier sees the city dweller.

How Does ‘Man’ Walk?

Prior to *The Radiant City*, Le Corbusier published *Urbanisme*, the eighth edition (published 1929) of which has been translated as *The City of To-morrow and its Planning*.[197] In this text we find many of the same themes as *The Radiant City* but in a much more straightforward manner. The beginnings of his heralding of the ‘machine-age’ as seen in *The Radiant City* are expressed here clearly within the university discourse: as an “enthusiasm … for exactitude … carried to its furthest limits and raised to an ideal: the search for perfection.”[198] We also find the kernel of his ideas for separating motor vehicles from pedestrian traffic still with this concern of “sacrifice to death” by “innumerable motors.”[199] And we find his hysterical revulsion of the city: “The city is crumbling, it cannot last much longer; its time is past.”[200]

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[194] Le Corbusier, *The Radiant City*, 329.

[195] Le Corbusier, *The Radiant City*, 329.

[196] Le Corbusier, *The Radiant City*, 329.

[197] Le Corbusier, *The City of To-morrow and its Planning*, trans. Frederick Etchells (New York: Dover, 1987).

[198] Le Corbusier, *The City of To-morrow and its Planning*, xxii.

[199] Le Corbusier, *The City of To-morrow and its Planning*, xxiii.

[200] Le Corbusier, *The City of To-morrow and its Planning*, xxiv.

What is of interest here, and why I introduce this book, relates to this disjuncture between the plans for the 'Radiant City' and the 'Radiant Farm.' The first chapter begins with this epigraph: "Man walks in a straight line because he has a goal and knows where he is going; he has made up his mind to reach some particular place and he goes straight to it."[201] This is repeated as the first sentence of the first chapter, so we can be sure that this is an important 'observation' of his. He then contrasts the "pack-donkey's way" with "man's way" by stating that, unlike man, the pack-donkey meanders along, stops here and there, zigzags to avoid large stones, obstacles, or steep climbs, or to gain some shade. So, for Le Corbusier, Man takes the straightest line; the pack-donkey takes the path of least resistance.

For Le Corbusier, a town of winding roads is a dangerous thing. They lead the people to laziness, a lack of concentration, and it is in this way "that cities sink to nothing and that ruling classes are overthrown."[202] These are the final words of this book's first chapter, so it is up to us to draw the connection between winding roads and the overthrow of the ruling classes. We should note first off that the overthrow of the ruling class is not something that Le Corbusier advocates or desires. As we saw in *The Radiant City*, the book is addressed to "authority" since authority of some form would have to power to demolish entire cities and implement Le Corbusier's plans. But if we take the side of the revolutionaries, or even oppose the installation of this type of 'authority' (i.e. totalitarianism), and we look at the reasons for Le Corbusier's insistence on roads with straight lines and square angles, we can see how winding roads can create problems for 'authority.' A gridded street network makes it "easy to police and to clean," as we have already learned from Foucault.[203] That a gridded network allows for easy policing suggests that winding city streets make it difficult to police and easy for subversive elements to organize and evade the police.

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[201] Le Corbusier, *The City of To-morrow and its Planning*, 3.

[202] Le Corbusier, *The City of To-morrow and its Planning*, 12.

[203] Le Corbusier, *The City of To-morrow and its Planning*, 7.

We can understand Le Corbusier's point about winding streets with regard to old European cities of the master's discourse that grew without an overarching plan. However, if we consider contemporary suburbs with the curvilinear roads, it is almost comical to think of these suburbs as leading to the overthrow of the ruling class. While some European suburbs have witnessed riots, North American affluent suburbs with their curvilinear roads do not, generally, have "subversive elements."[204] On the other hand, one will not find people governed solely by calculation and rationality on a gridded street network. I think the only thing we can draw from Le Corbusier's assumption that winding streets lead to laziness and/or revolution is a heightened sense of self-importance and hysteria.

Moreover, his contrast between winding streets and a gridded network is hardly accurate. That is, the city dweller often takes the 'pack-donkey's way'; the city dweller rarely "governs his feeling by his reason" and lets the city's sights, sounds, obstacles, elevations, etc. to shape his route of travel.[205] Sure, many people in their "commute" to and from work, likely because it is done day in and day out, want to get "from A to B" as directly as possible. But many of us, even during a commute, will allow many things to alter our route. Perhaps something lures us over, perhaps there is a crowd we wish to join or avoid. Le Corbusier, however, does not seem to accept this and demands the new city be created with straight lines mainly for *speed*. He asserts that cities ought to be designed with a road network of straight lines and square angles for fast-moving motor vehicles. *Streets* with pedestrians are to be abolished; only *roads* where no pedestrian shall ever be. Pedestrians are to exist only on the ground surface (where there are no cars). People, he assumes, only walk for pleasure not for any purpose. Thus, winding garden-type paths are their only option.

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[204] The suburbs I am referring to are those built at the edges, and beyond, of cities, which contain middle and upper class residences. Older, "inner" suburbs, which generally have residents of a lower socio-economic status, have roads less curvilinear and are more of a 'soft grid.' Recently, the musical group, The Arcade Fire released an album, *The Suburbs*, along with an accompanying short film, *Scenes from the Suburbs*, that depicts the militarization of a typical contemporary suburb. *Scenes from the Suburbs*, DVD, directed by Spike Jonze (New York: MJZ Productions, 2011).

[205] Le Corbusier, *The City of To-morrow and its Planning*, 5.

Contemporary planning has taken up the concept of ‘desire lines,’ which are the paths that people *want* to take while on foot. While this acknowledgment of people’s desires in urban planning is normally seen as ‘progressive’ and as opposed to modernist, Le Corbusierian conceptions of cities and people, there is actually a strong affinity between the two. These ‘desire lines’ nearly always show pedestrians finding the shortest distance to popular destinations. For example, a winding path in a park is often ignored in favour of a direct route to some destination on the edge of the park or beyond. In Toronto, where Lowther Avenue and Walmer Road meet, where there once used to be a traffic circle, there is now a small public park called “Gwendolyn MacEwen Park.” Just north of this Square is a public school and just south is an entrance to the subway, which means that many pedestrians cross the Square. The recent re-design of the park sought to put a path through the square based on this concept of ‘desire lines,’ where people actually walked.

The Athens Charter

Though Le Corbusier published a number of books, his main professional association was with the Congrès internationaux d'architecture moderne (CIAM). CIAM’s principles were agreed upon and expressed in the document, The Athens Charter, drawn up in 1933. It was never published and Le Corbusier took it upon himself to have in published in his book in 1943 as *La charte d’Athenès*.[206] Other members of CIAM were not consulted and some have said that what Le Corbusier published was not accurate. Thus, this version of the Athens Charter may not be exactly what CIAM agreed to, but it is the only copy available to the public. The Charter sets out their view of the world, identifying various constants (land, sun, etc.) and various variables (economies, political arrangements, etc.). It also marks the beginning of the “machinist age” which has significantly altered the way in which production occurs as well as the concentration of people in

[206] Le Corbusier, “CIAM’s ‘The Athens Charter’ (1933)” in *The Athens Charter*, trans. Anthony Eardley (New York: Grossman, 1973).

cities.[207] This is a "world-wide evolution without precedent in history. Chaos has entered the cities."[208] This "chaos" is relative to the "ancient equilibrium" that previous eras enjoyed, with a few craftsmen in cities, farmers in the fields, and "the natural relationships that used to exist between home and places of work."[209] The "evil" that has resulted "is expressed in the cities by an overcrowding that drives them into disorder."[210]

Thus we see CIAM holds a similar concern as Unwin (*Nothing Gained by Overcrowding!*). As I argued in the earlier discussion of Unwin, there is a sense that there cannot be too few people in cities and there cannot be too many. CIAM marks the line of 'too many' with a density that exceeds 200 inhabitants per acre.[211] However, this density is based on the construction techniques that were not until then available (that is, prior to concrete and steel constructions) which permitted buildings of a maximum of about six stories. CIAM argues that, with buildings no taller than six stories, a density beyond 200 inhabitants per acre is termed "a slum."[212] The problem is that there is not enough space for each person (though CIAM does not state how much space a person needs), there are not enough openings to the outdoors, a lack of sunlight, the likelihood of disease spreading, and a lack of sanitation facilities. The final concern with 'too much' density is "promiscuity" which arises "from the interior layout of the dwelling," the arrangement of buildings (too close to one another) and the "presence of troublesome neighborhoods."[213]

The Charter devotes a number of pages to the development of suburbs and how these have been built with no plan and only make it more difficult for

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[207] Le Corbusier, "CIAM's 'The Athens Charter' (1933)," 48–49.

[208] Le Corbusier, "CIAM's 'The Athens Charter' (1933)," 49.

[209] Le Corbusier, "CIAM's 'The Athens Charter' (1933)," 49.

[210] Le Corbusier, "CIAM's 'The Athens Charter' (1933)," 49.

[211] Le Corbusier, "CIAM's 'The Athens Charter' (1933)," 53.

[212] Le Corbusier, "CIAM's 'The Athens Charter' (1933)," 53.

[213] Le Corbusier, "CIAM's 'The Athens Charter' (1933)," 53.

people in the core of cities to get fresh air. Of the number of "requirements" for city zoning and bylaws is one of particular interest: "The alignment of dwellings along transportation routes must be prohibited."[214] The Charter is clear that by "transportation routes" it means "the streets of our cities."[215] These streets are a "menace" and no dwelling's front door is to open to them. As with Le Corbusier's Radiant City, all pedestrian and vehicle traffic is to be separated. Other "requirements" include building tall towers for living with "verdant" areas between them (i.e. open green spaces). The Charter, however, does not give a density ratio for these towers in parks. It only states that it will have to be determined once these towers are built.[216] Thus, it is these towers and parks that take precedence – only afterwards will the people be considered.

While CIAM is often 'credited' with the long-imposed separation of uses, the Athens Charter is quite specific about this, and rather surprising. Schools are to be close to where people live. "The distances between places of work and places of residences must be reduced to a minimum."[217] This is to reduce the time people spend travelling to and from work. Industrial areas are, however, to be separated from all other areas buffered with a "zone of vegetation."[218] The "craft occupations," or what we might think of as 'retail' today, are "closely bound up with the urban life from which they directly arise" and should be located within the city.[219] In this section on "crafts" we also see an early formation of the contemporary 'creative class' thesis: "the crafts … find the creative stimulus they need in the intellectual concentration of the city."[220]

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[214] Le Corbusier, "CIAM's 'The Athens Charter' (1933)," 64.

[215] Le Corbusier, "CIAM's 'The Athens Charter' (1933)," 64.

[216] Le Corbusier, "CIAM's 'The Athens Charter' (1933)," 65.

[217] Le Corbusier, "CIAM's 'The Athens Charter' (1933)," 76.

[218] Le Corbusier, "CIAM's 'The Athens Charter' (1933)," 76.

[219] Le Corbusier, "CIAM's 'The Athens Charter' (1933)," 77.

[220] Le Corbusier, "CIAM's 'The Athens Charter' (1933)," 77.

The Charter also calls for longer blocks so that cars can go faster without having to brake. Intersections are to be 200 to 400 yards apart, and roads are to be widened.[221] Oddly, though, the Charter insists that "the dimensions of all elements within the urban system can only be governed by human proportions"; all aspects of the city must be developed with the human being as the scale of measurement and "in relation to the natural walking pace of man."[222]

This chapter has presented a history of early cities and subsequent urban planning through Lacan's four discourses. The slow rotation from the master's to the university discourse has been shown in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Toronto as well as the parks movement and Garden City movement. Le Corbusier represented the completion of this rotation to the university discourse, though his overidentification with its knowledge-authority unwittingly exposed its failures. This chapter argued that the parks movement, the Garden City movement, and Le Corbusier's modernist principles all shared a commonality of a near necessity of beginning from the hysteric's discourse, but then seemingly chose to situate themselves within the university's. I have focused on things often overlooked in the Garden City movement, in Le Corbusier's theories, and in CIAM's principles: things that many progressive, anti-modernist planners and urbanists share. The theme of 'limit' arose here insofar as the parks movement and the Garden City movement respond to what they perceived as 'too much' urbanism of the industrial cities, while Le Corbusier's plans push the limits of density, cold calculation, and efficiency. The following chapter focuses on Jane Jacobs' work and positions her as understanding cities from within the analyst's discourse.

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[221] Le Corbusier, "CIAM's 'The Athens Charter' (1933)," 81.

[222] Le Corbusier, "CIAM's 'The Athens Charter' (1933)," 95.

CHAPTER 4: JANE JACOBS, THE ANALYST

Beginning in the 1930s and for the next few decades, CIAM and 'modernist' planning imposed drastic changes on many major cities. As the previous chapter makes clear, while Le Corbusier and CIAM were influential on 'modernist' planning, they are not fully to blame. Many of their proposals and underlying principles were ignored. In Canada, Toronto and particularly Montreal were drastically altered, largely for the worse. In Toronto, a 'problem' neighbourhood, Regent Park, was completely demolished and rebuilt in the late 1950s with modernist principles. Small apartment buildings replaced traditional housing, the streets were removed, and inhabitants were cut off from the surrounding area. Similar projects occurred in Boston and Washington, DC, areas which quickly became known as "the projects" or "slums." Toronto also saw an elevated expressway built along the waterfront and numerous plans for other expressways that would have destroyed various neighbourhoods and communities. While Toronto saw a number of tall office towers built with little regard for street life, the western portion of Montreal's downtown experienced this even more radically. City planners and developers were continually dreaming up new reasons to demolish entire areas of cities so that a new, modernist development could be implemented. The City of Toronto commissioned the Bruce Report in 1934, which determined that nearly the *entire* region of what was then Toronto from east of the Don Valley to Dufferin, and from Bloor south to Lake Ontario, was determined to be a "problem area" and that the best thing to be done was to demolish all buildings and erect tall towers arranged on large blocks along with expressways.[1] This, of course, did not happen, but it is worth noting that this was the plan.

Jane Jacobs witnessed this type of thinking and planning in New York and eventually had enough. She could not accept that city planners were so hostile to

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[1] See: John Sewell, *The Shape of the City: Toronto Struggles with Modern Planning* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), 66. For a detailed account of meetings and correspondence leading up to the Bruce Report, see: Ryan George, "The Bruce Report and Social Welfare Leadership in the Politics of Toronto's 'Slums,' 1934–1939," *Histoire Sociale/Social History* 44, no. 87 (Mai-May 2011): 83–114.

urban life and had seen too many of their 'block busting' programs result in absolute failure. It was from this frustration that she wrote the now seminal book *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*.[2] Though there were a few critics, mostly established planners (whom she was attacking), the book was well received and became a bestseller.[3] She saw these failures and thought she knew why they failed: planners were too caught up in drawings and abstract ideals and did not account for how people actually used cities. Rather than sitting in a room with a drawing board, Jacobs took to the streets. Much of *Death and Life* was written while living with her husband, an architect, and her children at 555 Hudson Street in New York City. Her observations and theories about cities and urban spaces were developed by watching out her windows, walking around and observing what people were doing. In more theoretical terms, we can understand modernist planning operating according to Lefebvre's "abstract space," whereas Jacobs draws from "social space."[4]

In this chapter, I will argue that, as with the urban movements and planners covered in the previous chapter, Jacobs begins from the hysteric's discourse. However, unlike the planners discussed in the previous chapter who sought to justify their arguments from the authority of the university discourse, Jacobs situates herself within the analyst's discourse. There is nothing in Jacobs' work to suggest she was familiar with Lacan's work, and my arguments about her position as the analyst are only to demonstrate the broad applicability of Lacan's theory and, more importantly, to offer an alternative reading of her work. It will become apparent that she is taking direct aim at the type of urban planning that I argued sought to position itself within the university discourse. The

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[2] Jane Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities* (New York: Vintage Books, 1992 [1961]).

[3] For an account of the reviews of *Death and Life* when first released, along with a transcript of it being mentioned (favourably) in the US Congress, see: in Max Allen, ed. "The Death and Life of Great American Cities," in *Ideas That Matter: The Worlds of Jane Jacobs* (Owen Sound: The Ginger Press, 1997): 47–62.

[4] Lefebvre's theories of space are briefly outlined in Chapter 1, and discussed more fully in Chapter 5. "Abstract space" is formal and quantitative at the expense of details and specifics. "Social space" is space as it is lived, and each society produces its own space.

first line of her *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*: “This book is an attack on current city planning and rebuilding.”[5] And this ‘current city planning’ is that inspired by Ebenezer Howard, Le Corbusier, and the principles of CIAM, which I discussed in the previous chapter and argued that they sought to position themselves within the university discourse. Further, since she is taking the city itself (as it actually exists) as the object of her analysis, it will become clear as to why I position her within the discourse of the analyst.

However, it is worth beginning with the final chapter of *Death and Life*, since it presents an argument about the “kind of problem a city is.” As shown in the previous chapter, all previous urban planners and theorists begin with a simplistic notion of the problem of the city (too dirty, too crowded, etc.), which their plans are meant to solve (Garden Cities, more parks, large towers in park-like settings, etc.). Jacobs, however, takes the problem of the city seriously, for cities do have problems but they are not as simple as previous urbanists thought.

I should mention from the outset that Jacobs is cautious of people who wish to theorize or think about cities. The reason is that she locates the blame for the failures of modernist approaches on their persistent imposition of a theory or conception of how cities are ‘supposed’ to be (from the university discourse), without regard for the specific city or urban space in question. That being said, Jacobs states that “thinking has its strategies and tactics too.”[6] However, it is essential that whoever seeks to ‘think cities’ needs to consider the *kind* of problem a city is.

She asserts that whatever we wish to think about, our thinking should not be structured by the particular way in which we would like to think.[7] Instead, our thinking must be based on the nature of the thing we are thinking. In this

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[5] Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 3.

[6] Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 428.

[7] I am aware of the irony here, since I am structuring my thinking of Jacobs and cities with pre-established theories. Though it may be that Lacanian psychoanalysis is, in fact, thinking ‘like a city’ (an ‘organized complexity’ that appears chaotic and illogical).

understanding of the relation between thinking and the subject of that which is thought, we see an implicit dig at Le Corbusier and the Congrès internationaux d'architecture moderne (CIAM).[8] They were explicit in their wish to impose a new way of thinking ('machine age') onto a subject (existing cities). Jacobs' insistence that we must base our thinking on the nature of the thing we are analyzing, is very much like the analyst as *objet petit a* in the analyst's discourse. This will be discussed more fully throughout this chapter, but here we can note that, just as the analyst seeks to be an object of pure desirousness to encourage transference, Jacobs is seeking to allow the city to express itself through her. While Jacobs goes on to discuss the various changes in "scientific" thought (which is a veiled critique of Le Corbusier's and CIAM's 'rationalism'), it is worth exploring her epistemological position here. If one wants to think *about* cities, one needs to think *like* a city. Thus, one cannot rely on a simplified formula or *code* (*pace*, New Urbanists!).[9] Instead, one should think of a city as a complex bundle of arrangements, desires, ideals, people, dreams, intentions, necessities: as a result our thinking about cities needs to be likewise. It is extremely unlikely that one form of good urbanism can be simply grafted onto another urban space. It *might* be, but it is hardly a matter of course.[10]

But what kind of problem is the city for Jacobs? They are "problems of organized complexity" in which multiple variables are all simultaneously and subtly interconnected.[11] Cities do not present *one* problem in organized complexity, which if understood explains all. Variables, or particular aspects of the city, cannot be understood in isolation from one another; they are all

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[8] Le Corbusier, "CIAM's 'The Athens Charter' (1933)" in *The Athens Charter*, trans. Anthony Eardley (New York: Grossman, 1973).

[9] This is in reference to New Urbanism latest web-based project, SmartCode. See: http://www.smartcodecentral.org/

[10] Jacobs' epistemological position might be something that Deleuzians/Guattarians would like to hear: just as a city shoots off in multiple directions and it is a 'rhizomatic structure' (if 'structure' is the correct term), our thinking needs to be likewise. While I am sure there is much Deleuze and Guattari can offer to the study of cities, they are not within the scope of this project.

[11] Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 433.

"interrelated into an organic whole."[12] In what can only be a direct response to Le Corbusier and CIAM, Jacobs insists that, while the factors of a city are complex, "there is nothing accidental or irrational about the ways in which these factors affect each other."[13] Le Corbusier and CIAM might like to assume that 'rational' means straight lines, square corners, and clear organization, but it does not. Just because something appears messy does not mean it is irrational.

Jacobs is right to argue that many urban spaces work well in some respects, but poorly in others. She insists that to "diagnose the trouble" does not mean to simply find that space's virtues and faults, as though these things are not connected. We must approach it as "problems of organized complexity."[14] She gives the example of her street (Hudson Street, NYC), but let us consider Kensington Market in Toronto.

Kensington Market is the epitome of a 'bustling' urban space. The many small shops provide everything from inexpensive foods to bicycles. There are coffee shops, restaurants, and bars. All of this commerce and life is packed within a relatively small space with narrow streets. Pedestrians easily outnumber vehicles dozens to one. Because of this factor, many people have proposed making Kensington 'car-free' and their campaign has been mildly successful since after experiments with "Pedestrian Sundays" on the final Sunday of each month in which the streets are closed to cars, these occurrences now take place every Sunday. While these Sundays are popular (it is nearly impossible to walk anywhere with all the people), many of those who live and work in Kensington find these days intolerable. The small shop owners see their sales decline, and residents find they have to leave the area for the day. It would appear that, though the pedestrian is the 'king of Kensington,' were the entire area permanently given over to pedestrians the area would fail. Why? Because of exactly what Jacobs is insisting on here: the area is an organized complexity.

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[12] Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 433.

[13] Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 434.

[14] Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 434.

Remove the vehicles and many other seemingly disparate things begin to unravel.

Kensington Market is likely the most successful urban space in Toronto and yet people have all kinds of ideas to 'improve' it. My position is that, rather than mess around with Kensington, we should be studying and learning from this urban space. Moreover, rather than seek to 'transplant' the *things* of Kensington to another area, we would need to look at the *processes* that brought Kensington about. We should study the types of people who began to populate the area, the types of rules that were in place and the rules that were overlooked, as well as other factors that affected these processes such as the surrounding area, and proximities to other services and spaces. In fact, Jacobs argues for three main themes when we want to understand cities and urban spaces: "to think about processes"; to employ induction rather than deduction; and to seek "unaverage" clues (in other words, look for the exceptions).[15]

The final aspect I would like to discuss from the last chapter of *Death and Life* concerns the old problem of "man and nature." Jacobs insists that the human city is just as much a part of nature as the beehive or the bed of oysters, but she notes a "curious thing" happened in the eighteenth century: the sentimentalization of nature.[16] For the many centuries prior to this recasting of nature, it was understood as cruel and we organized our lives in cities and villages to survive. "City air makes free," the medieval saying goes.[17] By the eighteenth century, cities were common enough that people forgot the ravages of nature and were able to romanticize it. Jacobs points to Marie Antoinette playing milkmaid, the "sillier" idea of the 'noble savage,' and Jefferson's "intellectual rejection of cities" along with his "pathetic dream" of rural yeoman whose land

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[15] Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 440. In the following chapter, I will discuss how these "three main themes" relate and intersect with Lefebvre's 'trialectic' of space (representation of space, representational space, and spatial practice).

[16] Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 444.

[17] (*Stadtluft Macht Frei.*) A German saying from eleventh century.

was tilled by slaves.[18] This this conceptual shift occurred despite the fact that those living in 'rural' or 'natural' settings in the eighteenth century were least free since they were bound by tradition, caught in castes, benighted by superstition, and fearful of anything deemed strange.

Yet, with the 'distance' people had placed between themselves in cities and nature 'out there,' it became possible to think of nature as "benign, ennobling and pure" and cities, because people were in them, or close to them, and could easily be thought of as the source of all social problems and enemy of what is natural and 'true."[19] While this sentimentalization was not quite enough to get people to move out of cities, it was enough to create a desire to bring this sentimentalized conception of nature into cities. Thus, we can see why the Garden City was popular – not so much because it brought ruthless, cruel nature into a mix with the urban, but because it mixed this sentimental or romantic version of nature (the 'garden') with the urban. This sentimentalization of nature also helps us to understand why it has become popular for urban dwellers like to 'play gardener' and young fashionable people extol the virtues of their beloved urban parks.

The trouble with sentimentalizing nature, for Jacobs, is that it is deeply disrespectful.[20] Thus, while North Americans are likely the biggest sentimentalizers of nature, we are also the ones who have voraciously destroyed much farm and rural land. It is a "sentimental desire to toy, rather patronizingly, with some insipid, standardized, suburbanized shadow of nature."[21] To think of being with nature as mowing the lawn, tending to flower gardens, sunbathing, and "contemplative uplift" is obscenely disparaging toward nature.[22] And so, "each day" (this being written in 1961), "several thousand more acres of our

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[18] Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 444.

[19] Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 444.

[20] Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 445.

[21] Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 445.

[22] Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 445.

countryside are eaten by bulldozers, covered in pavement, dotted with suburbanites who have killed the thing they thought they came to find."[23] This, suggests Jacobs, is why these suburban settlements, which are loved and desired by one generation, are despised by the next. While she points to these settlements' complete lack of infrastructural 'staying power,' perhaps it is the 'nature' of desire that best explains this. That is, one generation's desire is not the next's, just as one person's desire is not another's. The *objet petit a* found/placed in the suburban life is not found in the next generation, precisely because they grew up with it; they were too close to its 'reality' to fantasize about it, too close to sentimentalize it, and it was too direct an experience to cover over the gaps in the dream.

I have begun the discussion of *Death and Life* with its final chapter because I feel it contains some very important ideas and rarely do people pay it any attention. Most 'readers' of *Death and Life* come away from it with a vague sense of 'mixed-use zoning' and something about 'eyes on the street.'[24] And yet Jacobs proves to be a theorist and deep thinker in her own right as we have seen in this final chapter. One can only speculate why this final chapter is rarely read or referenced.

Nonetheless, though Jacobs' main arguments about 'mixed-use,' 'eyes on the street,' the 'ballet of the sidewalk,' etc. are well-known to any casual urbanist, it is worth exploring them in detail. Precisely because these ideas are now 'common sense' to most contemporary urban planners, we need to be cautious with them. From where does Jacobs get these ideas? Why does she find them so important? How have her arguments become 'common sense' and the dominant ideology of contemporary urban planning? We need to maintain a

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[23] Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 445.

[24] In what is otherwise an excellent account of experiments with 'mixed-use' development in Canada, the author fails to distinguish between primary and secondary uses: Jill Grant, "Mixed Use in Theory and Practice: Canadian Experience with Implementing a Planning Principle," *Journal of the American Planning Association* 68, no. 1: 71–84. In the practice of building, the near-universal conception of 'mixed-use' means a tall residential tower with shops on the ground floor.

critical distance from these ideas or we risk it (further) becoming ideology. Nearly all popular contemporary books on urban life[25] agree with Jacobs' main arguments though sometimes these agreements are implicit. As I will show, many of these works that cite Jacobs present her arguments in a selective, if not misleading, manner. Perhaps most significantly, Jacobs' argument about the need for a diversity of primary uses that will then lend themselves to a diversity of secondary uses is often conflated as 'mixed-use,' short-circuiting the primary and secondary uses.

Jacobs begins *Death and Life* with a hysterical attack: "This book is an attack on current city planning and rebuilding."[26] Many have misinterpreted this as 'an attack on *all* city planning.' Jacobs is not opposed to all planning, just what was going on at the time (and unfortunately still persists). The type of planning she opposes I have been referring to as 'modernist urban planning.' In fact, she is trying to propose new ways to understand urban planning – new concepts and variables. She is seeking to explain "why some parks are marvellous and other are vice traps," why some areas are and stay slums while others regenerate themselves, why downtown centres shift, and why some neighbourhoods work while others do not.[27] What is crucial to her theorizing of the city is that she thinks seriously "about how cities work in real life"; for her this approach "is the only way to learn what principles of planning and what practices in rebuilding can promote social and economic vitality in cities and what practices and principles will deaden these attributes."[28]

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[25] For example, P.D. Smith, *City: A Guidebook for the Urban Age* (New York: Bloomsbury, 2012); Ken Greenberg, *Walking Home: The Life and Lessons of a City Builder* (Toronto: Random House Canada, 2011); Fran Tonkiss, *Space, the City, and Social Theory: Social Relations and Urban Forms* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005); Allan B. Jacobs, *Great Streets* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993). Sharon Zukin, *Naked City: The Death and Life of Authentic Urban Spaces* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.) The increasingly influential New Urbanism movement also cites Jacobs' work for support. See: Andres Duany, Elizabeth Plater-Zyberk, and Jeff Speck, *Suburban Nation: The Rise of Sprawl and the Decline of the American Dream* (New York: North Point Press, 2000).

[26] Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 3.

[27] Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 3–4.

[28] Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 4.

This shows that Jacobs is positioning herself with the analyst's discourse as she is taking her object of study (the city) as a subject in its own right ($8). This means that we are to deal with the problem of the other's (the city's) desire with more nuance than simply imposing a knowledge system which characterizes the university discourse. Taking the city as a subject in its own right is directly related to what I already highlighted above from the final chapter of *Death and Life*: that we must not impose a way of thinking on an object, but that we must allow the object of our study to determine our city. In other words, various modernist planners have sought to impose (usually a moral) order on urban spaces whereas Jacobs is looking at these urban spaces and learning from them, allowing the uses and shapes of these spaces to guide her thinking. Some might just categorize her as "a good empiricist" but I think things are bit more complicated. She is fully aware that her approach is guided by a theory and a normative position: then-contemporary urban planning was based on wrong theories, and her position is that cities are good things. Perhaps most fundamental to her theory is that she is employing inductive rather than deductive reasoning (and imploring others to do so as well); we ought to start on the ground, observing all the details and go from there, not try and fit the small details into a grand theory. So, as with the urbanists and planners discussed in the previous chapter, Jacobs begins from hysteric's discourse but immediately situates herself within the analyst's discourse and remains ensconced there.

Jane Jacobs and the Four Discourses

As explained in the previous chapter, early cities and towns were of the master's discourse. There was little in the way of plans and these cities and towns grew 'organically': they grew the way they grew because that was how they grew. The parks movement, Howard's Garden Cities movement, Le Corbusier's plans, and the aims of CIAM represented the dominant plans and ideologies that began to

inform the growth of cities and demonstrated the rise of the university discourse in response to the ‘master cities.’

Hysteric’s Discourse

$$\frac{\$}{a} \in \frac{S_1}{S_2}$$

We might think of Jacobs operating within the hysteric’s discourse since she is ‘talking back’ to the master (S_1), demanding the master prove its right to authority. But I have positioned the old, unplanned cities as with the master’s discourse. Further, Jacobs is ‘talking back’ to and criticizing the planned cities of the university discourse, but this is only a small portion of what she is doing. The majority of her work is takes the city as it actually exists and reveals its ‘truth’ (S_2) at the expense (loss) of the university discourse’s privileging of ‘knowledge’ (S_2) However, the hysteric’s discourse does help us understand some of her critics’ initial responses to *Death and Life*. For example, Lewis Mumford wrote a long critique of her book in the *New Yorker*, which relied heavily on gendered categories of knowledge.[29] With a skewed reading of *Death and Life*, Mumford suggests “Mrs. Jacobs’ … ideal city is mainly an organization for the prevention of crime”[30] and her biggest concern is “for the smallest unit of urban life” (the family).[31] Mumford finds that Jacobs both unknowingly confirms some of Ebenezer Howard’s ideas and makes proposals that counter her overall goal. Mumford is seeking to position Jacobs as the Lacanian hysteric: irrationally demanding the master prove its worth and providing so-called ‘alternatives’ that end up being just as bad as the master’s, unwittingly establishing what it seeks to oppose, full of contradictions, etc. In the ‘discourses’ of urban planning, I think the

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[29] Lewis Mumford, “Mother Jacobs’ Home Remedies,” in *New Yorker* December 1, 1962: 148–179. To be fair, Mumford was a follower of Ebenezer Howard, of whom Jacobs is critical.

[30] Mumford, “Mother Jacobs’ Home Remedies,” 160.

[31] Mumford, “Mother Jacobs’ Home Remedies,” 170–171.

hysteric's discourse best fits with many 'residents associations' that fall under short-sighted NIMBYism.[32]

Analyst's Discourse

$$\frac{a}{S_2} \in \frac{\mathbb{S}}{S_1}$$

Jacobs fits best, I argue, in the analyst's discourse. Above, I suggested that the analyst takes the city as a subject ($\mathbb{S}$) in its own right. However, we can also think of $\mathbb{S}$ as a product of the university discourse, which the agent in the analyst discourse interrogates. That is, Jacobs is interrogating the failures of the supposed 'objective' knowledge or truth of modernist city planning. The first line of *Death and Life* is "This book is an attack on current city planning and rebuilding."[33] By "current," she is referring to the modernist planning of the late 1950s and early 1960s. While we can see the 'truth' of Jacobs' analyst's discourse as knowledge of the city revealed through her observations and letting the city 'speak' for itself, we can also understand this knowledge as the knowledge of the book: not only will we find a wide variety of prescriptions, principles, and 'pearls of wisdom' for cities in the book, but the 'knowledge' of the book has lasted for fifty years now. Jacobs' ideas continue to inform the work of a wide array of urbanists and planners. The product of the analyst's discourse (S_1) is slightly different than S_1 in the master's discourse. In the analyst's discourse, it refers to a master signifier that the analysand would 'cough up' in analysis. It would be a "word or phrase that puts an end to association."[34] With Jacobs the phrase could be "cities are an organized complexity" rather than previous conceptions of cities being a terrible problem, which a simple principle or plan would solve all issues. In relation to modernist planning, the phrase would be that

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[32] NIMBY: Not In My Back Yard. A pejorative directed at people who agree a certain building or project is necessary for the larger community, but do not want it near their residences.

[33] Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 3.

[34] Bruce Fink, *The Lacanian Subject: Between Language and Jouissance* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 135.

central thing around which modernist planning circles yet never speaks. While it could be understood as a fetishization of 'science' or 'rationality,' I argue it is modernist planning's hatred of the city. One could imagine a modernist planner like Le Corbusier or any member of CIAM (or Howard, Olmsted, or Unwin) being interrogated by Jacobs until they finally admit, "I hate the city!"[35] Of course, Le Corbusier and CIAM did write that they hate cities. This should have put an end to their circling and 'free-association' of various scientific, rationalist, and functionalist terms and phrases. But what of Jacobs herself as a? In the analyst's discourse, it is the analyst who takes the position of the agent as a, meaning a desiring subject or "pure desirousness."[36] I think it is fair to characterize Jacobs as such as she presents herself in the book as a subject of *jouissance*: her obvious love of all things urban, and the messiness of city life that modernist planning seeks to rationalize and remove. This love is very apparent in one section of *Death and Life* wherein she phones Boston's city planner while visiting the North End.[37] The city planner is shocked to hear she is in this area alone and urges her to get out of this dangerous place immediately, to which Jacobs general reply is "No! It's great! I'm having fun!" She enjoys the very things that modernist planning is seeking, through its knowledge, to eradicate. In any case, allow me to leave this aside for now and discuss some details of *Death and Life*, in order that my positioning of Jacobs as the analyst in the analyst's discourse will become more clear.

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[35] Many other urbanists reveal their dislike of cities as well, including most of the Marxist 'everyday life' writers from the 1960s onward. Henri Lefebvre's argument about urbanism, to greatly simplify, is that it is a result of unequal social relations caused by capitalism. See: Henri Lefebvre, *Urban Revolution*, trans. Robert Bononno (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003). As shown in the final chapter below, Manuel Castells finally reveals his conservatism and desire for 'less urban' forms of association. See: Manuel Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*, 2nd edition (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 492. Even Witold Rybczynski, the well-known contemporary essayist on cities, admits he prefers garden suburbs. See: Witold Rybczynski, *Makeshift Metropolis: Ideas About Cities* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2010).

[36] Fink, *The Lacanian Subject*, 135.

[37] Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 10.

It is probably well-known that Jacobs writes about the 'small' things of cities rather than large, overarching plans. While this does not seem particularly interesting, it is worth considering more deeply. Modernist planning is not particularly concerned with what already exists on the ground (unless it is a 'slum' it wishes to eradicate). Modernist planning, with at least one interesting exception, literally does not have a perspective.[38] The plans of modernist planning are not presented as they would appear to a person in the space, nor are they presented as though viewed from above. They are purely abstract, a pure representation of space (Lefebvre). So, while many have suggested that Jacobs brought urban thinking down to street level, this is not accurate. Yes, she thinks at street level, but earlier planners were not thinking from 'above,' they were thinking from a totally abstract space, the space of calculation with no regard for specifics. Thus, Jacobs warns the reader they will be disappointed if they expect her to explain how cities "ought" to work.[39] She goes on to say that it is "futile to plan a city's appearance" without knowing what type of thing or problem a city is.[40] As mentioned above, the city, for Jacobs, is a problem of organized complexity, which is not how any modernist urban planner considered the city.

Reply to Howard and Le Corbusier

Jacobs gives a faithful account of Ebenezer Howard's Garden Cities project, making note that what has been done in the name of 'garden cities' was not what Howard intended. She argues that Howard's ideas "set spinning powerful and city-destroying ideas" because he proposed that "the way to deal with the city's functions was to sort out and sift out of the whole certain simple uses, and to

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[38] Lacan refers to this as "'geomatral' or 'flat' (as opposed to perspective)": Jacques Lacan, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan*, Book XI, *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: W.W. Norton, 1998), 85.

[39] Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 14.

[40] Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 14.

arrange each of these in relative self-containment."[41] Were there one crucial sentence or argument that we ought to take from *Death and Life*, this is the one. Jacobs' argument is that the various things that go on in cities cannot be separated. While Howard only saw two actual "Garden Cities" built with their own separation of uses, nearly all of North America saw new zoning practices that separated land uses. But to blame Howard for this might be a bit unfair. We ought to recall the unquestioned, appalling conditions of industrial towns. Howard's impetus for separating land use was the existence of residential buildings right next to factories which polluted the air, land, and water. Though the issue is not addressed, it would be difficult to imagine Jacobs advocating for worker dormitories or housing next to factories. Nonetheless, North America took this idea of separating land uses to the extreme so that certain areas or streets would only have a single use: retail, restaurants, residential, recreational, industrial, etc.[42] This separation of uses is why North American suburbs do not have corner stores, but instead any number of corporately owned gas stations with an attached convenience store at the intersection of two arterial roads.

Jacobs also argues that paternalism, if not authoritarianism, is another aspect of Howard's plan, which was taken up by modernist town planners. This refers to large scale developments that were justified by a 'we know best' attitude of government officials.[43] Many planners ignored any aspect of city life that could not be abstracted and controlled. All the following were excluded from Howard's

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[41] Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 18.

[42] The problems that stem from separating land uses are too long to list. Throughout *Death and Life* many of these problems are discussed. However, Jacobs does note there are certain buildings which have functions that ought to be separated. They all share a common feature: they thwart diversity.

[43] This paternalistic attitude is why Frederick Gardiner, the first mayor of Metro Toronto, was known as "Big Daddy Gardiner." See: Timothy J. Colton, *Big Daddy: Frederick G. Gardiner and the Building of Metropolitan Toronto* (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1980). Of course, Jacobs has in mind Robert Moses, the "master builder" in New York City. Jacobs had organized opposition to many of his plans, the most famous of which was the proposed Lower Manhattan Expressway, which Jacobs helped to cancel while completing *Death and Life*. See: Anthony Flint, *Wresting with Moses: How Jane Jacobs Took On New York's Master Builder and Transformed the American City* (New York: Random House, 2009).

plans and most modernist planning: the way "cities police themselves, or exchange ideas, or operate politically, or invent new economic arrangements."[44] This is by no means a complete list, but it does speak to how planning and its implementation were understood as static, abstract *things* which occurred once without any thought given to *process*.

Jacobs makes the connection between Howard's Garden City and Le Corbusier's Radiant City. Though the Garden City advocates were "aghast" at Le Corbusier's plans, its favourable reception was largely due to it being a "vertical Garden City."[45] Further, it took up the increasingly popular ideas of the "super block, the project neighborhood, the unchangeable plan, and grass, grass, grass," all the while presenting these ideas as the "hallmarks of humane, socially responsible, functional, high-minded planning."[46] Though Jacobs argues that Le Corbusier's plan was taken up by many architects and planners and informed many buildings and projects, it should be noted that much of Le Corbusier's plan was ignored, just as much of Howard's were in the various 'garden suburbs.' Jacobs argues that automobiles were the reason Le Corbusier's ideas were (partially) taken up: large highways and arterial roads, one-way streets and fewer cross-streets that would impede motor traffic.

Jacobs writes that Le Corbusier "proposed underground streets for heavy vehicles" and "he kept the pedestrians off the streets and in the parks."[47] It is surprising that Jacobs misconstrues Le Corbusier's plan, which was to have all personal motor traffic on elevated highways with some underground streets for heavy, commercial vehicles so that the *entire ground* would be given to pedestrians. It is partially true that pedestrians would be "in the parks," but this is because the whole city would be a park. This misconstruing of Le Corbusier's ideas does not necessarily strengthen Jacobs' point. In fact, Le Corbusier's

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[44] Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 19.

[45] Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 22.

[46] Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 22.

[47] Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 23.

repeated calls for the 'death of the street' are ignored by Jacobs and would make her criticism much stronger. Below, I will show how Jacobs disagrees with any notions of car-free streets, including Le Corbusier's plan where "no pedestrian would ever meet an automobile."[48]

Jacobs clearly states that it was Howard's and Le Corbusier's ideas that were "constantly use[d], as fixed points of reference" by all guilty parties: "zoners, highway planners, legislators, land-use planners and parks and playground planners."[49] However, there was one other important movement. Not the 'parks movement' outlined above, but a related one: the "City Beautiful" movement that began in Chicago in the 1890s, very close to the time Howard was formulating the Garden City. Jacobs describes the City Beautiful movement as a dramatized "retrogressive imitation Renaissance style."[50] This movement implemented many grandiose monuments in as many parks as possible, grand "baroque boulevards" with the general theme of a central town square.[51] Jacobs' critique of these central civic or cultural centres is that they were planned and implemented with no regard for the city itself, treated as a separate unit. She argues that, though people were proud of them, they quickly lost interest. Very few people ever visited these monuments or squares and the surrounding areas eventually "acquired a congruous rim of ratty tattoo parlors and second-hand-clothing stores" or simply became vacant and decayed.[52]

Jacobs as analyst is able to see these seemingly different ideas as one articulation: the "Radiant Garden City Beautiful," which, until at least the time of

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[48] Le Corbusier, *The Radiant City: Elements of a Doctrine of Urbanism to be Used as the Basis of Our Machine-age Civilization*, trans. Pamela Knight, Eleanor Levieux, and Derek Coltman, (New York: The Orion Press, 1967), 113.

[49] Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 24.

[50] Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 24.

[51] Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 24. Toronto's Old City Hall was planned to have a public square based on City Beautiful principles, but this was never built. Just east, University Avenue with a large meridian boulevard and a few monuments is a classic example of a City Beautiful project, especially since this boulevard is rarely used.

[52] Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 25.

her writing this book, had informed urban planning.[53] The underlying problem is that all of these plans, separately and together, are "irrelevant to the workings of cities. Unstudied, unrespected, cities have served as sacrificial victims."[54]

Central Arguments of *Death and Life*

After Jacobs' "Introduction," the following three chapters are devoted to sidewalks; that is to say nearly sixty pages devoted to sidewalks. It would not be productive to summarize everything in these three chapters, so instead I will instead pull out a few essential arguments and seek to show how they relate to the various theories informing this dissertation, to contemporary planning, and to some examples from Toronto.

Earlier, I outlined Foucault's argument about circulation in the urban. Jacobs, however, argues that sidewalks are "bound up with circulation but are not identical with it."[55] That is, there is much more going on with city sidewalks than merely circulating people and goods. Sidewalks by themselves are nothing more than an abstraction and only gain meaning and purpose in relation to the things that surround it: buildings, other land uses, or other nearby sidewalks. This goes for streets as well. Streets and sidewalks are partially about circulation but are a city's "most vital organs."[56] A city's streets and sidewalks are what define a city: if they are interesting, the city is interesting. Moreover, if streets are safe, then that city is safe. And streets are safe not because of policing or the containment of a certain 'class' of people or because they are empty. Rather, streets and sidewalks are safe because of the people who use them; people *using* streets and sidewalks are what make a city safe.

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[53] Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 25.

[54] Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 25.

[55] Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 29.

[56] Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 29.

Interestingly, Jacobs points out that these are not the roles of streets and sidewalks in small towns or suburbs; cities are not like towns, only bigger and they are not like suburbs, only denser. This is because “cities are, by definition, full of strangers.”[57] So, for a city to function well, people need to feel safe in the midst of strangers. Though Jacobs repeatedly argues that cities are problems of organized complexity, that there is not one ‘key’ that will unlock the solution, she is, in fact, arguing that without safe streets and sidewalks, a city will find itself with “mountain on mountain of trouble.”[58]

Jacobs goes through a list of the ‘usual suspects’ that people blame for unsafe streets and sidewalks: slums, older parts of the city, and minority groups. None of these factors are what cause streets to be or feel unsafe. And streets and sidewalks are not kept safe by the police, but “primarily by an intricate, almost *unconscious*, network of voluntary controls and standards among the people themselves, and enforced by the people themselves.”[59] In fact, parts of the city where police are constantly present are the least safe parts of the city. “No amount of police can enforce civilization.”[60] Jacobs presents a strong argument that the safest streets and sidewalks are those that are well-used, a point which she summarizes accordingly: “A well-used city street is apt to be a safe street. A deserted city street is apt to be unsafe.”[61]

So, rather than trying to come up with policy or plans to make streets safe, planners and governments need to think about how to make streets well-used. Jacobs provides three main qualities streets must have to make them safe. These three qualities are the central arguments to Jacobs’ work, which are revisited and relied on throughout the book. They are: 1) there must be a clear

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[57] Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 30.

[58] Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 30.

[59] Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 32. Emphasis added.

[60] Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 32.

[61] Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 34.

demarcation between public and private space; 2) there must be "eyes on the street" and; 3) a sidewalk must have people on it fairly continuously.[62]

The least discussed feature is the first one, that there needs to be a "clear demarcation" between public and private space and that the two cannot "ooze into each other" as they do in suburban settings. While Jacobs does not elaborate on this argument, we can assume that the point is that people need to be able to clearly understand where public space, like a sidewalk, ends and private space, like a front yard, begins. Interestingly, this appears contrary to what Jan Gehl argues in his *Life Between Buildings*.[63] In a later book, Gehl contends that life occurs between buildings because "something happens because something happens because something happens" or "nothing happens because nothing happens because nothing happens."[64] Gehl continually uses the words "inviting" or "invite" when explaining his theories of urban design: a space needs to be inviting to people, cities must invite people to use transit or ride bikes. In *Life Between Buildings*, Gehl argues that to get people outside, the space there must be inviting. To this end, he argues that there must be flexible, not sharp, borders between private space (dwelling) and public space (sidewalk). Though Jacobs is insisting that there must be a "clear demarcation" between public and private space, I think Jacobs and Gehl are in agreement, though using

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[62] Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 35. Jacobs' arguments concerning safety of well-used sidewalks, and particularly the concept of 'eyes on the street,' have been validated by the numerous cities that have adopted this theory in their design policies, including Vancouver, New York City, and even Thunder Bay. The recent re-development of Regent Park in Toronto has also followed these principles. For the most cited study concerning this theory, see: Oscar Newman, *Defensible Space: Crime Prevention Through Urban Design* (New York: Macmillan, 1972). Newman was asked to condense and update his theory for the U.S. Federal Government, which he produced and published: Oscar Newman, *Creating Defensible Space* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1996). Retrieved from http://www.huduser.org/publications/pdf/def.pdf For a succinct account of Newman's theory in relation to Jacobs, see: Michael Lewyn, "Crime and Design: Oscar Newman 36 Years Later," *Planetizen* August 13, 2008. Retrieved from: http://www.planetizen.com/node/34530

[63] Jan Gehl, *Life Between Buildings: Using Public Space*, trans. Jo Koch (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1987).

[64] Jan Gehl, *Cities for People* (Washington, D.C: Island Press, 2010), 64. It is worth noting the similar structure of "something happens because something happens" to the 'dogmatic stupidity of the signifier': a word means what it means because that is what it means.

different words. For Gehl's concern to get people outside doing something, he envisions a type of semi-private, semi-public space between purely public and purely private space. Consider a typical Toronto house in relation to the street: interior of the house, a front porch, a front yard, and then the sidewalk. With this arrangement, the person in the house can come outside of the purely private interior of the house and be in a semi-private space of the front porch. The front yard is also semi-private, but becomes semi-public closer to the purely public space of the sidewalk. People arrange their front yards to be more private (the extreme is high bushes along the perimeter) to being more public (open border, maybe even a bench close to the sidewalk). Rarely, though, are benches in people's front yards used. Following Jacobs' ideas, it might be because they are 'too' public and people prefer to sit out front closer to their house, such as on the front porch. As to why people would put these benches in their front yard and not use them, it is helpful to recall Lacan's distinction between imaginary and symbolic identification discussed in chapter 2. It is not so much that they want to identify themselves as people who enjoy urban life (imaginary identification), but rather that they want to *been seen as* people who enjoy urban life (symbolic identification). For, if they really did enjoy the public nature of urban life and like to engage with strangers, then they would sit on their benches.

Gehl's reasoning for flexible borders is so that a person may go outside to do something (like tend to a garden or fix something up) and be exposed to the possibility that someone else will be outside doing something similar. Or, if only one person goes out, then others might see this person and go out themselves. Again, "something happens because something happens." However, if the house has no relation to the front street and the outside area is a fenced-in back yard (as found in a typical suburb), then there is a sharp border between public and private space, or between two private spaces. In these arrangements, people will not see anyone else outside and, if they do, socializing is difficult. Or, if there's no semi-private or semi-public space in front of the house, then a person will not have this middle space to be outdoors without being in purely public space; going

outside will be a ‘full commitment,’ not just a ‘step outside’ to see what is going on. Typically, in suburban environments, the ‘nosey neighbour’ is the person who shows up when someone is enjoying their yard. This is likely a problem in the suburbs for a number of reasons: that it is probably the same person or people who do this, or there is little hope of ‘escape’ from these encounters (they will not ‘take a hint’). This relates to the types of contact urban dwellers have and the mutual respect of privacy and private space.

Though Jacobs says there needs to be a “clear demarcation” between public and private space I think she is essentially in agreement with Gehl. By “clear demarcation,” she does not necessarily mean a tall fence or bushes or a “no trespassing” sign. Rather, this demarcation between public and private space is made in clear but subtle ways. The most obvious is the straight line of the edge of a sidewalk. People walking on a sidewalk know they are in public space and welcome there. And they know that that edge of sidewalk is the end of this public space. Some people might raise the edge of their front yard to further this demarcation, or perhaps erect a low, decorative fence, as is popular with many Portuguese families in Toronto.[65]

What is it about this distinction between public and private space that makes a street safe? In short: people can be certain that public space is public space and that they are welcome there. They are invited to use this public space without feeling they are infringing on someone’s private space. People on the street are what make a street safe, so whatever encourages people onto the streets and sidewalks will make streets and sidewalks safer.

The agreement between Gehl and Jacobs becomes clearer when we look at the second quality for safe streets. This is the famous, if not infamous,

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[65] Many first-generation Italian and Portuguese immigrants in Toronto arrange the front area of their houses with paving stones instead of grass, and wrought iron fencing and overhang supports. This aesthetic appears to be influenced partly by wanting to showcase *azulejos* (painted glazed tiles) with Christian iconography. For a study of this practice, see: Catharine Ponte’s website *Front Yard Devotions*: http://individual.utoronto.ca/kitkat/ftydev3.htm

argument that “there must be eyes on the street.” But it is not just anyone’s ‘eyes’ – it must be the eyes of those who Jacobs calls the “natural proprietors” of the street.[66] That is, the people who live in the houses and apartments on the street and the people who work in the shops. This means that houses, apartments, and shops must face the street. Recall the typical Toronto house described above. Aside from a porch that faces the street, there are also a number of windows that face the street as well. On the other hand, a common trend with some larger, chain stores is to poster over the windows that face the street or stock product in front of them so one cannot see in or out. However, having many people watch the street at various times of the day ensures that, were there to be something nefarious going on, someone would see it and intervene. More importantly, it means that people on the street and sidewalk feel comfortable – they know there are people watching.

But why would they assume that if something were to happen to them that someone, the owners of one of these pairs of eyes, would intervene? For Jacobs, it is called “trust” and this is why it does not work if the “eyes” are hired security or the police.[67] Here we need to recall that, for Jacobs, cities are by definition full of strangers. This trust among people is developed by “many, many public sidewalk contacts”[68] and is directly opposed to the “togetherness” found in small towns or suburbs, which Jacobs calls “nauseating.”[69] Jacobs argues, rightly, that there are so many people in cities, with whom a certain degree of contact is useful and enjoyable, “but you do not want them in your hair. And they do not want you in theirs either.”[70] So people get to know other people in their neighbourhoods, but they maintain a degree of privacy. Without this level of social privacy, people would not want to go out for fear they would have to discuss private parts of their lives. Thus, people trust other people to not meddle

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[66] Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 35.

[67] Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 56.

[68] Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 56.

[69] Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 62.

[70] Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 56.

in their affairs but also trust that there is a “general street support when the chips are down.”[71] While Jacobs explains this trust is developed through the many seemingly trivial sidewalk contacts, an urban dweller can judge this level of trust in other ways. For example, where I live on Bloor Street, I have seen people stop to pick up a lost glove and place it on a newspaper box or somewhere else prominent so the owner might find it. I have seen a person fall off a bike and a half dozen people rush over to ensure she was all right and wave at cars in case the drivers did not see her. I have seen someone drop an item and a person pick it up and rush ahead to return it. While I have never seen someone provoking a fight, I once witnessed a truck full of young men verbally harass a woman walking on the sidewalk. Though there is little someone on foot can do to a group of cowards in a truck, everyone within ear-shot looked at each other in disgust and with sympathy for the young woman. There is also the treatment of and the *existence of* panhandlers. On Bloor they come from all over the city, one a woman from Jane and Finch, because people give them money and food, and treat them with respect. Were the area dangerous or unsafe, there would not be panhandlers – and the danger of Jane and Finch is the primary reason why the woman comes here. There are many other examples I could mention, but I think my point is made: I know, for certain, that if anything were to happen to me on the sidewalk of my street, people will intervene. This communal trust is what makes the street safe – not necessarily because they will ‘save’ me from some incident, but that I *feel* safe. A street that is safe or *feels* safe amounts to the same thing.

The third quality is tied into the previous two: there must be people on sidewalks nearly continuously. This is what the “ballet of the sidewalk” refers to: a diversity of people on the sidewalks continuously throughout the day and well

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[71] Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 56.

into the evening.[72] Having a clear demarcation between public and private space ensures that people know the public space is public and feel welcome. Having "eyes on the street" includes those who are on the streets, not just those watching from windows or porches. Essential for this stratagem to work is having many people on the sidewalks nearly continuously to give the people watching the street something to watch. And, to ensure that people are on the sidewalks, there must be places for people to go throughout the day and night: there must be stores, bars, restaurants, etc. Consider a strictly residential area, not necessarily a suburb, but an older residential area of any town or city with few if any stores. There will only be people on the sidewalks during the day and they will be those walking recreationally or taking a dog out for a walk – or, if there is one close by, a few people walking to a solitary store when it is open. It is in these environments that people often do not feel safe when walking alone since there is nobody around, nobody to help or intervene if something were to happen. And, while proper studies would be required, it might help to explain why suburban areas of Toronto and other cities are more dangerous than the more densely populated central areas.[73]

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[72] Jacobs' concept of the 'ballet of the sidewalk' is very similar to the rhythms of a day that Lefebvre describes in "Seen from a Window," which he wrote much later (this essay, along with the others published in *Rhythmanalysis* were the last of Lefebvre's writings and published after his death in 1991): Henri Lefebvre, "Seen from a Window," in *Rhythmanalysis: Space, Time and Everyday Life*, trans. Stuart Elden and Gerald Moore (London: Continuum, 2004), 27–37. Further, that Jacobs makes this seemingly random or chaotic aspect of urban life an valid object of analysis fits it within Rancière's concept of politics outlined in chapter 2.

[73] However, high levels of residential density is not a guarantee of feeling safe or low crime rates. Many relatively small suburban areas with many high-rises (i.e. areas with high residential densities) often have a high rate of crime. As will be shown below, Jacobs (and contemporary planners) do not find much value in residential or even dwelling density alone since other factors need to be included, such as employment density, public space, and retail. Further, as is argued throughout this chapter, the point is the need for a *diversity* of these land uses. So, rather than comparing crime rates to density ratios, one would more likely find a correlation between low diversity (however that may be defined) and high crime rates.

Diversity: An Economic Argument

While these are ways in which to ensure sidewalk safety, the most overlooked aspect of Jacobs' work is the economic aspect. Many suggest that Jacobs is advocating for some happy, safe, "Sesame Street urbanism,"[74] but the main point she is making concerns economic prosperity. To demonstrate this, let us look at the central portion of her book on the "Conditions for City Diversity."[75]

Jacobs' argument for city diversity is what makes her so different from previous urban or town planners. Modernist urban planners insisted on the separation of uses ('zoning') to ensure that various land uses (e.g. residential, commercial, manufacturing, etc.) were kept separate. Jacobs is insisting that both cities and city districts must have a diversity of uses for vital urban life, but primarily to provide the necessary conditions of economic prosperity. Using the example of a "pretty sidewalk park in Baltimore" that "needs some commerce for its users' convenience,"[76] Jacobs states:

> Anybody who started a retail enterprise here, for example, would be stupid. He could not make a living. To wish a vital urban life might somehow spring up here is to play with daydreams. The place is an economic desert.[77]

I quote this at length because, while much of her ideas are about making the city a vibrant place to live, I want to insist that Jacobs' central argument is about generating economy. And what generates the economy is diversity – diversity of users and uses.

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[74] This is Shawn Micallef's term. See, for example: Shawn Micallef, "Ye Old Merry Christmas," *Spacing Toronto*, Dec 25, 2006. Retrieved from: http://spacingtoronto.ca/2006/12/25/ye-old-merry-christmas/

[75] Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 141.

[76] Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 144.

[77] Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 145.

Many have conflated Jacobs' argument about diversity as the 'need for mixed-use,' but Jacobs argument is the "need for *primary* mixed-uses."[78] A 'primary' use is something like office buildings, factories, dwellings, some places of entertainment, education, and recreation. To a lesser extent, so are museums, libraries, galleries.[79] Jacobs is arguing that there needs to be a few of these in one area so that there are people out and about throughout the day. A district with just one or even two primary uses, such as an office building, will only have people outside when people are coming to the office and leaving to go home. The downtown of London, Ontario, is a prime example of this problem: there are many office buildings but little else so that the area is nearly deserted by 5:15 PM, so the shops close and remains vacant until the bar crowd shows up.

While there is a need for a mix of primary uses, "by itself it is relatively ineffectual as a creator of city diversity."[80] If there are multiple *primary uses* that get people on sidewalks and streets at different times (the "sidewalk ballet"), "then the effect can be *economically stimulating*: a fertile environment for *secondary diversity*."[81] Secondary diversity refers to "enterprises that grow in response to the presence of primary uses, to serve the people the primary uses draw."[82] These are the smaller shops and services such as corner stores, lunch places, dry cleaners, bicycle shops, bookstores, etc. Jacobs argues that this secondary diversity will only develop where there is a diversity of primary uses. If there is only one primary use (such as residential) it is unlikely that a secondary service will do well. The main reason for this is that a diversity of primary uses will bring a multitude of diverse people into the district, from which the secondary

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[78] Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 152. Emphasis added. It is astounding that this is overlooked; it is the title of Chapter 8.

[79] Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 161.

[80] Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 162.

[81] Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 162. Emphasis added.

[82] Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 162.

services “can sift their clienteles.”[83] And, if a secondary service does well enough, it can become one of a district’s primary services.

Below I will further discuss Jacobs’ economic theories, but here I will point out that few, if any, urban scholars make much use of this economic theory regarding primary and secondary diversity. Below it will be clear that, whenever Jacobs is taken up as an economic thinker, it is nearly always in reference to her other works, not *Death and Life*. In rare instances when the economic aspect of *Death and Life* is acknowledged, it is only in passing.[84] What has been adopted by many city’s official plans and builders is a concept of ‘mixed-use.’ This concept of ‘mixed-use’ is usually a diversity of uses in a single building, not a diversity of land uses in an area or district. While apartment or office buildings were once nearly always built with a lobby on the main floor, these buildings are now nearly always built with space for retail on the main floor. In Jacobs terms, the apartments or offices are ‘primary use’ while the retail space is ‘secondary use.’ While Jacobs argues that a district needs to have a diversity of primary uses (residents, work space, etc.) so that secondary uses would be supported, we see that current building practices seek to ‘short-circuit’ this process by providing both primary and secondary uses in a single building. While this practice does help to enliven the streetscape, it is not without problems. If an apartment or condominium tower is built in an area without other primary uses, the retail store at street level will not have enough people around throughout the day to support the business. Condominium buildings are largely financed by those who buy the residential units, whereas the retail space is leased. There is less financial risk to the builder if they lease that retail space to one, larger business. Better would be a diversity of smaller stores, though this means multiple leases the developer (or whatever management company is hired) to

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[83] Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 162.

[84] For example, see: Pierre Desrochers and Samuli Leppälä, “Rethinking ‘Jacobs Spillovers,’ or How Diverse Cities Actually Make Individuals More Creative and Economically Successful,” in *What We See: Advancing the Observations of Jane Jacobs*, ed. Stephen A. Goldsmith and Lynne Elizabeth (Oakland, CA: New Village Press, 2010): 287–296.

negotiate and smaller, independent stores are more likely to run into trouble and not be able to pay their rent. But much of this increased risk comes from this attempt at short-circuiting the development of secondary uses.

Were city's official plans and developers to follow Jacobs' arguments more closely, they would see there is nothing wrong with building an apartment, condominium, or office building that serves only one use – so long as there are a variety of these primary uses in the area. With this diversity of primary uses in an area, entrepreneurs will move into the area based on their own estimations of the viability of whatever business, and will be much more likely to succeed. In terms of policy, cities really only need to do one thing: get rid of any 'single use' zoning bylaws that are in place. There are many areas where two or more primary uses exist (such as residential and educational), which make it an excellent location for secondary uses (a café, restaurant, variety store), but the zoning bylaws prohibit such a thing. Of course, I am simplifying here. The obvious problem would be the availability of retail space, which is partly why there is this insistence on retail space on the ground floor of residential towers. Perhaps, though, there are things cities can do to ensure these spaces are built, but have policies in place so that developers are not so inclined to rent these out to larger, chain stores. Dictating that these spaces be multiple and smaller is probably not the best route, but there are practices a city can (and do) take to relieve the financial burden of the retail spaces on developers (such as lower developmental fees, tax breaks on vacant stores, or subsidizing the rent) so that these secondary uses develop on their own accord.

The need for a mixture of primary uses to generate secondary uses is the first condition to generate diversity. The second condition is the need for small blocks. Again, many have taken up this argument in favour of small blocks to support walkable, 'Sesame Street' urbanism.[85] But, again, Jacobs' argument for

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[85] In Toronto, the leading culprits of this misinterpretation are those writing for *Spacing* magazine, both in print and online. As well, a few writers involved with *Spacing* have created an advocacy group, Walking Toronto, that also relies on this misreading of Jacobs for support.

small blocks has to do with economy: small blocks generate the economy. Now, a series of small blocks does make it interesting for a person living on a street and needing to walk to various destinations.[86] He or she is able to choose from a variety of routes. More importantly, it ensures that this person is more aware of what happens on the other streets and is assured that "these people have [some]thing to do with him" or her.[87] And by "having anything to do with him" or her, Jacobs is referring to an "*economic* effect."[88]

The economic effect is explained in two ways. With long blocks, people must go to the end of their block to a perpendicular, usually larger, street. Jacobs' example is in New York City, where 88th Street crosses Columbus Avenue. Here, people from all the long blocks (88th, 87th, 86th, etc.) "stream" together into one place (Columbus Avenue). And, Jacobs argues, because of all these long blocks leading to one place, Columbus Avenue "has its own kind of monotony": there are only shops and commercial standardization.[89] It might be surprising to some to read Jacobs referring to Columbus Avenue as part of the "Great Blight of Dullness," but Columbus Avenue along these blocks is, in fact, rather dull: liquor stores, dry cleaners, and not much else. 88th, 87th, 86th, etc. are all 'beautiful' streets with large trees and lovely apartments and houses. It is clearly an expensive place to rent or own a house or apartment. But Jacobs' point remains: there a deadening economic effect. While upper-class people may live here, their money is not going to anything else besides mortgages or rents, at least in this area. The long blocks sort people "into paths that meet too infrequently, so that different uses very near to each other geographically are, in practical effect, literally blocked off from one another."[90]

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[86] Jan Gehl, for example, argues that urban dwellers ought to walk or bicycle for its enjoyable features, but he rarely connects it to these economic aspects. See: Jan Gehl, *Cities for People* (Washington, D.C: Island Press, 2010).

[87] Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 179.

[88] Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 179. Emphasis original.

[89] Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 180.

[90] Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 181.

Now, if 88th, 87th, 86th, etc. were to be bisected with another street that ran parallel to Columbus, the blocks along 88th, 87th, 86th, etc. would be shorter. While this would give people choice in their routes, the economic effect would mean that rather than a single "stream" of people, there would be multiple "pools" of intersecting pathways. And these multiple intersections are the place for stores to serve the residents of these streets: a corner store, ice-cream shop, bicycle shop, fresh produce, etc. Short blocks allow people to "pool their [economic] support nearby."[91]

While Jacobs' example are streets in New York City, there are similar situations in Toronto that verify her arguments. The streets between Avenue Road and Bedford Avenue, south of Davenport Road and north of Bloor Street have a similar problem as 88th, 87th, 86th, etc. These streets are Bernard Avenue, Tranby Avenue, Boswell Avenue, Elgin Avenue, Lowther Avenue, and Prince Arthur Avenue. Though these Toronto blocks are slightly shorter at 270 metres (the blocks Jacobs describes on 88th, 87th, 86th, etc. are each 320 metres), there is a similar problem: with the exception of Prince Arthur, none of these streets have anything but houses and Avenue Road, with a few retail spaces, has, as Jacobs says, "its own kind of monotony."[92]

I will discuss the third and fourth conditions for diversity momentarily, but I would like to first discuss Jacobs' arguments about automobiles in cities. Since Jacobs spends much of *Death and Life* discussing sidewalks and that she is most famous for successfully opposing the Lower Manhattan Freeway in New York City,[93] then again helping to stop the Spadina Expressway in Toronto,[94] it is perhaps not surprising that many assume that Jacobs was fully opposed to cars

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[91] Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 181.

[92] Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 180.

[93] This fight is well-documented in Flint, *Wrestling with Moses*. It is interesting to note that Jacobs makes scant mention of it herself, just a few sentences in *Death and Life*, the book she was writing while involved in this battle: Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 360.

[94] For a detailed account of Toronto's plans for major expressways throughout the city, including Spadina, see: John Sewell, *The Shape of the Suburbs: Understanding Toronto's Sprawl* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009).

and supported pedestrian-only areas.[95] But this is not the case. In fact, Jacobs is quite clear that it is wrong to blame automobiles for the destruction of cities or making them hostile: "automobiles are hardly inherent destroyers of cities."[96] Further, Jacobs goes to lengths to show that earlier forms of 'horse and buggy' streets were worse than paved streets for automobiles and that "the internal combustion engine … was potentially an excellent instrument for abetting city intensity."[97] As for those finding it "fashionable to suppose that the solution lies in designating certain places for pedestrians," they will not find much support from Jacobs.[98] She suggests they *might* work if there is a reduction of cars in the city as a whole; otherwise the area surrounding the pedestrian areas will become deadened parking lots. So, Jacobs insists that, rather than trying to make an area or two car-free, the "problem is how to cut down drastically the absolute numbers of vehicles using a city" and so she devotes a chapter to the "attrition of automobiles."[99]

Jacobs' arguments against 'car-free' zones helps elucidate my discussions of Kensington Market's Pedestrian Sundays in chapter 2 and above in this chapter. A main problem with pedestrian-only areas is the need of vehicles for services, supplies, and products. Jacobs suggests one of two alternatives must be accepted. The first is that the area would not have any services or shops, which writes "is automatically an absurdity."[100] This is because there would be little reason for pedestrians to show up. The second alternative is to develop some novel method for delivering products to shops, such as "underground tunnels for trucks," a "post officing" method which claims to rationalize delivery of products so there would be fewer trucks and could make their deliveries at night.

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[95] Even Jan Gehl thinks Jacobs would be proud of his 'car-free' projects: Jan Gehl, "For You Jane" in *What We See: Advancing the Observations of Jane Jacobs*, ed. Stephen A. Goldsmith and Lynne Elizabeth (Oakland, CA: New Village Press, 2010): 234–241.

[96] Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 343.

[97] Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 343.

[98] Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 344.

[99] Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 345.

[100] Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 346.

Thus, this is separating automobiles from pedestrians over time, not of space. And it "involves considerable expense."[101] Jacobs ultimate suggestion, in keeping with her argument on the need to reduce overall automobile use, is to ensure that pedestrians are not "overwhelmed and dominated by floods of cars."[102] Again, we encounter this problem of limits. While Le Corbusier wanted no pedestrians to ever meet an automobile, and many contemporary urbanists want to ban cars, Jacobs is proposing a balance. She is pointing to a limit of the number of cars, but not defining this number. We will see this type of limit in Jacobs' thinking below with her arguments about dwelling densities.

Density is Not a Number

The third condition for diversity is the "need for aged buildings,"[103] because only large corporations and companies can afford to build new buildings or pay the high rents associated with brand new buildings. Older, plain buildings are where "new ideas" can flourish.[104] This is probably the most unconvincing argument that Jacobs makes in the entire book, which I will return to presently after covering the fourth condition for diversity: densities.

The fourth condition for diversity is a "sufficiently dense concentration of people."[105] While 'density' is a well-used measurement of a city or district, there is much to learn from what Jacobs argues here. First, her conception of density is *not* strictly residential: a district "must have a sufficiently dense concentration of people, *for whatever purpose they may be there.* This *includes* people there

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[101] Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 346. Oddly, this 'post officing' system is what some cities have implemented, and what Gehl thinks would impress Jacobs. See: Gehl, "For You Jane," 236.

[102] Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 348.

[103] Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 187.

[104] Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 188.

[105] Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 200.

because of residence."[106] Thus, Jacobs understands density completely differently than the term is normally used in urban planning (as only residential density). Jacobs recognizes the importance of residential density, as it will be mostly these people on a district's streets and sidewalks. But the "dwellings of a district … need to be supplemented by other primary uses," so that there will be people on the streets and sidewalks throughout each day "for the economic reasons explained" in the central chapter on the need for diversity of primary uses.[107] That is, a district with high residential density must also have other primary uses, which ensures there will be people outside throughout the day, to provide the conditions for economic development and the generation of secondary diversity.

However, because dwelling densities are so important to a district's success or failure, Jacobs devotes much of this chapter to dwelling densities. The densities of the examples Jacobs gives for areas with high and low densities range from 255 dwellings per acre to 21, with "row-house neighbourhoods in trouble" at 30–45 per acre.[108] This ratio is quite strange, as the generally agreed-on density for an area to be considered 'urban' is 400 persons per square kilometre, which is 1.6 persons per acre.[109] Even though this is *persons* not *dwellings* per square kilometre, the difference is astounding: 1.6 persons per acre is much, much lower than a population density occupying 30–45 dwellings in an acre of land. 'Overcrowding' is normally understood to exist when there are more than 1.5 persons per *room*, so 30–45 dwellings (with multiple rooms) would easily accommodate about 100 people per acre. So, Jacobs' examples of low density are about 5000 dwelling units per square kilometre. Toronto, for example, has a density of 2700 people per square kilometre (or 10 per acre).

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[106] Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 200. Emphasis added.

[107] Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 201.

[108] Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 203.fn.

[109] Prior to the metric version of 400 persons per square kilometre, the nearly identical 1000 person per square mile (or 1.6 per acre) was the agreed-upon density requirement for an area to count as 'urban.'

While Jacobs provides much evidence that districts with “a low density of dwellings” are dull and unsuccessful, she is adamant that high densities do not necessarily equal successful urban areas: “the relationship between concentrations of people and production of diversity is [*not*] a simple, straight mathematical affair.”[110] Thus, there is no ‘desired density’ without accounting for the diversity of the area. Dense concentrations of people are *one* of the necessary conditions for diversity, but not a sufficient condition.

Jacobs also makes the all-too-obvious distinction between high densities and overcrowding. It is astounding that she needed to insist on this definition, that it is often overlooked, and that the metrics of urban densities are *still* understood by the simple formula of residents per unit of area. Jacobs is clear, and remains consistent through the book with her definitions: “High densities mean large numbers of *dwellings* per acre of land. Overcrowding means too many people in a dwelling for the number of rooms it contains.”[111] That is, ‘density’ ought to refer to number of dwellings per unit of area and ‘overcrowding’ to refer to an insufficient number of dwelling units. This way, an area with many people and plenty of dwellings would not be considered ‘overcrowded,’ whereas an area with even a low rate of people would be considered ‘overcrowded’ if there were an insufficient number dwellings.

This distinction between numbers of people and numbers of dwellings is important, especially when we recall *Nothing Gained by Overcrowding!* because Unwin conflated the number of people and dwellings and, in doing so, proposed extremely low population densities that would not generate diversity. Howard’s ‘Garden City’ and his followers also conflated the two, resulting in plans for low population densities as a solution to low dwelling densities: two distinct things.[112]

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[110] Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 205.

[111] Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 205. Emphasis added.

[112] Howard’s Garden City was to have 90–95 people per acre.

Consider Ward 20 in central Toronto, which has 51,210 people, 25,185 occupied dwellings, and is 8 square kilometres.[113] This means that in traditional population/residential 'density,' Ward 20 has 6,400 people per square kilometre which is more than 10 times the minimum for an area to be considered 'urban.' Following Jacobs' insistence that 'density' must refer to number of *dwellings* per unit of land, Ward 20's 'Jacobsian' density is 3,150 *dwellings* per square kilometre, assuming 2 persons per dwelling. Though this appears to be above Jacobs' figure of than 1.5 persons per *room* as 'overcrowded,'[114] it must be noted that *dwellings* refers to houses and apartments, nearly all of which contain multiple *rooms*. Thus, it can be inferred that Ward 20 has a somewhat high population density and is decidedly *not* overcrowded.[115]

It would, then, be wise for anyone discussing density to distinguish between an area's overall population (including working), the number of residents, and the number of dwellings per area of land. Keeping these measurements separate would ensure that an area is not diagnosed as a 'slum' or 'overcrowded' when it merely has a high population or residential density. And it would ensure that an area with low population or residential density can still be understood as 'overcrowded' if there are too few dwellings.

Despite the fact that some ratios allow us to measure and understand a district's residential densities and crowding, Jacobs insists that there are no "proper" figures for any of these factors. *There is no magic number*. The only measure, for Jacobs, is whether these numbers "frustrate city diversity instead of abetting it."[116] However, after much cautioning, Jacobs suggests that the common proposal of 100 dwellings per acre (24,711 dwellings per square

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[113] Census Canada, 2001. See: http://www.toronto.ca/wards2000/pdf/wardprofiles_20.pdf

[114] Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 205.

[115] For a detailed analysis of Toronto's neighbourhood densities, see George Baird and Robert Levit, *Urban Density Case Studies in the Greater Golden Horseshoe*, Queen's Printer for Ontario, 2011. http://www.citiescentre.utoronto.ca/publications.htm

[116] Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 209.

kilometre) “will be found to be too low” to produce diversity.[117] Ward 20 in Toronto has 3,150 dwellings per square kilometre (12.75 per acre) is only 13% of this ‘too low’ dwelling density. Within Ward 20, the Annex has 5457 dwellings per square kilometre (22 per acre). For comparison, St. Jamestown in Toronto (Canada’s densest neighbourhood) has 125 dwellings per acre (30,900 dwellings per square kilometre).[118] For the entire city of Toronto, there are 2.6 million people on 630 square kilometres of land, which gives each person 240 square metres – the size of two tennis courts.[119]

In terms of ‘too much’ density, Jacobs again measures this in terms of frustrating diversity. The actual numerical density does not particularly matter: if diversity is frustrated then density is too high (or too low). However, she does suggest that 200 dwellings per acre is a “danger mark” of too-high dwelling density.[120] When dwelling densities are very high, the only way to accommodate this is by standardization of the buildings, which is precisely the opposite of diversity.[121]

Her discussion of density figures is the closest Jacobs brings us to the university discourse. But she is adamant that there is no ‘simple calculation’ or a ‘magic number’ to guarantee diversity.

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[117] Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 212.

[118] 2006 Census Canada data. See: http://www.toronto.ca/demographics/cns_profiles/cns74.htm

[119] This calculation is given by Neal Madras, a professor in the department of mathematics and statistics at York University. See Jennifer Pagliaro, “Falling Debris in Toronto: How Likely Are You To Be Hit?” *Toronto Star*, May 29, 2012. Retrieved from: http://www.thestar.com/news/article/1202429--you-won-t-find-this-statistician-under-the-gardiner-no-matter-how-unlikely-the-falling-debris

[120] Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 217. CIAM suggested that 200 *people* per acre would be ‘too many.’ Assuming more than one person per dwelling, Jacobs’ ‘too-dense’ threshold is higher than CIAM’s. See: Le Corbusier, “CIAM’s ‘The Athens Charter’ (1933)” in *The Athens Charter*, trans. Anthony Eardley (New York: Grossman, 1973), 53. Le Corbusier’s density of Radiant City is 1,200 *people* per acre. See: Le Corbusier, *The Radiant City: Elements of a Doctrine of Urbanism to be Used as the Basis of Our Machine-age Civilization*, trans. Pamela Knight, Eleanor Levieux, Derek Coltman, 2nd publication, (New York: The Orion Press, 1967), 21.

[121] Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 212.

These density figures that Jacobs discusses, and the current threshold of what constitutes an 'urban area,' are vastly different than one another, and they are difficult to 'square' with Toronto's neighbourhoods. To be clear, Jacobs argues that 100 dwellings per acre (with about 125 persons per acre) will likely be too low to generate diversity. The current threshold for what counts as an 'urban area' is only 400 persons per square kilometre (1.6 per acre). The 'downtown,' highly populated neighbourhoods of Toronto have population densities of around 10,000 per square kilometre (40 per acre) and dwelling densities around 5,000 per square kilometre (20 per acre).

Recently, Edward Glaeser published *The Triumph of the City*, which became noteworthy because he criticizes Jacobs (blasphemy!).[122] Glaeser writes that Jacobs argues "cities need at least a hundred households per acre to generate enough street traffic to support exciting restaurants and shops."[123] So far so good. But then he claims that Jacobs "argue[s] that two hundred homes per acre was a 'danger mark.'"[124] While she does use the phrase "danger mark"[125] at 200 dwellings per acre, her point is lost on Glaeser. Jacobs is arguing that somewhere around 200 dwellings per acre, standardization of buildings is required and that nearly all developments with skyscrapers inefficiently use land as they are surrounded by grass lawns. *And*, she refers to the North End in Boston with 275 dwellings per acre throughout *Death and Life* as an example of a good, successful urban area. The reason is not the high density, but the diversity of uses and users in this district.

Glaeser argues that a "typical Manhattan apartment … has about 1,300 square feet" and that to "accommodate two hundred households per acre" the

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[122] Edward Glaeser, *Triumph of the City: How Our Greatest Invention Makes Us Richer, Smarter, Greener, Healthier, and Happier* (New York: Penguin Press, 2011).

[123] Glaeser, *Triumph of the City*, 146.

[124] Glaeser, *Triumph of the City*, 146.

[125] Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 217.

apartment buildings would need to be "about six stories high."[126] Here, Glaeser is demonstrating three things which are precisely what Jacobs opposes: the standardization of buildings, the simple yet flawed easy calculation, and, most importantly, a lack of diversity. One can imagine that were a district mostly six-story buildings, with other non-residential buildings mixed in, and room for streets with short blocks, we would arrive at Jacobs' preferred 100–150 dwellings per acre range.

However, we must keep in mind Jacobs' warning if we are to fall into the university discourse: dwelling densities, and I would include population and employment densities as well, "cannot be based on abstractions about the quantities of land."[127] Further, planning experts are extremely wary of comparing densities of two or more areas.[128] To create a diverse and vibrant area, there are many important factors or variables that must be considered: wide sidewalks, access to mass transit, streets designed for many different users, nearby amenities such as large supermarkets, restaurants and cafés, schools, etc. Generally, high densities will work well if the density is distributed evenly (e.g. not in one or two apartment towers) so that life at sidewalk level is alive, vibrant, and diverse.[129]

Thus, and this should not be surprising, the university discourse fails: one cannot determine or design a desirable area or district with an abstract ratio. That is, an area with high densities for whatever purpose can be bland and dull, just as an area with low densities can be bland and dull. Nonetheless, Jacobs' general observation that districts with at least 100 dwellings per acre (about 25,000 per square kilometre) are usually much more diverse than areas with less density does help to thwart some preconceptions. Many find the Annex in Toronto

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[126] Glaeser, *Triumph of the City*, 147.

[127] Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 208–209.

[128] Ken Greenberg and John Gladki. Personal email, May 15, 2012.

[129] Ken Greenberg. Personal email, May 15, 2012.

to be a desirable neighbourhood[130] and often point to Jacobs once calling the area home as proof it being the type of district she advocates. But her density figures prove otherwise. The Annex only has 22 dwellings per acre (5,457 dwellings per square kilometre), well below her threshold of 100 per acre. With these numbers in mind, observation of the Annex neighbourhood reveals that, while Bloor Street at its southern edge does contain vibrant diversity, crowded sidewalks, etc., the rest of the neighbourhood is, in fact, strictly residential with only a few buildings higher than three stories. There are no stores[131] between Bloor and Dupont, Bathurst and Spadina, though there are, of course, stores *on* these main streets. While there may be zoning laws prohibiting stores here, to quote Jacobs slightly out of context, "anybody who started a retail enterprise here, for example, would be stupid."[132] The blocks are long, longer than similar sized areas to the immediate south, east, and west (areas that *do* have stores). And, in the Annex, there simply are not the numbers of people coming and going at different times of the day for different purposes to sustain a retail store.

Further, the Annex Residents' Association, the members of which absolutely adore Jacobs, consistently oppose any further 'intensification' of the neighbourhood even though the density is well below Jacobs' minimum threshold. And it is here that I bring back the argument that Jacobs can be understood through the analyst's discourse: planners and residents are claiming to desire all these things, but Jacobs' work forces us to answer the question *Chè vuoi*? – What do you really want?

As well, Jacobs does not seek to wash over the problem of 'the political': she does not reconcile the limit of density with an arbitrary number. Rather, she

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[130] For example, a small house at 237 Major Street was listed for $600,000 in February 2010 and then listed by another owner for $800,000 in May 2012. It sold quickly, and above this asking price.

[131] There are a few offices and services such as massage therapists.

[132] Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 145.

insists it be a judgment based on 'diversity,' which is a conception of the 'good life.'

Economy and Space

Jacobs' third condition for diversity is the "need for aged buildings," not nice old buildings with 'historic value,' but "plain, ordinary, low-value old buildings."[133] Jacobs' argument is that only large corporations and companies can afford to build new buildings or pay the high rents associated with brand new buildings. Older, plain buildings are where "new ideas" can flourish – neighbourhood bars, good bookstores, restaurants, etc.[134] "New ideas must use old buildings" because they need cheaper rents.[135] This is probably the most unconvincing argument that Jacobs makes in the entire book. Even without Glaeser's critique,[136] it is simply not the case that that all old buildings in cities have cheaper rents. There may be a few old, derelict factory buildings in districts that are not particularly successful that have cheap rents, but any old building in a desired area will have a high property value and mean that, for a person to afford the property taxes, they will have to rent it out at a price comparable to the buildings around it. Old factory buildings in Toronto's core which contain apartments, office space, or stores have some of the highest rents and purchase prices.

Glaeser's critique is based on simple supply and demand theory. Preserving a short, old building instead of building something taller does not assure affordability to 'new ideas.' Increasing the supply of office or housing units will, Glaeser argues, keep prices down in a popular area. The new, taller building

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[133] Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 187.

[134] Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 188.

[135] Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 188.

[136] Glaeser, *Triumph of the City*, 135–163.

will not be likely to “house any quirky, less profitable firms” but it will help to keep the rents lower in the district.[137]

Oddly missing from both Jacobs’ and Glaeser’s theories about the relation of buildings to affordability is location. If a district is popular, then there is little to be done to ensure the district is affordable except through government subsidies. Many cities, Toronto included, have policies in place that ensure that new buildings have some units designated as ‘affordable housing.’ Other cities, such as Victoria, BC, subsidize the rent of low-income earners so that people can live in existing neighbourhoods, rather than designated low-income areas or housing projects.[138] Toronto Community Housing owns and rents out properties across the city, a fact which is usually unnoticed by anyone passing by.[139]

In terms of enterprises with ‘new ideas’ or ‘quirky, less profitable businesses,’ which require relatively cheaper rents, observation shows they begin and survive in *districts* that are affordable. That is, successful and popular districts do not typically have an old, plain building with low rents. For example, in Toronto, in Yorkville or the Annex or other popular areas, it is extremely rare to find a storefront or office space with a low rent. Thus, an enterprise with ‘new ideas’ that cannot afford the rental prices of these areas will look for a storefront or office in a different district.[140]

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[137] Glaeser, *Triumph of the City*, 148.

[138] See the Capital Regional District’s website on affordable housing for details: http://www.crd.bc.ca/housing/

[139] See the City of Toronto’s website on affordable housing: http://www.toronto.ca/affordablehousing/

[140] For example, a friend of mine, Jason MacIssac planned to open store specializing in artistically inspired interior design products. While this would have once been a perfect fit on Queen West, in 2007 he chose to open his store, Ministry of the Interior, just off Queen West at 80 Ossington Avenue. His store was very successful and this stretch of Ossignton which has radically transformed since. He decided to close his shop in 2011 and he now lives in Hamilton, where many other creative and artistic people are moving. For a short write-up of MacIssac’s store, see: Kate Carraway, “Ministry of the Interior Closes,” *The Grid*, June 1, 2011. Retrieved from: http://www.thegridto.com/life/design/ministry-of-the-interior-closes/

The municipal government of Toronto has sought to provide low rents to various upstarts by providing subsidies or running their own offices and storefronts. 401 Richmond is an example of this: located in Toronto's core, it was once a factory but has been renovated and is now broken up into various art galleries, offices, and a bookstore to merchants who pay lower rents than the area demands. There are also grants available to new businesses that help to offset costs, including rent.

Nonetheless, and following Jacobs' argument that these subsidies should not be necessary for the economy to grow, the vast majority of 'new ideas' enterprises locate themselves in a district that is less popular and charges cheaper rent. In the 1970s, Queen Street West between Simcoe Street and Spadina Avenue was a neglected part of Toronto's downtown. Rents for both storefronts and apartments above the stores were considerably cheaper than elsewhere in the city. Many artists, musicians, writers, and other interesting people with little money began moving into the area. Within a decade or so, the area became well known for this artistic community, which was flourishing and supporting many diverse 'secondary' services. Pages Bookstore opened at Queen and John streets, with the Rex (a jazz and blues bar) just east at St. Patrick Street. Further west, this secondary diversity included Steve's Music, which provided instruments to the area's musicians, other bookstores, clothing shops, restaurants, and bars (most famously, the Horseshoe). It is worth noting that this area did not have many primary uses, let alone a diversity of primary uses, except for some residential spaces above the street's stores and Ryerson Press which was located in what is now a CTV building. At this area's eastern edge are some office buildings, though few if any of these workers had any interest in what was going on along Queen Street. To the south of this area were, and remain, rather desolate one-way arterial 'streets' (really, small expressways). Following Jacobs' theory of primary and secondary uses, one can only say that these new, artistic people generated secondary services without there being much in the way of primary services. And the successful secondary services

became the area's primary attractors to people outside the area. That is, people from different areas of the city and beyond eventually started coming to Queen West to shop in the interesting stores, see bands play at the bars, or simply experience and witness this vibrant artistic community.

By the 1990s, however, much of this artistic community had been pushed out.[141] Larger corporations, wishing to 'cash in' on the area's cultural capital, began renting and buying buildings with storefronts. These corporations were able to pay higher rents, which pushed the prices out of reach of the existing artistic community or to any enterprise with 'new ideas.' Pages Bookstore eventually closed when their rental lease expired: the building's owners were demanding much more rent to renew a lease. Today, the only remaining businesses are those that own their own building (the Horseshoe Tavern, the Rex, Steve's Music) and Queen West is now home to one of Canada's largest media companies, CTV, stores owned by Nike, Adidas, a host of other stores one normally finds in a mall (Bootlegger, Footlocker, Aldo), and, of course, Starbucks.

The artistic community did not, of course, simply disappear. Instead, they have moved further west on Queen Street around and beyond Ossington Avenue. While there are a multitude of small, storefront galleries in this area, there does not appear to be much else. Rather than the diversity of services found in the 'original' Queen West, this new 'Queen West West' is nearly exclusively comprised of small art galleries. Thus, there is little reason for larger corporations to want to locate a store here. Instead, the area is set to become primarily residential with many new, recently finished, and under-construction condominium buildings. This new primary use (residential) has yet to produce much in the way of secondary services. Many artists and writers who appear to be tired of being chased along Queen Street have moved much farther west – all

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[141] The transformation is well-know to nearly everyone living in or even visiting Toronto. However, for a detailed analysis, see: Katharine N. Rankin, *Commercial Change in Toronto's West-Central Neighbourhoods* (Toronto: Cities Centre University of Toronto, 2008). Retrieved from: http://www.urbancentre.utoronto.ca/pdfs/publications/RP214RankinCommercialChangeWestToronto9-2008.pdf

the way to Hamilton. This 'edge city' of Toronto is much cheaper in terms of rents and costs of living and with many artists and creative people migrating there, it is quickly becoming an interesting and diverse area.

This 'migration' along Queen Street and towards Hamilton can be, in a strange way, partly explained by Richard Florida's infamous 'creative class' thesis. Before explaining his thesis, it is well-worth pointing out that Florida is heavily influenced by Jacobs. Many find this surprising, but only because they have a 'Jane's Walk' understanding of Jacobs.[142] That is, they think Jacobs arguments are about making 'walkable,' 'mixed-use' communities, full stop. They have failed to see the intricacies of Jacobs' 'mixed-use' arguments (primary and secondary diversity) and that, while these principles make for nice places to live, they are primarily about generating economy. One only needs to look at the titles of her other books to see that she is primarily an economist.[143] David M. Nowland notes the "interesting story" of how Jacobs' work on economics fell into obscurity, then became standard reference.[144] Much of her work's resurrection was caused by the influence she had on the Nobel Prize winning economist, Robert Lucas. However, Nowland only discusses *The Economy of Cities* and *Cities and the Wealth of Nations*, with no reference to *Death and Life*. However, it has been Richard Florida who is most well-known for taking up Jacobs' ideas about the role of 'creativity' that develops the economy. Florida, however, does not write about the impact of urban design on the economic generation. Instead, Jacobs'

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[142] Jane's Walk is an annual event, now world-wide, in which volunteers lead walks in their neighbourhoods. It is based on Jacobs once saying, "You have to get out and walk." See: Jane Jacobs, "Downtown Is for People" *Fortune*, 1958. Retrieved from: http://features.blogs.fortune.cnn.com/2011/09/18/downtown-is-for-people-fortune-classic-1958/

[143] For example, the following books by Jane Jacobs: *The Economy of Cities* (New York: Random House, 1969); *Cities and the Wealth of Nations: Principles of Economic Life* (New York: Vintage, 1985), *Systems of Survival: A Dialogue on the Moral Foundations of Commerce and Politics* (New York: Random House, 1992); *The Nature of Economies* (New York: Random House, 2000).

[144] David M. Nowland, "Jane Jacobs Among the Economists," in *Ideas That Matter: The Worlds of Jane Jacobs*, ed. Max Allen (Owen Sound: The Ginger Press, 1997): 111–113.

work on street design and the sociability of sidewalk life is taken up by people arguing for the need of 'third places' for people to leisurely socialize.[145]

In *Cities and the Wealth of Nations*, Jacobs argues, among other things, "for the necessity of vigorous cities remaining creative."[146] The book's larger argument on the centrality of a nation's wealth depending on cities 'takes aim' at the tradition of thinking of economy in militaristic terms ('targets,' 'long-range planning,' etc.) and instead insists that economic *life* needs to be concerned with development and creation. Jacobs goes so far as to suggest that necessity is not the 'mother of invention' but rather "aesthetic curiosity."[147] She gives a long series of examples. Metallurgy began with jewellery, not weapons. Pigments (the first use of iron ore), porcelain, ceramics, glass, and welding "all started with luxury or decorative goods."[148] A wide variety of engineering accomplishments (hydraulics, wheels, lathes, etc.) were all first used for enjoyments and toys before any 'useful' purposes. The first working railroad was an amusement ride in London, plastics were first used to make toys and kitchen gadgets, and computers were primarily for games before being produced for office use. Jacobs point is that economy and invention occurs as a result of creativity and play, not "the order of 'challenge' and 'response'" (or 'solutions,' as is so common is business-speak now).[149] Thus, economies are better off when evolving, "producing diversely and amply" for people, than when trying to specialize.[150] Cities, Jacobs argues, are "open-ended types of economies in which our open-ended capacities for economic creation are not only able to establish 'new little things' but also to inject them into everyday life."[151] Further, when faced with "economic

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[145] See, for example: Ray Oldenburg, *The Great Good Place: Cafes, Coffee Shops, Bookstores, Bars, Hair Salons, and Other Hangouts at the Heart of a Community* (New York: Marlowe, 1999).

[146] Jacobs, *Cities and the Wealth of Nations*, 216.

[147] Jacobs, *Cities and the Wealth of Nations*, 222.

[148] Jacobs, *Cities and the Wealth of Nations*, 222.

[149] Jacobs, *Cities and the Wealth of Nations*, 223–224.

[150] Jacobs, *Cities and the Wealth of Nations*, 224.

[151] Jacobs, *Cities and the Wealth of Nations*, 224–225.

deterioration," cities can remain "afloat by keeping city economies creative."[152] Finally, a poorly performing city economy can be corrected if that "correction depends on fostering creativity in whatever forms it happens to appear in a given city at a given time."[153]

I quote Jacobs at length here to demonstrate that she argued for the necessity of creativity to sustain city economies well before Richard Florida presented and popularized his 'creative class' thesis in 2002.[154] Though Florida can be a bit too much of an 'urban cheerleader,' he does well in presenting the evidence for why cities, and which cities in particular, are becoming popular again. Florida's argument is that this class of creative people is becoming larger and that these people have different world views and desires than earlier dominating classes, such as William H. Whyte's 'organization men' that defined the 1950s.[155] This creative class includes those who work in "science and engineering, architecture and design, education, arts, music and entertainment."[156] They are people "whose economic function is to create new ideas, new technology and/or new creative content" and "engage in complex problem solving that involves a great deal of independent judgment and requires high levels of education."[157] This is different than those in the working or services classes who are "primarily paid to execute according to plan."[158]

Florida admits that what 'creative class' denotes is ambiguous. And, he has many critics. Jeremy Peck was one of the earliest, accusing Florida of selling "neo-liberal snake-oil" since Florida does not provide a sufficient critique of the

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[152] Jacobs, *Cities and the Wealth of Nations*, 225.

[153] Jacobs, *Cities and the Wealth of Nations*, 230.

[154] Richard Florida, *The Rise of the Creative Class: And How It's Transforming Work, Leisure, Community, and Everyday Life* (New York: Basic Books, 2002).

[155] William H. Whyte, *The Organization Man* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1956).

[156] Florida, *The Rise of the Creative Class*, 8.

[157] Florida, *The Rise of the Creative Class*, 8.

[158] Florida, *The Rise of the Creative Class*, 8.

'trickle-down' economic theory held by much of the creative class.[159] Many other critics dispute Florida's claim that this creative class spurs economic generation.[160]

Nonetheless, he does identify a group of people who are growing in numbers and have continued to do so since he proposed this thesis. Regardless of the critiques of economic causality, my reason for bringing Florida into this discussion is that throughout Florida's work one theme persists: the type of place that the creative class prefers. They are not interested in the things that cities have traditionally done to lure businesses and residents such as stadiums, highways, malls, or theme-park-like entertainment districts.[161] Instead, they are looking for precisely what Jacobs argued makes for a successful city: abundant amenities and experiences, and diversity of people and things.[162] Florida sums the factors that the creative class uses to judge the "quality of a place": a diversity of built environment combined with the natural environment; a diversity of people that are open to new and different people and ideas; and a vibrancy of street life, arts and music with people outside.[163] This creative class also wants to participate in their city's or district's development: they attend public consultations for new developments, pay attention to what city or neighbourhood councils are

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[159] Jeremy Peck, "Struggling with the Creative Class," *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 29, no. 4 (Dec 2005): 759.

[160] A large study done in Europe found that, in terms of policy implementation, attracting this 'creative class' is much more complex than Florida suggests: Sako Musterd, et. al. *Making Creative-Knowledge Cities: A Guide for Policy Makers* (University of Amsterdam: Amsterdam Institute for Social Science Research, 2010). An earlier study also demonstrated that there is no empirical evidence that the presence or absence of the creative class is not related to economic growth: Michele Hoyman and Christopher Faricy, "It Takes a Village: A Test of the Creative Class, Social Capital, and Human Capital Theories," *Urban Affairs Review* 44, no. 3 (Jan 2009): 311–333. For an account of many of Florida's critics, see: Frank Bures, "The Fall of the Creative Class," *Thirty-Two Magazine*, June 15, 2012. Retrieved from: http://thirtytwomag.com/2012/06/the-fall-of-thecreative-class/ Florida responded to Bures' article; the crux of which is determining the difference between 'human capital' (an educated population) and this 'creative capital.' See: Richard Florida, "What Critics Get Wrong About the Creative Class and Economic Development," *The Atlantic Cities*, July 3, 2012. Retrieved from: http://www.theatlanticcities.com/jobs-and-economy/2012/07/what-critics-get-wrong-about-creative-class/2430/

[161] Florida, *The Rise of the Creative Class*, 218.

[162] Florida, *The Rise of the Creative Class*, 218.

[163] Florida, *The Rise of the Creative Class*, 232.

doing, etc. Florida's reasoning for this is, at best, rather thin: members of the creative class come from different backgrounds and are attracted to places that "offer something for them all."[164]

It is worth noting that Florida published this thesis well before the large economic decline in 2008 involving mortgages, the stock market, etc. In 2010, Florida published a book which seeks to explain this economic shift as a "reset" of capitalism and social structures and values.[165] Among other things, Florida argues that this shift in the economy is not simply economic, but is changing how "we" are building infrastructure, systems of transportation, new housing patterns: "it ushers in a whole new way of life."[166] While I do not agree with the scale of this shift, there are patterns that Florida identifies, some of which others agree with, and a few which challenge conventional wisdom.

As regards the latter, Florida argues that it is wrong to make a sharp distinction between the urban and the suburban. While there has been a movement towards bringing some of the spatial arrangements and green space associated with suburbs into urban areas, more interesting is the urbanization of suburbs and edge cities.[167] This means that various suburban communities are beginning to increase their densities as well as relax strict, single-use zoning laws. Most important is a shift in transportation: many suburban areas desire and are developing mass transit. Distant edge cities like Markham and Mississauga, Ontario, are doing much more in terms of urban-style development, mass transit, and bike and pedestrian infrastructure than the city of Toronto. And these edge cities are not doing these things because they are 'embarrassed' by their 'sprawl' or are adhering to some socially progressive ideology or wish to be more 'environmentally sustainable.' Markham mayor Frank Scarpitti, elected on a

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[164] Florida, *The Rise of the Creative Class*, 234.

[165] Richard Florida, *The Great Reset: How New Ways of Living and Working Drive Post-crash Prosperity* (New York: Harper Collins, 2010).

[166] Florida, *The Great Reset*, 5.

[167] Florida, *The Great Reset*, 144.

fiscally conservative 'cut the wasteful spending' platform, is championing environmental initiatives, pedestrian-scaled development, and mass transit. He states that "Markham is a community made up of executives, and any time the GO line has been improved to downtown Toronto, it is filled, you can't get a seat" because it is filled up with highly paid executives.[168] The lesson here is that developing mass transit is not some 'left wing,' socially progressive, environmentally sustainable enterprise but something that attracts highly-paid business executives. However, Toronto's TTC Chair believes otherwise, stating the TTC's core job is "to make sure that people who don't have access to a car have mobility."[169] Meanwhile, Ajax, another suburban edge city outside of Toronto, is recognizing that people want quality places to live (meaning 'diverse' in Jacobs' terms) and is seeking to provide this for entrepreneurs and other professionals.[170]

That suburban edge cities are seeking to urbanize themselves speaks to the rise in popularity of traditional urban centres. Florida cites various polls and demographic statistics to show that "college grads" desire to live in large urban areas like New York City, Boston, Chicago, and San Francisco.[171] Of course, much of this has to do with the availability of employment, but people are increasingly choosing to live in dense, fully urban districts rather than a suburban, residential district and commute by car.

While the increasing costs of owning, operating, and maintaining a personal car is a major reason why younger people are not buying cars as previous generations did, much of this trend has to do with larger social and psychoanalytic factors. A number of studies have shown that a personal automobile is not the status symbol it once was, as it no longer represents

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[168] Edward Keenan, "How the 905 Stole Our Urbanist Mojo," *The Grid*, Jan 5, 2012. Retrieved from: http://www.thegridto.com/city/politics/how-the-905-stole-our-urbanist-mojo/

[169] Quoted in Keenan, "How the 905 Stole Our Urbanist Mojo."

[170] Keenan, "How the 905 Stole Our Urbanist Mojo."

[171] Florida, *The Great Reset*, 147.

freedom and autonomy.[172] Instead, it represents 'boring suburbia,' isolation, and wasted time: people increasingly want to live in places where owning a car is not necessary. People are increasingly choosing to travel by subway, train, bus, bike, and by foot and desire places that accommodate these choices. In Manhattan, for example, 82% of people go to work on public transit, by bicycle, or on foot.[173] New York City is the place where most people use non-car travel, but in Washington, DC, 57% of people commute by means other than a car.[174] Many major American cities have about half of workers eschewing cars when commuting.

What is perhaps the most significant shift Florida outlines is the shift from owning one's residence to renting it. As is well-known, the cornerstone of the American Dream is to own a house with a yard, fence, and a car or two in the driveway. But younger people do not, for the most part, share this dream. Much of this has to do with the financial aspects: the cost of owning a home has gone up tremendously, while at the same time they are no longer the stable investments they once were. But less tangible are the factors of mobility and flexibility. With many young people now working contract positions rather than one or two jobs their entire lives, being able to move from city to city or to a more or less expensive apartment or house within a city is necessary. In fact, many people were burdened by homeownership when the economy collapsed in 2008: they were unable to move somewhere else for employment because they owned a house which they could not sell.[175] Homeownership in America peaked in 2004 at 69.2% and fell to 67.6% in 2009, and it continues to decline.[176] In cities, rental

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[172] Benjamin Davis, Tony Dutzik and Phineas Baxandall, *Transportation and the New Generation: Why Young People Are Driving Less and What It Means for Transportation Policy*, Frontier Group, April 2012. Retrieved from: http://www.uspirg.org/sites/pirg/files/reports/Transportation%20%26%20the%20New%20Generation%20vUS_0.pdf

[173] Florida, *The Great Reset*, 160.

[174] Florida, *The Great Reset*, 160.

[175] Florida, *The Great Reset*, 174.

[176] Florida, *The Great Reset*, 175.

rates are, not surprisingly, much higher: 66% of New Yorkers rent; Chicago and Washington, DC, are both a bit more than 50%.[177]

In *The Great Reset*, Florida devotes a chapter to Toronto, the city he has called home since 2007. He argues that, in contrast to American cities, Toronto's "downtown core is loaded with middle-class families" with a very high level of "diversity," which reflects the city's ability to "attract top talent from around the world."[178] He cites reports that consistently put Toronto near the top of 'most liveable city' rankings and notes that Toronto's murder rate is 1.9 per 100,000 residents, making it "half as deadly" as the safest city in America, Des Moines, Iowa.[179] Toronto, along with the rest of Canada, did not suffer the 'mortgage bubble' that America did because of mortgage lending rules. Thus, between September 2008 and September 2009 Toronto housing prices rose 10%, with a 28% increase in sales.

Florida's observations about Toronto *were* accurate. While nearly all American 'downtowns' saw their populations decrease significantly from post-WWII to the 1990s, many Canadian cities experienced this as well. Toronto, however, did not. Toronto continued to invest in infrastructure, transit, parks, and resisted further expressway developments.[180] Currently, Toronto is experiencing a very large building boom which, I argue, is largely supported by the presence of big banks and the spin-off financial jobs, not the presence of the 'creative class.' Toronto seems to be doing everything it can to keep the 'creative class' out and many new 'tech' start-ups are opting to locate themselves in other Canadian cities. Much of this has to do with the cost of living and housing, which continues to rise because of wealthy people who are *not* part of the creative class: those who work in finance, law, and government. Rather than shift away from

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[177] Florida, *The Great Reset*, 176.

[178] Florida, *The Great Reset*, 88.

[179] Florida, *The Great Reset*, 88.

[180] Sewell, *The Shape of the City*. For a more critical account of how transit development contributed to Toronto's suburban 'sprawl,' see: Lawrence Solomon, *Toronto Sprawls: A History*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007).

automobile-centric planning, Toronto is now removing bike lanes and reducing mass transit. Toronto's current fetish for subways is in fact a desire to make room for cars by putting all mass transit off the roads. While the city is experiencing a 'condo boom' in the core, these are simply profitable ventures for developers, with little in the way of an overall plan, and a wilful blindness to the impending demands on basic infrastructure and mass transit. Rather than investing in public space, Toronto has contracted out the 'street furniture' program to the advertising company Astral Media. Toronto continues to hang onto arcane bylaws that make it difficult or impossible for 'secondary diversity' services (such as bars and restaurants) to open and operate.[181] So, while Toronto continues to rank high on various 'quality of life' indexes, much of its economy comes from the presence of large banks, financial groups, and corporations. I would suggest the people who work in these industries hold more conservative values in terms of housing and transportation. And these values are supported by long-standing residents associations that fear apartment buildings and rooming houses in favour of traditional single family dwellings. The Annex neighbourhood, once a prime location for many authors and eccentrics, is drastically changing. Older houses that were broken up into apartments are being returned to single family dwellings with prices reaching 2 million dollars. This results in a lack of diversity as evidenced by the changing nature of the stores along Bloor. Increasingly, independent businesses are being priced out by corporate chain stores. For example, an independent hair-dresser was overtaken by a David's Tea, an independent record shop, Sonic Boom, was overtaken by a Dollarama,[182] and the independent and much-loved Dooney's Café became a Menchies. This is not necessarily 'upscale displacement,' but rather evidence of building owners increasingly able to find corporate tenants rather than having to rely on more

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[181] An odd example: Toronto outlawed arcades in the 1980s, then introduced a permit system but made it nearly impossible for a permit to be issued. After many meetings and calming the fears of Councillors and City Staff, a small, family-friendly pinball arcade was allowed to open in Parkdale last year.

[182] Sonic Boom moved to a similarly sized location within the Honest Ed's building just south of Bloor on Bathurst.

risky independent business tenants. This is ultimately a testament to a lack of the diversity that Jacobs advocates. Other once-middle class neighbourhoods are also experience such changes. The following chapter will further discuss changing notions of urban life through the theoretical frameworks of Manuel Castells.

This chapter has argued that Jacobs' analysis of cities falls within the analyst's discourse and results in 'the city' coughing up its 'truth': that it is a problem of organized complexity which cannot be understood or 'solved' by ratios or simple calculations. In other words, I argue that Jacobs is correct to insist that declaring a limit of 'too much' or 'too little' urbanism cannot be reconciled by a number, calculation, or ratio. And, that any plans or strategies to do so are only attempts to make this judgment on a limit in advance and avoid this central 'problem' of cities. Through a close reading of her important book, *Death and Life of Great American Cities*, I have countered a number of common misreadings and have argued that this text is not primarily concerned with valourizing human-scaled, walkable urbanism but rather with the economic developments within cities. Though Jacobs' analysis of cities was welcomed by many urbanists and city dwellers, many cities continued to plan and build on 'modernist' principles, or more specifically for suburban homeownership and cars. However, more recently Florida has diagnosed a generational shift in desires, which finds that increasing numbers of people want the diverse urban space that Jacobs insisted was successful.

CHAPTER 5: SPACE-TIMES OF THE MOBILE CITY

This chapter continues from the previous chapter by looking at why cities have become popular again in the last couple decades. Here, though, it is through a discussion of theories of urban space, contemporary economy, and society. The final section of this chapter will consider how electronic communication is affecting and effecting urban space and everyday urban life.

Richard Florida is perhaps the most well-known person to argue for the importance of cities in relation to economy ("prosperity"), and it is somewhat surprising to see that he does not mention the work of Manuel Castells. The amount of research Castells has done and published prior to Florida is astounding.[1] Florida's unwillingness to engage Castells' work is surprising because Castells had already presented similar arguments about changing desires for urban space which are mediated through new forms of work and technology. While the majority of Castells work is devoted to a critical account of global capitalism, within this is a theory of urbanism, which relies on three underlying theories: a theory of space, a theory of time, and a theory of technology.

For the purposes of this chapter, I will not be analyzing his arguments about global economic exploitation. Instead I will begin my analysis of Castells by turning to an underlying argument he makes in the "Conclusion" of *The Castells Reader*.[2] Beyond the simple fact that the number of people living in urban areas is increasing, there are multiple ways in which these people are experiencing and altering these urban environments. Mobile connectivity has dispelled the "myth of futurology" that people will telecommute to work. Instead, people are able to move physically while remaining connected to work and professional networks,

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[1] A full bibliography of his work from 1967 to 2002 can be found in Manuel Castells and Martin Ince, *Conversations with Manuel Castells* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003). A select bibliography of his work on cities and urban regions is found in Manuel Castells, *The Castells Reader on Cities and Social Theory*, ed. Ida Susser (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2002).

[2] Manuel Castells, "Conclusion," in *The Castells Reader*, 390–393.

all the while valuing face-to-face communication. People are not living great distances from their work or professional connections, but are instead living (close to) where they work in urban centres. The implication for cities is that people are not choosing to live in 'electronic cottages' or suburban residential areas and communicate solely by electronic means, but instead they are living where they work, in urban centres, and thus have a stake in these urban centres. So, urban centres are increasingly becoming (or at least attempting to be) more liveable, walkable, and diverse, providing the services and shops these residents need or desire. Crucial here is that people are *living* in these urban centres and not visiting them for work. For the remainder of this section I will seek to unpack these claims and explain the implications and theories which undergird them.

Castells' theories and arguments about the importance of cities is within the tradition shared by Henri Lefebvre. Lefebvre's theories of the social production of space inform and influence Castells' theory of the space of flows and timeless time. Though both Lefebvre and Castells operate within the Marxist tradition of urban theory, Lefebvre is the more radically leftist of the two; that said, both thinkers are concerned with economy.[3] However, Lefebvre sees economy as a much more determining feature of society and politics than does Castells. Moreover, Castells 'updates' the role of economy on cities by looking at contemporary global capitalism.

This dissertation began with a brief account of Lefebvre's theories of space as a social production and the historical process of urbanization. This chapter does repeat some of that introduction but significantly expands on these theories and history for the purpose of contextualizing Castells' work.

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[3] Castells, when pressed, self-identifies as 'neo-anarchist.' However, I do not feel that these ideological labels are necessary to unpack in order to understand Castells' theory of networks, space, time, and technology. For an account just how Marxist Castells' thought is, and in comparison to Lefebvre's, see: Andy Merrifield, *Metromarxism: A Marxist Tale of the City* (New York, Routledge, 2002), 113–132.

The Production of Urban Space

In *The Production of Space*, Lefebvre's main argument appears quite basic: "(social) space is a (social) product."[4] Each society or community creates its own space, a space as distinct as the society or community. For example, ancient Greece produced a space particular to it (i.e. the *polis*), which is different from the urban forms which would come to supersede it. While the specificity of 'social space' is emphasized, Lefebvre often broadens this to space in general. However, Lefebvre's argument is *not* that *all* space is a social production, as he accepts that there is something called 'natural space' – some formal conception of space which is then *altered* by social production.[5] In other words, one will not find a satisfying critique of Kant's philosophy of space and time in Lefebvre's theory. Kant argues that space and time are concepts which we have by "pure intuition": that we must *a priori* conceptions of "figure and extension" in order to determine *particular* spaces and times.[6] Similarly, Lefebvre accepts that there is some *a priori* notion of space, "natural space."[7] That said, there may be something in Lefebvre's work from which we can argue that even Kant's philosophy of this *a priori* time and space (which he calls the 'transcendental aesthetic') is itself a social production (reproduced through its universal acceptance).[8]

Lefebvre presents two corresponding triads for thinking the social production of space. One is composed of "spatial practice," "representations of space," and "representational space." The second triad is, respectively, "perceived space," "conceived space," and "lived space."

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[4] Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, trans. Donald Nicholson Smith (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), 30.

[5] Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 101.

[6] Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, revised 2nd edition, trans. Norman Kemp Smith, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 66.

[7] Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 101.

[8] For a concise, clear, critical and yet fair reading of Kant, see: Gilles Deleuze, *Kant's Critical Philosophy: The Doctrine of the Faculties*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984).

Spatial Practice → Perceived Space
Representations of Space → Conceived Space
Representational Space → Lived Space

Spatial practice "embraces production and reproduction" and the spatial locations of each social formation.[9] It is spatial practice which ensures there is some form of cohesion and continuity for the social group, and for this spatial practice to keep a social group cohesive and give it continuity, the group (individually and collectively) must have some level of "competence" and ability of "performance."[10] It is a society's spatial practice that "secretes that society's space."[11] A society's space is presupposed and propounded by its spatial practice. A society's spatial practice reveals how that society *perceives space*.

Representations of space are "tied to the relations of production" and the "order" these relations impose.[12] Representations of space are concerned with knowledge, signs, and codes. Representations of space are 'beyond' (in Hegelian dialectical terms) perceived space and concern *conceived space.* This is the space for scientists, urban planners, "technocratic subdividers," and some artists with "with a scientific bent" (such as those concerned with ancient Number theory, the Golden Number, etc).[13] This is the conception of space that was verbalized with a series of signs and codes and thus dominates any society.[14]

Representational spaces embody "complex symbolisms, sometimes coded, sometimes not."[15] They link to the "underground side of social life" and to

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[9] Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 33.

[10] Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 33.

[11] Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 38.

[12] Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 33.

[13] Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 38.

[14] Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 39.

[15] Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 33.

art which might come to be understood more as a code of representational space than as a code of space. This is space as it is *directly lived* through its symbols and associations and can be understood as the space of the users, the inhabitants. It is the space of artists, writers, and philosophers who only seek to describe and aspire to do no more than describe.[16] It is the space dominated by the users/inhabitants and thus only "passively experienced." It is representational space that "overlays physical space" and makes symbolic use of its objects. As with representations of space, representational space tends toward (with some exceptions) fairly coherent "systems of non-verbal symbols and signs."[17] "Representational space is alive: it speaks. It has an affective kernel or centre: Ego, bed, bedroom, dwelling, house; or: square, church, graveyard."[18]

These "representational spaces" can be further our understanding of Lacan's arguments about the problem of the desire of the other. As I argued in chapter 2, people invest the city with its own forms of desire, and they attempt to satisfy those desires. We can think of "representational spaces" as contributing to this 'otherness' or 'personification' of the city: that these spaces with "an affective kernel" are the nodes by which we create the network of the city's desire. These are the spaces which help us identify a particular city as having a 'feel' or a 'texture'; these are the spaces we 'care' about or in which we have a personal stake. It is how a patch of land becomes a 'beloved park' that we tend and protect or how an otherwise inconsequential building comes to have 'heritage status' that, again, needs our protection.

Lefebvre suggests the body as an example of these three moments of space. *Spatial practice* presupposes the body as a tool, as the hands, and the senses in which social space is perceived. The *conceived representations* of the body are the body's own knowledge (mixed with ideology) of itself – anatomy, physiology, its health. The *lived experience* of the body is the most complex, as

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[16] Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 39.

[17] Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 39.

[18] Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 42.

society's "'culture' intervenes" so that what appears to 'immediate' perception is inflected by symbolisms, "certain aspects of which are uncovered by psychoanalysis."[19]

In the previous chapter, I mentioned the "three main themes" Jane Jacobs insists we much keep in mind when thinking about cities: "to think about processes"; to seek "unaverage" clues (in other words, look for the exceptions); and to employ induction rather than deduction.[20] That we need to think about processes ties into Lefebvre's spatial practice (perceived space) insofar it concerns production and reproduction as well as continuity to a society.[21] What Jacobs calls "unaverage clues" fit within Lefebvre's representational spaces since they concern the "underground of social life" and the way that urban space is directly lived. That is, the way space is used that can go against urban planners' abstract representation of space.

Finally, just as Jacobs argues in favour of induction over deduction, Lefebvre argues this triad of perceived—conceived—lived (spatial practice—representations of space—representational space) loses its force if it is treated as "an abstract model."[22] That is, we must not use it as a model for deductive reasoning. For Lefebvre, it must grasp the (Hegelian) "concrete" as distinct from mere "immediacy" otherwise it just becomes a mediating ideology.[23] The three 'orders' of the triad are interconnected, though (obviously) they can be signified as separate. There are moments when their interconnectedness is more apparent: one of the examples Lefebvre gives is "the Western town, from the Italian Renaissance to the nineteenth century" in which a common language,

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[19] Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 40.

[20] Jane Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities* (New York: Vintage Books, 1992), 440.

[21] David Harvey, influenced by Lefebvre, argues that community is not a thing, but a process. See: David Harvey. "Contested Cities: Social Process and Spatial Form," in *The City Reader*, 4th edition, ed. Richard T. LeGates and Frederic Stout (New York: Routledge, 2007): 225–232.

[22] Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 40.

[23] Lefebvre's thought is often characterized as being less rigidly Marxist and more inflected with Hegel. For example, see: Merrifield, *Metromarxism*, 72–76.

consensus, and code were shared by the inhabitants.[24] During this period, these towns were dominated by the representation of space and representational space, of religious origin, which were reduced to symbolic figures of Heaven and Hell, the Devil and angles, etc.[25] The dominance of representation of space might have been limited to elites and authorities as the sensibilities of the common people, though perhaps reduced to silence, were still routed in representational space. Essential for the shift from representational to representations of space was the "vanishing point" – parallel lines that stretch to infinity, invoking the primacy of the gaze, and a "logic of visualization."[26] This representation had become enshrined in architecture and urban planning; the "code" of linear perspective dominated the production of space.

Lefebvre tells us that representations of space are "shot through" with a mixture of understanding and ideology which are subject to change in different times and places. While the representations of space are abstract, they are also a practice: they inform political and social practice, the relations between objects and between subjects. While representational spaces require no ordered consistency, representations of space require logic and order and will thus "break up" the subject as he/she cannot conform to this rigidity. Lefebvre suggests that we can understand Frank Lloyd Wright endorsing a communitarian representational space that derives from Biblical or Protestant traditions, whereas Le Corbusier worked towards a technical, scientific representation of space.[27]

Lefebvre contrasts "absolute space" with "abstract space." Absolute space concerns the sites of habitation chosen for their natural features, such as caves, mountains, rivers, and lakes. Since these places were consecrated as 'spaces' they quickly lost their natural characteristics.[28] Often, an architect of some sort

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[24] Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 40.

[25] Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 41.

[26] Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 41.

[27] Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 43.

[28] Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 48.

would pick a site for its natural uniqueness and impose a political or symbolic structure that produced the space for its purpose or meaning. Adhering to his Marxist roots, Lefebvre finds that the abstraction of labour led to “abstract space.”[29] This is the process by which the “historical town of the West,” with the countryside under its control, came to dominate. This arrangement of town and country changed the relationship to production and reproduction that perpetuated social life. In other words, this was a shift that divorced the place of human reproduction from the place of object production. Labour, no longer social or ‘natural’ (self-sustaining, small-scale, etc.), became *abstract*, and with abstract labour comes abstract space.

Though ‘historical’ or ‘absolute’ space never fully disappears, it lost its force and importance to abstract space. Abstract space “functions ‘objectally,’ as a set of things/signs and their formal relationships.”[30] It is formal and quantitative, creating generalizations at the expense of specifics. Abstract space is a “product of violence and war, it is political” insofar as it is imposed by the institution of the state.[31] It appears homogeneous, as a *tabula rasa*, as a clearing of differences that stand in the way. This is the space of “a plane, a bulldozer, or a tank.”[32]

Lefebvre tells us there are three aspects (or what he terms “formants”) to abstract space. One is the ‘geometric,’; often understood as Euclidean, a pure space of reference; it is homogenous and guarantees its social and political unity. It is the means by which space becomes a reduction – from its ‘real’ properties and from three dimensions to two, by way of the lines of perspective (e.g. a plan, map, or “any kind of graphic representation or projection”).[33]

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[29] Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 49.

[30] Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 49.

[31] Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 285.

[32] Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 285.

[33] Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 285.

The second “formant” is the optical or visual, which concerns the “logic of visualization.”[34] Visualization begins to take over other senses (smell, taste, touch, etc.) so that the visual is the part that takes over for the whole. The culmination of this aberration or reduction is the written word. The eye renders the object of its gaze passive. Space loses its social significance and becomes purely visual and results in “a series of substitutions and displacements” usurping the entirety or the whole.

The third is the “phallic formant” which ‘makes up’ for the remainder lost in the pure visuality of space. It is the response to the demand for a “truly full object – an objectal ‘absolute.’”[35] It symbolizes force and “male violence” and this brutality does not remain simply abstract, but is materialized in the brutality of political and bureaucratic power. Moreover, “phallic erectility bestows a special status on the perpendicular … as the orientation of space.”[36]

Abstract space seeks homogeneity yet is not itself homogenous. Homogeneity is its end, it lens, its goal, but only rendered homogenous through itself being “multiform” (its “geometric and visual formants”).[37] The outcome of abstract space is “the reduction of the ‘real’ … to a ‘plan’ existing in a void and endowed with no other qualities” while at the same time reducing to “the flatness of a mirror, of an image, of pure spectacle under an absolutely cold gaze.”[38] The phallic function of abstract space works to ensure that “‘something’ occupies this space, namely a signifier” which signifies not the void it is but plenitude and the illusion of the space burdened with myth.[39] Lefebvre tells us that the “use value”

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[34] Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 286.

[35] Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 287.

[36] Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 287.

[37] Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 287.

[38] Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 287.

[39] Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 287.

of abstract space is "political" insofar as it assumes the role of a subject with aims and actions – thus "political" being "power as such and the state as such."[40]

Since Lefebvre invokes the concept of the 'gaze,' it is worth bringing Lacan into this discussion. For Lacan (and for Lefebvre), the eye and the gaze are split: the gaze refers to the object of the scopic drive.[41] Further, the 'primary' gaze is that of the subject "seeing itself seeing itself" so that the subject "tries to adapt himself" to the power of the gaze.[42] Since the gaze is "not a seen gaze, but a gaze imagined by me in the field of the Other," we can get a sense of the power of the 'cold gaze' of Lefebvre's abstract space; it is cruel and attempts to adapt oneself to it are dehumanizing. Further, since the gaze is also understood as *objet a*, the attempts to satisfy its desire is doomed to failure: the gaze does not know what it wants – if it really wants anything at all – and, if it does, the subject can and will be eluded by the shifting 'location' of *objet petit a*.

From the historical shift that moved labour outside the domestic realm and into factories, Lefebvre locates the beginning of "abstract space."[43] Spatial practice, in opposition to abstract space, defines the places of the local in relation to the global and the representation of that relationship; it defines the spaces of the everyday by opposition to "spaces made special" through symbolization that makes them desirable, benevolent and/ or sanctioned or forbidden. Spatial practice concerns "the places of a *purely political* or social kind."[44] It would seem that spatial practice is political because it counters the "violence intrinsic to abstraction."[45] By "violence," Lefebvre is referring to an apparent "absence" in abstraction (as opposed to the concrete thing immediately present), which imposes a particular order onto nature.

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[40] Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 287.

[41] Jacques Lacan, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan*, Book XI, *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: W.W. Norton, 1998), 73.

[42] Lacan, *The Four Fundamental Concepts*, 82–83.

[43] Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 49.

[44] Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 288–289.

[45] Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 289.

Lefebvre's *Urban Revolution*

Lefebvre's *Urban Revolution* precedes *The Production of Space* and places a stronger emphasis on urbanism. Thus, Lefebvre's theory of urban space is best articulated in *The Urban Revolution*,[46] in which he declares that society has been completely urbanized. Consistent with his theory of the history of the city,[47] Lefebvre insists that the modern form of the urban is not the same as pre-industrial or industrial cities because of the social relationships of production. Lefebvre identifies the modern form of the urban and the "urban field" as comprising not just the built world of cities, but all manifestations of the dominance of the city over the country. A country home, for example, is part of the city; it is there because of the city.[48]

Lefebvre introduces a "space-time axis" as a graphical representation of the dialectics he seeks to work through. The axis runs from the total absence of urbanization ("pure nature" or bare "earth") to total urbanization.[49] The commonly known historical shift from nomadism to agriculturalism is, for Lefebvre, merely "a gathering" of people. Authoritarian pressure from urban centres began the development of the modern state and its administrators, establishing the "political city," which he locates as the beginnings of urbanization.[50]

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[46] Lefebvre, *Urban Revolution*, trans. Robert Bononno (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003).

[47] See Lefebvre, "The City in History" in *Writings on Cities*, trans. and ed. Eleonore Kofman and Elizabeth Lebas (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996).

[48] For an account of how the rural fits within Lefebvre's theory, see: Stuart Elden, "From the Rural to the Urban," in *Understanding Henri Lefebvre* (London: Continuum, 2004): 127–168.

[49] Lefebvre, *Urban Revolution*, 7.

[50] It may be worth noting here that, just as Lefebvre does not accept the "mere gathering" of people as constituting a politics, Rancière does not accept that politics is a necessity that comes from the gathering of people. Both locate the political in an order of ruling and being ruled.



Fig. 11. Lefebvre's space-time axis *Lefebvre's space-time axis*. (Diagram from Henri Lefebvre, *Urban Revolution*, trans. Robert Bononno (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003), 15.

For Lefebvre, the "political city" was an order of ruling and being ruled. It was populated by priests, princes, nobles, and administrators, and its function is to administer, protect, and exploit a territory. The outskirts of the political city is the place of economy, though eventually the market found its place in the centre of the city, supplanting the "forum" or "agora" as the "place of assembly."[51] Churches and town halls grouped themselves around the market and a new urban form appeared, succeeding the "political city" into what Lefebvre terms the "merchant city."

Lefebvre suggests that industrialization is responsible for "the urban" and replaces "the city." The "urban reality" loses the previous period's sense of "organic totality, belonging."[52] The "urban" (not the 'city') is "stipulative, repressive, marked by signals, summary codes for circulation (routes), and signage."[53] This shift from the "merchant city to the industrial urban space marks what Lefebvre calls a "process of implosion-explosion."[54] The "implosion" refers

[51] Lefebvre, *Urban Revolution*, 10.

[52] Lefebvre, *Urban Revolution*, 14.

[53] Lefebvre, *Urban Revolution*, 14.

[54] Lefebvre, *Urban Revolution*, 14.

to excessive concentration of people, activity, wealth, goods, and thought while "explosion" refers to an outward projection towards the peripheries of suburbs, vacation destinations, and satellite towns (14). This implosion-explosion marks the beginning of the "critical zone," which is the main focus of *Urban Revolution*.

The "critical phase" occurs as the urban encompasses all of society and there the "blind field … appears" as a result of a particular "fetishizing" of nature. While nature is determined as prior to thought and human action, the city appears as a "second nature of stone and metal built on an initial, fundamental nature made of earth air wind fire."[55] The various attempts to reunite the spontaneous and the artificial, nature and culture, are exemplified by parks in the urban, the "between" places of urban and rural that comprise a "visual elsewhere" (utopia) as an essential reference point for urban reality to be reality.[56] These are the "blank" or "dark" spaces which Lefebvre terms the "blind field." The "blind field" is theorized as a blind spot, or as the centre of the eye that does not see or know it is blind.[57] We try to see the urban as a reality unto itself but with concepts of another field (industrial, rural); "Our eyes were shaped in villages" and "factories" so that we cannot "see" the urban.[58]

This "blind field" is much like the Lacanian concept of the stain of the Real. As with the concept of the 'gaze' outlined above, this blind field is a visual order caught up in the other's desire. In the distinction between the eye and the gaze, Lacan invokes the notion of the 'stain': "a given-to-be-seen."[59] This 'stain' of the gaze is what "governs the gaze most secretly" and what escapes the conscious form of vision.[60] Lacan also theorizes his concept of the Real as a stain. As Žižek writes, "the Real is anamorphic stain" which appears in reality, not as part of

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[55] Lefebvre, *Urban Revolution*, 25.

[56] Lefebvre, *Urban Revolution*, 26.

[57] Lefebvre, *Urban Revolution*, 29.

[58] Lefebvre, *Urban Revolution*, 29.

[59] Lacan, *The Four Fundamental Concepts*, 74.

[60] Lacan, *The Four Fundamental Concepts*, 74.

reality, but as a rem(a)inder of the precariousness of the structure of the Symbolic order.[61] Thus, following Lefebvre's arguments, we 'see' the urban as a symbolic whole, but this is only constituted by the 'eyes' of another paradigm and this precariousness is continually under threat of irruption.

Lefebvre argues that the urban needs to be understood as "the freedom to produce differences (to differ and invent that which differs)."[62] There is nothing "harmonious about the urban form and reality": it "incorporates conflict" and "presents itself as a place of conflict and confrontation."[63] The urban can thus be defined "as a place where conflicts are expressed."[64] Thus, depending on the content of the "conflicts expressed" in the urban, and if it concerns the recognition of an as yet 'speaking being,' this may be a Rancièrian political space.

Urbanism cannot be conceived without "self-management," which "implies the withering away of the state and the end of politics as such."[65] Though Lefebvre argues that politics and the state can only "retard" the development of the urban, the book ends with the statement, "the space it [the urban] creates is political."[66] So, for Lefebvre, 'politics' and the 'political' are two different terms. Jacques Rancière can be employed here to reconcile these two different uses of "politics" coming to an end through the urban and "political space" that the urban creates.[67] As outlined in chapter 1, Rancière argues that much of what we normally understand as politics is in fact the 'police order.' The latter concerns

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[61] Slavoj Žižek, *For They Know Not What They Do: Enjoyment As a Political Factor* (London: Verso, 2008), lxxxix.

[62] Lefebvre, *Urban Revolution*, 174.

[63] Lefebvre, *Urban Revolution*, 175.

[64] Lefebvre, *Urban Revolution*, 175.

[65] Lefebvre, *Urban Revolution*, 180. For a discussion, not of 'politics' as such, but how Lefebvre's theory takes up the role of territory and the state (which then 'naturalizes' its territory), see: Neil Brenner and Stuart Elden, "Henri Lefebvre on State, Space, Territory," *International Political Sociology* vol. 3 (2009): 353–377.

[66] Lefebvre, *Urban Revolution*, 180.

[67] Jacques Rancière, *Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998).

power and the arrangement of things (a 'distribution of the sensible') whereas politics is whatever ruptures that police order. Thus, if the urban rejects "state politics," which is part of Rancière's 'police order,' then the "political space" the urban creates *could* be taken as the Rancièrian political space since it appears to rupture the police order of the state.

Castells' Theory of Urbanism

Castells' theory agrees with much of Lefebvre's, and his history of urban sociology expands on what Lefebvre calls the 'critical phase.' Castells argues that, though a founding field of sociology, urban sociology has gone through only a couple phases and is now largely ignored. The Chicago School of the 1920s and 1930s that included Robert Park, Louis Wirth, and others was "ideologically biased" with a notion of a unified urban culture that would "characterize city dwellers regardless of their class, gender, or ethnicity."[68] Their main concern was *integration*: how to integrate these diverse members of society into one collective group. The 1960s and 1970s saw this integration approach sharply decline in favour of analyses based on *conflict*. Lefebvre and others posed questions about who had the 'right to the city,'[69] by highlighting the problems with industrial capitalism and gender and ethic inequality. These concerns made the concern for social integration seem quaint if not blatantly ideological. In this milieu, cities became defined by points of contradiction between "capital accumulation and social redistribution, between state control and people's autonomy."[70]

The third phase of urban sociology Castells describes as "a deep silence."[71] In spite of the pursuit of various academic careers and the publication

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[68] Manuel Castells, "Conclusion" in *The Castells Reader on Cities and Social Theory*, ed. Ida Susser (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2002), 391.

[69] See: Lefebvre, "The Right to the City" in *Writings on Cities*; David Harvey, "The Right to the City," *New Left Review* 53 (Sept–Oct 2008): 23–40.

[70] Castells, "Conclusion," 392–393.

[71] Castells, "Conclusion," 393.

of scholarly books and articles, urban sociology was only restating and redefining the issues of the first two phases of urban sociology: integration and conflict. There is a clear link between this 'deep silence' and the 'blind field' that Lefebvre outlines as part of the 'critical phase,' partly in that the urban became so pervasive that it could not be seen or, closer to Lefebvre's theory, sociologists of the 'deep silence' period had their 'eyes shaped' by previous, less-applicable theories and not 'see' the changes to urban life. And, again, we see the applicability of Lacan's theory of the gaze: the urban as the primary site of sociology is so central that it was hardly seen.

In any case, Castells argues that a new phase of urban sociology is now upon us, a phase he terms the Information Age, which is based on new understandings and experiences of space and time which are not determined but *expressed* by technology.

Networks

Before giving a detailed account of Castells' theory of space and time, it is necessary to explain his main concepts of the 'network society' and the 'informational society.' Castells favours the term 'informational society' over 'information society' because it emphasizes the centrality of the role of information in our society. Information, "the communication of knowledge," has been a critical aspect of every society, but contemporary society is centrally organized around information, just as 'industrial society' was organized around the industrial means of production.[72]

Castells defines 'network' as a set of interconnected nodes in which a node is "the point at which a curve intersects itself."[73] A node is dependent on the network of which it is a part: a stock exchange, governmental organizations,

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[72] Manuel Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*, 2nd edition (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 21.

[73] Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*, 501.

street gangs, money launderers, television systems, mobile devices, etc. Important is the "architecture of relationships between networks" which determine the inclusion or exclusion of nodes and networks and the dominant processes and functions in society.[74] Echoing Marshall McLuhan, Castells argues that the "power of flows takes precedence over the flows of power": that the way in which power moves is more important than any power that moves.[75] Similarly, more important for social domination or change than the substance of the network is the presence or absence in the network itself.

While these networks are comprised of information flows, Castells has argued that we ought to abandon the term "Information Society" as it is too vague.[76] Instead, we need to consider that informational and communication technologies are more important to contemporary society than previous technologies were in earlier societies: more important than the technologies of the Industrial Revolution. The "shift from computer-centred technologies to network-diffused technologies" along with the rise of nanotechnologies and a "biology revolution" coupled with the circularity of communication and exchange of knowledge and information: all of these changes mean information processing is at the source of basic life and social action so that our "eco-social system is thereby transformed."[77] Throughout his work, Castells gives detailed examples and arguments about the changing networked nature of global economies, structures of work, entertainment, education, gendered roles, governance, culture, art – just about everything in the realm of society. However, I will focus on his theories 'space of flows' and 'timeless time.'

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[74] Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*, 501.

[75] Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*, 500.

[76] Manuel Castells, "Materials For an Exploratory Theory of the Network Society," *British Journal of Sociology* 50, no. 1 (Jan/March 2000): 10.

[77] Castells, "Materials For an Exploratory Theory of the Network Society," 10.

Space of Flows

In an article published in 2000, Castells defines his concept: "the space of flows refers to the technological and organizational possibility of organizing the simultaneity of social practices without geographical contiguity."[78] Castells' first published use of this concept is in *The Informational City* published in 1989.[79] Here, Castells begins to formulate this concept in relation to his larger thesis of the 'mode of development' which he contrasts with and relates to Marx's 'mode of production.' The 'mode of development' refers to the "technological arrangements through which labour acts upon matter to generate the product, ultimately determining the level of surplus."[80] 'Technology' is understood by Castells to be "the use of scientific knowledge to specify ways of doing things in a reproducible manner."[81] In *The Informational City*, Castells defines the space of flows as something emerging in this new, informational mode of development which "dominates the historically constructed space of places."[82] That is, dominant organizations have begun to detach themselves from the "social constraints of cultural identities and local societies" through communicative technologies.[83] We can also understand the space of flows as Lefebvre's 'total urbanization.'

While 'space of flows' is used in *The Informational City* as a way to explain emerging patterns in global capitalism and labour, we see an early version of the argument I began with: technological determinists are wrong to forecast the demise of cities because of the rise of communicative technologies.[84] Castells is outlining a dialectical relationship between the space of flows in which dominant

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[78] Castells, "Materials For an Exploratory Theory of the Network Society," 14.

[79] Manuel Castells, *The Informational City: Information Technology, Economic Restructuring, and the Urban-Regional Process* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989).

[80] Castells, *The Informational City*, 10

[81] Castells, *The Informational City*, 10. Castells is citing Daniel Bell, who cites Harvey Brooks. Daniel Bell, *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society* (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 29.

[82] Castells, *The Informational City*, 6

[83] Castells, *The Informational City*, 6.

[84] Castells, *The Informational City*, 126.

organizations are detaching themselves from localities (decentralizing) and new centralizing forms of informational and technological industries. The mountain of empirical data Castells presents concludes that “There is no direct effect of communication technologies on the location of offices and services.”[85] Instead, corporate and industry offices and producer services are increasingly concentrated in “nodal large metropolitan areas” and “central business districts.”[86] However, many secondary offices and some head offices, finding the real estate too expensive in urban areas, are locating in suburban areas. As well, consumer, public, and social services are following the suburbanization of the middle class.[87] The conclusion Castells draws is that centralization or decentralization depends on the specific industry, corporation, or service. Based on a series of studies, Castells finds that “information-intensive industries are disproportionately concentrated in metropolitan areas.”[88] The reason for this, Castells argues, is because of the infrastructure needed to support these ‘information-intensive’ industries. Large metropolitan regions are where telecommunications companies are able to install new communication infrastructure. Thus, we see the rise of the ‘wired city’ rather than the ‘electronic home’ of telecommuters.[89] Quoting Mitchell Moss: “Although new communications technologies permit geographical dispersal, the economics of the new infrastructure are oriented towards those urban regions that are major information centres.”[90] While this reason for the concentration of ‘information-intensive’ industries and corporations was likely true at the time, this needed infrastructure is now spread geographically wide. However, even though this reason is no longer valid, cities remain and have not withered away.

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[85] Castells, *The Informational City*, 142.

[86] Castells, *The Informational City*, 143.

[87] Castells, *The Informational City*, 143.

[88] Castells, *The Informational City*, 146.

[89] Castells, *The Informational City*, 149.

[90] Castells, *The Informational City*, 149. Mitchell Moss, “Telecommunications and the Future of Cities,” in *Land Development Studies*, 3 (1986): 33–44.

Castells second reason for the continuance of cities and urban areas in spite of communicative technologies does a better job standing the test of time: the "importance of trusted person-to-person contacts."[91] This argument remains throughout Castells' work, and I will return to it below in my discussion of mobile communicative technologies.[92]

Castells returned to this concept of the 'space of flows' in the first of his major, three-volume work. In *The Rise of the Network Society*, published in 1996 and updated in 2000, Castells sought to give a more theoretically informed explanation of this concept along with his theory of time. Here he argues that "space organizes time in the network society."[93] This, of course, is opposed to classical social theory that assumes space is dominated by time. Here, Castells repeats the points outlined above from *The Informational City*: that communication technology has not dispersed offices out of urban areas and that telecommunications infrastructure was one of the reasons for keeping corporate locations within urban centres. Further, evidence since *The Informational City* finds that only between one and two per cent of workers worked online from home. And, importantly, though some groups of professionals are increasingly working part-time from home, this shift is not determined by the technology, but rather "out of the rise of the network enterprise and of the flexible work process."[94]

Though Castells claims that he understands the space of flows in a dialectic with the space of places, his ultimate argument is, as I show below, that the space of flows has dominated the space of places. Space, for Castells, "is the expression of society";[95] it "does not reflect society, it expresses it";[96] it is not a

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[91] Castells, *The Informational City*, 150–151.

[92] In *The Rise of the Network Society*, page 416, Castells suggests that business people need to meet privately face-to-face because many business arrangements are "marginally illegal."

[93] Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*, 407.

[94] Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*, 408.

[95] Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*, 440.

[96] Castells, "Conclusion," 393.

"photocopy of society, it is society."[97] Since society is undergoing a "structural transformation" (towards the networked, informational society), "new spatial forms and processes are currently emerging" under a new "logic."[98] Since space cannot be defined outside of social practices, and social actors do things with previously established (urban) infrastructure, space is "crystallized time."[99] Castells borrows heavily from David Harvey's materialist conception of space: that it cannot be understood independently from social action.[100]

At the most general level, space is the "material support of time-sharing social practices" that always-already bears a "symbolic meaning."[101] Since Castells argues that contemporary society is constructed around flows (of capital, information, technology, images, sounds, symbols, etc.), and these flows are the processes dominating our economic, political, and symbolic life, then the space of flows is the dominant spatial form. And by 'flows,' Castells means the "purposeful, repetitive, programmable sequences of exchange and interaction between physically disjointed positions held by social actors."[102]

Castells argues that there are "three layers of material supports that, together, constitute the space of flows."[103] The first is the "material support" of these flows which are "constituted by a circuit of electronic exchanges": telecommunications, computer processing, etc.[104] Taken together, these are the "spatial form" of the network society so that no place exists in isolation but rather in positions related to the exchange of flows within the network.[105] While the logic of spatial arrangement changes within the space of flows, places do not vanish

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[97] Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*, 441.

[98] Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*, 440.

[99] Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*, 441.

[100] See: David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), 204.

[101] Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*, 441.

[102] Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*, 442.

[103] Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*, 442.

[104] Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*, 442.

[105] Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*, 442.

but are rather articulated and understood in relation to the network. This is much like how railroads defined economic regions in industrial society, or how the rules of citizenship defined early spatially bound cities in mercantilism and early capitalism.

The second layer of the space of flows is "constituted by its nodes and hubs."[106] Again, the space of flows is not placeless but the logic of the network largely determines its arrangement. Various places come to have specific functions within the network, based on "social, cultural, [and] physical" characteristics.[107] Nodes within the network are those places which are "the location of strategically important functions" that develop a host of "locality-based activities and organizations around a key function in the network."[108] Nodes have a hierarchy and an example of an important node in the network is Castells definition of the "global city," which is not a title of distinction that cities bestow upon themselves but rather a specific node that plays a large role in global capitalism. Thus, New York City or London, with their stock exchanges and offices of global businesses, are obviously global cities. However, depending on the function within specific networks, various locales can become privileged nodes. For example, Cannes, France, has become a node in global film industry, and Chapare or Alto Beni in the global cocaine industry. An essential element to keep in mind is that these places are only important in relation to the larger, global networks and their own local developments are dependent on the global networks. However, Castells clearly states that these nodes' hierarchies are not based solely on the flow of capital, but on "wealth generation, information processing, and power making."[109]

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[106] Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*, 443.

[107] Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*, 443.

[108] Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*, 443.

[109] Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*, 445.

The third layer of the space of flows is the "spatial organization of the dominant, managerial elites (rather than classes)."[110] That is, these elites play a dominant role in the spatial organization their locales (cities). While the space of flows is largely structural it is not solely determined by this structure. It is reproduced by the actions, conceptions, decisions of social actors. As a kind of shorthand, Castells writes that "elites are cosmopolitan, people are local," meaning that though elites are a minority their interests dominate the majority of people living in locales.[111] Elites establish themselves in spaces and cultural networks apart from their local society (gated communities, private clubs, etc.) and enact decisions that have global consequences. One can identify these elite spaces by their uniformity (they look the same regardless of local culture): hotels, golf clubs, exclusive restaurants, airports, VIP lounges, etc. These are designed to maintain a social distance between society at large and the elite spaces of flows.

One effect of this space of flows for the managerial elite is the uniformity of architecture, interior design, and lifestyle, from the beige walls of hotels and offices to the "mandatory diet of grilled salmon and green salad" along with regular jogging.[112] Architecture *of* the spaces of flows seeks an escape from local history and culture and instead becomes homogenous in reference to a "new *imaginary*, wonderland world of unlimited possibilities."[113] Castells terms this the "architecture of nudity": forms so neutral that they pretend to say nothing; a message of silence.[114]

Though Castells insists on a dialectic between the space of flows and the space of places, they do come across in his work as opposites. Pointing out the obvious, that the vast majority of people live in places, he then assumes that they

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[110] Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*, 445.

[111] Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*, 446.

[112] Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*, 447.

[113] Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*, 448. Emphasis original.

[114] Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*, 450.

"perceive their space as place-based."[115] He defines 'place' as "a locale whose form, function, and meaning are self-contained with the boundaries of physical contiguity."[116] Unfortunately, Castells does not give much more detail, and instead turns to a rather long description of the Parisian *quartier* of Belleville, where he lived when he was younger and returned to many times. Nonetheless, Castells point is that Belleville is a clearly identifiable place with a host of physical features that distinguish it.

Spaces of places are not synonymous with 'communities' and not all are "socially interactive and spatially rich," just that they are distinctive, different, recognizable, and unrepeated.[117] Oddly missing from Castells' theory of the space of places are the (sub)urban forms that lack this distinctive character, such as residential developments that are nearly identical in, say, Toronto, Calgary, or Edmonton. One can be at the intersection of two arterial roads in suburban Edmonton and easily mistake it for suburban Toronto. Earlier residential districts, even urban forms built *pre*-WWII, can be near identical in different cities and different areas within the same municipal boundary. However, perhaps we can use Castells' 'space of flows' to understand why urban developments have increasingly become similar, whether it is suburban road networks and housing, retail areas (malls and 'power centres'), or density-intensifying condominium buildings. Since "function and power in our societies are organized in the space of flows, the structural domination of its logic essentially alters the meaning and dynamic of places."[118] This dominating space of flows is a networked "ahistorical space" that imposes "its logic over scattered, segmented places."[119] The suburban sameness is of the 'architecture of nudity': ahistorical, with no reference to local culture.

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[115] Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*, 453.

[116] Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*, 454.

[117] Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*, 456–457.

[118] Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*, 458.

[119] Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*, 459.

Timeless Time

Since Castells understands the implications of the space of flows as an ahistorical, abstract space, it is not surprising that time is closely linked to this concept. Castells' philosophy of time is largely influenced by Leibniz, who understands time as the "succession of 'things' so that without 'things' there would be no time."[120] While Castells appears familiar with various sociological theories of time, he relies mainly on Harold Innis' argument that "the fashionable mind is the time-denying mind."[121] Castells offers a history of various conceptions of time, but points to the predominance of the critical factor of industrial capitalism: clock time.[122] However, this "linear, irreversible, measurable, predictable time is being shattered in the network society."[123] This is not a return to earlier cyclical, rhythmic notions of time, nor a relativization of time based on local customs. Rather, it is a "mixing of tenses to create a forever universe."[124] This "timeless time" mainly refers to two things: the acceleration of "just about everything" and the disappearance of sequence.[125]

In terms of acceleration and the compression of time, Castells cites David Harvey's notion of post-modern time: "time-space compression," which accounts for near-instant global financial transactions,[126] new forms of production, and labour ('just-in-time' production),[127] and the resulting obsession with 'managing time.' To explain the disappearance of the 'proper' sequencing of time, Castells relies heavily on our "biological clocks" as the benchmark.[128] He argues that

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[120] Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*, 494.

[121] Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*, 460.

[122] Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*, 463. See E.P. Thompson, "Time, Work-discipline, and Industrial Capitalism," *Past and Present*, 36 (1967): 57–97.

[123] Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*, 463.

[124] Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*, 464.

[125] Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*, 464.

[126] Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*, 465. See: Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity*, 284–285.

[127] Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*, 467.

[128] Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*, 475.

these biological rhythms (of the individual, species, or cosmic) are "essential to human life" and we "ignore them at [our] peril."[129] Thus, Castells understands nature in the traditional 'perfect balance' ideology and advances in industrial production, medicine, and the imposition of reason over fate are altering the life-cycle. The network society is "undermining this orderly life-cycle … by breaking down the rhythms, either biological or social, associated with the notion of a life-cycle."[130] Strangely, Castells' main concern is with the ability to control human reproduction and human longevity, thus the loss of the 'natural life-cycle,' and his concerns border on social conservatism. But, since Castells does not pursue this much further, and does not argue anything offensive, let us turn instead to the "culture of real virtuality" and changing notions of time.[131]

This 'real virtuality' shares the features of timeless time explained above: "simultaneity and timelessness": near-instant worldwide communication, such as journalistic reporting, to 'witness' history along with more personal communication across vast distances.[132] More interesting is the blurring of tenses or the "mixing of times" such that what would be considered a beginning, middle, or end is lost. What Castells calls "non-sequential time" can be understood as the loss of narrative. Information is now organized based on "the impulses of the consumer" so that culture becomes eternal and ephemeral: eternal since it draws on all historical cultural expressions and ephemeral as each arrangement or organization is based on a specific context and purpose.[133]

While his contention similar to Harvey's "'postmodern condition' induced by space-time compression," Castells does *not* agree with Harvey's insistence on

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[129] Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*, 475. Though not referenced or mentioned by Castells, he appears to be borrowing heavily from the section "The Rhythm or Symmetry of the Contents of Life" of Simmel's *Philosophy of Money*. See: Georg Simmel, *The Philosophy of Money*, 3rd Edition, ed. David Frisby, trans. Tom Bottomore and David Frisby (London: Routledge, 2005), 491–494.

[130] Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*, 476.

[131] Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*, 491.

[132] Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*, 491.

[133] Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*, 492.

capitalism being the sole cause because “culture does not simply reproduce in all its manifestations the logic of the economic system.”[134] This “eternal/ephemeral” time fits within contemporary capitalism but adds new layers: the “ideological and technical freedom to scan the planet and the whole history of humankind.”[135]

Thus, ‘timeless time’ belongs to the ‘space of flows,’ whereas disciplined time and biological time belong to the ‘space of places’: “space shapes time in our society, thus reversing a historical trend: flows induce timeless time, places are time-bounded.”[136] Castells argues that our age is one in which space is enacting some kind of “historical revenge” in that space is “structuring temporality” in different and contradictory logics.[137] The space of flows is dissolving time by disordering the sequence of events, suggesting instead a simultaneity between and among them. The resistance to this timeless time is what Castells terms “glacial time.”[138] Glacial time suggests the proper sequencing of events based on history along with the slowing down of this sequencing.

Space, Time, and Cities

In the preface to the 2010 edition of *The Rise of the Network Society*, Castells tries to clarify his theories of space and time. Rather than backing down from his argument about the essential nature of space regarding society, he states that space is not a tangible reality but a “concept constructed on the basis of experience.”[139] Thus, echoing Lefebvre, space is a social form and a social

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[134] Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*, 493.

[135] Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*, 493.

[136] Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*, 495.

[137] Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*, 495.

[138] Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*, 498. Castells borrows this term from Scott Lash and John Urry, *Economies of Signs and Space* (London and Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1994).

[139] Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*, xxxi.

practice and “defines the time frame of social practices.”[140] While cities are located where they are because of relations of communication, exchange, and economy, cities are now “characterized by the formation of a new spatial architecture made up of global networks connecting major metropolitan regions and their areas of influence.”[141] This means that cities can no longer be understood simply by their urbanized centres and suburbanized fringes because these “metropolitan regions” have a multitude of centres, each different in size and function. Each metropolitan region has a multicentred, hierarchical structure, with decentralized activities, residences, and services and a diversity of land uses. It is a “nameless” territory that extends “wherever its networks go.”[142]

Castells argues that “suburban sprawl” is no longer a predominant urban form.[143] Instead we are seeing these multifunctional, decentralized metropolitan regions and Castells gives a series of reasons for this transformation of cities. The main one, of course, is the “networked connection between the local and the global.”[144] However, Castells insists on the hierarchy in which certain locales are more important because of their relative value to the networks: certain regions become important nodes. Within this global architecture of networks, these important nodes are the places that “attract wealth, power, culture, innovation, and people.”[145] Most important for a place to be an important node is their physical and electronic connectivity: transit and telecommunication networks. While these are the crucial features to attract “highly skilled personnel,” there also needs to be a host of services (hotels, entertainment, etc.) that require service workers.[146] This is precisely the premise of Richard Florida’s work: the

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[140] Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*, xxxi.

[141] Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*, xxxii.

[142] Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*, xxxiii.

[143] Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*, xxxiv.

[144] Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*, xxxv.

[145] Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*, xxxv.

[146] Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*, xxxvi.

need to attract “talent” who will earn relatively high wages along with service workers who will earn relatively low wages.[147]

Unchanged in this updated “Preface” are Castells’ reasons for why cities have not disappeared in spite of the fairly easy possibility for telecommuting: the need for face-to-face meetings and the required communication infrastructure. However, as this “Preface” was written in 2010, Castells recognizes that while the communication infrastructure was once a cause for these important nodes, it is no longer as important as it was. This infrastructure (Internet access, cellular coverage) is available well beyond large metropolitan regions. Instead, “the value-making locales offer greater opportunities and services, and this offer attracts talented and innovative professionals.”[148] (Had Castells written ‘creative professionals,’ we would be forgiven for thinking this remark was made by Richard Florida.) Because these places attract wealthy professionals, there develops a “thriving market” with better cultural, educational, and health amenities. All of this requires workers so these areas become “the hubs for immigration.”[149] And here we ought to remember Florida’s argument that people in the technology and creative class like multi-ethnic urban areas since these areas are usually more open new and different ideas and people.[150]

Unfortunately, Castells does not tie these ‘metropolitan regions’ with his theory of the ‘space of places.’ Earlier in the preface he defines “the space of places the space of contiguity,” and later argues that “there is an increasing

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[147] It should be noted that areas that contain Florida’s ‘creative class’ have high numbers of service workers who earn more than they would in a non-creative class area. In other words, those working at, say, a hotel in an area with a significant amount of creative/tech jobs earn more than they would at a hotel in an area with few creative/tech jobs. See Richard Florida, “The Inequality of American Cities,” *The Atlantic Cities*, March 5, 2012. Retrieved from: http://www.theatlanticcities.com/jobs-and-economy/2012/03/inequality-american-cities/861/

[148] Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*, xxxvii.

[149] Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*, xxxvii.

[150] It is worth recalling the relationships I established between desire, enjoyment, and urban spaces articulated in chapter 2. A larger or separate project could take up Lacan’s concepts of enjoyment and desire to theorize the psychoanalytic motives for this new-found interest in urban spaces that Florida’s and Castells’ research finds.

contradiction between the space of flows and the space of places."[151] I understand this as meaning that, while these new metropolitan regions are developing through networks and the space of flows, these spaces still have a foot in the space of places. That is, while people participate globally through work and culture, there has developed a renewed insistence on quality of their local 'space of place.'

This insight can be paired with Castells' theory of time: while people participate globally in the space of flows, within 'timeless time,' they are *not*, despite Castells' pleas, countering this with anything approaching 'glacial time.' While there might be a few examples of people wishing to 'reconnect' to biological, slower time (yoga, urban gardening, fighting light pollution at night, etc.), people's everyday lives, which are immersed in their locales, are wilfully embracing (but are not 'dominated by') the space of flows. A clear example: travel arrangements to and from work that are interspersed by other errands and arrangements. While Castells paints this as the "frantic race of everyday life,"[152] I would argue this reflects an entirely new way of experiencing everyday life and, just because everyday life is 'quicker,' more compressed, and out of sequence does not mean it is a bad thing. People are no longer required to make arrangements ahead of time but can communicate with others to, for example, decide what to buy at the supermarket, who will pick children up, what entertainment will be enjoyed in the evening, etc. All these seemingly banal errands and outings are decided 'on the fly' because of mobile communication technologies.

I will discuss the implications (most of which I argue are positive) of this mobile connectivity below, but I should be clear that I largely disagree with

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[151] Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*, xxxi.

[152] Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*, xli.

Castells.[153] He assumes that timeless time is a dominating force that is destroying 'proper' biological, sequenced time. Moreover, he sees properly sequenced time as a "counterpower" to this timeless time, and continues to see "glacial time" as a form of resistance.[154] Castells becomes near religious in his nostalgia for slower paced, sequential time: "It is sequential time … that seems to us eternal. And in fact it is, because we can only follow the planetary sequence when we rejoin nature in eternity."[155] So, far from favouring the space of flows, networks, or timeless time, Castells becomes increasingly conservative, using these concepts and theories to warn our society that we are getting ahead of ourselves and need to return to slower, sequential time.

While I am strongly critical of Castells nostalgia and moral hand-wringing,[156] I nonetheless find he has much to offer regarding contemporary mobile communication technologies. I argue that the recent developments of this technology are much more profound than normally understood: it is radically reshaping both the spatial makeup of urban spaces and our experiences and behaviours in urban spaces.

Connectivity, Mobility, and Cities

Common criticisms of technology's effect on everyday life are usually based on conservative and nostalgic ideals. The introduction of early telecommunication into homes was also met with similar annoyances. Walter Benjamin was rare in his more nuanced insight into the telephone. He remembers the telephone's "regal entry" into his childhood home, how it annoyed his parents and its effect on

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[153] I may be closer to Heidegger's thoughts on technology when he quotes Hölderlin to assert that, though technology has its dangers, "where the danger is, grows the saving power also." Martin Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Technology," in *The Question Concerning Technology*, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Garland Publishing, 1977): 3–35.

[154] Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*, xlii.

[155] Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*, xlii.

[156] See especially his paternalistic concerns about women's reproductive choices.

the "younger generation."[157] For those who were lonely, the telephone was a consolation; for those "forsaken, it shared its bed."[158] In other words, for young people unable to connect with friends and 'stuck' at their parents' house, the telephone gave them the possibility of sociability. But for those who had few, if any friends, the telephone only brought their social isolation into relief. Similarly, contemporary mobile phones do not create sociability but only allow social people to be social in new and different ways. And unsociable people will not find their answers in a mobile phone. Currently, the strangest complaint from older generations is that they cannot talk to people of younger generations because they are absorbed in their cell phones or smartphones.[159] It is as though they are hysterically complaining, "They are not social because they are constantly being social." While there are some problematics with mobile communication technologies, which I will discuss below, we ought to be cautious of any criticisms that come from a nostalgic or conservative position.

In 2007 Castells co-authored a book in which its authors articulate the relationship between the space of flows and timeless time and mobile communication.[160] One chapter, "The Space of Flows, Timeless Time, and Mobile Networks," repeats much of what he wrote earlier in *The Rise of the Network Society* and *The Informational City*, but here adds that "the diffusion of mobile communication technology greatly contributes to the spread of the space of flows and timeless time as structures of our everyday life."[161] While social interactions are increasingly within the space of flows, there remain concrete spaces. People use mobile technology to meet one another while on the move, a practice

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[157] Walter Benjamin, *Berlin Childhood Around 1900*, trans. Howard Riland (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2006), 48.

[158] Benjamin, *Berlin Childhood Around 1900*, 48.

[159] The cellular phone refers to mobile phones that only transmit voice and SMS, whereas smartphones are enhanced by computer technology and access the Internet through Wi-Fi or mobile Internet such as 3G, 4G, and LTE.

[160] Manuel Castells, Mireia Fernandez-Ardevol, Jack Linchuan Qiu and Araba Sey, *Mobile Communication and Society: A Global Perspective* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2007).

[161] Castells, et. al., *Mobile Communication and Society*, 171.

Castells calls “rendezvousing.”[162] While this technology allows people the freedom to contact whomever without being tied to a specific place (as it is with a ‘land line’), most interesting is that mobile communications “build a new space” in which people selectively communicate (i.e. not with people in their immediate vicinity) and may do so at any given time.[163]

This connectivity does not eliminate place, but rather redefines the meaning of places: “anywhere from which the individual chooses or needs to communicate.[164] In other words, “everybody transports their world with them.”[165] The implications of this portability, for Castells, is threefold and he refers to these as ‘rhythms.’ The “rhythms of device use” make “relationships durable and continuing, rather than ‘fragmented.’”[166] The “rhythms of institutional change” refer to the ways in which people use mobile devices to be productive or entertained during what was once ‘dead time’: waiting in line, riding transit, etc.

The “rhythms of everyday” are of particular interest as these refer to the “local temporalities associated with social and cultural relationships.”[167] One way in which mobile phones have altered social relations is that they keep alive a “full-time intimate community.”[168] It connects multiple ‘heres’ and ‘theres’ and does not demand one’s full engagement. SMS (short message service), or ‘texting,’ allows people to keep in touch but does not require immediate attention and allows a person to respond when they want or can, rather than when the other demands. And, more than being about a new capability of motion, these mobile communications allow family and friend networks to both communicate and physically connect more frequently. Research shows this is much different

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[162] Castells, et. al., *Mobile Communication and Society*, 172.

[163] Castells, et. al., *Mobile Communication and Society*, 173.

[164] Castells, et. al., *Mobile Communication and Society*, 174.

[165] Castells, et. al., *Mobile Communication and Society*, 175.

[166] Castells, et. al., *Mobile Communication and Society*, 175.

[167] Castells, et. al., *Mobile Communication and Society*, 175.

[168] Castells, et. al., *Mobile Communication and Society*, 92.

than those who primarily communicate through desktop-based Internet: they are shown to spend less time physically with friends and family, while those with mobile Internet are more socially active.[169] Thus, “mobile users are more sociable than non-users.”[170]

Another interesting implication of mobile communication has been given the unfortunate name “m-etiquette.”[171] This refers to the tension between established cultural norms or rules and the new practices enabled by mobile communication. There have emerged established rules for using a mobile phone in a variety of social settings: libraries, theatres, restaurants, classrooms, public transit, etc. There is a “social learning process” that has occurred to adapt manners and respect customs. Newer mobile phones have been designed to assist this by allowing users to easily turn ringers off or set the phone to vibrate. In places with high-levels of mobile phone users, it is no longer surprising or bothersome to most to hear a ringtone or overhear a conversation. These manners and rules of etiquette are, of course, specific to various social groups and age groups. Older people will often feel that social manners have degraded and that younger people are less social (even though these devices are connecting people). About ten years ago, a bill in Illinois was proposed that would force restaurants to have separate sections for those who had cell phones. Studies have found that in the US, most mobile phone users will switch off (or turn to silent) their devices in some public spaces such as churches or concert halls, but not while interacting with friends and family.[172] Japan has stricter codes and has been quicker to regulate mobile phone usage: for example, people are not permitted to use their phones on public transit. Many of these social codes concern voice communication, whereas SMS texting is less intrusive to others and thus rules are less strict.

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[169] Castells, et. al., *Mobile Communication and Society*, 92.

[170] Castells, et. al., *Mobile Communication and Society*, 92.

[171] See: Lacohee et. al. “A Social History of the Mobile Telephone with a View of its Future,” *BT Technology Journal* 21, no 3, 203.

[172] Castells, et. al., *Mobile Communication and Society*, 95.

Personal safety and security is an important aspect of mobile phones since many users purchase their first device for safety (in case they get lost, their car breaks down, etc.) but then begin to use their phones for other, social reasons. A large number of studies have been done on the role of mobile phones and the "9/11" attacks on the World Trade Center and the aftermath of hurricane Katrina.[173]

Mobile phones are not simply communication devices. Certain phones are marketed to be associated with particular groups or lifestyles. The most heavily marketed is the iPhone by Apple, who have successfully associated its brand with a young, 'cool,' and, notably, *urban* demographic. No matter which brand of phone, they have all "become closely involved in the process of personal identity construction" so that a person's phone makes a statement about them. And, beyond the brand of phone, a wide variety of personalizations are available, from ringtones and wallpapers to cases and straps with beads or figurines of popular characters.

I agree with theorists such as Castells, Leopoldina Fortunati, J.E. Katz, and others that mobile communication has not changed social conceptions of time and space but rather that this technology is *of* a space and time already present in society. As Castells outlined his theory of the space of flows well before the ubiquity of mobile phones, Fortunati argues that "the mobile" is interacting with a "space that was already transformed."[174] She also argues that space has become increasingly complex so that one's understanding of their place in the world is fraught with anxiety which mobile connectivity helps to alleviate. It allows people the choice of engaging their immediate physical space or connecting to another space, usually a space of friends and family. Though

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[173] It is worth noting that Foucault's arguments about 'security,' discussed in chapter 1, refer to problem of series: a "series of mobile elements" that circulate: Michel Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977–1978*, ed. Michel Senellart, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Picador, 2009), 20.

[174] Leopoldina Fortunati, "The Mobile Phone: Towards New Categories and Social Relations," *Information, Communication & Society* 5, no 4 (2002): 514.

Fortunati argues that these mobile connections mean that people are less connected to their immediate environment and the conversations held are within a closed circle of people that repeats the same structures of exchange, I suggest there is a much different aspect at play. The connections that people make with mobile technologies are not always of their choosing nor are they always similarly structured conversations with the same group of people.

Two Tel Aviv University researchers, Tali Hatuka (Department of Geography) and Eran Toch (Department of Industrial Engineering) began a study in 2012 on the different uses and perceptions of public by cell phone and smartphone owners.[175] Thus far, their research indicates markedly different behaviours in and understandings of public space. Cell Phone users are far more likely to hold private conversations on their devices in private spaces, whereas smartphone users will most likely engage in private phone conversations in public spaces. Smartphone users believe they have much more privacy than they do in public space (they believe that people cannot hear their conversation), are much likely to reveal private information in public space, and are much less concerned about their phone conversations bothering other people in public spaces. Hatuka believes that smartphone users are under the illusion of being in a "private bubble." Interestingly, their conclusions are similar to the much earlier proposed Illinois bill: to create separate sections of public space, like smoking and non-smoking sections. Another conclusion, which should not be surprising is that smartphone users felt "lost" without their phones since they were no longer able to make the multiple connections with people and information that they are used to making.

While mobile communication devices like smartphones and tablets allow urban dwellers to find one's way in a city, there are recent developments that help users get lost in their cities. The Broken City Lab in Windsor, Ontario, has

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[175] "Smartphone Users Develop New Concepts of Privacy in Public Spaces: Study," (no author) *Phys.Org,* May 10, 2012. Retrieved from http://phys.org/news/2012-05-smartphone-users-concepts-privacy-spaces.html

developed an application ("app") called "Drift" that helps users "unfamiliarize" themselves with their cities and neighbourhoods.[176] The app's developer, Justin Langlois, claims this was not meant to be a wry comment on smartphones, but wanted "to recreate serendipity in the world when modern technology has largely extinguished it."[177] The app works by giving the user a set of directions and then asking the user to take photos, such as head east two blocks, turn at a crack in the sidewalk and take a photo of "something warm." Langlois hopes that users will begin to experience their seemingly-known environments in new ways; they will discover things they pass by and ignore on their routine routes. One cannot help but wonder if Langlois was inspired by Benjamin: "Not to find one's way around a city does not mean much. But to lose one's way in a city, as one loses one's way in a forest, requires some schooling."[178]

In 2007, Microsoft filed a patent that would help pedestrians avoid areas of cities that are dangerous or high in crime as well as environmentally harsh areas. When the patent was approved in January of 2012, it was immediately dubbed the "Avoid Ghetto App" and, obviously, was subject to much criticism. While many critics make sarcastic suggestions for apps, many would in fact be quite useful. Sarah E. Chinn, author of *Technology and Racism* suggested, "a more useful app would be for young black men to be able to map blocks with the highest risks of their being pulled over or stopped on the street by police."[179] Many in Toronto are currently criticizing the police's practice of stopping black youths on the street and asking for identification, making them 'known to the police.'[180] Were this app

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[176] See: Emily Badger, "An App to Help You Lose Yourself in the City," *The Atlantic Cities*, May 31, 2012. Retrieved from: http://www.theatlanticcities.com/neighborhoods/2012/05/app-help-you-lose-yourself-city/2149/

[177] Badger, "An App to Help You Lose Yourself in the City."

[178] Benjamin, *Berlin Childhood Around 1900*, 53.

[179] Cited in Sarah Goodyear, "GPS, Smartphones, and the Dumbing Down of Personal Navigation," *The Atlantic Cities*, Jan 24, 2012. Retrieved from: http://www.theatlanticcities.com/technology/2012/01/gps-smartphones-and-dumbing-down-personal-navigation/1036/

[180] The *Toronto Star* has run an on-going series in 2012 on this problem. The most well-known 'police watchdog' currently in Toronto is former Mayor John Sewell, who runs the Toronto Police Accountability Coalition. See: http://www.tpac.ca

available in Toronto, I am sure many would find it useful. Gathering statistics and other information can help people experience cities in a variety of different ways. There are apps that help people take public transit, find a safe or comfortable bicycle route, avoid traffic jams, find restaurants, etc.[181]

There are many other apps that affect urban everyday life. In many larger cities, there are apps that let smartphone users know how to reach a destination on mass transit and when the next bus, streetcar, or subway is arriving. In San Francisco, people can find parking spaces through a smartphone as parking meters send signals when spots are vacant or empty. The system, SFpark, is able to use "demand response" pricing to make it more expensive to park when there is high demand, thus reducing demand and freeing up spots.[182]

Nearly all of these types of apps rely on what is being called the 'Internet of Things' (IoT). This term refers to objects, rather than people, that transmit data to the Internet.[183] Early adopters of the IoT were public transportation systems that used the system's GPS locators to predict bus or train arrival times and then made this information public. The "[murmur]" project is an early form of IoT in Toronto. It began in 2003 in Kensington Market and quickly grew across Toronto and then to Vancouver and Montreal. It consists of recorded stories of an area's history. A sign is placed at the relevant location with a phone number which people can call to hear the story. A recent new IoT is a product made by the Spanish company Via Inteligente called "iPavement," which are paving stones that contain microprocessors and a variety of built-in apps.[184] The data and

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[181] This development of statistical information would not surprise Foucault since this is the maturation of the panopticon – not so much surveillance but the extraction of knowledge.

[182] For a detailed account of SFpark, along with links to various studies and criticisms, see: Bridget Moriarity, "Feeding the Hungry Parking Meter," *Next American City*, June 21, 2012. Retrieved from: http://americancity.org/daily/entry/feeding-the-hungry-parking-meter. The classic text on parking in cities remains Donald Shoup, *The High Cost of Free Parking* (Chicago: Planners Press, 2005).

[183] For a recent comprehensive survey of IoT see: Luigi Atzori, et. al., "The Internet of Things: A Survey," *Computer Networks* 54, no 15 (2010): 2787–2805.

[184] See: http://www.ipavement.com/

information is 'cloud' based, so whoever owns the pavers (municipal governments, companies, citizens) can update or change what the pavers do. While they are most likely to be used as way-finding devices (directing tourists to hotels, banks, transit, etc.), they are also able to accept uploaded documents and books which would then be available to the public. There is also a program which would allow residents to post events or information that would then be available all – a bit like a digital 'community board.' Though only released in June 2012, Madrid, Spain, is already testing the product and Dubai will soon install some as well.

These apps and predictive systems require the data of patterns, which is now being referred to as "Big Data."[185] With the surge of data from Internet users and various sensors (such as shipping containers, private vehicles, and public transportation), algorithmic computations are able to extract trends and make predictions. While seemingly innocuous, the trends and predictions have wide-ranging implications. In earlier times, companies had to decide what type of data they wanted, then collect it. For example, a car company might want to know the age or gender of their customers and so they would then go about gathering this information. Now, much of this data is already collected and available – and the moment a person, group, or company defines the schema through which to analyze available data, they determine what that data concerns.[186] For example, data concerning your music preferences is how iTunes' 'Genius' feature is able to predict other music you like, but that same data can be used to guess at a person's racial background and deny them a bank loan. A device called "FootPath," using GPS data from smartphones, tracks the movements of pedestrians on a very small scale to predict pedestrian behaviour. This data can

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[185] For a good overview of the growing importance and the implications, see: Steve Lohr, "The Age of Big Data," *New York Times*, Feb 11, 2012. Retrieved from: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/12/sunday-review/big-datas-impact-in-the-world.html?_r=2&scp=1&sq=Big%20Data&st=cse

[186] Alistair Croll, "Big Data is Our Generation's Civil Rights Issue, and We Don't Know It," *Solve for Interesting*, July 31, 2012. Retrieved from: http://solveforinteresting.com/big-data-is-our-generations-civil-rights-issue-and-we-dont-know-it/

be used to, for example, reduce pedestrian bottlenecks or map pedestrian routes – however, it is largely targeted at retailers to assist them maximizing revenue.[187] Related is a somewhat infamous practice of American Express which is clearly stated in a letter to cardholder: "Other customers who have used their card at establishments where you recently shopped have a poor repayment history with American Express."[188] In an excellent discussion between Helen Nissenbaum and Kazys Varnelis on privacy in the age of Big Data, it is pointed out that if you buy premium bird-seed, banks and other lenders determine you are good credit-risk.[189] Again, these implications derive from the availability of data prior to hypothesizing a correlation. No one working for a bank or lending institution thought to compare the purchase of premium bird-seed with credit risk, but because purchases are quantified and plugged into various formulas, these correlations become apparent. There is a striking similarity between the predictive 'information' of Big Data and Foucault's theory of security discussed in chapter one: that punishment and the partitioning grid was aimed at decreasing the probability of, respectively, crime and disease.[190]

What interests me most, however, is how mobile communication and connectivity, along with the rise of IoT and Big Data, will affect everyday urban experiences and behaviours. Again, I reject the notion that people who are 'staring at their phones' are perforce being anti-social. Very few people in public using smartphones are doing anything but being social, whether it is sending SMS texts or emails to people, reading what their Facebook 'friends' are up to,

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[187] See: http://www.pathintelligence.com/products/footpath/about-footpath The data on pedestrians' routes could then fairly easily be compared with point-of-sale purchases to find correlations between the paths and time taken in store and amount spent.

[188] Quoted in Kevin Drum, "Today's Two Minute Hate," *Mother Jones*, Jan 31, 2009. Retrieved from: http://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2009/01/todays-two-minutes-hate

[189] Helen Nissenbaum and Kazys Varnelis, *Situated Technologies Pamphlets 9: Modulated Cities: Networked Spaces, Reconstituted Subjects* (New York: The Architectural League of New York, 2012), 18. This pamphlet is available free of charge: http://www.situatedtechnologies.net/?q=node/110

[190] Michel Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977–1978*, ed. Michel Senellart, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Picador, 2009), 6 and 12.

what people are posting on Twitter, or – and this is most likely – making plans to meet in person with someone. Further, as Castells points out, the networks that people are developing online and increasingly with mobile devices are both local and specialized.[191]

The proliferation of various 'social media' (which should be called 'mobile media') networks connect people who do not know one another. Facebook is perhaps the exception since it allows users strong controls over who they interact with. But Facebook is based on an earlier model without mobility. Though it is trying to catch up, it cannot.[192] Twitter and other newer platforms, however, connect strangers to one another through either shared networks or by the lack of commitment required to 'follow' someone. Rarely are one's Facebook 'friends' unknown to the user, whereas a Twitter user usually does not know the people he or she 'follows.' While many scoff at Twitter as being a time-waster with little value, it revealed its value and importance during the G20 protests in the urban core of Toronto in June 2010. Traditional media outlets were either unable or unwilling to send reporters to the locations where the police response to protests had become violent. Television coverage eventually became 'reporters' in studios reading messages and showing photos and videos posted to Twitter. Since then, many complaints against the police's actions have been substantiated by these photos and videos, and many who were charged were able to prove their innocence by these photos and videos.

While Facebook controls what content its users see (which items appear in the 'newsfeed') and are now charging 'fan pages' to have their posts seen by more than 10% of their 'fans,' Twitter, in contrast, shows its users everything. This means that it is up to each user to see what he or she wants: they will need to follow accounts that interest them, unfollow those that do not, use search boxes

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[191] Castells, "Conclusion" in *The Castells Reader on Cities and Social Theory*.

[192] For an interesting argument that Facebook is like a landline and why its structure is inherently anti-mobile, see: Valdis Krebs, "Facebook is Toast," *The Network Thinkers*, May 14, 2010. Retrieved from: http://www.thenetworkthinkers.com/2010/05/facebook-is-toast.html

or click on ‘hash tags.’ William Gibson, the well-known science fiction author once quipped, “Facebook is the mall; Twitter is the street.”[193] The point is that Facebook is controlled and familiar, whereas Twitter (and most other newer platforms) provides encounters with people who are more or less strangers and their connections are engendered by events, interests, and proximities of time and space. So, networks on Twitter and other newer platforms become specialized and often based on locale; specialized interests are usually global, while the local interests are of a material urban nature.

That is, many of the people a mobile device user connects with are in the same city or region; these connections, whether on a local or global scale, are increasingly specialized. If a person is interested in, for example, local politics and governance, these networks allow one to learn from and discuss with others who share a similar interest. So long as a person’s hobby or interest does not require physical meetings or gatherings (such as organized, team sports), he or she can pursue just about anything through these communication devices. If a person is interested in movies that came out in 1941, or poets that lived on islands, or the details of the history Italian bicycle production, there will likely be others that share the interest and have created a ‘space’ online (a ‘place’ in the ‘space of flows’) where members can ‘meet,’ discuss, learn, teach, and share information. In the past, prior to Internet, a young person who took an interest in some alternative or non-popular form of culture would likely be alone in their interest (especially if they did not live in a large city) and would need to physically travel to a larger city in the hopes of finding more artefacts of this alternative culture. Today, this young person can find people with similar interests, the information, and possibly the artefacts themselves with a simple Google search.

So, what does this do to urban space and to urban dwellers’ experience and behaviour of this space? Regarding specialization of interests, it means that

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[193] He said this in an unpublished interview in Vancouver in either September or October of 2010. This phrase appears on Twitter in many places, all attributed to Gibson whose Twitter handle is @GreatDismal.

a person can most likely pursue and enjoy this interest without having to physically travel. The tendency for mobile communication to take place between people (or things) in the same city or region, helps to explain *why* so many of Richard Florida's 'creative class' choose to live in cities. Castells repeatedly argues that technology never *determines* social practices, but reflects social practices and relations already in place. Internet and mobile communication is most likely not the single cause of the surge in interest in urbanism or people wanting to live in vibrant urban areas, but mobile technology and *its use* reflect and sustain this desire to live in urban areas. Many of the 'things' online are urban, be they websites, organized data in an app platform, or the people with which one connects.

In fact, recent studies have shown that the majority of young people would prefer to have a high-end smartphone than a car.[194] This trend, along with the shifting conceptions of home ownership are radically changing what types of urban space is desired. No longer desired is the lifestyle associated with suburban enclaves and the expressways that serve them. This was a previous generation's desire. Now, younger people desire 'good' urban spaces: diverse, well-served by mass transit, with a strong cultural sector, entertainment, unique restaurants, etc. And it is mobile connectivity that is encouraging (not determining) this.

The way in which mobile devices interact with the internet helps to explain this. Comments on news media sites are one of the worst things about the internet. But the vast majority of these are left by those accessing the internet in a stationary way (desktop or laptop computer). The 'mobile versions' of these sites rarely support the comment platform. If they do, it is difficult for the user to navigate. It is much more likely that a mobile user will share a link to the article with their networks and attach their comment. So, rather than leave a comment in a group of unknown, and usually hostile, people, the mobile user will share the

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[194] Benjamin Davis, et. al., *Transportation and the New Generation*.

article and comment with a pre-established network (friends, family, those with a similar interest, etc.) and will be much more likely to have a productive discussion.

The ‘Walkman’ of the 1980s, the portable CD player of the 1990s, and then the iPod were all intensely isolating technologies. These were mobile technologies that were not communicative, but rather allowed users to shut out everything of the world around them. The smartphone is drastically different. While some use their smartphones to listen to music on headphones, these devices are connecting users to organizations, media, and other people which are all social practices. However, these social connections are not immediate or physical, but are within the space of flows. So, though being social, studies show that smartphone users are more likely to be unaware of their immediate surroundings.[195]

We are all familiar with pedestrians who are looking at the screen of their smartphones and not watching where they are going. Perhaps there is a need to redesign urban infrastructure to accommodate smartphone users. And, since this is about mobility, perhaps there are things to be learned from recent redesigns of urban infrastructure to accommodate people with ‘mobility issues.’ The difference, of course, is that smartphone users can change their behaviour. But consider that the ubiquitous ‘walk’ and ‘don’t walk’ pedestrian signals were only made common place in the mid-twentieth century. There have been recent developments for people with vision or hearing impairments: they make sounds and have tactile or vibrating buttons. For the actuated or semi-actuated signals, pedestrians used to push a physical button. Now, they are electrostatic so there is no need to use any force. For smartphone users, perhaps the ‘walk’ and ‘don’t walk’ signals should be on the ground at the curb. Or users can make use of current textured sidewalks that let those with vision or hearing impairments know they are at an intersection. Or perhaps the electrostatic switches for pedestrians

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[195] Goodyear, “GPS, Smartphones, and the Dumbing Down of Personal Navigation.”

can emit an RFID (radio frequency identification) or NFC (near field communication) signal to nearby phones to send a pop up message that they are at an intersection – the smartphone users could tap the message to tell the light to change.

But these are all speculative and I do not wish to commit the errors of previous 'futurologists.' Instead, let us turn to Georg Simmel's social theory to help us understand the implications of technology and mobility on urban life. Simmel is one of the earliest theorists of urban social life, whose observations are still extremely relevant and, as I will show, are extremely applicable to understand the social relations revolving around contemporary mobile communication. Further, Simmel's arguments regarding technology reveal the tensions between subjective experience and objective technology as well as elaborate Castells' observation that communication technology has not led to the demise, but rather the revival, of socially rich urban areas.

Simmel on Technology and Mobility

In what is Simmel's most well-known essay, "The Metropolis and Mental Life," we find the famous phrase "blasé attitude."[196] Many read this essay as arguing that people in cities have a blasé attitude toward one another: that people do not care for each other and ignore what is going on around them. *This is a misreading*. Simmel's argument is not that the metropolis results in a loss of interaction, a disconnected society, or even that the blasé attitude is necessarily bad. He is not suggesting that the metropolis is an unnatural site for human community, implying that we ought to return to the rural. Unlike many of the other urban planners discussed in this dissertation and nearly all Marxist urban theorists not

[196] Georg Simmel, "The Metropolis and Mental Life," in *Simmel on Culture: Selected Writings*, ed. David Frisby and Mike Featherstone (London: Sage, 1997), 174–185.

discussed here, Simmel likes cities.[197] While recognizing that city life has its own issues, he does not assume they are problems in need of a drastic solution.

The blasé attitude is (for some) the *initial* result of living in an urban space in which there is an excessive demand on the senses, so that it becomes near impossible to give one's attention to all these demands. The blasé attitude is not a problem, but is rather a type of intellectual accomplishment that leads to a type of freedom. In fact, "metropolitan life is unimaginable without ... the enhancement of the metropolitan intellectuality."[198] Simmel is clear that the blasé attitude is an intellectual ability: "stupid people who are not intellectually alive in the first place usually are not exactly blasé."[199] The blasé attitude is just the *initial* mental response which then develops into what we can call the "attitude of reserve": "this mental attitude of metropolitans toward one another we many designate, from a formal point of view, as reserve."[200] If it were not for this attitude of reserve, and the subject were to engage in every social exchange such as is done "in a small town … one would be completely atomized internally and come to an unimaginable psychic state."[201] Simmel recognizes that it is this reserve which makes people from rural areas regard metropolitan people as "cold and heartless," and that it *can* lead to complete indifference, hatred, and violence. But, this attitude of reserve, or "antipathy," is what protects from both dangers of the metropolis: complete "indifference and indiscriminate suggestibility."[202] In other words, the attitude of reserve protects the urban dweller from the blasé attitude (indifference). Thus, most urban dwellers have this "metropolitan

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[197] We will see how Simmel praises the "intellectuality" of the urban dweller immediately below, but Simmel is even more explicit elsewhere referring to the "backwardness" of small towns and the more refined "complexity" of city life: Georg Simmel, "The Sociology of Space," in *Simmel on Culture: Selected Writings*, ed. David Frisby and Mike Featherstone (London: Sage, 1997), 153.

[198] Simmel, "The Metropolis and Mental Life," 177–178.

[199] Simmel, "The Metropolis and Mental Life," 178.

[200] Simmel, "The Metropolis and Mental Life," 179.

[201] Simmel, "The Metropolis and Mental Life," 179.

[202] Simmel, "The Metropolis and Mental Life," 179.

intellectuality" that allows them to respond to some things, but not all things. Were they to have the blasé attitude, they would not respond to anything.

This attitude of reserve should be familiar to anyone who lives in a city and enjoys urban life. It is how we are able to walk down a busy street and not say "hello" to everyone, attempt to take everything in, or respond to every car horn – all the while aware of what is around us. It is how dozens of strangers can sit in close quarters on mass transit and give each other privacy. It relates to Jane Jacobs' theory of trust and privacy in cities full of strangers: the attitude of reserve 'protects' us from "nauseating togetherness"[203] *and* from isolation. And it is this attitude of reserve that can help us understand changing behaviours and responses to cell phone and smartphone usage in urban public spaces. When cell phones were still novel, or in areas where there is little usage, a person talking on their phone in public would demand our attention. But urban dwellers have, for the most part, developed the "metropolitan intellectuality" and ignore these one-sided conversations. Mobile phone usage behaviour can be understood in Simmel's terms. Were one to respond to every notification, they might come to the "unimaginable psychic state" in similar way as the person who attempts in a city to respond to all of the demands on the senses. Like those who develop an "attitude of reserve," experienced smartphone users have the ability to ignore their phone's alerts when talking face-to-face with someone.

Simmel also provides ways in which we can understand the relationship between individuals and technology, especially mobile technology. In "Bridge and Door," Simmel begins with the argument that in positing two objects as 'separate' they are in fact bound together in our consciousness and in emphasizing the two 'things,' we look over what rests between them.[204] For example, the banks of a river are simply apart in nature, but for us they are separated in our minds, and

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[203] Jane Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities* (New York: Vintage Books, 1992), 56 and 62.

[204] Simmel, "Bridge and Door," in *Simmel on Culture: Selected Writings*, ed. David Frisby and Mike Featherstone (London: Sage, 1997), 170.

this is reflected in the aesthetic of the bridge. So on the one hand, the bridge plays a unique part in making things separate, while on the other the bridge's practical aspect works to make unity between the two sides. We can think of communication technology similarly. It addresses this tension between 'apart' and 'separate' insofar as we, as subjects, are 'separate' and communication technologies represent an attempt to be simply 'apart' from one another and emulate the connectedness of nature.

The door, however, provides a stronger example of "how separating and connecting are only two sides of precisely the same act."[205] The door represents the linkage between the realm of the subject and what is outside of this realm. The door, itself a technology, functions to separate space so that 'man may stand in certainty,' in finitude rather than the 'natural' infinite world of possibility. Communication technology, like the door, moulds the plasticity of the world, gives permanence to dynamism, and yet allows for the 'opening up' into the fluctuating character of life. Both, too, represent "the enclosure of his or her domestic being" yet they provide the essential and constant possibility of "stepping out of this limitation into freedom."[206] Just as the research presented above shows the personalization and individualization of smartphones alongside their inherent communicative capacities, these smartphones represent this tension between individual 'enclosure' and the ability to engage with the other.

The aesthetic of the handle, Simmel argues, has a similar social function as bridges and doors.[207] And here we can see how constantly present mobile communication technologies ("handheld" devices) function like the handle. Simmel is not suggesting that the handle provides a link between the realms of the aesthetic and the practical, but rather that the harmonization of these two

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[205] Simmel, "Bridge and Door," 172.

[206] Simmel, "Bridge and Door," 174.

[207] Simmel, "The Handle," in *Georg Simmel, 1858–1918: A Collection of Essays, with Translations and a Bibliography*, ed. Kurt H. Wolff (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1959), 267–275.

spheres is “our unconscious criterion for the aesthetic effect.”[208] Simmel argues that the handle is a way of approaching the problem of relationship between the “soul” (psyche) and the world that appears ‘outside’ the subject. Rather than considering these things to be separate, Simmel is arguing that the soul (psyche) “has its home in two worlds,”[209] which is similar to the function of a smartphone: it allows the user to live in two worlds, perhaps even multiple worlds.

Prior to these essays, Simmel wrote and published *The Philosophy of Money* (1903), which argues (among many other things) that technology has advanced far more than individual culture. That is, tools and machinery are more “refined” than art and intellectuality: “Machinery has become so much more sophisticated than the worker.”[210] This is clearly the case with contemporary technology and users, but it is no longer simply the technologies of work but also that of entertainment and communication. Thus, we literally do not understand the technology and processes involved when we communicate with each other. So, while Simmel argues that this objective technology leads to an objectification of the external world, which begins to influence the internal world of the subject (such as the rise of ‘objectivity’ in thought), we can infer that communication technologies give rise to ‘objective’ interpersonal (subjective) communication. In other words, communication between two subjects is mediated by objective technology which they do not understand.

The Philosophy of Money also provides a discussion of some problems for subjectivity in relation to technology. Interestingly, contemporary communication technology resolves much of his critique:

> Cultural objects increasingly evolve into an interconnected enclosed world that has increasingly fewer points at which the subjective soul can interpose its will and feelings. And this trend is supported by a certain autonomous mobility on the part of the

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[208] Simmel, “The Handle,” 268.

[209] Simmel, “The Handle,” 274.

[210] Simmel, *The Philosophy of Money*, 453.

> objects. It has been pointed out that the merchant, the craftsman and the scholar are today much less mobile than they were at the time of the Reformation. Both material and intellectual objects today move independently, without personal representatives or transport. Objects and people have become separated from one another. Thought, work effort and skill, through their growing embodiment in objective forms, books and commodities, are able to move independently; recent progress in the means of transportation is only the realization or expression of this. By their independent, impersonal mobility, objects complete the final stage of their separation from people.[211]

Conversely, mobile communication technologies give users increasingly *more* "points at which the subjective soul can interpose" since they are able to engage and interact with the information, objects, and other subjects. Simmel's concern about "intellectual objects" moving independently without their "personal representatives" is, however, increased with communication technologies. The circulation of scholarly work without the scholar present may not, though, be such a bad thing, as it enables larger audience, influence, and circulation of exchange. However, recalling Castells' argument that cities remain important despite predictions of 'electronic cottages,' the desire for face-to-face interaction can be considered a response to this impersonal exchange of ideas. But our increasing ability to manipulate, interact, and actively engage with the ideas, information, and 'data' in many ways returns these technological objects back to the people. It should also be noted that Simmel argues that "money symbolizes acceleration in the pace of life," not that money is the *cause*.[212] Similarly, Castells argues that technology *expresses* life, not determines life. However, though I would argue that mobile communication technologies are not the cause of changes to contemporary society, these technologies do have a hand in teaching us what to desire. And Simmel seems to agree:

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[211] Simmel, *The Philosophy of Money*, 465.

[212] Simmel, *The Philosophy of Money*, 511.

> People's ecstasy concerning the triumphs of the telegraph and telephone often makes them overlook the fact that what really matters is the value of what one has to say, and that, compared with this, the speed or slowness of the means of communication is often a concern that could attain its present status only by usurpation.[213]

This "ecstasy," Simmel suggests, is what distracts people from their true desire (what one has to say) in favour of the desire taught by the technologies (how quickly it transmits what one has to say).

While I see interesting and positive developments by communication technologies, we ought to remember Lacan's advice: "the only thing of which one can be guilty is of having given ground relative to one's desire."[214] We need to 'maintain a fidelity' to our desires and ensure that what excites or interests us on an everyday urban level are our own desires and enjoyments, not those taught to us by technology. Mobile technology can help us enjoy, explore and experience urban spaces in different ways but we ought to be on guard for mistaking the enjoyment of the technology with our own enjoyment. In many contemporary discourses, especially the 'business discourse,' there is an overriding fantasy of technology: that it will solve all problems hitherto unsolved. In Lacanian terms, this discourse holds the belief that technology will finally cover over the Real. We need to remember that the Real is always with us (always in its place) and judge the value of communication technologies by, as Simmel says, their ability to let us say what we want to say and not by a parameter it sets (usually speed). Further, we need to be cautious about any communication technology that reduces our ability to communicate and understand.

Thus, we need to consider what desires are seeking fulfillment with mobile communication technology. Are they our desires, or the desires of the technology itself? Apps like Drift can assist us in exploring our immediate urban

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[213] Simmel, *The Philosophy of Money*, 487.

[214] Jacques Lacan, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan*, Book VII, *The Ethics of Psychoanalysis*, trans. Dennis Porter (New York: W.W. Norton, 1992), 319.

environments in novel ways. But we should be wary of allowing our movements and desires to be dominated by the technology itself, such as going to a particular place solely because it has free WiFi or gazing at our devices and missing the urban around us.

This chapter has continued the line of thought of the previous chapter – that Jane Jacobs' primary concern was the economies of cities, and many of her arguments have been taken up by Richard Florida who has documented the recent trend that more people are choosing to live in urban areas, and has sought to explain why. This chapter has continued to investigate this trend through the arguments of Manuel Castells, whose research finds that, despite the rise of communication technologies and predictions that people would increasingly chose not to live in urban areas and instead 'telecommute' to work, more and more people are choosing to live in urban areas. This new interest in urban areas is understood through his theories of the 'space of flows' and 'timeless time.' While Castells ultimately laments the loss of 'space of places' and 'traditional time,' I argue that, though people are situating themselves within the 'space of flows,' the desire to live in urban areas suggests a continued affection for 'space of places.' However, there appears to be little interest in returning to 'traditional' or 'glacial time.' Much of the reconfiguration of urban areas and people's desire for these urban areas is meditated through communication technologies, particularly those which are mobile. I argue that mobile communication technologies are significantly altering the experiences of everyday urban life, particularly how people relate to their immediate urban environments. Rather than assume these changes are negative, I seek to show how they altering and even increasing urban sociability. A handful of Georg Simmel's theoretical observations of urban life and technology are then introduced because he seeks to find a balance between, or help us understand 'when' we declare a limit to, our responses to the demands of urban life and our own sense of freedom as well as objective technologies and our internal world of subjectivity.

CONCLUSION: The City as Symptom

This dissertation has taken cities and urban space as arrangements of space across time, and as arrangements of time across space, and so many urbanists and urban planners address time and space as a problem of circulation. As Foucault argues, this problem of circulation made urbanizing and policing identical practices, which explains the predominance of the grid. The rise of mobile communication technology and a network society suggests a shift from gridded circulation to a more complex arrangement within the space of flows. While mobile technology allows users to interact across space instantaneously and appears to 'defeat' the constraints of time and space, contemporary society nonetheless insists on the importance of traditional circulation and arrangements of space (the space of places), however: we seem content with the compression and desequencing of traditional 'clock' time (timeless time). Contrary to predictions that communication technologies would result in the 'electronic cottage' and the decline of cities, we are instead witnessing a re-found desire for the intensities and contingencies of urban life. Just as previous generations reached their limit to urban life and retreated to the suburbs, current generations have reached their limit with the suburban lifestyle. While this shift means that cities have higher populations and densities, there are also signs of a trend in which the fringes of cities are becoming 'edge cities' rather than strictly residential enclaves.

So what are the contemporary practices in urban planning and development, and how do these practices confront the city as a problem of desire? The main contemporary practices, or at least those to which urbanists

express adherence,[1] are Smart Growth,[2] Complete Streets,[3] and New Urbanism.[4] 'Smart Growth' is largely an empty signifier – the central principles of it lack anything close to a clear definition – but it seeks to make urban spaces more 'sustainable' and 'respect the natural environment.'[5] The Complete Streets movement also suffers from a dependence on master signifiers, but is brilliant in its simplicity. The movement is based on the argument that urban streets in North America are built primarily for private vehicle use and these streets need to be 'completed' by redesigning them for all users (including children, the elderly, and those with mobility issues) and making room for all uses (such as walking, cycling, and public transit). New Urbanists, briefly mentioned in this dissertation, claim an affinity to Jane Jacobs, but their projects do not demonstrate a fidelity to her work.

New Urbanists seek to develop new towns and suburban spaces that are more walkable and focus on the aesthetics of rooflines and the architectural rhythms of streets. While their suburban developments contain a 'neighbourhood centre' with a few basic shops and services, they completely ignore Jacobs' insistence on the need for a diversity of primary land uses that spur secondary uses. New Urbanist projects usually only have one primary use – a residential one – and impose a few secondary uses in the form of a few shops and services.

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[1] Of course, what urbanists plan or propose is not necessarily what is built.

[2] For an overview of Smart Growth, see: Andres Duany, Jeff Speck and Mike Lydon, *The Smart Growth Manual* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2010).

[3] The National Complete Streets Coalition website explains the essential features the movement: http://www.completestreets.org/. Also see: Michael Ronkin and Lynn Weigand ('lead authors'), "Chapter 7: Creating Complete Streets: Design Principles and Features" in *Complete Streets: Best Policy and Implementation Practices* (Chicago: American Planning Association, 2010): 80-99.

[4] The New Urbanism website explains their principles: http://www.newurbanism.org/. Also see: Andres Duany, Elizabeth Plater-Zyberk, and Jeff Speck, *Suburban Nation: The Rise of Sprawl and the Decline of the American Dream* (New York: North Point Press, 2000); and Peter Katz, *The New Urbanism: Towards an Architecture of Community* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1994).

[5] Michael Gunder and Jean Hillier argue that the nearly the entire contemporary planning profession revolves around a handful of 'empty signifiers,' including "Smart Growth." See: Michael Gunder and Jean Hillier, *Planning in Ten Words or Less: A Lacanian Entanglement with Spatial Planning* (Surrey, England: Ashgate, 2009).

It might be argued, since many New Urbanist projects also contain a town hall or community centre, along with a public green space, that these should count as primary land uses. Perhaps, but missing is a significant number of places of employment. Because there are so few places to work within these neighbourhoods, people still travel for work and treat those work destinations as only work destinations. They still reside in suburbs and work 'downtown,' *using* the downtown. Further, while New Urbanism's insistence on garages at the rear of houses accessed by laneways does make the streetscape 'prettier,' it also takes life off the street. The houses might have porches and balconies and be closer to the street than typical suburban homes, but there is not much to look at from these porches and balconies. And, though New Urbanists assist in shifting away from single-use 'zoning bylaws,' they are replacing these with 'codes' which re-enforces the university discourse.

Further, many New Urbanism projects come across as 'pre-gentrified.' Their first project was Seaside, Florida, which was the set for the film, *The Truman Show*. One of the film's producers, Edward Feldman, found the town to be "a set" (thus, there was no need for a set to be built for the film) and refers to it as a "candy floss town," while the lead actor, Jim Carrey, calls it as a "Norman Rockwell scene."[6] This façadism is also apparent in the New Urbanist development outside of Calgary – McKenzie Towne, Alberta. This suburban development features a central area with a town hall along with what resembles a main street (McKenzie Towne Gate) of a small town, with amenities like a post office, drugstore, restaurants, and a pub. Though this main street features buildings of at least two stories, so that the upper floors could be apartments, all of these upper floors are, in fact, empty.[7] Similarly, the districts of Cornell and Greensborough in Markham, Ontario, also New Urbanist projects, were planned with a central areas containing shops and services, but these shops and services

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[6] Peter Weir, et. al. "How's It Going to End? The Making of *The Truman Show*," Special Features of *The Truman Show*, DVD, directed by Peter Weir (Hollywood: Paramount, 1992).

[7] Chris Turner, "Diagnosis: This is Nowhere," *Azure*, May 2008. Retrieved from: http://www.azuremagazine.com/magazine/backissues/features.php?id=1775

are hardly enough to sustain communities or neighbourhoods as there is not much more than a dry cleaner and a bakery.

In chapter 4, I argued that many have sought to 'short-circuit' primary and secondary diversity by advocating or building towers with retail on the main floor and calling it 'mixed-use.' This 'short-circuit' also occurs, but in a different form in these New Urbanist developments: they impose a few secondary uses with little diversity. Put another way, from the outset, these New Urbanist projects seek a limit on secondary uses, which does not allow for sufficient diversity. Or, put yet another way, these New Urbanist projects seek to calm down the urban. We see a similar thing with Smart Growth: an attempt to calm down the urban, to control a series of disparate events, practices, and externalities. The Complete Streets movement also dreams of accounting for everything and make streets a realm of pure functionality. Ebenezer Howard and Le Corbusier provided their own solutions to the problems of urban life, and now we are facing more 'solutions.' These contemporary movements – perhaps, ideologies – are in many ways repeating history by determining in advance the problems and thus arriving at the 'solutions.'[8]

We see this type of thinking dominating discussions at street level, too: automobile drivers calling for synchronized traffic lights to solve their frustrations,[9] transit riders calling for an unimpeded right-of-way, cyclists calling for bike lanes segregated from other forms of traffic to, again, allow for unimpeded travel, and pedestrians calling for fewer patios, signs, or street furniture, which encroaches on sidewalk space. City dwellers with environmental concerns want more and more 'green space,' trees, and gardens until, it seems, the entire city becomes a woodlot. Those who worry about safety demand stop-signs, speed-bumps, and crossing-guards in florescent vests. Resident

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[8] For example, nearly all contemporary urban planning movements insist on the importance of 'walkability,' which is a good thing, but it avoids the problem of the continued use of automobiles.

[9] Synchronized traffic lights do not relieve congestion. It is extremely difficult to synchronize traffic lights and, if successful, only invites more traffic – more congestion. See: Tom Vanderbilt, *Traffic: Why We Drive the Way We Do (and What It Says About Us)* (New York: Vintage, 2009), 111–114.

associations make futile attempts to ensure fellow residents are ‘respectable’ and well-to-do and have presentable houses and yards. All the while, municipal governments impose bylaws on extremely minor issues such as the minimum height of overhanging awnings on storefronts, or the width of curb cut-outs, as though the difference of a few centimetres is the difference between a vibrant street and skid-row.

At the beginning of the short documentary film *City Limits*, Jane Jacobs makes a relevant point: “We shouldn’t be frightened because problems show up in our cities,” and toward the end of the film iterates her point: “We shouldn’t be dismayed at the fact that our cities have problems.”[10] Jacobs’ contention is that cities are complex and do, indeed, have their share of problems from mass transit to public health to parks, but governments and bureaucrats are not doing a very good job of solving them. Her suggestion is to listen to the people who actually live in so-called ‘problem’ areas, those who are affected by poor mass transit, or those who regularly use neighbourhood parks. While Jacobs is largely correct, I would like to discuss what underlies her argument: how precisely do we determine what *is* a problem? That is, mass transit, for example, is not inherently a problem but becomes one when, perhaps, it is not doing what we expect. Similarly, the issues I raised above (automobile traffic, pedestrian space, safe infrastructure, the environment, housing maintenance, etc.) are all things that are not problems in themselves but can become problems when we judge them to be such. I argue that there is no prescription for this judgment. There is no formula to determine when, for example, automobile use becomes ‘too much,’ nor can there be a predetermined ratio of trees per acre to ensure there are ‘enough.’ There is no code. These are all things that – perhaps unfortunately – require us to make a determination, either individually or collectively. Or, as Jacobs says, we must “depend on our wits.”[11]

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[10] *City Limits*, DVD, directed by Laurence Hyde (Toronto: National Film Board, 1971).

[11] *City Limits*.

This dissertation has discussed a number of failed attempts to avoid making this judgment: the imposition of the grid, establishing urban parks, Howard's "Master-Key" and mathematical diagrams, Le Corbusier's grandiose plans, predetermined density ratios, and predictions from Big Data are a few examples. But attempts to avoid this judgment go as far back as Plato: in the *Laws* he argues that a *polis* should have "five thousand forty landholders,"[12] whereas Aristotle determines that the maximum population should be the "largest number that can be taken in at a single view."[13] All of these plans, codes, and other attempts at avoiding making a judgment share a means by which to 'calm down' the urban, if not eradicate it. They are in the realm of Lacan's Imaginary, which are used in attempts to cover the gaps in the Symbolic – and they fail because the Real returns, or, rather, it is "always in its place."[14] They fail because of the stubborn 'remainders' or 'surpluses' of these plans, codes, and calculated 'solutions.'

We have already seen a number of remainders and surpluses of the city. The 'voice' in the graph of desire discussed in chapter 2 (not the 'voice' of the city as a product of transference) is the remainder of the signifying operation, which I linked to the surplus sounds of the city: buzzing of fans, honking of cars, din of the crowd, etc. These are all, I argued, the 'sounds of the city.' Also from chapter 2, my discussion of Lacan's theory of imaginary identification argued that we identify with the flaws of the city, and that these flaws are what make a city a city. Related is the argument that the terms 'urban' and 'city' are caught up in fantasy and so these terms fail to live up to the attempts to define these terms. It is the surplus (here as *objet petit a*) that remains in the name 'city' or 'urban' that resists precise definitions. Urban planners who situate themselves within the university

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[12] Plato, *The Laws of Plato*, trans. Thomas L. Pangle (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 124 (Stephanus pagination: 737e). Plato chooses this number because it makes it simpler to divide parcels of land.

[13] Aristotle, "Book VII, Chapter 4" in *The Politics*, ed. Stephen Everson, trans. by Jonathan Barnes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 162.

[14] Jacques Lacan, "Seminar on 'The Purloined Letter,'" in *Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English*, trans. Bruce Fink (New York: W.W. Norton, 2005), 17.

discourse find that the 'truth' of the discourse is the city itself – the messiness and apparent disorder of the city that eludes their plans for orderly distribution. Le Corbusier thought that technology and machines would 'liberate' humanity from the contingencies of life, though that would, in fact, 'liberate' us from life itself. Similarly, Le Corbusier could not accept the complexities of street *life*, and so proposed its eradication. Recall Lacan's argument that "Enjoy!" is the imperative of the superego. Žižek takes this up to suggest that in contemporary society we are to enjoy the object, but one deprived of its dangerous element. This perhaps best explains the sensation that New Urbanist projects are 'candy floss towns.' They are lacking the dangerous element; the surplus, the object of desire – the urban, in other words – is absent. And their failure, coming across as 'unreal,' is because the symptom persists as a surplus and "returns through all attempts to domesticate it, to gentrify it."[15]

Much, if not all, of these stubborn surpluses and remainders relate to enjoyment. The things we love about the city are the very things that can turn into problems. People who live in or visit the city enjoy what only the urban can offer: its arts, music, shopping, public space, restaurants, bars, etc. But eventually nearly all of us reach our limit, cry "too much!," declare it a problem and seek some form of solution or reprieve.

I would like to propose that this shift from enjoyment to problem can be theorized with Lacan's concept of the symptom or sinthome.[16] I am not suggesting a psychologization of individual city dwellers, but rather a psychoanalysis of the city itself – putting the city on the 'couch.' I propose that these 'surpluses' or 'remainders' that citizens, urban planners, governments, and bureaucrats seek to solve or 'calm down' are the symptoms of the city itself. And,

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[15] Slavoj Žižek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology*, (London: Verso Press, 2008), 74.

[16] This is an analytical framework which I am developing from my argument that the political is the judgment and declaration of a limit. This theory of the city as symptom is something I will continue to pursue in future work.

following Lacan, the symptom is part of the subject's (the city's) *jouissance*; it is the kernel of enjoyment.

Lacan understands symptoms much differently from traditional medicine, which takes symptoms as manifestation of illness. In Lacan's early work, he theorized the symptom as a signifier that could be used to read the unconscious "structured like a language,"[17] but then later as part of the subject's *jouissance*, "as the way in which each subject enjoys the unconscious."[18] Further, Lacan defines the symptom as a metaphor for the subject. The subject presents his or her symptoms instead of him or her self – they are "messages about the subject that are designed for the Other."[19] In the analyst's discourse, as discussed in previous chapters, symptoms arise from the analysand ($\$$) in a whole host of forms, even as a master signifier (S_1), and "more and more aspects of a person's life are taken as symptoms."[20] Because the subject presents symptoms instead of him or her self, because these symptoms are part of *jouissance* and the kernel of enjoyment, and since the purpose of analysis is not necessarily to remove or have the subject stop displaying symptoms, we end up with Žižek's wry comment, "Enjoy your symptom!"[21]

If we take some liberties with Lacan's theory of the symptom (part of the subject's *jouissance*, a metaphor for the subject, describing much of subject's life) and take the city itself as the subject, we can rephrase Žižek: "Enjoy your city's symptoms!" I am suggesting that the complexities of the city, all the things

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[17] Jacques Lacan, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan. Book XI, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: W.W. Norton, 1998), 20.

[18] Dylan Evans, *An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis* (London: Routledge, 2005), 189. This shift in his understanding of the symptom is represented in his use of the term 'sinthome' rather than 'symptom.' Here, however, I will only use 'symptom.'

[19] Bruce Fink, *The Lacanian Subject: Between Language and Jouissance* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995), 73.

[20] Bruce Fink, *Lacan to the Letter: Reading Écrits Closely* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2004), 135.

[21] Slavoj Žižek, *Enjoy Your Symptom!: Jacques Lacan In Hollywood and Out* (New York: Routledge, 1992).

that citizens, planners, governments, and bureaucrats seek to 'calm down,' are the symptoms of the city. And, if we treat these symptoms as symptoms, we can, instead of seeking to eradicate or 'calm' them down, enjoy the city in a more honest way than the superego's cruel injunction to "Enjoy!" Put another way, Simmel's attitude of reserve is both a symptom of city life *and* what allows us to enjoy the city.[22]

To take the city as symptom would mean that, instead of trying to 'calm down' or eradicate the complexities of urban life, we would enjoy its complex nature. Instead of trying to tidy up the inherent messiness of urban life, we can experience this messiness (not necessarily disorder) as a symptom of the city, a part of the *jouissance* of the city we can take part in. In fact, I would argue we need to enjoy these symptoms of the city because they are precisely what defines it; moreover, they are not going away. If I can put it another way, we need to "traverse the fantasy" of the city.[23] That is, we should endorse an engagement with the city's symptoms as symptoms and seek to neither calm them down nor eradicate them. This would mean that we would break with the dream of a new master in the form of a perfect urban plan or in the form of one of a series of master signifiers that, if realized, would "solve all."[24]

However, the problem of limit arises again. At what point does a symptom of the city, such as a crowded street, become too much, too crowded? When does a well-used public transit system become overused? At what point does a city's symptom become unbearable? Again, there is no schema to determine this – there is no code. Foucault, as discussed in chapter 1, suggested as much: a "good street" has miasmas and disease circulating, along with beggars, thieves,

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[22] Georg Simmel, "The Metropolis and Mental Life," in *Simmel on Culture: Selected Writings*, ed. David Frisby and Mike Featherstone (London: Sage, 1997), 174–185.

[23] Slavoj Žižek, *The Plague of Fantasies*, 2nd ed. (New York: Verso, 2008), 41 and 59.

[24] Jane Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities (New York: Vintage Books, 1992 [1961]), 433.

and riots.[25] It is worth recalling the question "*Chè vuoi*?" – What do you want? – since this question is meant to have us take responsibility for our own desire. It is up to our judgment, either individually or collectively, but I propose that thinking of these 'problems' of the city as symptoms of the city changes the way we respond and judge. We can accept these symptoms – enjoy them, even – and recognize that eradication or radical proposals are not the 'solution' but only an invitation to different (perhaps the same) problems. It might be worth recalling Foucault's discussion of governmentality as "the right disposition of things," insofar as this suggests neither full acceptance nor prohibition.[26]

Typical, if not stereotypical, suburban developments have few if any of the symptoms noted above – and it is for this lack that they are derided and mocked. Similarly, the towns and suburban developments based on New Urbanist principles plan in advance to avoid any of the symptoms of urban life, since they are based on a 'code' to ensure similarity while appearing to contain difference – a "candy floss town." It is a distribution of things, but not to a particularly 'convenient' end.

Allow me to point to Kensington Market once again. It is a wonderful example of 'messy urbanism,' appearing chaotic and unorganized, but it is actually an organized complexity. It is difficult to walk through, and even more difficult to navigate by bike, or worse, by car. And this is because it is teeming with people. Clearly it is doing something right since it consistently attracts so many people. Perhaps this manifested desire and enjoyment is a way to help us judge the limit of a symptom of the city. And yet, organizations attempt to pedestrianize it, to control it and calm it down. It is worth remembering that very little of what makes up Kensington today was ever planned, yet it exhibits the very best (symptoms) of urban life. Ultimately, we need to relinquish control. We cannot contain a city's desire – we cannot, and should not, plan it away.

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[25] Michel Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977–1978*, ed. Michel Senellart, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Picador, 2009), 19.

[26] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 96.

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